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MODERN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY:

CHAPTERS

ON

COLERIDGE, HARE, MAURICE, KINGSLEY,
AND JOWETT,

AND ON THE

DOCTRINE OF SACRIFICE AND ATONEMENT.

BY THE

REV. JAMES H. RIGG.

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PREFACE.

The present is not a volume for theologians only. I hope that the student of philosophy also, and well-informed persons in general, who are desirous of understanding the drift and tendencies of the present age, especially in relation to theology and morals, will find here what will prove both interesting and instructive. The book professes to supply what has for some time been a *desideratum*. The obscurity of the Coleridgean philosophy and theology has long been matter of common complaint. Coleridge himself is understood by very few. Mr. Maurice has a considerable number of admirers; but there are not many, perhaps there is none, of these, who would deny that he is frequently obscure, and not seldom ambiguous, in his language; and that it is difficult to make out his philosophical and theological basis of thought and feeling. Those who have embarked upon the wide waters of his theological speculations, generally feel as if they were at sea without a chart. Mr. Kingsley, too, even in his novels, especially the earlier ones, often perplexes his readers, except the few initiated, more than all of them are willing to confess. Much of "Hypatia" is to most, whether ladies or gentlemen, an utter puzzle. Parts of "Alton Locke" are confessed by the candid to be bewildering. The later portions of "Yeast" remain inexplicable. "Westward Ho" has its mysterious philosophizing passages, which most readers pass over lightly.

Now, in this volume, I have endeavoured to explain the meaning and tendency of that *theosophy* which Coleridge first introduced into this country, and which is the "unknown quantity," the ingredient of perplexity, in the writings of Maurice and Kingsley. Hare's name stands in such relationship both to Coleridge and also to Maurice, that it was necessary to ascertain his place in the *Neo-Platonic* succession of the

Coleridge school. For reasons which will appear in the volume, I have also analysed the philosophy, and explained the theological position, of Professor Jowett.

It would be mere egotism to explain how I was led a few years ago to address myself to the study of Maurice's writings. Let it suffice to say that at that time, about the period of his dismissal from King's College, his name was much before the public; and that I found myself as strongly attracted towards him, on some accounts, by the combined influence of sympathetic admiration and of puzzled curiosity, as I felt myself opposed to him on fundamental questions of philosophy and theology. The able volume of Dr. Candlish, in reply to his "Essays," was about this time published; but I soon perceived that Dr. Candlish had not attained to a fundamental comprehension of the drift of Mr. Maurice, and was consequently often at fault as to his real meaning. Patient and repeated readings of Mr. Maurice's principal works, aided by conversations with a near kinsman and friend, enabled me, after a time, to attain to a distinct and assured comprehension of the peculiar philosophical mysticism on which his theology was founded; and which, though nowhere distinctly explained by Mr. Maurice, I presently perceived to be always assumed and implied. Having once obtained the clue, I found myself comparatively at home in the labyrinth of Mr. Maurice's speculations. The master-key fitted all the locks. The result of this was an article on "Mr Maurice and his Writings," which appeared in the "London Quarterly Review," for January, 1855; and which, so far as I know, contained the first explanation of Mr. Maurice's Neo-Platonic Realism ever published. The articles on "Rationalism in the Church of England" and on "the Writings of Charles Kingsley," which have since appeared in the same journal, have excited interest and attention; and many have been desirous that they should be published in another and more permanent form.

The substance of those articles forms about one half of this volume. They have, however, been very carefully revised, and considerable alterations and additions have been made. The chapters on Professor Jowett contain a few passages which were not in the article on "Rationalism in the Church of England." Those on Mr. Maurice contain half as much more matter as the original article. That on the "Antecedents of the Rev. F. D. Maurice" is all additional, though part of it had been previously published in an American journal. The Supplementary Notes, which investigate some very important, but also not a little obscure, points connected with Mr. Maurice's theology, are published now for the first time; and will, I hope, be found worthy of particular attention. Other considerable additions have been made in those chapters which include the substance of the original article.

The substance of the chapters on the late Archdeacon Hare was written for the "American Methodist Quarterly Review," at the request of the Editor, and on the suggestion of the distinguished Professor Schaff, who had been interested in an article which I had contributed to the same journal on Mr. Maurice. The chapters on Coleridge and on the doctrine of Sacrifice and Atonement are now published for the first time.

I believe that the chapters last referred to, those on Sacrifice and Atonement, will be found to contain a completer outline of argument on that vital subject than has recently appeared in this country; and moreover that they furnish a clearer and more detailed statement, and a more explicit and complete refutation, of the ingenious and subtle theory of Bähr, represented in this country by the views of Maurice, than has yet been given to the English public. Herein, also, I trust this volume will be found to supply a *desideratum*.

I am conscious that I have, to the best of my knowledge and ability, written fairly and candidly. This has been acknowledged in regard to the articles which appeared in the "London Quarterly Review," by some whose testimony, when given in favour of a hostile critic, must be admitted as unexceptionable and decisive.

I have to acknowledge myself greatly indebted to two able articles on Hare and on Maurice in the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review," (Nos. V. and VII.,) for incidental lights and suggestions. But, most of all, I am bound to confess my obligations to the writings of the gentlemen whom I have undertaken to criticize, particularly of Hare and Kingsley. Greatly as I differ from such men on very important points, I cannot but honour them, both for the gifts with which they have been endowed, and for the earnest and elevated purpose which has actuated them in employing them.*

I have one thing more to say before I close this Preface. Some readers may find a few pages in the middle of the chapter on Coleridge to be very obscure. Let such do me the justice to believe, what all who are familiar with the subject would, I have no doubt, at once concede, that this obscurity arises from the nature of the subject itself. No one can go down to the foundations of Coleridge's philosophy, or to what he supposed to be its foundations, without finding himself in a dark region of shadows and abstractions, where he can but grope his way. *His* words and formulæ must be quoted by one who professes fairly and authentically to represent his views; and with them comes in the obscurity, while to do anything in the way of explaining them is but to render "darkness visible." But if the reader heretofore uninitiated in Coleridge's transcendentalism will read attentively the few pages I have referred to, (pp. 18–20,) he will afterwards find the atmosphere soon grow clearer; and he will also perceive, as, in passing through the volume, he gets light upon the opinions of Hare, Maurice, and Kingsley, that even the abstruse philosophy of Coleridge has a purport and bearing; and that it has helped to give shape and direction to all the opinions of his followers, so that, without taking a preliminary view of it, these opinions could not be understood. For it is a mistake to suppose that an unintelligible philosophy can have no practical influence. Many of the war-cries of philosophy, of religion, and of politics, have in themselves been absurd, and have implied principles absolutely inconceivable and unintelligible. But they serve as vehicles for feelings or prejudices. Hence their power. The peculiar principles which lie at the foundation of the Coleridgean philosophy are, as I presume to think, inconceivable and unintelligible; neither given as facts by intuition, nor definable or provable by logic. But they *seem* to magnify man's reason, to bring his nature very near to God, to lift him above the region of logical scrutinies and judgments, and of all external control and authority, whether over head, or heart, or conscience. Hence *their* fascination and their practical power.

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* Mr. Kingsley addressed a letter to the Editor of the "London Quarterly Review" on the subject of my criticisms. I need not say that the tone of the letter was frank and gentlemanly. This was to be expected from Mr. Kingsley. I may here, however, with propriety remark, that it corrected a misconception on one point into which I had fallen in reading an article contributed by Mr. Kingsley to "Fraser's Magazine," for September, 1856, on Mr. Vaughan's "Hours with the Mystics." I had supposed a certain "mystic teacher" to whom he there refers to be Mr. Carlyle. Mr. Kingsley informs the Editor that therein I was mistaken; and, while acknowledging Carlyle's merits on certain points, disclaims all sympathy with his quasi-theology, and with his recently disclosed social views, as illustrated, for example, by his "attack upon Howard, as well as his views on Negro Slavery and Criminals' Reform." One short passage from this letter I have taken the liberty of quoting at page 264. I have not, however, on repeated consideration, seen fit materially to alter what I had previously written in regard to Mr. Kingsley's philosophy and theology.

To the competent student of philosophy, and the accomplished man of letters, I must apologize for the last didactic paragraph. Suffice it to say, that I have not written it for them, but for the sake of what I know to be a very large class of otherwise well informed and thoughtful persons, whom a few abstruse metaphysical phrases will repel from any inquiry. If such as these will be content occasionally with only a general idea of the drift of a few pages of philosophical discussion, they will still be able to apprehend and follow the main scope of my inquiries; and will, I hope, find very much the greater part of the volume to be plain reading. I have, at any rate, spared no pains to give a popular character to my expositions. Considering the extent to which Maurice and Kingsley are read, there must be a very wide circle who ought to understand the meaning and drift of their philosophy and religious teaching.

JAMES H. RIGG.

STOCKPORT,
May 27th, 1857.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The reception which has been given to the first edition of this work, has been much more favourable than I could have anticipated. In eighteen months the impression was sold, and now for the last four months it has been out of print. For a volume consisting mainly of philosophical and theological discussions, and in some portions rather abstruse in its character, this must be accounted as gratifying success. I attribute this success mainly to the fact, that the volume did something to satisfy, for the first time, a want, which had for some years been increasingly felt.

The general, the almost unbroken, cordiality with which my attempt has been welcomed by the organs of public opinion in the circles of which we speak, collectively, as the religious world, has been another gratifying circumstance,—the more gratifying as it was scarcely to have been expected. Chief organs of churchmanship and of low churchism, in England and Ireland, nearly all the principal representatives of orthodox English nonconformity in its various shades, whether described as newspapers, magazines, or quarterlies, together with some of the most eminent Presbyterian journals, have agreed in according generous praise to this volume. Besides which, I have received from Ministers of eminence, both in England and Scotland, private letters of thanks, such as could not but afford me the greatest satisfaction and encouragement. To one of these, in particular, from the venerable Dr. Redford, late of Worcester, now of Birmingham, I cannot refrain from specifically referring, as peculiarly valuable and gratifying.

I expected, of course, the ill word of the "Leader," which, however, can find no stronger argument or more discriminative criticism with which to encounter me than the dictum, that the theological system which I uphold is one of "diluted Spurgeonism." The tone of contempt which the "Leader" affects in its slight notice might have passed as sincere and merely in character, but for the fact that it had previously spoken in terms of marked respect of the "candour," "ability," and "insight," shown in several of those articles, as published in the "London Review," which form the main substance of this volume. But from what little I knew of the "Homilist," I hardly should have expected to find in that journal so petty and splenetic a notice of this volume, coupled with a wretched worn-out sneer at Wesleyan Ministers generally, as the one which was actually published there. .The notice is so evidently from the pen of a man who is not only ignorant of the decent courtesies which belong to the literary character, but an inexperienced writer and unintelligent critic, that I do not feel it necessary to make any more special reference to his effusion.

I wish, however, to say a few words in reference to a brief notice which appeared in the last January number of that excellent periodical, the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review." I have no reason to complain of the tone or general purport of the notice. It is courteous and commendatory, couples my volume with Dr. Candlish's examination of Maurice's Essays, and welcomes it, not only as "an able and seasonable contribution to the cause of sound theology," but as "the most valuable and comprehensive work" on the subject yet published. Yet the writer of the notice has fallen, as I think, into two inadvertencies which are calculated to produce a mistaken and (*pro tanto*) unfavourable impression as to the character and execution of the volume. If such errors had appeared in a journal of ordinary character, I should not have deemed it necessary to refer to them; but the deservedly high reputation of the "British and Foreign Evangelical Review" lends them an importance they would not otherwise possess. I think, then, that in his passing comparison of my work with Dr. Candlish's, the writer has forgotten that the doctor gives a whole volume to the examination of a single volume; whereas I give but two or three chapters—the matter of a somewhat overgrown review article—to the many volumes which Mr. Maurice has written. It was not my business to "exhibit marvellous ingenuity and acuteness in dissecting" all Mr. Maurice's writings, and exposing all his sophistries. Such a work would have been an endless, and also, as I think, a bootless task. I will not profess that I could have performed such a logical exercise with anything like the ability of Dr. Candlish; but I will be bold enough to say, that I could have "exhibited" any amount of such play, to the extent not only of one, but of many volumes, if that had been in the least degree my object. That this was not my object I distinctly stated in the earlier part of my examination of Mr. Maurice's opinions, and also why I refrained, in spite, I confess, of most tempting provocation, from engaging in such sport as hunting down his sophisms might have afforded. My business was to find out Mr. Maurice's system and principles,—to discover the root of all his heresies,—the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of all his errors. If that were done, all was accomplished. The key of his position once ascertained, and once wrested from him, the field must needs remain in our possession. But until this was done, it was of little avail to attack in detail the holds and ambushes of one so infinitely subtle in his shifts and ingenious in his disguises, whose sophistries, too, were spread over so wide a surface. His methods and tactics could not even be understood until that key was discovered; and until dislodged from his main and central point and hold, he would still, however pressed, retain a place of retreat, and a position for assault. I believe that I have unmasked Mr. Maurice's theological position, and shown the way to refute his errors, not *seriatim*, but in their root and principle. That is the one merit of this volume, so far as regards Mr. Maurice, if it has any distinctive merit. Everything in the way of argument has been subordinated to this one thing. And if I have clearly, consecutively, without waste of words, or either redundance or defect of argument, accomplished this, I have accomplished the purpose of the volume. Wherein I have missed of this, I am open to the imputation of failure, but not in the non-exhibition of what it would have been beside my purpose—a mere gratuitous display—to make any attempt to exhibit. Nevertheless it did fall within my scope, as the reader will find, to afford, in the course of my demonstration of the true character of Mr. Maurice's theology, a sufficient reply to his main offensive and mischievous sophistries. In this, too, I have thought it most proper to aim, not so much at showing into how many errors and inconsistencies Mr. Maurice had fallen, (this, I repeat, would have been an endless task,) as at giving a clear and decisive reply to whatever seemed most plausible and most like truth in what he teaches.

The writer, on whose notice of my book I have been commenting, thinks, indeed, in consistency with the bearing of his remark already referred to, that in dealing with Coleridge, Maurice, and Kingsley, I "ascribe too much to the influence of some philosophical notions of a Neo-Platonic cast." The only possible answer to this saying is the volume itself. If Mr. Coleridge were *not* trained in Neo-Platonism,—if he does *not*, in terms, declare his own connexion with that school,—if his theology of the Godhead, and of the influence of the Spirit on man, is *not* such as, if it is to be at all characteristically or accurately designated, can only be defined as Neo-Platonic;—if Mr. Maurice, again, does *not* homologate the Neo-Platonic interpretations of Moses given by Philo,—if he does *not* teach the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Trinity and of ideas,—if he is *not* confessedly both Coleridgean and, at the same time, distinctly Neo-Platonic on these main points, and all subsidiary points of any importance;—and if Mr. Kingsley does *not* explain and accept Neo-Platonism in his Lectures and teach it in his novels; then the writer of the notice is right, and I am wrong. To me it seems that he cannot have studied the evidence I adduce, that he can hardly have read my book with attention. No, "the modern theology is" *not* "to be traced *principally* to the old Socinianism," though that certainly has had its influence, as I say and show. That was a low-caste materialism, a hard and narrow would-be common-sense philosophy; this is a transcendental spiritualism, and essentially a mystical theosophy. It would be about as reasonable to say that Swedenborgianism or even Behmenism was derived mainly from the old Socinianism, as Maurice-Kingsleyism.

I have bestowed great pains in the revision and completion, so far as my scant time and numerous engagements would allow, of the present edition. The chief portion of the additions now made is printed in small type, in the form of foot-notes or in appendices. By the omission of a quotation from Mr. Kingsley's *Alton Locke*, which was given in the first edition, a little space has been gained. Altogether, more than thirty pages of new matter, equal to between forty and fifty of the ordinary pages, have been added. In compliance with suggestions received from several quarters I have, by prefixing a brief chapter on "Platonism and Neo-Platonism," endeavoured to supply a convenient introduction and clue, for the benefit of the general reader, such as might render the subsequent analysis and historical outline of Coleridge's views sufficiently intelligible, even to those who have no acquaintance with the character of Alexandrian speculations. The subject, indeed, is one of such a sort that either it must be dealt with very slightly, or there must be what most readers would consider a repulsive investigation of abstruse questions. To enter at all into details, is to become at once involved in intricate subtleties and most obscure speculations. I have therefore had no choice but to give a very slight and general view of the respective character and mutual relations of the elder and the later Platonisms. But, as a pen-and-ink profile may sometimes represent with accuracy the leading features and the most characteristic expression of the human countenance, so I hope that the slight preliminary sketch which I have given may so far indicate the general character and the distinctive spirit and tendencies of the systems delineated, as to enable the reader from the first to follow the steps of the following exposition and argument. As he proceeds, he will find that the subject opens more and more; so that when he has closed the volume, his knowledge of the features and influence of the old philosophies, so far as they have been brought into relation with Christian theological speculation, will not, I hope, be either indistinct or inconsiderable.

I have not followed the counsel of a leading religious journal, in giving a view of the manner and degree in which Coleridge's moral power and sense of moral obligation were impaired by that lamentable habit of opium-eating which so darkened his history and lowered his character. However this may weigh as a presumption against the probability of his possessing the faculty of clear and steadfast vision, or the power of exercising a wise and wary judgment, in regard to the most perilous and difficult questions connected with moral and religious science; yet, in fact, his views must ultimately be judged on their own intrinsic merits. They are neither more nor less reasonable in themselves because their author unhappily was enslaved to a ruinous habit, over which nearly all his life long he deeply mourned, and from which, in his later years, he sought most earnestly to shake himself free. As my sketch of Coleridge's philosophy and theology is really only introductory to the principal contents of the volume, I cannot expand its proportions by the addition of matter which, while criminatory of the dead, would be irrelevant to the purpose of my work. Yet as I have given high praise to Coleridge in very important respects, it would perhaps hardly have been right not to mention the sad fact. This I have done, not only here and now, but in the volume. More than this I cannot do; nor go distinctly out of my way to lay bare the frailties of one who, if he had grave faults and marked failings, was a man, notwithstanding, not only greatly gifted, but, in several respects, of truly great and noble sympathies and aims.

The appended notes to the chapters on Maurice I have greatly enlarged, and have also appended several new ones to two of those on Kingsley. I have made some additions to the chapters on Atonement and Sacrifice; and throughout I have interspersed explanatory foot-notes, which I hope will be found useful. A few corrections and additions have besides been made in the text.

Some of my friends seem to have misunderstood the object of my chapters on Sacrifice. My purpose was not to write a treatise on Sacrifice, nor to set in array, against Socinian or Socinianising writers, the total Biblical evidence on this subject. In particular, I had no intention whatever of exhibiting exegetically the teaching of the New Testament in relation to it. Such a work would require a volume to itself. Moreover, it has already been admirably done by such writers as Wardlaw, Pye Smith, and Magee. In my judgment, these writers are not likely soon or easily to be either refuted or superseded. But certain new and subtle methods of obscuring the Scripture testimony on this subject have recently been put forth, especially in connexion with the Coleridgean school, which seemed to require a special examination. My principal object was to furnish this examination, so that, the new obscurities having been removed, the old impregnable arguments might clearly be seen to abide in their strength. This humble but useful office I have endeavoured to perform; and this volume still remains, even after the publication of the Donnellan Lectures for 1858, the only work in which Bähr's anti-evangelical refinements on the subject of Sacrifice, adopted by Maurice, together with Mr. Maurice's peculiar subtleties, are succinctly yet, as I hope, fully examined. In connexion, however, with this, I found it necessary, in order to clearness of view and decisiveness of conclusion, to re-state, in general outline, the entire argument on Sacrifice, so far as regarded the Patriarchal and Mosaic Dispensations. And, in the present edition, I have been induced to go a little beyond this, and furnish a partial, confessedly a very partial, view of the New Testament argument which completes the Scriptural evidence on the subject of Sacrifice and Atonement.*

J. H. R.

STOCKPORT,
May 14*th*, 1859.

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* There is but one correction which I have to ask the reader to make in the following pages. Archdeacon Hare's sermon on the Law of Self-Sacrifice is now printed in the volume of "Sermons Preacht on Particular Occasions." The passage quoted at p. 64 will be found at p. 54 of that volume.

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MODERN ANGLICAN THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

PLATONISM AND NEO-PLATONISM.

What has Platonism or Neo-Platonism to do with Christian theology? Of what concern are its old-world theories to the upholders of evangelical orthodoxy in these modern times? Let these questions be answered by the late distinguished Professor Butler, himself, it need scarcely be said, a most friendly as well as an acute, accomplished, and large-minded expositor of the Platonic philosophy. "Teachers," he says, "have abounded in every age, who, by unwarrantable glosses, dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God; and in one remarkable era of our English Church-history, such teachers were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title. Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts, nobly expressed; but they are all marked with the characteristic defect of Platonized Christianity,—a forgetfulness or inadequate commemoration of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for" [against?] "sin,—the fact of the Christian atonement."*

Again, let M. Matter, the learned historian of Gnosticism and of the school of Alexandria, be heard in answer to the questions which have been put. "The Platonicians," he says, "of this period" [the period of Ammonius, in the third century after Christ] "have played so important a part, or rather so many parts, their doctrines present such variety and such wealth of ideas, and such important religious facts stand connected with the relations between these doctrines and those of Christianity, that the influence of the one upon the other has been profound. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the moral history of the first ages of our era is contained in the history of Platonism." *

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* "Lectures on Philosophy," vol. ii., pp. 307, 308.

That in the present day the race of Platonizing divines has re-appeared, and has exerted an influence upon Christian orthodoxy as much to be deplored as in any former age, is shown in the following pages. Here it will be convenient to give a slight preliminary sketch of Platonism and Neo-Platonism, and of their mutual relations. More light will be gained, as we proceed, upon the essential points connected with these subjects, as related to the purpose of this volume. The brief remarks about to be made may serve as a convenient introduction and clue to some following chapters. The object in this chapter, it need hardly be said, is not to attempt a description of Platonism and Neo-Platonism,—to do which with anything like accuracy would require volumes,—but merely to supply so much information, and no more, as may suffice for the understanding of the main exposition and argument of the volume.

Plato, amid the glory and culture of the latest age of Athenian liberty, stood forth as the opponent of the Sophists. These taught the impossibility of any sure knowledge, of attaining to absolute truth, of anything beyond sense-perception and opinion. Conceiving such principles to undermine the basis of all moral certitude and authority, Plato taught the contrary doctrine,—that human reason could attain to truth and certainty,—that the genuine philosopher, the truth-seeker, purged of self-begotten and world-begotten errors of

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* MATTER'S *Histoire de Gnosticisme,* livre viii., chap. 28.

prejudice and opinion, might ascend to the direct intuition of that supercelestial sphere in which dwelt the essences and originals of all things true and beautiful.

This supercelestial sphere, the home of the gods, and of the purified and enfranchised philosophic spirit, he held to be spiritual, eternal, and immutable, such as might be known by the pure intelligence, but was separate from matter or sense, containing, however, the original and archetypal "ideas," of which all the things of time and sense were but the imperfect embodiment and shadowy copies. As a necessary consequence from this tenet, Plato held the pre-existence and transmigration of souls, the purified soul of the true philosopher alone attaining to ultimate rest in the supercelestial sphere. In this realm dwelt the "immortal gods," ethereal virtues and essences by no means to be confounded with the deities of the popular Olympus. In what sense Plato believed in one supreme Deity, or whether in his real esoteric doctrine he believed in any such Deity at all, is extremely doubtful.*

All sensible things, and all temporal existences, Plato supposed to derive their qualities by "participation" from the "ideas,"—the original and only true essences—of the supercelestial or intelligible world. This is an exceedingly obscure doctrine, but one on which the philosopher constantly insists. To most men it is, practically considered, unintelligible. It deserves attention, as containing a germ of the doctrine of pantheistic emanation, such as had been long taught by Brahminical philosophers, and such as the Neo-Platonists afterwards developed from this very principle.

Neo-Platonism, as Mr. Kingsley justly teaches, may be said to have fairly begun with Philo the Jew in the first century of the Christian Era. But its most distinguished heathen professors, by whom the famous Neo-Platonic system was matured and elaborated, flourished from the third to the fifth century. These philosophers did not, as is often alleged, apostatize from the philosophical system and principles of Plato, though undoubtedly they departed very greatly from his methods. They applied the logical science of which Aristotle had been the great master, to unfold the idealism of Plato. They occupied much the same position in relation to Plato as the doctors of mediæval Popery afterwards did in relation to the Church-fathers of the fifth century. The germs which they found in Platonism they systematically developed. So far as Numenius, Ammonius Saccas, and Plotinus are concerned, this statement may be made with little qualification. Of Iamblichus and Proclus it must be admitted that they corrupted and degraded the Platonic doctrines.

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* See BUTLER'S "Lectures," vol. ii., pp. 61, 62; and, in particular, Professor Thomson's note.

Plato had taught that human reason could, under favourable conditions, see into the very truth and essence of things; that, in abstract thought, men could be put face to face with naked being. To teach, as the Neo-Platonic masters came to do, that thought and being are, each in its ultimate truth and simplicity, one and the same, was but the easy consequence of this principle. How else could thought, without medium, mediator, or any sort of representation whatever, absolutely and infallibly know and realise truth and being, unless truth and being were one and the same with pure thought? Plato had, as Professor Butler says, "*given the hint*" of this principle. The Neo-Platonists, while adopting all the clear and certain tenets of their master, gave out, also, with distinct utterance, this principle which he had but "hinted." In this principle, says Professor Butler again, "the Platonism of Alexandria was founded or resulted, *as to this the original theory of Plato always really tended.*"* "Thus was taught," as M. Matter says, "by Plotinus the famous system of the identity of Being and of Thought, the greatest temerity of our age."† Here, in fact, is the central and most essential principle alike of Spinozism and of Schellingism, which are fundamentally the same, but differ in method and phrase, the one being in form mathematical and material, the other wearing the guise of a transcendental mysticism, and adopting a Kantish nomenclature.

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* BUTLER'S "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 353.

† MATTER, *Ecole d'Alexandrie*, tome iii., livre vi., chap. 10.

Another characteristic of Neo-Platonism, as distinguished from Platonism, is the doctrine of *emanation.* What, however, is this but the Platonic principle of *participation* systematized and carried out? How are things sensible to derive their qualities from things intelligible or spiritual, to participate of the nature of their archetypal ideas, but by a process of emanation? How, again, is the world of ideas to be harmonized and reduced to unity, how is it to find a centre or to be conceived as under the dominion of order, unless its constituent parts, and its varied elements of power and splendour, be similarly supposed to be derived from one fount by way of emanation, and ranged around that central and primeval fountain in grades of nearer dependence and greater glory, according to the directness and immediacy of their emanation? Let it be borne in mind that all these schemes were elaborated in ignorance of the true principle of creative power, and in the absence of Revelation, and it will be perceived that the Platonic doctrine of derivation by participation was the fit and natural germ of the doctrine of emanation, by which most of all Neo-Platonism has been commonly represented as distinguished from Platonism.

The two principles which have now been mentioned may be considered as affording the characteristic definition of Neo-Platonism, viz., the identification of Thought with Being, and the doctrine of Emanation,—as held in conjunction with the idealism of Plato. These two being fixed, there was founded upon them a highly developed system of Pantheism. Plotinus thought, that the Reason of which each man is conscious, is not a faculty of the individual soul, but a ray or flash of the universal Reason; that each man possesses it entire and indivisible, and yet that it is bounded by the personality of no man; that it is at once common and particular; diffused throughout the Universe, and yet entire in each soul, in each life, in each impulse, in each act.*

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* MATTER, *Ecole, &c.*, tome iii., livre vi., chap. 10.

In imitation or rivalry of Christianity, this Pantheistic system, with its identity of all reason and of all life, yet professed to recognise three first principles of being or life, from which all things eternally flow, the original, formless matter alone excepted, which possessed an independent co-eternity. "As knowledge consisted in unity of the knowing and the known," Unity was considered to be an ultimate abstraction higher and more refined than Reason or Knowledge, or Being; and "so the first principle of the universe was a mysterious Unity out of which all things emanated. This principle was superessential; it was alike above Being and Intelligence" [Knowledge or Reason]. "You find them here," says Professor Butler, from whom we are quoting, "upon the road which Plato had traced, but advancing with a bold and hurried step very alien to the spirit of the great master. The second principle is pure Intelligence," [*Νοῦς*, Reason, the universal, indivisible, impersonal Reason lately spoken of.] "The third is Soul (*Ψυχή*). These [three] fill the sphere of the intelligible world, and actuate all things. There is nothing truly real but these, and these in all their *forms*," (co-eternally dependent and derived,) "which are the *ideas* of Plato, are connected together by secret links that establish a sympathy between all the parts and elements of the Universe." *

It has been said that Philo, the Jew of Alexandria, must be considered, so far as any remains of importance can afford evidence, the father of Neo-Platonism. His influence, however, seems to have been greater and more direct on the Christian Neo-Platonists,—of whom, as distinguished from the heathen, we shall have occasion to speak when criticizing Mr. Kingsley's writings,—than on the heads and first chief teachers of heathen Neo-Platonism. The heathen Neo-Platonism, definitively so called, is generally said to have originated with Ammonius Saccas, in the third century. Some have supposed, indeed, that he was more or less of a Christian. But Matter says, that "he was a sincere Polytheist, as were all his principal disciples." He further says, that Ammonius "set himself to reconcile the ideas of Plato with those of Aristotle, and professed that eclecticism towards which the school of Plato had long been tending;" but, further, that "he had a marked *penchant* for the mysticism of the East," and that he seems to have communicated this *penchant* to his disciples Plotinus and Longinus.*

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* BUTLER'S "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 354.

But Numenius of Apamea (A.D. 180) appears to be best entitled to be called the father, on the heathen side, of Neo-Platonism. He seems to have taught most of the principal doctrines afterwards expounded by Plotinus.† He it was who said that Plato was Moses writing in Attic.

Plotinus was undoubtedly the great master of Neo-Platonism. Of him Matter says,‡ that "all his life he was meditating on the mysteries of Plato's doctrine, incessantly modifying his own system, (*la science,*) in the persuasion that he was conforming it more exactly to the spirit of his type, and only fixing it in a definite form at that season of life when all that belongs to a man becomes fixed." This agrees precisely with the view which has been already given as to Neo-Platonism, as a system, being, on the whole, a legitimate and direct development of Platonism. With Proclus (*circ.* A.D. 450) the reign of Neo-Platonism passed away.

Neo-Platonism, then,—this conclusion must be borne in mind,—was properly Platonic in its doctrine of ideas; it was indirectly and derivatively, but truly, Platonic also in its Pantheistic theory of emanation; and it borrowed the notion of its Trinity from Christianity.

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* *Ecole d'Alexandrie*, tome iii., livre vi., chap. 7.

† *Ibid.*, chap. 6.

‡ *Ibid.*, chap. 7.

CHAPTER II.

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

A RECENT essayist on Coleridge has remarked that it is a common mistake to suppose that Coleridge's philosophy is by this time well understood. Assuredly no one qualified to form an opinion can suppose it to be easy of comprehension; and none who, having closely examined for himself those writings in which it is contained, comes to read what others, although competent students and critics, have done in the way of elucidation and systematic exposition, can fail to leave their work with the reflection that, as yet, no comparative anatomist in philosophy has fully mastered the *disjecta membra* of the "system of faith and philosophy of S. T. C." Nor is this to be wondered at. Admirable in many respects as were Coleridge's powers, both as a thinker and a writer; piercing as are his distinctions, and accurate as is his language; yet, when dealing with questions of the highest philosophy, relating to regions of thought too elevated and too much apart to permit of illustration from analogy with subjects in any lower and more frequented sphere, his very aim to be logical and exact induced an abstruseness of expression and an uncouthness of formula which it has hitherto baffled the ingenuity of his most ardent admirers to explain. These abstrusities were intended, not unfrequently, to indicate ideal relations such as Coleridge denied the power of the "understanding" truly to conceive, or of ordinary language justly to express. Some will therefore probably conclude that, in matters of philosophy, mathematical signs and formulæ can hardly accomplish a feat too difficult to be achieved by words; and that, in these matters, Coleridge was sometimes deluded by his symbols,—to which there existed no really correspondent ideal relations,—as he has supposed common people to be by their "conceptions." But, altogether apart from this peculiarity of Coleridge's method,—which transforms his "empyrean of ideas" into anything but a serene or translucent region,—the utter want of proportion and completeness in his philosophical writings is a still more powerful cause of the obscurity which has enveloped their meaning. They are not merely fragmentary; each of them is an irregular fragment, containing, also, many heterogeneous admixtures. His philosophy is scattered through them here in grains, and there in veins and lodes; but these latter are never to be found without great inequalities and many and perplexing angles and faults. To construct a system of philosophy out of his fragmentary discussions and obscure intimations, is almost as hopeless an undertaking as to rebuild a temple, the stones of which are distributed through all the houses of a town, and often also buried in swamps, or hidden in thickets round about,—with this peculiar doubt and difficulty in the case, that most probably the temple itself was never at any time completed, but, having been commenced on one plan, and further proceeded with upon another, was finally undermined by the builder's own hands, and abandoned in this condition. This presents, as some at least believe, a pretty close analogy to the progress and construction of Coleridge's philosophy,—which Mr. Green, if memory rightly serves, has dignified and magnified as a "temple" of truth and religion.

One of the best expositions of Coleridge's philosophy was published in the "British Quarterly Review" for January, 1854. An Essay on "Coleridge," also,—that referred to in the first line of this paper,—is contained in the "Cambridge Essays" for 1856. It is written by F. G. A. Hort, M.A., a Fellow, as one might almost have anticipated, of Trinity College, the same college which fostered Hare, Sterling, and Maurice,—of which the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies, author of "St. Paul and Modern Thought," is a Fellow, and in which, if report is true, Coleridgean Platonism still maintains its traditionary place of honour. This Essay may in some respects supplement the article in the "British Quarterly," but will be thought by many to be inferior in soundness, discrimination, and depth. The former, however, it is proper to state, is intentionally more critical and theological, the latter more simply explanatory, and more impartially comprehensive in its range. Neither of them, however, nor both together, can be said to bring out distinctly and fully the theosophical character of Coleridge's system, or its bearing on theology. The reviewer was on the right track, but seems to have not been willing to suppose that Coleridge meant all he said, either in regard to the higher aspects of his philosophy,—when writing on these points intelligibly,—or to the theological points connected therewith.

The present volume is only so far concerned with Coleridge, as his philosophy has formed the root from which the theological doctrines of a certain school of modern divines have been developed. The legitimate line of theosophical and theological derivation from Coleridge is traced, in part, through Hare, and more directly and fully through Maurice and Kingsley, to a number of later disciples, of whom Mr. J. L. Davies is one of the most intelligent. Though Mr. Jowett's theology will be discussed in this volume, and though the influence of Coleridge upon him has not been small, yet he cannot be called one of his disciples. He sees through and despises the Neo-Platonist disguise which serves to veil from Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley the really inherent Pantheism of the doctrines which they would fain present as anti-pantheistic, and he teaches a philosophy much more directly and manifestly pantheistic. On the other hand no attempt is made in this volume to connect Arnold with the school of Coleridge. He did indeed sympathize with that philosopher in some of his feelings, and agree with him in some of his opinions. But he did not owe him any allegiance. He was probably, like his friend

Whately, an Aristotelian in philosophy. In politics he took a very different tone from Coleridge. His doctrine of Church and State, though in many of its results agreeing with that of Coleridge, was developed from different principles. His views of inspiration were ✓ perhaps as lax, but they were not engrafted upon the Coleridgean doctrine of the Logos. He agreed with him in some points of objection to current evangelical phrase and statement, but his preaching upon faith is of a very different savour from Coleridge's dissertations on the same. He was, no doubt, as Mr. Maurice testifies,—and no one can have a better right to speak than he,—himself an independent teacher, and may even be considered as the founder of a school. But though his influence has been most powerful, in the way of suggestion and impulse, yet his distinctive principles, being grounded on no special philosophy, are too few and too vaguely defined, to form the bond of any permanent party in the Church of England.

It is not essential to the purpose of this volume to present a detailed view of the historical development of Coleridge's opinions. Indeed, there are scarcely sufficient materials for this, besides that Coleridge's notorious untrustworthiness of recollection as to the order, details, and mutual relations, even of important facts in his own history, has introduced a confusion into the whole subject, which only very ample information from independent sources will be able to dissipate. There are, however, a few leading and suggestive facts which are certain, and which it may be of service to name in order. As this is not a biographical sketch, but merely a needful introduction to the following Essays, dates will be only sparingly introduced. As far as possible, too, all anticipation of such incidental notices of Coleridge's philosophical and theological position and influence as will be found scattered through the after part of this volume, will be avoided.

Coleridge was born in 1772. He was a dreamy, pre- ✓ cocious child, with "all the simplicity, all the docility, of the little child, but none of the child's habits."

He became a strangely speculative youth, already, when at "Christ's Hospital," enamoured of pantheistic mysticism, as taught by the Alexandrian Neo-Platonists of both the heathen and the Christian schools. Before he was fully fourteen years old, he had translated the hymns of Synesius[*] into English Anacreontics. Before he left Cambridge, whither he went up from Christ's Hospital in the year 1791, we find that he had become familiar with the metaphysicians of the eighteenth century, from Leibnitz to Hartley. For some years he greatly admired not only Berkeley, but also Hartley. At this time he was in morals a philosophical necessitarian, with Hartley; in regard to nature, his philosophy seems, from his "Religious Musings," (1794,) to have been a sort of fusion of Hartleyism and Berkeleyism, taking the general form of pantheistic idealism; in theology he was a Unitarian.[†]

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[*] Synesius, the well known bishop of the former part of the fifth century, a pupil of Hypatia, the celebrated female philosopher of Alexandria. When he professed to embrace Christianity, he did not even profess to abandon his Neo-Platonism.

[†] In the "Religious Musings," Coleridge classes together Milton, Newton, Hartley, and Priestley. The last he speaks of as "Patriot, Saint, and Sage;" Hartley he describes as—

"He of mortal kind
Wisest, he first who marked the' ideal tribes
Up the fine fibres through the sentient brain."

In a note to the last paragraph but one of this poem, he declares his faith in "the sublime system of Berkeley," and thus expresses himself in the text:—

"Life is a vision shadowy of Truth;
And vice, and anguish, and the wormy grave,
Shapes of a dream! The veiling clouds retire,
And lo! the Throne of the redeeming God
Forth flashing unimaginable day
Wraps in one blaze earth, heaven, and deepest hell."

The lines which follow sound very pantheistic.

"Contemplant Spirits! ye that hover o'er
With untired gaze the' immeasurable fount
Ebullient with creative Deity!
And ye of plastic power that interfused
Roll through the grosser and material mass
In organizing surge! Holies of God!

But while a Unitarian in theology, it is a thing to be noted, especially by those who, like Mr. Hort, in admitting Coleridge to be a Platonist, deny him to have been a Neo-Platonist, that he was, and had long been, a Neo-Platonizing philosophical Trinitarian.

What the Neo-Platonic Trinity was has been already slightly stated. It consisted of three principles: the One, Reason or Intelligence, and the Soul of the World. The first of these three was conceived as the infinite fountain from whose superabundance the other two principles flowed, and is otherwise, though not very consistently, designated by Plotinus, in ancient Platonic phrase, as the Good, and the Being or Reality. In endeavouring to develope the second and third principles of his triad from the first, Plotinus teaches that Reason or Intelligence is begotten by the "One turning his regard upon Himself," (if Himself I must say of that which is but an hypostasized, a personified, abstraction;) and that the Soul of the World is an Energy, derived from the Intelligence or Reason, which vivifies and organizes all things.* How nearly related was Coleridge's doctrine of the Christian Trinity, as he conceived it, to Plotinus's pantheistic Trinity of principles, we shall presently have particular occasion to observe. Here, without criticizing the scheme itself, let us merely note that, at that early period of his history which we are just now passing under review, he seems, though professedly a Unitarian in religion, to have been, in reality, about as good a Trinitarian as at any future period of his life. We shall very soon see the proof of what has just been affirmed, that he was at this time a Neo-Platonizing philosophical Trinitarian. It will at the same time appear, if we are not mistaken,

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(And what if Monads of the infinite mind?)
I haply journeying my immortal course
Shall some time join your mystic choir!" &c.

With this last quotation may be compared a sentence in Lewes's exposition of Schelling's Philosophy: "The souls of men are but the innumerable individual eyes with which the Infinite World Spirit beholds himself."—LEWES'S "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 594.

* MATTER, *Ecole d'Alexandrie*, vol. iii., livre vi., chap. 10.

that he held the same views at this time, on this point, which he held at a much later period of his life. At page 321 of the *Biographia Literaria*, (second edition,) he formulates his own doctrine of the Christian Trinity, being at the time he wrote this professedly orthodox. In this formula, the Father appears as "Mind, the absolute Thesis of its own Reality;" the Son as "the Idea, the absolute Antithesis of Mind, *absoluta adæquata*, Deus Filius;" the Spirit, as the "Absolute Synthesis, Love, Deus Spiritus." In regard to the mutual relations of the Father and the Son, as here laid down, he says, "The Father beholdeth Himself in the only-begotten Son, and the Son acknowledgeth the Father in Himself."

It may be seen at a glance that this formula bears the Neo-Platonic mint-mark upon it. *Mind*, indeed, comes in place of *The One*, which may agree better with the doctrine of Personal Deity; but the *Idea* is a mere metaphysical derivative from *Mind*, as *Reason* or *Intelligence* from *The One*. Such is his *Christian* Trinity: what now were his Trinitarian views when he was a pantheizing young man? Having referred to the Neo-Platonic triad of principles, he proceeds:—

> "These principles I held *philosophically*, while in respect of revealed religion I remained a zealous Unitarian. I considered the *idea* of the Trinity a fair scholastic inference from the being of a God, as a creative intelligence; and that it was therefore entitled to the rank of an esoteric doctrine of natural religion. But seeing in the same no practical or moral bearing, I confined it to the schools of philosophy. The admission of the Logos as hypostasized, *i.e.*, neither a mere attribute nor a personification," [but, shall we say? a *mode* of Deity, an *aspect* of the Godhead,] "in no respect removed my doubts concerning the Incarnation and the Cross; which I could neither reconcile in reason with the impassiveness of the Divine Being, nor in my moral feelings with the sacred distinction between things and persons, the vicarious payment of a debt and the vicarious expiation of guilt."—*Biographia Literaria*, pp. 209, 210.

It may be doubted whether Coleridge ever moved essentially from the position here indicated, except in regard to the Incarnation. He says, indeed, in the following sentence, "A more thorough revolution in my philosophical principles, and a deeper insight into my own heart, were yet wanting." But, in fact, the Unitarian objection here intimated against the doctrine of vicarious atonement continued to be urged by him to the last,—is particularly insisted upon in his "Aids to Reflection,"—and is now characteristic of all his followers in philosophy and theology. And his doctrine of the Trinity, also,—it is even implied in this passage,—remained substantially unaltered. His Unitarianism, in fact, in later days, merely passed into a Neo-Platonized Sabellianism. It is to no purpose, to allege that he, by implication, disclaims or condemns Sabellianism in one or two passages, and that he speaks as though he were a follower of Bull and Waterland on the doctrine of the Trinity. There is not a single passage, wherein he partially draws aside the veil, and expounds his doctrine of the Trinity, in which this does not assume a form perfectly identical with that given above. Indeed, the extracts just given distinctly prove that his *idea* of the Trinity, when he was avowedly not a Christian Trinitarian, but a Unitarian Deist, accurately agreed with that which he afterwards held as a believer in Revelation. Such an idea can only, therefore, have been Sabellian, or, to use a name which, in the present day, will carry with it a plainer meaning, and which is substantially equivalent, Swedenborgian. What has been quoted, moreover, throws light upon a passage in the "Notes on English Divines," in which he says that the distinctions of the Trinity are an "idea," and ought to have been left as such, and no attempt made to define them as "conceptions." *

But we have been led, almost of necessity, to anticipate in these remarks what more properly belongs to a later stage in this sketch of Coleridge's views. From such Unitarianism as has been described,—*i. e.*, from a system of pantheistic and idealist fatalistic optimism,—Coleridge seems to have passed, by a sort of logical necessity, into utter scepticism, scepticism more sheer and thorough-going than even that which Hume argued for. But it was not possible that this should hold him or any man long. He found he *must* postulate some truths, and began to perceive that certain facts and principles of religious faith had as good a claim to take rank as necessary postulates as any regarding the existence and mutual relations of man and outward phenomena. He is said to have become acquainted with the works of Spinoza about the year 1797, and for many years he retained a strong admiration for his writings. These did not, however, secure his adhesion, though no doubt they prepared the way for his acceptance of those transcendental speculations of German philosophy, of which Spinozism forms the common substratum, and of which, notwithstanding important specific diversities, certain fundamental principles and distinctions of Kantism define the general mould and shaping. Coleridge visited Germany in 1798, and from this time, for a number of years, he must be considered as a student of that German philosophy, of which he was to be the first to impart the rudiments to his countrymen. Lessing was his master in general criticism, Eichhorn in biblical criticism, and first Kant, then Schelling, in philosophy. The most fundamental parts of the system of the latter he rendered into English in his *Biographia Literaria*, originally published in 1817. But he never completed his exposition of this philosophy, which passed not for Schelling's, but for his own, as he made slight acknowledgment of his heavy obligations to the German. Many hints and notes, indeed, are scattered through his various writings, which throw light upon a point here and there of his system. All together, however, are insufficient to give any conception whatever of such a scheme of philosophy, in its relation to metaphysics, morals, and religion, as he was ever promising for many years before his death (in 1833). Nay, the effect of many of his latest and most valuable notes, appended to the *Biographia Literaria,* is to undermine the foundations of that very philosophy on which he had professed to ground all his speculations, and in conformity with which he had fashioned all his phraseology. His work of construction, so far as any system of philosophy was concerned, ended in demolition. He became convinced at length that the fundamental philosophy of Schelling was essentially pantheistic, and incapable of being reconciled with the Christian Revelation, in which, for many years before his death, he professed to be an orthodox believer. Of this the proofs will be given in chapter xi. on "Kingsley's Philosophy."

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* See "Notes on English Divines," vol. i., p. 12. Edition of 1853.

The pantheistic idealism of Schelling, however, so far as it was at that time developed, or as Coleridge had had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with it, did not fill up the whole region of his speculations. In regard to the mutual relations of Reason and Faith, and to the ground of Morals, Kant and Jacobi seem to have been with him high authorities. On the relation of Coleridge, however, to these philosophers, and of each of these to the other, it appears as if Englishmen were incapable of attaining to any definite conclusion. After all that has been written by expositors of Kant and historians of philosophy, one need only read a few pages of Mr. Hort's Essay on Coleridge,* to see how great is the confusion and perplexity in which the subject still remains. Fortunately it is not in any way necessary to the purpose of this sketch minutely to investigate the origin of Coleridge's opinions; what we have to do is to exhibit their practical influence in relation to the doctrines of Christian theology.

Reason and Religion, according to Coleridge, are not so properly in agreement, as identical, unless we may so far distinguish as to say that Religion is right Reason applied to morals and worship.* Philosophy is inclusive of Theology, as its highest and noblest department. These positions are postulated or implied throughout every part of his system. And the cherished desire of the last twenty or thirty years of his life was to show the coincidence of the transcendentalism which he had adopted with the Christian Revelation,—in a word, to harmonize Schelling with St. John and St. Paul. A Neo-Platonist in philosophy, as we have seen, he had been throughout his early manhood; a Spinozist he was afterwards disposed to become, for which, indeed, he had been well prepared by his faith in Berkeleyism, added to his pantheistic tendencies. Let the substance of Spinozism be moulded into a scientific form harmonizing with the general outline and method of Neo-Platonism, and the result would be a philosophical system materially agreeing with, and in many respects singularly resembling, the "objective idealism" of Schelling, who has been well called the Plotinus of Germany.† Thus not only was the philosophy of Schelling, himself a student and admirer of the Neo-Platonists, the natural terminus of Coleridge's metaphysical course of thought, and congenial to all the sympathies of his mind,—indeed, he himself tells us that he had independently worked out, and set down as his own conclusions, its essential points; but, beyond this, a medium was suggested, viz., Plotinism with its Divine triad, for effecting a union between Schellingism and Christianity. Schelling might not care much about doing this, but to Coleridge, with his deep inward reverence for Christ and Christianity, it was a life-or-death question. And if Cudworth and many another of our great Christian philo-Platonists have tried to persuade themselves and others that the Neo-Platonist philosophers did really believe in a personal God, and held a doctrine of the Godhead nearly equivalent to that of the Christian Trinity, it cannot be matter of surprise if Coleridge, too well informed to doubt of the real Pantheism of the Alexandrians, should yet fancy that their doctrine might, *mutatis mutandis,* be conformed and adapted to that of Christianity. Accordingly, in the Alexandrian philosophical Tri-unity he thought he had found the *nexus* between the philosophy of Schelling and the theology of St. John. Here, as he might himself have said, was the *meso-thesis* of Schellingism and Christianity.*

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* "Cambridge Essays," 1856, pp. 320–324. But some intelligible and distinct ideas as to the mutual relations of Kant and Jacobi may be gained from Chalybäus's "Historical Survey of Speculative Philosophy from Kant to Hegel," lecture III. On the points distinguished in the text Jacobi rather than Kant seems to have been followed by Coleridge. Jacobi's was the *Glaubensphilosophie* or *Gefühlsphilosophie.* In several important respects he seems to have anticipated the positions maintained by Sir William Hamilton, and recently by Professor Mansel. He upheld the absolute authority and certitude of our intuitive faiths, and the reality of the external world.

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* "Church and State," &c., Edition of 1839, pp. 258–261. Appendix B.

† On the fundamental identity of Spinozism and Schellingism see Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy," p. 598, and Kahnis's "History of German Protestantism," pp. 195–6. (Edinburgh: Clark.)

According to the pantheistic idealism of Schelling, Knowledge and Being, "the Idea and the Mind," (to quote from the Trinitarian formula, given some pages back,) are ultimately and essentially one. All creaturely and finite Being is but the manifestation of the Infinite, or, as Schelling would say, the Absolute, Being; all Ideas and all Knowledge are but emanations from the Infinite Mind, or Absolute Knowledge or Reason. This Being and this Knowledge or Reason both inhere in, or rather both are, One, viz., the Absolute. But, besides Being and Knowledge, there is in Nature and Man an active Energy, (Schelling's *Weltseele* or *Mundane Soul,*) resulting from and ultimately one with this Being and Knowledge. This may be considered, and Coleridge chose to consider it, as a third principle, distinct from and yet one with the two former: and to this, as we have seen a few pages back, he gives the name Love, using the word apparently, in part at least, in that physiological sense which the latter Greek philosophers, in particular the Neo-Platonists, gave to it, and with which the readers of Cudworth are familiar. These three principles closely agree with the Neo-Platonic Triad,—the Being or the Good, the Nous or Logos or the Reason, and the Psyche or Soul of the World. And Coleridge attempts to identify them, as already quoted, with the Christian Trinity, by baptizing these abstractions with the names, and investing them with the personal attributes, of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. He did not see, so had his over-subtleties blinded him in this case as in many more, the essential and infinite distinctions between the metaphysical abstractions and the Living Persons !*

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* Many years later, Coleridge, writing in one of his best moods, says excellently:—

"From the confounding of Plotinism with Platonism, the Latitudinarian Divines fell into the mistake of finding in the Greek philosophy many anticipations of the Christian faith, which in fact were but its echoes. The inference is as perilous as inevitable, viz., that even the mysteries of Christianity needed no revelation, having been previously discovered and set forth by unaided reason."—"Notes on English Divines," vol. i., p. 352.

From all this it comes out, that the relation of the Father to the Son is as that of Being to Knowledge, or of the Mind to the Idea. In this sense, or non-sense, "the Father beholdeth himself in the Only-Begotten Son, and the Son acknowledgeth the Father in Himself" (*ub. supr. cit.*)! So, in "The Friend," (vol. ii., p. 172, edition of 1844,) "Christ, the Logos," is called "objective Deity." Similarly, the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son is as that of Action to Being and Knowledge, or to the Mind and its Ideas. In *this* sense, the Spirit proceedeth from the Father and the Son ! †

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* What Ullmann says of Master Eckart, with the change of a very few words, and without any change in its general sense, applies strikingly to the case of Coleridge. "Master Eckart, with great originality, constructed out of these elements a system which he did not expressly design to contradict the creed of the church, but which, nevertheless, by using its formulas as mere allegories or symbols of speculative ideas, combats it in its foundations, and is to be regarded as the most important mediæval prelude to the pantheistic speculation of modern times."—ULLMANN'S "Reformers before the Reformation," vol. ii., p. 24.

† In what sense Coleridge can be fairly considered a Trinitarian Christian, we cannot understand. That his was practically a Sabellian view of the Trinity, under Neo-Platonic forms, is shown in the text. But let the reader also refer to the "Notes on English Divines," vol. i., pp. 115, 116. The modern view which comes nearest to his is, as we have intimated, that of Swedenborg. Thus, in the "Notes on English Divines," vol. ii., p. 182, Coleridge says, "O most unhappy mistranslation of Hypostasis by Person ! The Word is properly the only Person." So also Swedenborg, in the first chapter of his "True Christian Religion," says, "God is one, in essence and person, and Jesus Christ is He. Jesus Christ is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."—Even philosophically, indeed, Coleridge was not strictly a Trinitarian. Like some of the Neo-Platonists, he believed in a four-fold unity. His *Tetractys,* as he termed it, consisted of four terms,—Causative Will, which he calls *the Prothesis ;* the Father or Mind, *the Thesis ;* the Son or Idea, *the Antithesis ;* and Love or the Spirit, *the Synthesis.* (*Biographia Literaria,* vol. i., p. 321.) His complaint against one of the great defenders of the ortho-

Here is the core of Coleridge's philosophical Pantheism, from which, with all his efforts, he could never extricate his understanding, whatever we may hope for his heart; and here too is the root of all that Coleridgean mysticism which pervades the writings of the Maurice-Kingsley school. A few more quotations will illustrate its bearing both upon the relations of God to man, and upon the mutual internal relations of the Godhead.

After characterizing as "false" the "notion of reason as a quality, property, or faculty of the real," he adds, in the "Dialogue between Demosius and Mystes,"—

> "Whereas Reason is the supreme reality, the only true Being in all things visible and invisible; the *pleroma, in whom alone God loveth the world*."—*Church and State*, Edition of 1839, pp. 195, 196.

Again, elsewhere we read in the same volume:—

> "In its highest sense, and which is the ground and source of all the rest, Reason is Being, the Supreme Being contemplated objectively, and in abstraction from the personality. The Word, or Logos, is life and communicates life; is light and communicates light. Now this light, contemplated *in abstracto*, is reason. Again, as constituents of reason, we necessarily contemplate unity and distinctity......The distinctities considered apart from the unity are the *ideas*, and Reason is the ground and source of *ideas*. This is the first and absolute sense.
>
> "The second sense comes when we speak of ourselves as possessing reason; and this we can no otherwise define than as the capability with which God has endowed man of beholding, or being conscious of, the divine light. But this very capability is itself that light, not as the divine light, but as the life or indwelling of the living Word, [Logos,] which is our light; that is a life whereby we are capable of the light, and by which the light is present to us, a being which we may call *ours*, but

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dox doctrine of the Trinity is that "the total idea of the 4=3=1, of the adorable Tetractys, eternally self-manifested in the Triad, Father, Son, and Spirit,—was never in its cloudless unity present to him;" ("Notes on English Divines," vol. ii., p. 179;) and he further says, that by "changing the formula of the Tetractys into the Trias, by merging the Prothesis in the Thesis, the Identity in the Ipseity, the Christian fathers subjected their exposition to many inconveniences."—*Ibid.*, p. 195: *cf.* p. 196.

which I cannot call *mine*; for it is the life that we individualize, while the light, as its correlative opposite, remains universal." [Dated, 1827.]—*Church and State*, p. 265.

"When education has disciplined the minds of our gentry for severer study; when educated men shall be ashamed to look abroad for truths that can only be found within; within themselves will they discover, intuitively will they discover, the distinction between *the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world*, [the intuitive Reason,] and the understanding which forms the *peculium* of each man, as different in extent and value from another man's understanding, as his estate may be from his neighbour's estate. The words of St. John (i. 7–12) are in their whole extent interpretable of the understanding ……This" (universal) "light comes as to its own. Being rejected, it leaves the understanding to a world of dreams and darkness," &c.—*Church and State*, p. 286.*

These extracts need little comment. Those who have intelligently followed the line of this examination hitherto, and are able to gather the general purport of the quotations we have made, will easily connect the general view and outline given in the text of our remarks with the illustrations which have now been cited. They will not fail also to perceive how the intuition of ideal truth is made to be identical with the spiritual communion of God with man in love and holiness. This is not an accidental, but an essential, characteristic of Coleridge's theology. It runs through all his interpretations of Scripture. In that profound and spiritual passage of St. Paul (1 Cor. ii. 11–16) he perverts and profanes its whole course of thought, by interpreting the "natural man" as meaning one who merely judges by the logical understanding, which is the "spirit of the world;" and "the spiritual man," who has the "mind of Christ," and "receives" and "discerns" "the things of the Spirit of God," as signifying one who beholds truth by the light of the "intuitive Reason."* So also regeneration is but "the self-subjection to this universal light of the will of the individual," who thus "becomes capable of a quickening intercommunion with the Divine Spirit."† Correspondently, his transcendental doctrines of the Logos or Reason are made to be, in the highest and most sacred sense, the discoveries of the Holy Spirit to man's soul. He quotes, in this connexion, such precious passages as Rom. viii. 15, 16; 2 Cor. iii. 18; Rom. viii. 20–23. Nothing is said or intimated of the knowledge of forgiveness, as following true repentance and evangelical faith; but the spiritual or intuitive faculty is represented as introducing its possessor and user to God in the Word.‡

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* We will here quote a few lines from the article in the "British Quarterly," to which we have referred. The doctrine contained in the extracts given above bears (the reviewer says) a "suspicious resemblance to the doctrine of Spinoza, as expressed in a letter to Oldenburg, (*Ep.* xxi., *Opera*, ed. Bruder, vol. ii., p. 195,) who had asked him to state his sentiments regarding salvation by Christ. Spinoza declares that an historical belief in Christ, which is to know Christ according to the flesh, is not necessary to salvation. '*Sed de æterno illo filio Dei, hoc est, Dei æternâ sapientiâ* [Coleridge's 'Essential Reason'] *quæ sese in omnibus rebus, et maximè in mente humanâ, et omnium maximè in Christo Jesu, manifestavit, longè aliter sentiendum. Nam nemo absque hâc ad statum beatitudinis potest pervenire, utpote quæ sola docet, quid verum et falsum, bonum et malum sit.*'"

Faith is often described by Coleridge as the union or synthesis of the individual will and the reason, which is only a transcendental way of saying that it is the act by which the individual recognises as true and right, embraces and appropriates, the revelations of the Reason, whether in philosophy, science, or religion. The Imagination he describes in a characteristic passage as,—

> "That reconciling and mediatory power, which, incorporating the reason in images of sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanent and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors. These are the *wheels* which Ezekiel beheld," &c.—*Statesman's Manual*, in *Church and State, &c.*, p. 229.

And again he says:—

> "The completing power which unites clearness with depth, the plenitude of the sense with the comprehensibility of the

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* "Aids," &c., p. 107. † *Ibid.*, p. 163.

‡ "Church and State," pp. 281, 282, Appendix B. "Notes on English Divines," vol. i., pp. 17, 111, 112, 202.

understanding, is the imagination, impregnated with which the understanding itself becomes intuitive and a living power."—*Ibid.*, p. 266.

Imagination, that is to say, is the synthesis of the intuitive reason and the bodily sense. Both its constituent factors, therefore, being, though in different spheres, intuitive, it is itself an intuitive and inspired faculty.

In one of the passages recently quoted Coleridge draws his well-known distinction between the intuitive Reason, "the light which lighteth every man," and the logical understanding, "the *peculium*" of each particular man. Correspondent with this is his distinction between "ideas" and "conceptions," without apprehending which it is impossible to understand many pages together of his writings. According to him, ideas and conceptions are things utterly alien in their nature, and differing from each other *toto cœlo.* "Ideas" are flashes from the universal light or laws and impulses flowing from the Divine Spirit; "conceptions" are the abstract images and definitions of things drawn by each man's particular understanding. The former are strong in the infant, before he has become capable of forming abstractions and conceptions. We may be, and may ever remain, unconscious of their existence and operation, and yet they inspire and regulate our judgments, feelings, and conscience. And even if we become conscious of them, we still find it impossible to conceive or define them. Such an idea or law is that which gives us the sense of moral freedom, upon which we act from the beginning, long before we are, properly speaking, conscious of our freedom, and on which we cannot but act, though we should even deny our freedom. Such instinctive or intuitive ideas, giving the sense of truth, goodness, and beauty, are, moreover, the laws and impulses which inspire and guide the true poet, and the true inductive philosopher. These remarks may help the uninitiated to enter into the meaning of Coleridge when he says, "That which contemplated objectively we call a law, the same contemplated subjectively is an idea. '*Quod in naturâ naturatâ lex, id in naturâ natu-*

rante idea, dicitur;'"[*] and again, when he calls "an idea—a truth-power of the Reason," adding that "as expressed in words it is always and necessarily a contradiction in terms."[†] In his "Notes on English Divines" he somewhere speaks of "ideas" as "truth-powers," operative or productive laws, "manifesting themselves and their reality in their products."[‡]

Such is an outline of Coleridge's transcendental metaphysics, so far, perhaps, as common people may hope to be able to systematize them, who have not attained to "that higher state," of which he speaks in his "Table-Talk," "to which Aristotle could never raise himself, but which was natural to Plato, and has been to others," [Coleridge himself, to wit,] "in which the understanding is distinctly contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon from the throne of actual ideas, or living, inborn, essential truths." Some may, perhaps, be disposed to imagine that, even as here exhibited, they are sufficiently obscure and abstruse. What then will they think when they are told, that at the close of a note in the volume which contains the "Church and State" and "Lay Sermons,"—which note, for mathematical abstruseness of form, and jargonish obscurity of matter, out-Coleridges even Coleridge himself,—he says, referring to that note and to some of the disquisitions from which we have previously quoted, "These disquisitions form the drawbridge, the connecting link, between the disciplinary and preparatory rules and exercises of reflection, [the 'Aids, &c.,'] and the system of faith and philosophy of S.T.C.!"[§] The date of this note is 1827.

The fundamental Pantheism of this philosophy has been sufficiently indicated. The next point to be noted is its bearing upon the authority of Revelation. Hard names and bigoted denunciations we are innocent of using. But it is too plain to be doubted that such a philosophy could not but be the parent of rationalism in religion. Even if Coleridge's actual personal faith in God and Christ, and his acceptance of the doctrines of theology, had been as orthodoxly sound, as he wished them to be considered,—although, in fact, he knew perfectly well that the esoteric doctrine which he shrank from revealing, and of which his writings contain hints and glimpses which sometimes almost appal the Christian reader, was such as no Church-court, in any age, could have heard without condemning;—even had his personal faith been orthodox, his view of the nature of Inspiration and the authority of the Scriptures could not but be considered as essentially rationalistic. Coleridge was fundamentally a mystic; the philosophy to which he was addicted was, it may now be said, by his own confession, a pantheistic mysticism: and it has been well and strikingly remarked by Dr. Hampden, that "mysticism is but an insane Rationalism." Coleridge's view of inspiration, as implied throughout his writings, and explicitly stated in his posthumous work, "The Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," is, that the Bible is only so far inspired to any man as it brings the voice of God home to his heart, and "finds him at his lowest depths." In this sense he denies, in his "Notes on English Divines," that there can be any "revelation *ab extra*." Throughout it is implied that only so far as the Reason in us answers to and authenticates the contents of the Bible, can they be considered as entitled to the authority of the Word of God. Now, even though Coleridge's Reason had authenticated to him every jot and tittle of the Bible, this would not have absolved him, in holding such doctrine, from the charge of Rationalism.* The effect of it is that no man need acknowledge any external standard of truth whatever. Each man's Reason becomes to him the measure and standard of all truth. "Wesley's Hymns" are as truly and fully the Word of God to him who hears the voice of God in them, as is the Bible itself. Nay, each and every book is inspired in precisely the same sense, and with as full authority, as God's Holy Book, just in so far as its statements commend themselves by their own evidence to the intuitive Reason of the reader.

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[*] "Church and State," &c., pp. 12, 13.

[†] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[‡] "An idea is a power, δύναμις νοερά, which constitutes its own reality, and is in order of thought necessarily antecedent to the things in which it is more or less adequately realized, while a conception is as necessarily posterior."—*Notes on English Divines*, vol. i., p. 27.

[§] "Church and State," &c., p. 270.

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* Compare Mansel's "Bampton Lectures," First Edition, pp. 4, 5.

Philosophy and Theology, Reason and Religion, the Imagination and Conscience,—the latter being the light and voice of Reason in regard to duty and morals,—are, according to Coleridge's "system," all homogeneous and co-ordinate, all in fact one. Hence poets and philosophers become prophets and apostles, and Plato and Plotinus are co-sphered with Paul and John. The "Spirit of God" is the spirit of Plato; "the wisdom of God in a mystery," even "the hidden wisdom," is the transcendental theosophy of the Platonist Paul and the semi-pantheistic idealist Coleridge; on the other hand "the spirit of the world" is the spirit of the Greek sophists, with their logical quibbles, and of the Scotch and Benthamite philosophers, whose century has passed away. This is not caricature, but strict Coleridgism. This was his philosophical theology, and is now the doctrine of his followers.

The relation of Coleridgism to evangelical theology is now so well understood, that there is no need to dwell upon it here. All are aware that in the true spirit of Platonizing theologians, as described by Professor Butler, (*ante*, p. 1: see also *Butler's Lectures*, vol. ii., pp. 306–7,)—though expressing a deep sense of the power and evil of sin, as a disorder, disease, and unhappiness of our nature and earthly condition,—he explains away the evangelical doctrines connected with guilt and atonement, and equally explains away the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. It is of some importance, however, to ascertain what was his position in regard to that pro-Popish movement in the Church of England, of which he has sometimes been regarded as one of the originators. Our own judgment is, that to suppose him or his philosophy favourable to Popery in its essential or characteristic principles, is no more warrantable than to call him, as some have done, a Tory in politics in his later years, though there are not wanting plausible facts which may be adduced in favour of both opinions. He believed in the instincts of humanity, and that the "intuitive Reason" had, on the whole, spite of many obstructions from human selfishness, and the incompetence of men's understandings, guided the progress of the race. Hence his reverence for the wisdom of the past, and for institutions which were the growth of ages, and which had been originated and moulded by the long-continued tendencies of nations. What has thus *grown* he revered. This was his Conservatism. This led him to reverence "Catholic" doctrines of faith, and national customs, laws, and institutes. But yet, in all this, he looked back to what he called the original "idea" latent in the doctrine, custom, law, or institute. He knew how easily this might be lost sight of, and some parasitic corruption or abuse come to be mistaken for it. And in creeds, or the forms of legislative decree,—whether in Church or State,—he was very far from being an implicit believer. So that, underneath all his conservative tendencies, there lay principles, not, indeed, of reckless revolution, but, in a true sense, of "radical reform,"—reformation which might go down even to the roots of things;—such principles, indeed, as might theoretically warrant, under certain conditions, even the re-distribution of property, to which he utterly denied that inheritance or personal acquisition could give an abstract and absolute right. And, similarly, notwithstanding the favour with which he was disposed to regard several (so-called) "Catholic" doctrines, yet, at bottom, he was antipodally opposed to the most essential characteristics of Popery, which we take to be the doctrines of priestly power, in the communication of sacramental virtue and in absolution, and of church infallibility and absolute authority.

As to the extent of his agreement with "Catholic" doctrines, no more intelligent or competent witness need be adduced than his daughter, Mrs. Sara Coleridge, who, as Editor of her father's works, has more than supplied the place of her late husband, his nephew, Mr. H. N. Coleridge. Her evidence is that Coleridge's

> "Christian divinity agreed more with 'Catholicism' than with the doctrines of any sect, since according to his judgment

> and feelings *that* contains, whether in a right or wrong form, the spiritual ideas in which the true substance of Christianity consists, more completely: on some points it coincided with the 'Catholicism' of Rome, rather than with that of Anglicans; he recognised, for instance, the idea of the immanence of spiritual power and light in the church, independently of the authority of a revelation completed in past ages, opposed, as he was, to the application of that idea made by Papists. His religious system, according to his own view of it, might be described as exhibiting the universal ideas of Christianity, not those which have been consciously recognised always, everywhere, and by all, but those which the reason and spiritual sense of all men, where sufficiently developed, bear witness to, explained according to a modern philosophy, which purports to be no mere new thinking, but inclusively, all the thought that has been, and now is, in the world."—*Biog. Lit.*, *Introd.*, p. lxxii.

Just before this, Mrs. Coleridge says that her father, "in his own opinion, is as consistently and regularly opposed to" Anglo and Roman Catholics "in his *rationale* of doctrine, as consentient with them respecting the great objects of faith, viewed in their essence." He himself intimates very distinctly his general agreement with "the rights and doctrines, the *agenda* and *credenda*, of the Roman Catholics, could we separate them from the adulterating ingredients combined with them, and the use made of them by the sacerdotal Mamelukes of the Romish monarchy, for the support of the Papacy and Papal Hierarchy."*

The more precise meaning of these statements may be thus exhibited. The Coleridgean "true idea" is, that the Word or "intuitive Reason" is, by the Spirit, immanent in humanity, and particularly, as the fullest embodiment of the highest truth, in Christianity; and that thus the Word leads the race forward into truth and righteousness, from age to age: the Roman distortion and perversion of this "true idea" is the doctrine of Papal infallibility,—on which is now grounded that of absolute church authority. The "true idea" is, that human spirits, in a future state, are still to be disciplined and purified, there being no sharp contrast between the conditions of life here and there: the Romish perversion is the doctrine of purgatory, with its traffic in masses and indulgences. The "true idea" is, that all human spirits, though they fall and die by the quickening and dominion of self and selfishness within them, are yet so essentially one with the Word, that in Him they possess, as an essential and constitutive part of their being, a divine and holy life and nature, of which, both as to its universality and its effects, the ordinance of infant baptism, the common right of all who are born into the world, is the appointed symbol: the "Catholic" abuse and perversion of this idea is the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; or, as Hare has called it, of "baptismal transubstantiation." It is manifest that Coleridge's view of the nature of this ordinance, equally with that of Catholics, implies a denial of regeneration subsequent to baptism. Thus, as Mrs. Coleridge writes, "the new birth, as the change of the soul itself, is out of time; viewed phenomenally in its manifestations, it takes place, as my father conceived, gradually, as a man becomes gradually a new creature, different from what he was by nature,"* &c. The "true idea," again, is, that this better life is sustained, strengthened, and perfected by the communion of the human spirit with the Word, as present in every man, and especially as revealing Himself through the written Scripture, and through the symbols of the Eucharist, in which more especially His presence is made known to the reason and imagination of the recipients: the perversion is the doctrine of transubstantiation. Coleridge's love of mysticism, and of mystification, does, indeed, lead him in many places to throw around this last doctrine the shield of his metaphysical subtlety; but Mrs. Coleridge maintains,—we have no doubt, justly,—that he by no means adopted it.† He looked indulgently upon it, in so far as it served to express *his* "true idea" that the presence of the Word with the Church is its source of spiritual strength and refreshment, and that this Word—the self-revealing Reason—shines into men, as living light, through the eucharistic symbols: but he rejected it, so far as it gave to *his* doctrine of a real spiritual presence a coarsely material expression, and embodied it under the form of an uncouth and incredible transformation.

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* "Church and State," p. 146.

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* *Biographia Literaria,* Introduction, p. lxxxiii. † *Ibid.,* pp. lxxxiv.–xcii.

We might have extended this parallel and contrast; but what has been given will probably suffice. It is evident that his doctrine, no less than that of Papists, supplants and shuts out the Reformed doctrines of justification by faith and a conscious regeneration. Substantially, he agrees upon these points with Dr. Newman, who, indeed, has distinctly stated that Coleridge's disquisitions, in his "Aids to Reflection," had their share in determining his own change from the doctrines of Evangelical Protestantism to "Catholicism." At the same time, it should be noted that where Catholicism agrees with Evangelical Protestantism, as to the doctrines, to wit, of satisfaction and atonement, Coleridge, for the most part, differs from both.

Thus far, then, Coleridge approximated towards Popery. But, in the foregoing sketch of certain points in which he agreed, it has been in part intimated how gravely he also differed from Papal doctrine. He who set up Reason as the judge as to the Divine inspiration of the Word of God, was never likely to suffer himself to be bound fast by the trammels of tradition, by the decrees of councils, or by the bulls and decisions of Popes. He did not admit, Mrs. Coleridge shows us, "the ordinary mysticism on the subject of apostolical succession."* He admitted, with his views he could admit, no "priestly" power or prerogative whatever,—no authority to absolve from sin, no power of transubstantiating either the elements of the eucharist by consecration or the nature of the infant in baptism. No one could be more utterly opposed than he to the pretensions of the "sacerdotal Mamelukes of the Romish monarchy." Clearly, then, he can have had no sympathy with the ulterior purpose and inner spirit of the Tractarian and pro-Romish movement in the Church of England; nor will any of his thorough followers be found moving in that direction.

What was his judgment as to the practical influence of Popery may be understood from the following striking quotation, with which it is a pleasure to enrich this sketch:—

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* *Biographia Literaria*, p. xcii.

> "As, at the risk of passing for a secret favourer of superannuated superstitions, I have spoken out my thoughts of the Roman theology, so, and at a far more serious risk of being denounced as an intolerant bigot, I will declare what, after a two years' residence in exclusively Popish countries, and in situations and under circumstances that afforded more than ordinary means of acquainting myself with the workings and process of the machinery, was the impression left on my mind as to the effects and influences of the Romish (most un-Catholic) religion—not as, even according to its own canons and authorized decisions, it ought to be; but, as it actually and practically exists......Repeating the answer long since returned to the question put by a friend, that is to say, 'When I contemplate the whole system, as it affects the great fundamental principles of morality, the *terra firma*, as it were, of our humanity; then trace its operation on the sources and conditions of national strength and well-being; and, lastly, consider its woful influences on the innocence and sanctity of the female mind and imagination, on the faith and happiness, the gentle fragrancy and unnoticed ever-present verdure of domestic life,—I can with difficulty avoid applying to it what the Rabbins fable of the fratricide Cain, after the curse, that the *firm earth trembled wherever he strode*, and *the grass turned black beneath his feet*.'" —*Biog. Lit.*, vol. i., pp. 131, 132.

That Coleridge has exercised a remarkable influence upon the English mind of this age, is undeniable. The special reasons for this are indicated in following chapters. Here it only remains to sum up the findings of the present inquiry. What we have found, then, amounts to this, that Coleridge's philosophy was a Neo-Platonized edition of Schelling's; that his theology has affinities with Popish rather than with Protestant doctrine, but is essentially rather a semi-pagan theosophy or mysticism, baptized with a Christian and biblical nomenclature, than any system of doctrines directly derived from the Bible; that in intellectual and ecclesiastical sympathies he was radically Protestant, though disposed to be highly reverent of ancient religious forms and ceremonies.

CHAPTER III.

DIVISIONS OF PARTIES IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

Our readers do not need to be informed that within the Church of England there is ever maintained a division of parties. The different influences which, three centuries ago, combined to determine the complex form, and to fix the incoherent accessories, of English Protestantism, as by law established, have, through the circumstances of that Church's position, and, above all, through the spirit and tendencies of her established order, and her many-toned and sometimes dissonant teachings, been themselves continually re-produced and propagated afresh. That is to say, the influences which determined the form and conditions of that Church have been continually generated anew by that very form and those very conditions. There has ever been, for instance, a Sacramentalist party, approximating in doctrine to the teachings of Rome. There have, indeed, been periods of universal dormancy, when the principles of this party have been little more than alive; but they have never been extinct or quite forgotten. And so, on the other hand, there have never been absolutely wanting representatives of the Puritan or Evangelical school, who have held by the doctrines of grace, and whose stronghold is the "Articles," as that of "the other party is the sacramental services and the offices of the Church, especially as performed according to the rubric."

But besides this distinction of parties there is, and has always been, another, not indeed so marked and obvious, but scarcely less important. One school of Anglican divines has been accustomed to dwell more predominantly, sometimes almost exclusively, on the personal history and character of Christ, considered as

God incarnate, and, at the same time, as "the Pattern Man." His life in the flesh has been their theme of meditation and the inspiration of their eloquence;—His life as that of "God manifest in the flesh," and His death as crowning and consummating that humble, holy, and loving life: but not His death as the need and hope of man, as the essential fact of His history and of God's revelation, as the grand centre on which the eyes of all believing men must be fixed, and round which all the harmony of earth and heaven revolves. Another school, again, has probably fixed its attention too exclusively on the death of Christ, and the results which directly flow therefrom for the benefit of sinners, and has comparatively neglected the glorious teachings and revealings of the personal life of Christ, as the image of His Father's glory upon earth, as the perfect teacher of pure wisdom, truth, and holiness, and as the pattern and example of faultless and God-inspired humanity. The remote cause of *this* distinction of parties, also, may be traced to the formularies of the Church of England. The impulse which the Anglican Church received from the Reformation very mainly through the divines of Geneva and western Germany, would have led it to dwell mainly upon the atoning character and virtue of the death of Christ, and the doctrines immediately connected with this grand and central truth, which were, in fact, the very life-blood of Protestantism, especially of Calvinism, and which are strongly and impressively embodied in the Articles and in the Communion Service of the Church of England. But the dominant tendency of the formularies of the Book of Common Prayer—a tendency derived from the originals out of which these formularies were selected and prepared, and characteristic of the whole stream of post-apostolic teaching, down even beyond Augustine, and indeed till the time of Anselm—is to dwell with marked predominance upon the personal life and character of Christ as the incarnate Son of God; so much so, that it has been calculated by a competent and favourable critic, that "in the whole eighty-six collects for the year the doctrine of the atonement is only some two or three times explicitly expressed, and in some of these very cursorily; while on some of those occasions where *à priori* we should have most confidently expected to find it, it is certainly not present."

This second division of parties in the Church of England is made upon a different principle from the former; yet it will, of course, be seen at once that the section of divines which, according to the distinction just stated, makes the atoning death of Christ the main theme and centre of their ministrations, must coincide substantially with the Puritan or Evangelical party, according to the former division. It will not, however, follow from this, that the two other parties must be identical. There is this point to be observed, that whereas the doctrines of the Sacramentalists and of the Evangelicals are essentially opposed, and can never blend, there is no such necessary opposition in the other case. It is only when the incarnation and life of Christ are so dwelt upon as to ignore or deny the atoning virtue and true sacrificial character of Christ's death, that there ensues any positive opposition between the two parties in this case. It were well, indeed, if these two themes were always dwelt upon in just mutual proportion. In fact, the tendency to dwell upon the character and glory of the living Christ, as God incarnate, is capable of being combined with either Sacramentalist or Evangelical views.* Some of the most luminous, spiritual, and instructive theological writing of the higher and more thoughtful Evangelical school, in both Scotland and England, is strongly imbued with this tendency; the best expository preaching of the age has been improved and heightened, in tone and quality, by a tincture of the same. In the opposite direction, again, the able and comprehensive work of Robert Wilberforce, on the Incarnation, shows how the most highly cultivated, the most thoughtful and refined masters of Sacramentalist theology can combine their

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* The great Bishop Hall affords a fine specimen of the manner in which this characteristic habit or tendency may be united with a staple of doctrine thoroughly evangelical and moderately Calvinistic.

Popery or semi-Popery with the contemplation of the incarnate Son of God, in His various offices and relations as toward God, and, especially, as toward man.

It is necessary, however, to state that the tendency to which we have referred has been greatly strengthened and reinforced during the last thirty years by influences derived from Germany, and that these influences have affected some schools of theology which have no affinities otherwise either with the philosophy or theology of those from whom, in this respect, they have received impression and direction. The reaction from the cold and dry German Rationalism of the latter half of the eighteenth century seems to have made itself first strongly felt in the influence of Schleiermacher. He brought the life of Christ and its relation to the sanctification of Christians into peculiar prominence. To borrow the words of Mr. Vaughan, jun., author of "Hours with the Mystics," as given in an able article on Schleiermacher in the "British Quarterly Review,"—"In his views concerning the work of Christ, Schleiermacher bears towards that aspect of it which partakes most largely of mysticism. Here all is resolved into the mystical union of Christ with His members. The Redeemer draws the soul of the believer to Himself, receives his life into His own, and communicates His own life to him......In His members, His earthly life is yet perpetuated. The Christ of the true believer is a Christ within him. Only through union with Christ can we appropriate the blessings He came to bestow... The whole life of the Redeemer was a redeeming act. His death was the necessary consummation of a complete obedience. The peculiar constitution of His nature rendered it unavoidable; it perfected the manifestation of His oneness with God. The entireness of that self-surrender on our behalf which could become obedient even unto death, constituted the sufficiency of His sacrifice."* How exactly all this agrees with Coleridge's doctrine of the Logos, being little else than a rendering of that doctrine into plainer speech and more practical application, will be obvious to those who have read the preceding chapter. Coleridge and Schleiermacher also coincide in regarding the Immaculate Conception, and the miracles of our Lord, as not essential to Christianity; though we have found no evidence whatever that the former would also have agreed with the latter in regarding the Resurrection and Ascension, though historically true, as likewise non-essential, inasmuch as "they are not required to account for the exalted knowledge of God, and capacity for holiness, which our Christian position confers."* This agreement between Coleridge and Schleiermacher, and the substantial identity of their views regarding the Trinity, are not to be accounted for by any supposition of intercourse between them, but by the fact that both were, in the main, adherents of the same philosophy. Schleiermacher was a devoted student of Plato, and a follower of his school. Both, in fact, were Platonizing idealists, and both studied and admired Plotinus as well as Plato. If Coleridge, moreover, had been a student of Spinoza, Schleiermacher had not only studied his writings, but had championed his reputation as "the holy rejected Spinoza." Both had been greatly influenced by Schelling. And though in a sense and within certain limits Schleiermacher professed to oppose the prevalent Pantheism of his country, while Coleridge (in his middle and later life) ever expressed his strong dissent from Pantheism in any form, yet in fact both were, philosophically, Pantheists under a new form; and their Pantheism moulded their views of the relations uniting the Logos and humanity, Christ and all who believe in Christ.†

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* "British Quarterly Review," vol ix., p. 333, or VAUGHAN's "Remains," vol. i., pp. 86, 87.

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* THOMPSON'S "Bampton Lectures," 1853, p. 200.

† The statement in the text, so far as regards Schleiermacher's Pantheism, is too gentle. According to the representation of both Chalybäus and Kahnis, whose authority on this point must be decisive, he was as really and thoroughly a Pantheist, notwithstanding his faith (so far as this went) in historical Christianity and the Mission of Jesus, as even Schelling or Hegel. His God was "an indefinite substance, not a personal Spirit."—CHALYBAUS'S "History of Speculative Philosophy," lecture viii.; KAHNIS'S "History of German Protestantism," pp. 202–215, 241–243.

It is at the same time, however, obvious that the Pantheism of Schleiermacher does, to a very considerable extent, simulate, and may easily seem to express, beautiful and most important truths respecting the relation between Christ and believers. Herein it resembles the mysticism of the Middle Ages, which, though thoroughly pantheistic in its philosophical basis, and sometimes even grossly and impiously pantheistic in its phraseology, yet served frequently to express the most elevated and holy Christian feelings, and the most real and delightful experience of spiritual union with Christ. In a real and spiritual, though not in a pantheistic, sense,—by grace, though not by nature,—as a consequence of the continued operation of the Holy Spirit, in combination with Christian truth, upon the hearts and minds of men, from age to age, though not as the necessary heritage, or as any part of the necessary and constitutive life, of humanity,—there is and ever has been a living union of believers with Christ. His life is not only the model but also the fountain of theirs; and this life, becoming more refined from the depraving and depressing influences of ignorance, error, and superstition, and more extensively prevalent among men, gives to Christendom at large a "Christian consciousness," to use Schleiermacher's phrase, which becomes, we would fain believe and hope, continually clearer, purer, and stronger. These are the great truths which lie masked and disfigured under the pantheistic guise of Schleiermacher's phraseology. They have been taken up, connected with more or less of the errors adhering to them as they lay in the mould of Schleiermacher's philosophy, by most of his followers, especially by Neander. In this country they have given a decided stimulus to the humanitarian divines of the day. Much good have they, doubtless, produced, but also not a little evil. They have tended to refine and elevate Unitarianism, to broaden and vivify orthodoxy, to invest the narratives of the New Testament with a new and living interest; but also to depress the standard of the Divine law, to lower the awfulness and majesty of the Divine holiness, to reduce the strength and impoverish the blood of English Protestant theology, both within and beyond the limits of the Established Church. They supplant the grand doctrine of the Christian atonement; they do away or ignore the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the distinct offices and mutual relations of the Divine Persons; they allow a practical and superficial, but, in effect, deny that there is any essential and vital, distinction between the church of Christ and the world of Christendom.

It is obvious, however, that the characteristic tendency of the age, of which we have spoken, stimulated and reinforced as it has been by the influence of Schleiermacher's school, transmitted into this country through the writings of such men as Neander and Tholuck, although sufficiently broad and obvious to require specific notice, is yet, as a mere tendency or feeling, not sufficiently defined or dogmatic to be exclusive of any other school, or to be considered as characteristic of any special party in the Church of England. Perhaps it coincides tolerably well with what Mr. Conybeare has called the "Broad Church." But a designation which was intended to include men of such radically contrary tendencies in philosophy, and in fundamental theology, as Hare and Whately, Arnold and the present Bishop of Oxford, Conybeare and Jowett,—nay, which, at the time it was first brought out, would have leashed together Thirlwall or Kingsley and Robert Wilberforce, who had not then seceded to Rome,—may well be complained of by Mr. Maurice* as vague and misleading. In truth, a distinctive philosophy must always lie at the basis of distinctive schools and systems of theology,—witness the scholastic, the Calvinistic, the Arminian, theologies, and the German rationalism. Coleridge's philosophy was the basis of his theology,—if we might not rather say that the two were one. And he has become the founder of a school, which embraces more or less fully his philosophy and his theology at the same time. Hare was the freest and most independent, as he was the most distinguished, of this school: Maurice and Kingsley, Siamese Twins in theology, though very different in genius, are its present chief representatives.* Jowett, though taking a tone and impulse from Coleridge, borrowing some views and many thoughts from him, is of a more directly and intensely pantheistic school, and altogether an independent theologian. Nevertheless, for reasons that will appear in due time, his theological opinions will be discussed in this volume.

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* Introduction to Hare's previously unpublished "Charges."

To the school which we have thus indicated, "the school of Coleridge," we shall take the liberty, when convenient, of applying the designation "Broad Church," using it thus in a definite sense, and one somewhat more restricted than it has frequently obtained. As applied to the Coleridgean school of theology, this appellation is peculiarly appropriate, because, on the theory of this school, as we shall see, when we come to criticize Maurice and Kingsley, the Church is really as broad as the (so-called) Christian world, and all their views in ecclesiastical doctrine and politics tend much more towards latitudinarianism than bigotry. We make this remark in the way neither of praise nor of censure, but merely of definition.

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* The accomplished Dr. Trench, an early and intimate friend of Hare, Maurice, and unhappy Sterling, must in his younger life have largely shared the impulses and influences of this school; but has every right to be regarded as evangelical in his theology, though generally understood to belong to what is called the "Broad Church."

CHAPTER IV.

THE LATE ARCHDEACON HARE—SKETCH OF HIS LIFE—HIS ECCLESIASTICAL POSITION—LAST ILLNESS AND DEATH.*

Julius Charles Hare had an elder brother, Augustus William, a Graduate of Oxford, and Fellow of New College, who became, after leaving the University, Rector of Alton Barnes, a retired village in Wiltshire. Between these two brothers there existed a tender affection, and there appears to have been considerable similarity in their tastes and opinions. They were the joint authors of the "Guesses at Truth;" a work of which the rare merits were generally recognised long before the authorship had ceased to be a secret. Augustus William was also the author of a posthumous volume of "Sermons to a Country Congregation," which had the singular good fortune to attract the attention and gain the high praise both of the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, at that time in the height of their unrivalled eminence as the arbiters of taste, the Minos and Rhadamanthus of literary destinies. Their gifted author died at Rome, which was also his birthplace, in 1834, while still in the prime of his life, and left his brother, but for the "good hope" which religion afforded, inconsolable on account of his loss.

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* 1. *Guesses at Truth.* By Two Brothers. First Series. Fifth Edition. Revised. London. 1855.

2. *Guesses at Truth.* By Two Brothers. Second Series. Third Edition. 1855.

3. *Sermons preacht in Herstmonceux Church.* By Julius Charles Hare, M.A., Rector of Herstmonceux, Archdeacon of Lewes, and late Fellow of Trinity College. Two Vols. Cambridge. 1841 and 1847.

4. *The Victory of Faith.* By Julius Charles Hare, &c. Second Edition. 1847.

5. *The Mission of the Comforter, with Notes.* By Julius Charles Hare. Second Edition. Revised. 1850.

6. *Vindication of Luther against his recent English Assailants.* Cambridge. 1855.

7. *Essays and Tales.* By John Sterling. *Collected and edited, with a Memoir of his Life.* By J. C. Hare, &c. Two Vols. 1848.

8. *The Contest with Rome: a Charge delivered in* 1851, *with Notes; especially in Answer to Dr. Newman's Lectures.* By J. C. Hare, &c.

9. *Letter to the Dean of Chichester on the Appointment of Dr. Hampden.* Second Edition. With Postscript. By J. C. Hare, &c.

10. *Charges to the Clergy of the Archdeaconry of Lewes from* 1840 *to* 1854. By J. C. Hare, &c. With an Introduction, explanatory of his Position in the Church with Reference to the Parties which divide it. In Three Vols. 1856. (*The Contest with Rome* is published in the third of these volumes, as well as separately.)

11. *Sermons preacht on Particular Occasions.* By J. C. Hare, &c., 1858.

12. *Two Sermons on the Occasion of the Funeral of Archdeacon Hare.* By the Rev. H.O. Elliott, M.A., and the Rev. J. N. Simpkinson, M.A. 1855.

There were two other brothers, Francis, the eldest of the four, and Marcus, the youngest. Of the former it is said in the Introduction to the recent publication of the Charges, that he gave to Julius "his first initiation into Greek, was an excellent German scholar, combined the rarest literary accomplishments with the most agreeable social qualities, was equally popular with scholars, men of the world, and children." Marcus, to whom Julius is said to have been "most fondly attached," is described as possessing "the clear manly sense, warm heart, and resolute purpose of an English sailor and Christian gentleman." Both these brothers died comparatively early in life.

Nor was it destined that the last survivor of this beautiful family should live to old age. Broken down, not by weight of years, but by repeated attacks of severe illness, Julius Charles Hare has now passed to his place above. A prince in intellectual wealth, an oracle for sagacity, a poet in genius, a master in criticism and in polemics, a champion of Protestantism, a brave and truthful, but, at the same time, gentle and loving spirit, a devout and humble Christian, has left the world to find out its loss, and not a few devoted friends and warm admirers to mourn his departure. It is with such an estimate of his character that we undertake the office of reviewing his writings. In some important respects we are compelled to deem his views and teachings defective; but he was, notwithstanding, a noble and a lovely spirit among men.

The position of Archdeacon Hare was peculiar, and is not easily to be defined. His antecedents and connexions, so far as we know them, would have led us to expect that his place would be found at that pole of the Coleridgean Church school, where pseudo-philosophic anti-evangelism meets infidelity half way. He was the friend and biographer of Sterling, who for a short time was his Curate, and whose dangerous errors he has not concealed, and yet, in too many instances, has not attempted to reprove and confute. He married a sister of Mr. Maurice's, whose wife, again, was a sister of Mrs. Sterling; and, by Hare's will, Mr. Maurice is appointed his executor, and inherits the bulk of his library. In more than one place of his writings, Hare seems to identify his opinions on the subject of inspiration with those contained in Coleridge's "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit;" yet, on the other hand, his own writings breathe more of the evangelical spirit than any other of the school to which we have referred. Often, indeed, he all but comes up to the full standard of explicit evangelical orthodoxy; though it is not to be concealed that in other places his statements are seriously defective. He has, besides, in one of his latest works so alluded to the "Evangelicals" by name, as to seem to make their cause his own; though, again, it must be admitted that sometimes elsewhere his remarks have implied some disparagement of them and their doctrine. He often refers, in terms which imply high approbation, to the writings of Mr. Maurice; yet we can find no trace in all his works of agreement with Mr. Maurice's specific views; but, on the contrary, we think there is proof positive that, as to some of these views, he is altogether at variance with him. On the other hand, he appears as the courteous and discriminating, but decided opponent of the doctrinal and ceremonial High Churchism of Bishop Wilberforce, (of Oxford,) toward which we may presume that the views of Professor Trench,* his examining chaplain, more or less incline, especially as in his exegetical writings there is nothing to disfavour this presumption, while there is some evidence to support it. He was the declared enemy and the able and intrepid assailant of Tractarianism. With easy and brilliant mastery of learning and of logic, he has met and refuted Dr. Newman at every essential point in his attacks upon Protestantism, and has broken at every point the line of defences wherewith, in his "Development Theory," he attempted to surround Popery. Moreover, he published the most complete vindication of Luther from the calumnies of Bossuet and others, that Protestantism has yet produced. So that, while indisputably a writer of the Coleridgean school, and too often showing a tendency toward considerable laxity of doctrine; while, it is to be feared, scarcely sound and heart-whole as to the grand central and vital doctrine of justification by faith in the vicarious and expiatory sacrifice of Christ; yet it appears that Archdeacon Hare sympathized strongly, and was disposed to fraternize closely, with orthodox evangelical teachers of the old-fashioned Lutheran and Methodist doctrines; and that he held an independent position equally remote from the semi-infidel and from the High Church poles of the "Broad Church." In Church politics he was a liberal, and a conservative reformer. He had long pleaded for the restoration of Convocation, but would have had its form amended, and the rights of the laity (who, except in so far as churchwardenship may go, are ignored in the English Episcopal Church) recognised, defined, and conceded. By seminal reforms he would prevent the incoming of "radical reforms" [so called] or of revolution.* Dwelling thus

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* See note on p. 40. Evangelical as Dean Trench is in his theology, he seems tied by so many sympathies and relations to the Coleridgean school,—and has so little in common with the "Evangelicals" except his doctrine as to sin and atonement, on which points again he differs from them in being no Calvinist,—that we must regard him as standing in many respects on the border-line between the followers of Coleridge and that great school of liberal evangelical English divines to which Dr. Barrow and the grand Nonconformist Howe equally belonged.

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* Hare's feelings as to reform are indicated in the following pregnant extract. He is finding fault with the phrase *radical reform* as "involving an absurdity," and thus concludes his remarks:—

"The word may be borrowed from 'medicine,' in which we speak of a *radical cure*. This, however, is a metaphor implying the extirpation or complete uprooting of the disease, after which the sanative powers of nature will restore the constitution to health. But there is no such sanative power in a state; where the mere removal of abuses does not avail to set any vital faculties in action. In truth, this is only another form of the errour, by which man, ever quicker at destroying than at producing, has confounded repentance with reformation, *μεταμέλεια* with *μετάνοια*. Whereas the true reformer is he who creates new institutions, and gives them life and energy, alone in the Church field, being a man of no party, and belonging to a school the adherents of which were too eclectic and too mutually independent to have a common organ, even if they had been numerous enough among the people at large to be able to sustain one, Archdeacon Hare was never able, if he had been disposed, to identify himself with any public journal.* He exercised no influence through the columns of a newspaper; he contributed to no review or magazine. Perhaps this may be one reason why his decease received so little notice in English periodicals. Three or four lines sufficed for it in the "Athenæum," and the short notices which appeared in the "Christian Observer" and "Church of England Quarterly Review," though highly laudatory, were most meagre and inadequate. An extended article, however, appeared in the "Quarterly Review."

Julius Charles Hare was born September 13th, 1795, at Herstmonceux, a rural village and parish in Sussex, situated near the southern coast of England. His father was a gentleman of good family, lord of the manor, and having in his gift the rectory of Herstmonceux. His mother was the daughter of Bishop Shipley, of St. Asaph, and is said to have possessed a fine and noble character. Lady Jones, a superior and excellent woman, who had been the worthy wife and was then the widow

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and trusts to them for throwing off such evil humours as may be lying in the body politic. The true reformer is the seminal reformer, not the radical. And this is the way the Sower, who went forth to sow His seed, did really reform the world, without making any open assault to uproot what was already existing."—*Guesses at Truth*, *First Series*, pp. 282, 283.

Let our readers take notice that in this extract and elsewhere we leave Hare's peculiar spelling as we find it. He had his own system, somewhat resembling that of W. S. Landor. There is principle and consistency in it, and often it is apt and convenient, though sometimes the results look queer enough, *e.g.*, *forst* for *forced.*

* In the independence and isolation of his position, Hare resembled his friend Dr. Arnold, between whose views and his own there were many points of agreement or sympathy. Dr. Arnold somewhere says, in reference to his own relations at the same time with Oxford and with the London University, that he was considered a "latitudinarian at Oxford and a bigot at London." Dr. Arnold, however, was a more *modern* man than Hare. He had not the same veneration for by-gone learning and wisdom. He was less reverent and conservative, and the frequency and profuseness of his contributions to newspapers and periodicals contrast strongly with Hare's tastes and habits.

of the celebrated Sir William, was his aunt, and one of the guides of his childhood and youth. On the father's side, also, a Bishop was among his ancestors,—Francis Hare, a churchman of learning and reputation, well known as chaplain to the great Marlborough, having been Bishop of Chichester. This Bishop became the lord of Herstmonceux Castle, and his descendants remained on the property till after the birth of Julius Hare. Young Hare, as might be expected from such connexions, was sent to one of the great schools of England. At the Charter House he was prepared for the University; and it is remarkable that, among his schoolfellows, there were Waddington, the Church historian, now Dean of Durham, and Grote and Thirlwall, the future historians of Greece.* Manning, too, as we gather from sundry hints in Hare's writings, was another of his schoolfellows. After a brilliant career at school, he went to Cambridge in 1812. Before this period he had spent much time, in boyhood and in youth, on the Continent. We are informed that he playfully said that, "in 1811, he saw the mark of Luther's ink on the walls of the Castle of Wartburg; and there first learned to throw inkstands at the devil." † The period when Hare went to Cambridge, was one of renovated activity and of high promise for both the English Universities. Among his companions and friends, during his residence at Cambridge, were numbered such spirits as Whewell, Sedgwick, and Thirlwall, the last of whom was associated with him as Fellow of Trinity College, and was afterwards his partner in the work of translating Niebuhr. About the same time there were at Oxford, Arnold, J. T. Coleridge,(now Sir J. T. Coleridge,) Whately, Pusey, Newman, Manning, the Wilberforces, &c., with several of whom, Arnold in particular, Hare became afterward acquainted through the medium of his brother Augustus, who was then at Oxford, and who formed one among this brilliant galaxy. His schoolfellow, Manning, became, many years later, his neighbour, friend, and official colleague, as a beneficed clergyman and as Archdeacon in the diocese of Chichester. Few things seem to have occasioned Hare more astonishment and grief than the secession, a few years ago, of this amiable man and beautiful writer, a brother-in-law, we believe, of the Wilberforces, to the Church of Rome.

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* Sir H. Havelock, also, the world has learnt, since the first edition of this work was published, was one of his schoolfellows and early friends. Sir Henry revived this friendship in later life, and cherished for Hare a warm affection as well as admiration.

† "Quarterly Review," June, 1855.

It appears, from his own account, to have been during this period of his residence at Cambridge, that Hare and some of his friends came, as he expresses it, on their "entrance into intellectual life," under the influence of the writings of Wordsworth and Coleridge, his obligations to both of whom, particularly to the latter, he never loses an opportunity of stating; whom he acknowledges as the "stimulators and trainers of his thought," and "by whom," he says, "the better part" of his contemporaries, as well as himself, "were preserved from the noxious taint of Byron," from his "antagonism to establisht opinions, and sentimental, self-ogling misanthropy," &c.* It must not be forgotten, however, that there were at this time other influences at Cambridge, besides those either of Byron on the one hand, or of Wordsworth and Coleridge on the other. Charles Simeon was in the zenith of his usefulness, and from the reverent mention made by Hare, both of him and his distinguished follower and friend, Henry Martyn, in the last pages of his last sermon on the "Victory of Faith," we cannot but hope and believe that the faith and piety of Simeon had its share in moulding the character of Hare, notwithstanding the divergency on some points, of no small importance, between the devoted Calvinistic clergyman and the accomplished gownsman who attended his ministry. Hare's success at college fully equalled the promise of his earlier academical career. He was esteemed one of the finest classical scholars even in classic Trinity. For a short time he left college to study the law, but, disrelishing the change, and advised by Whewell, he soon returned to Trinity, where he had a fellowship, and became assistant tutor and classical lecturer. From his "Life of Sterling," it appears that he held this office in 1824, at which time there were attending his lectures, John Sterling, Richard Trench, and Frederick Maurice, all of whom not only looked up to him as a teacher, but clave to him as a friend. It will not be deemed a violent conjecture, if we suppose that it was, in part, through the influence and advice of Hare, that these three remarkable men, two of whom were, in after days, to depart so widely and lamentably from the faith of Christians, were led to the study and admiration of the writings of Coleridge, of whom Hare says, in allusion to the influence of his writings on the mind of these men, that "at the time it was beginning to be acknowledged by more than a few, that Coleridge is the true soverein of modern English thought." "The 'Aids to Reflection,'" he adds, "had recently been published, and were doing the work for which they are so admirably fitted; that book to which many, as has been said by one of Sterling's chief friends, owe even their own selves."* In 1828, Hare and Thirlwall published the first volume of their translation of Niebuhr, the second volume of which was published in 1832. Niebuhr's third volume was left to be translated by other hands. In 1828, also, appeared in two small volumes the "Guesses at Truth. By Two Brothers." Of these the first volume, with large additions, has been re-published in two volumes, issued at a considerable interval from one another, and designated "First" and "Second Series." Each of these has since passed through several editions. The original second volume, with additions, was announced for publication as the "Third Series," before Hare's death; but it has not appeared.

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* "Mission of the Comforter," note Sa.

In 1832, Hare left Cambridge to enter upon the living of Herstmonceux, to which he had been presented by his brother. Before entering upon his pastoral work, he took an extensive tour, in the course of which he visited Rome for the first time. Here, at the English chapel, he preached a sermon, which is published at the end of the same volume with the "Victory of Faith," and is dedicated to Chevalier Bunsen, whose acquaintance Hare made for the first time on this visit to Rome, where Bunsen was then Minister from the Court of Berlin. In the dedication, Hare says of this sermon:—

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* "Life of Sterling," pp. 14, 15.

> "In my own eyes its chief value is, that it formed a new link in our friendship. From the very first, indeed, you had received me with that frank and gracious cordiality which I have so frequently found in your countrymen: from the very first, we both found that we were bound together by our common admiration and love for Niebuhr. But this sermon, you said at the time, convinced you that there was a still more intimate principle of union between us." *

What the value of this friendship was to Hare, will be partly understood by those who are familiar with the published letters of the late Dr. Arnold, some of which are addressed to Bunsen, while in others he frequently speaks of him. No higher compliment could be paid to Bunsen than that which is paid by Hare, when he says, in this dedication, that his "friendship was the most precious part of the treasure he brought away" from Rome. It will be remembered by some of our readers, that some of Bunsen's most valuable recent contributions to the knowledge of Christian antiquity have been affectionately dedicated to Archdeacon Hare.

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* Such a notice as that quoted above reveals in a very pleasing light the Christian sympathies of Bunsen, and reminds us of a passage in Hare's "Guesses at Truth," which might have expressed the experience of a Wesleyan Methodist: "In a regenerate world, the bars and bolts which sever and estrange man from man, would burst like the doors of St. Paul's prison at Philippi, and every man's bonds would be loost. Something of the kind may be seen even now, in the open-hearted confidence and affection which prevail almost at sight among such as find themselves united to each other by the love of a common Saviour,—a confidence and affection foreshowing the blessed communion of saints." (*Guesses at Truth, First Series*, pp. 181–2.) It is easy to understand how readily and how firmly Hare and Bunsen would become united to each other in friendship, if it is true, as Arnold says more than once in his correspondence, that there was a very singular resemblance in character and disposition, between Bunsen and Hare's brother Augustus William.

Returning from the Continent in the latter end of 1833, Hare proceeded to take up his residence at the rectory of Herstmonceux. Doubtless, to such a genial lover of nature and of all homely pleasures and virtues, there must have been much to please and to satisfy in thus returning to spend his days, as a country clergyman, near his patrimonial home, and to preach in the village church to which he had been taken in his childhood, and which stood in the graveyard where the dust of his fathers reposed. Yet it is not easy to imagine a more seemingly unlikely training for the office of teaching his congregation of country-folk, poor and unlettered tillers of the soil, than to have been engaged so many years as classical lecturer at Cambridge, and select preacher before the choicest audiences of the University. Nevertheless, he appears to have been both a happy and a useful man at what he loved to call his "dear Herstmonceux." This retirement, with its quiet duties, and tender, holy memories, seems to have satisfied his heart's desire; so that, when other and richer preferment was offered to him, he declined it. And how well he followed in his brother's steps,—how successfully he endeavoured to accommodate himself, in his style of preaching, to the simplest of his village congregation, without falling below the edification of the few families of the gentry or squirearchy who might attend his ministry, is attested by the two volumes which he published of his parish sermons. There is internal evidence, moreover, in these sermons, that as pastor no less than as preacher, in his ministrations to sick, and poor, and dying, he fulfilled the calling of his office.

In 1840, he was appointed Archdeacon of Lewes,* such being the designation of the archidiaconal district in which Herstmonceux is situated, one of the two into which the diocese of Chichester is divided. This is a High-Church diocese, on the whole; and Mr. Manning, a very High Churchman, who has since, alas! become a pervert to Rome, was the other Archdeacon. The principles of the new Archdeacon must have been unacceptable to not a few of the clergy of the district. At the Archdeacon's visitation in 1835, when but recently come into the diocese, having been appointed to preach at Hastings, he addressed the assembled clergy on the subject of the weakness and strength of their Church, probing its faults and exposing its infirmities with no faltering hand. While he maintained that episcopacy is indispensable to the *perfect* development of the idea of the Church, and is of apostolical institution, he denied absolutely that it is necessary to the *existence* of a Christian Church. "I cannot," he says, "discover the shadow of a word in the Gospels to countenance" this idea. "Feeble and flimsy," he proceeds, "as are the scriptural arguments on which the Romanists maintain the inalienable primacy of St. Peter, they are far more specious and plausible than those derived from the same source, on the strength of which it has been attempted to establish the absolute necessity of episcopacy to the existence of a Christian Church." "Let us rejoice," he says a little afterward, "that the salvation which Christ wrought for His people, is not tied to any one form of Church government or other; to anything that man can set up, or that man can pull down. Let us rejoice that in Christ Jesus neither episcopacy availeth anything, nor anti-episcopacy, but a new creature." Subsequently, he attributes the estrangement of so many of the people of England from the Episcopal clergy and the Established Church, among other principal causes, to the dry, unspiritual, unedifying character of the preaching of the clergy in former days. He speaks of these as having been "too often nothing but the dry husks of didactic morality,—often nothing but the parings and scrapings of controversial theology, delivered in a language, three-fourths of which the people could not understand, made up of long-tailed words of Latin origin, which would have been almost as intelligible to them in their original as in their derivative form,—and in involved logical sentences, which they were utterly unable to disentangle." The Archdeacon, further on, refers to the condition of the great towns of England, for the benefit of which he affirms that, "for scores of years, next to nothing was done by the Church or the State of England; that which was done being done almost entirely by members of the Dissenting communions."

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* In addition to this archdeaconry, there was afterwards bestowed on Hare a prebend at Chichester. He was also appointed one of the chaplains in ordinary to the Queen.

Having thus pointed out the practical errors and shortcomings of the Anglican Church, he then proceeded to indicate some of the causes—the "hindrances and disadvantages" connected with the actual condition of the Church—which had contributed to produce such results. Of these he mentions three: the want of "a regular governing and representative council," a rightly constituted and regulated "convocation;" "the manner in which the highest clerical dignities were filled up during the last century, sometimes with political partisans, sometimes with persons whose sole claims lay in certain accidents of personal connexion, sometimes—and this was almost the best case—with men distinguished [merely] for theological, or, it may be, classical learning;" and "the broad and almost impassable line of demarcation drawn between the clergy and the laity, as if they were two distinct castes, with totally different offices, each of them to be carefully barred out from encroaching on the other."*

We have given so full an outline of the principal portions of this sermon, not merely as characteristic of the candour and liberality of Archdeacon Hare, and of the plain-spoken fidelity with which he was accustomed to admonish his brother clergymen, but as indicative of the position held by himself, and the Coleridgean School generally, in reference to Church policy and polity. The "distinctive character" of this party "is the desire of comprehension," and their "watchwords are charity and toleration." Assuredly, within certain necessary limits, this is the only character which can be wisely or safely sustained by the members of a national Church establishment. The aim of the strict High-Church party, those who believe in apostolical succession and exclusive salvation, and who deliver over Dissenters to "uncovenanted mercies," must be to secure uniformity of creed, ritual, and all external Church action, as their only means and index of unity. But the motto of the Broad Churchman is rather unity in variety, and variety in order to unity. This is the position which Archdeacon Hare maintained with increasing earnestness to the last, and which he has especially contended for in a sermon on the "Unity of the Church," and its introductory dedication to Archdeacon Manning, (who had advocated the opposite view,) and in the notes on this sermon and dedication, which will be found (both sermon and notes) in the two volumes of the "Mission of the Comforter," first edition. The same view is also maintained in his "Contest with Rome." While, however, on this point, and on the associated questions of the sacraments and the priesthood, differing from the Romeward section of the Anglican Church, the new school agrees with the High Church of all grades, from the Bishop of Exeter and Dr. Pusey downward, in desiring to see Convocation revived, and the Church enabled to take independent action. On this point Hare long anticipated the recent movement, and he continued steadfastly to advocate the same view. Only it was his desire—as it is that of every Broad Churchman—to see the laity conjoined with the clergy in Convocation, and the clergy themselves much more fairly and adequately represented than according to the actual model. The Evangelical section of the English clergy generally differ both from the High Church and the Broad Church, in regard to this question, deprecating the restoration of the Convocation to functional life. The reason of this is, that while, on the one hand, too many of them lack breadth and boldness of view, such as would lead them to contend for a remodelled Convocation adequately representative of both the laity and the great body of the clergy; on the other hand, they feel a shrewd fear and strong foreboding lest, as the Convocation is actually constituted, the learning, eloquence, and general ability of the predominating High-Church element should prove utterly destructive to the prospects of evangelical religion in the Church of England.

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* "Sermons preacht on Particular Occasions," pp. 155–6, and pp. 166–175. Erastianism, patronage, and the dogma of the priesthood are, briefly, the hindrances and evils indicated above.

Hare's twenty years of life, after his settlement at Herstmonceux, were years of quiet retirement, but yet of great mental activity. His attention was wakefully alive to all the important questions of the day affecting the religion and social condition of the nation, and especially the interests of the Church of England. He evidently felt it to be his particular duty to do battle against the progress of Tractarianism and of Romanizing errors. While a recluse student at Cambridge, and conversant with the great Popish writers more than with Popery itself, he showed that indulgence to Popery which is shown by so many scholars. He understood its heresies, and rightly estimated its usurpations; but he admired the wonderful energy and ability exhibited in its earlier history; he sympathized, to a certain extent, with its love of ritual beauty and splendour; and could not be insensible to the musical power and pomp of its services. Indeed, to admire music and painting, sculpture and architecture, was (literally) a part of Hare's religion, as it was a part of his creed, a favourite tenet of his "Broad" Churchism, that music, painting, and all the arts not only may, but should, be made tributary to religion. To cultivate his taste was a dictate of his piety. And with what a keen and exquisite relish he had studied the works of the masters of art of all schools, but especially of those Italian masters whose genius was employed upon sacred subjects, will be remembered by all who have read the "Guesses at Truth." It is no wonder, then, that his æsthetical tastes, as well as his catholic sympathies as to all things human and humanizing, should have disposed him to regard with as much leniency as was possible in a good Protestant, the errors and sins of the Church of Rome, more particularly in the ages preceding the Reformation. For like reasons, he would be disposed to look with indulgence upon the earlier movements of the Oxford High-Church party. But he never seems to have vacillated in his *principles* on these subjects. His acquaintance with mediæval and modern history, his love of liberty and abhorrence of despotism, his independent spirit of investigation, which led him as strongly to require, as he freely conceded, the right of private judgment, and his profound admiration of the character of the German and English Reformers, especially of Luther, all these things constituted for him a seven-fold shield against the influence of Romish principles and Romeward tendencies. His visit to Rome in 1833, of the effect of which upon his mind he speaks in his later editions of the "Guesses at Truth, First Series," appears to have added depth and vividness to his convictions of the essential evil and necessary curse of Romanism; and it may be justly affirmed that, during the last fifteen years of his life, Hare was the most independent, fearless, effective, and in every way accomplished opponent of Tractarian sophistry and bigotry, and of Roman audacity and assumption, to be found in the ranks of the English clergy. His "Mission of the Comforter," and his "Contest with Rome," are mainly controversial. He was cut off in the midst of conflict with Popish principles; his last charge, delivered not long before his death, having been a powerful and energetic admonition upon this subject, eminently suited to the needs of his Church. What his feelings were with reference to this work, and how his aspect toward Romanism had become changed in the course of years, is partly indicated in his "Guesses at Truth, First Series," pp. 230–237, pp. 28–30, and pp. 51, 52.

The Rev. H. V. Elliott, of Brighton, in his funeral sermon on Archdeacon Hare, justly says, in reference to his archidiaconal charges,—

> "In them, very conspicuous was the genuine and outspoken love of what he held to be truth and righteousness, accompanied by a largeness of heart in seeking and discerning all the good that could be found in all. Some of us were of opinion that his generosity of praise precluded him from the equal discernment of evil; and that his love of peace, which had its

roots in his heart, attempted unions which too great difference of principles rendered impossible."

This is a feature of his character which must be borne in mind in estimating his conduct; and it may assist us to understand his grief and surprise at the ultimate secession of Archdeacon Manning, (which yet was in itself the natural termination of his previous course,) his unqualified praise of Maurice, and his undiscriminating veneration for Coleridge, in respect to whom he seems only to have regarded the goodness and wisdom which were apparent in his writings, without caring to notice the error and evil which were sometimes intermingled, and oftener still thickly set in tangled depths behind or underneath, in the shape of notes, appendices, &c. Acute as Hare was, and energetically as he opposed what he regarded as pernicious and threatening error or heresy, he had no delight in hunting for error through abstrusities of thought and language, or in beating the bush of mysticism to drive it into open day; and sometimes, like John Wesley, he suffered his charity to blindfold his acuteness.

Hare had, for some years before his death, been subject to a very painful internal disease. Its returns had latterly become increasingly frequent and severe, and one of these carried him off on the 23rd of January, 1855, at Herstmonceux. He died in the faith and consolation of the Gospel. His last clear words were remarkable. In answer to the question how he would be moved, he said, in a voice more distinct and strong than he had reached for several past days, with his eyes raised toward heaven, and a look of indescribable brightness, "Upwards! Upwards!" His age was fifty-nine.

CHAPTER V.

HARE'S PHILOSOPHY, CRITICISM, AND CONTROVERSIES.

We have already, in the foregoing sketch, afforded our readers the means of forming some estimate of the position, character, and accomplishments of Archdeacon Hare, whom, so long as he lived, the public rightly regarded as the principal and ablest representative of the loose and somewhat nebulous party known as the Broad Church. We should very insufficiently perform our task, however, if we did not add some more specific remarks upon his character and qualifications as philosopher, critic, controversialist, and religious teacher. The present chapter will have regard to the first three of these aspects of his character. His theology and religious teaching will be reserved for consideration separately.

We begin with Hare's philosophy; for philosophy should lie at the root of criticism, and the truths which it is in search of, or which it professes to have found, are, for the most part, such as religion rather assumes than expressly reveals, although consistency with the plain teachings and implications of Divine revelation is the highest test, so far as it can be applied, of the correctness of philosophical conclusions. We have already seen how emphatically Hare acknowledges his obligations to the teaching and influence of Coleridge. Such acknowledgments are very thickly scattered over his writings. Indeed, he quotes Coleridge expressly, and in the way of full and exact citation, not only more frequently than any other uninspired writer, but, in his notes to the "Mission of the Comforter," more frequently than the Scriptures themselves; and he yields to him an authority and reverence, after the sacred writers, only inferior, if inferior, to that which he pays to Luther. From this, and from Hare's eulogies of his brother-in-law, Maurice, it has been very naturally inferred by many, that Hare had fully embraced Coleridge's peculiar philosophical and metaphysical views. Hence, not only by the writers in the "English Review," but by others, he has been involved along with Coleridge, Maurice, Sterling, Francis Newman, and even Blanco White, in one common sentence of undiscriminating condemnation. There can be no doubt that the philosophy of Coleridge and of Maurice has shaped their theology, and been at the root of their religious heresies. Hence it would be very natural to expect, that if Hare agreed with them in philosophy, he would at any rate approximate towards them in his theological views. If, therefore, justice is to be done to him, it is a vital inquiry to what extent his philosophical views coincided with those of Coleridge. It is true, indeed, that what is expressly philosophical does not take up much of Hare's writings; but the inquiry may not be the less vital and important on that account. It is plain that he had a settled philosophy, and that his philosophy imbued his criticism, and gave a hue and tone to his theology. Nor can his relation to Coleridge and to English theology be understood, or a complete view of his character and genius be gained, unless this inquiry be determined.

Hare calls himself one of Coleridge's "pupils;" yet we doubt if he was one of his disciples. It is probable that Coleridge had not finally settled his philosophico-theological views until Hare had for some time been an independent student of German literature and philosophy. It is certain that the "Aids to Reflection" were not published until Hare's principles were fully determined, and his position as a thinker and scholar fixed. In 1816, Coleridge, shattered in body, and all but wrecked in mind and palsied in moral power, through his terrible vice of opium-eating, found refuge and guardianship under the vigilant, though tender and reverent, care of the Gillmans, at Highgate. Before this, he had only published, in philosophy, the "Friend," a periodical which had completely failed, and was soon dropped. Soon afterwards he published the *Biographia Literaria.*

It is not easy to conceive that either of these publications, or both of them together, could produce a critical and determinative effect upon the character and development of Hare's philosophical and religious opinions. He was then a man of established reputation at Cambridge. We gather from the "Guesses at Truth," and the "Notes to the Mission of the Comforter," that Hare, in middle age, had been for many years familiarly acquainted with the philosophical writings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and that he had exercised upon them his independent powers of criticism. He had, in fact, learnt German at Weimar, while but a child; and he had a much more extensive and profound acquaintance, for many years of his life, with not only German theology, but German philosophy, than Coleridge ever had.* It is scarcely to be supposed, therefore, that in the maturity of his own powers and learning, he would adopt at second hand from Coleridge that philosopher's rendering and adaptation of Kant's Philosophy of Pure Reason and Schelling's Dynamic Philosophy.

What was the amount of Hare's personal intercourse with Coleridge, or when it commenced, we know not: but it is not difficult to understand the general reasons which led him to hail with gratitude Coleridge's appearance and influence as a moral teacher and philosophical reformer. Let it be remembered that, during the latter part of the last century, and the early years of the present, the received philosophy in England was Sensationalism in intelligence and thought, and Utilitarianism in morals; and that the received theology contented itself, when didactic, with dealing forth the dry husks of a powerless moralism, and, when argumentative, with insisting upon the external evidences of Christianity. Grotius and Paley (whose "Moral Philosophy," no less than his "Evidences," was a textbook at Cambridge) were the sole oracles on the subject of the authority and evidences of the Christian religion. The Sermons of Blair were the favourite model of preaching. True, even then there were such men as Venn, Simeon, Newton, and Scott in the pulpits of the Establishment; but these were stigmatized as enthusiasts and Methodists. There was, indeed, also the learning, logic, orthodoxy, and eloquence of Horsley. But his eloquence was academic, not popular; his orthodoxy was wholly wanting in evangelical feeling and fervour; his preaching utterly lacked the *spirit* of holiness and love. It was, apart from Methodism, a heartless, pithless, powerless, Christless age. Arianism and Unitarianism, always found alongside of Sensationalism and Materialism, had crept like a fog-blight over half the face of British Christianity. From such a condition of things, and from all its causes and accessories, the spirit of such men as Hare revolted. We can scarcely wonder that they were ready to fly for refuge from Condillac and Priestley to Kant; from the cold, aguey flat of British thought and feeling to the transcendental heights of Germanism, with all their mistiness. Nay, even the idealistic egoism of the Hegelians would seem less repelling than a fatalistic Materialism. Under the influence of such feelings, it is easy to understand how the appearance of a teacher like Coleridge would be welcomed. He was the declared enemy of the sensational and utilitarian philosophers. He was reputed to have mastered the German philosophy, to have abstracted from it what was sound and true, and to have attained to a clear vision, from the utmost height of human thought, of the ultimate unity, the perfect and vital harmony, of philosophy and theology, of the revelation of reason and the revelation of God. He professed himself a devout and orthodox Christian believer. He spoke on

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* Writing in February, 1849, Hare says, in his "Letter to the Editor of the English Review," "That there is such a thing as German faith, that there are precious masses of German thought, I know, from an experience of more than thirty years, for which I shall ever be thankful." It follows from this that his direct and independent acquaintance with German philosophy and theology must have commenced at least as early as 1818. Since the text of this chapter and the preceding part of this note were first published in the "American Methodist Quarterly Review" for April, 1856, the Introduction to his Charges already quoted, and which is understood to be from the pen of his brother-in-law, Mr. Maurice, has fully confirmed this inference. See an extract from a letter to Lady Jones, p. xiii.

Christian subjects in a corresponding tone of reverence. He read and loved the works of Leighton, Jeremy Taylor, and others of the old divines of the English Church. He decried dry orthodoxy, and taught that a mere dogmatic faith was dead. He spoke of spiritual influences, and magnified the internal and spiritual work of Christianity. Thus opposing himself equally to dry, dogmatic orthodoxy, and to shallow, flippant infidelity, he appeared as a new star in the heavens, and soon was surrounded by others, enough to form a constellation. These rejoiced to be found at the opposite pole to the luminaries of the "Edinburgh Review," who were unhappily distinguished at that time for a sceptical and irreverent spirit.

We believe that the foregoing remarks fairly account for the position which Coleridge gained at the head of a school, and for the fact that Hare early enrolled himself among the number of his admirers. This he would do without pledging himself beforehand to his peculiar views in philosophy and theology. What those views were has been already sufficiently indicated. They were not given to the world in anything like a fair outline until many years had passed away from their first announcement; and though the world was eagerly and wonderingly expectant, they were never given but in outline or in fragments. Where they are most peculiar, —where they profess to solve the perilous and profound difficulties which surround the estate of man,—they become impenetrably abstruse. That Hare, in his repeated commendations of Coleridge, meant to commit himself to this incomprehensible philosophy, we cannot believe. His own perspicuous intellect and the pure transparency of his style must be taken as evidence that this could never be. It is remarkable, too, that he never quotes or refers to the peculiarly abstruse passages. Nor can we imagine a task much less likely to be agreeable to his taste than to be compelled to seek a path through such dark and tangled, thorny and fruitless, thickets and wildernesses of speculative and jargonish mysticism as some of Coleridge's notes and appendices. But what

Hare chiefly valued in Coleridge was his noble ideal of thought and purpose, his reverent spirit, his far-seeing, practical wisdom, his critical and intuitive sagacity, his union of deep learning, fine taste, and recluse habits, with philosophic breadth of view and wide human sympathies.

We have already seen that one main point, perhaps *the* main point, of Coleridge's Intellectual Philosophy was the Kantian distinction between the Reason and the Understanding, and that upon this distinction he grafted his peculiar and, as we think, unchristian doctrine of the Logos. The understanding is the logical faculty in man; the reason is the intuitive faculty, which stands face to face with spiritual and essential truth, and the immediate object of which is, as Mr. Morell says, "the good, the beautiful, and the true." The intuitive faculty in man has thus assigned to it an entirely separate sphere, and that the very highest. It dwells in a region apart, elevated above that of the logical understanding, and is quite independent of it. Being thus independent of the understanding, it is independent, so far as the morally good and right is concerned, of revelation also, (which must be presented to it through the understanding,) except in so far as it may, by its own light and authority, approve and warrant that which revelation brings before it. For reason, understood as above defined, must, whether in matters of taste, criticism, or morals, be the supreme judge, and be a law unto itself. It would seem to follow from these principles, if pushed fully to their consequences, that the scintillations of genius and the light of piety are but different manifestations of the same faculty. How well all this accords with Coleridge's supplementary doctrine, that reason is the light in man of the Divine Logos, and how naturally it is developed into Maurice's doctrine of the identification of the Word or Son of God with all men, will be readily seen. How nearly related it is to the theories of the modern Pantheists, is no less obvious.

Many who have not followed Coleridge in the theological doctrine, have agreed with him in reference to the metaphysical distinction. How far Hare so agreed with him it is hard to say, though there can be no doubt that he did so to a certain extent. Coleridge himself distinguishes all men into two classes, "besides which," he says, "it is next to impossible to conceive a third:—the one considers reason a quality or attribute; the other considers it a power." Hare evidently belonged to the latter class, and so far he agreed with Coleridge. It is a main feature in his philosophy to take knowledge in man of instinctive or "intuitive" principles, which constitute his laws of spiritual activity and feeling, which operate before they are recognised, which may be in continual operation, and yet never be recognised, which can never be adequately understood, and in attempting to apprehend and define which the understanding is extremely liable to positive and serious error; but which, nevertheless, imply the deepest truths and most vital mysteries of our being. These intuitive principles Hare follows Coleridge in calling "ideas," and in referring to reason as the source or "power" from which they proceed. Like Coleridge, also, he terms the abstractions of the understanding "conceptions," in contradistinction from these ideas of the reason, and teaches that no conception can ever be an adequate or perfectly true exponent of an idea.* Further, Hare follows Coleridge in maintaining that these instincts, intuitive principles, or laws of the human spirit, are directly from God, and imply, if we could but learn their lesson and read their meaning, Divine and essential truths. We have already, in the chapter on Coleridge, instanced man's sense of free-will, as one of the "ideas" or "truth-powers" of this philosophy. This is, assuredly, a sense or instinct, or intuitive principle, which operates from the beginning, which implies a mystery not to be explained, which, though it be denied, is not the less operative, and in attempting to conceive and explain which men's understandings have fallen into grievous error.

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* See above, chap. ii., pp. 23, 24.

That such were Hare's views might be proved by many citations from his "Guesses at Truth," which, indeed, are pervasively coloured by this philosophy of ideas. But two citations will be sufficient, the latter of which will at the same time illustrate Hare's sentiments as to the philosophy of Locke,* (whom we think he misunderstood,) and of his successors.

"As the Understanding feels the utmost confidence in recognising its own forms in the outward world, so does the Imagination feel a like confidence in recognising those ideas there, which rise out of the fontal depths of the Reason, to be embodied and clothed by its fostering hand."—*Sermon on the Law of Self-Sacrifice, published in the* "*Victory of Faith,*" *&c.*, p. 255.

"The purport of the 'Essay on the Human Understanding,' like that of its unacknowledged parent, and that of the numerous fry which sprang from it, was to maintain that we have no ideas, or, what amounts to the same thing, that our ideas are nothing more than abstractions, defecated by divers processes of the understanding.

"There is no hope of arriving at truth, until we have learnt to acknowledge that the creatures of space and time are, as it were, so many chambers of the prison-house, in which the timeless, spaceless ideas of the Eternal Mind are shut up; and that the utmost reach of abstraction is, not to create, but to liberate, to give freedom and consciousness to that which existed potentially and in embryo before."—*Guesses, &c., Second Series*, p. 219.

There can be no doubt, indeed, that in general Hare must be described as a transcendentalist in philosophy; and that he not only agreed thus far with Coleridge, but admired greatly Coleridge's German masters, who were also his own. He speaks in the highest terms not only of Kant, but of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and one object of his "Guesses at Truth" is manifestly to re-produce and interpret to the English mind some of the profound and true ideas (for there are such) brought to light by their philosophical studies. Still it is plain that he had read these writers discriminatively. He does not speak as if he had adopted the peculiar system of any one of them; and it is impossible that he could have agreed with them all. He seems to have abstracted from each of them, and to have adapted to his own philosophy, that which appeared to him to be true. How far he acted in a similar way with Coleridge is the question. We have seen to what extent he certainly agrees with him. We cannot, however, believe, much as he admired and commended him, that he went all lengths with him. For example, Coleridge, in a passage of his "Table Talk," with which many passages in his writings fully accord, speaks of "that higher state, to which Aristotle could never raise himself, but which was natural to Plato, and has been to others," [himself, for instance,] "in which the understanding is distinctly contemplated, and, as it were, looked down upon from the throne of actual ideas, or living, inborn, essential truths." He speaks of the spirit's ascending into "the empyrean of ideas." He identifies the reason with the Divine Logos, making Him, in this sense, to be the "light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." He denies, as many have learned from him to deny, the possibility of a revelation *ab extra*. He dares even to speak of the Trinity as an "idea," and to analyse this "idea" in such a way as to resolve the Tri-unity into what is really no better than a refined, Platonized Sabellianism.

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* Mr. Henry Rogers has a masterly defence of Locke in his collected "Essays." A work, also, has lately been published by Professor Webb, of Trinity College, Dublin, entitled, "The Intellectualism of Locke,"—a work of the highest excellence in its kind, both as respects form, style, and argument, —which is, on most points, a triumphant vindication of Locke.

Such were some of the results of Coleridge's peculiar philosophy, as applied to solve, or as used to measure and define, the mysteries of being, human and Divine.* To these results we find no evidence to prove that Hare gave in his adhesion. Nowhere does he seem to make reason a supreme, intuitive power, whose sphere is above and aloof from that of the understanding. Nor does his nomenclature uniformly agree with that of the Coleridgeans. Sometimes, indeed, especially in his

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* See the disquisition on the Reason and Understanding in the "Aids to Reflection," and the "Notes upon English Divines," *passim*.

"Victory of Faith," he appears to use the words "reason" and "understanding" in senses altogether different from Coleridge's; and we can scarcely avoid concluding that one object which he had in view in writing that series of discourses was to oppose those German philosophers who identify faith and reason, and to show that the highest objects of faith are such as reason, whether called speculative or practical, could never by itself, or with the understanding as its minister, have discovered, or enabled men to conceive. In his sermon on the "Children of Light" he goes farther still. His words are so striking and important, as coming from a writer of Coleridge's school, that we must quote them. "Reason," he says, "is so far from affording any assurance of a blessed immortality, that a blessed immortality without a mediator, without an atonement, is rather repugnant to Reason. Not that Reason could have devised such a mediation, could have thought of such a reconciling solution for the startling difficulty which stared it in the face at the end of the prospect of human nature; although, when such a scheme is set before it, Reason, if rightly exercised, may recognise its fitness and sufficiency. Indeed, the business of Reason is not so much to divine what is not shown, as to discern and exhibit the consistency of what is shown."

In his "Guesses at Truth, First Series," p. 113, occur the following connected apophthegmatic passages:—

> "When the pit seats itself in the boxes, the gallery will soon drive out both, and occupy the whole of the house.
>
> "In like manner, when the calculating, expediential understanding has superseded the conscience and the reason, the senses soon rush out from their dens, and sweep away everything before them. If there be nothing brighter than the reflected light of the moon, the wild beasts will not keep in their lair. And when that moon, having reacht a moment of apparent glory by looking full at the sun, fancies it may turn away from the sun, and still have light in itself, it straightway begins to wane, and ere long goes out altogether, leaving its worshippers in the darkness which they had vainly dreamt it

would enlighten. This was seen in the Roman empire. It was seen in the last century all over Europe, above all in France."

In this latter true and beautiful passage it will be observed that the conscience is adjoined to reason, and both are supposed to be enlightened by revelation, directly or indirectly, through the written word or through tradition: reason is not made a primary light, or independent authority.

Such passages as the following seem to be explicit in their opposition to the dogma of the separate supremacy of the reason, and are couched in phraseology very different from that of either Kant or Coleridge:—

"The word *reason* is often used to signify the whole complex of our reflective faculties; while at other times it is restricted to the logical faculty, or the power of drawing inferences. In the former sense reason is much less likely to err; though even then it needs to be continually refresht and replenisht by influxes from the imagination and the heart......In the latter sense, reason has often been a fruitful parent of errour and mischief, especially since the middle of the last century: and in this sense I have used the word when speaking against it. When nothing more than the mere faculty of reasoning, reason is most fallible; as is proved by the myriads of abortions and misgrowths in the history of philosophy and science. This, its fallibility, does not arise merely, or mainly, from slips of inaccuracy, but still more from its neglect of those corrections and adjustments which must be introduced at every step, before logical inferences can become scientific inductions."—*Preface to Sermon entitled "The Children of Light," in "Sermons Preacht on Particular Occasions."* *

"He who is the worthy, satisfying object of faith, must be a living personal being, a being to whom we stand in a living personal relation, who acts upon us, and will continue so to do. Nay, in its higher manifestations, as trust in Him in whom we believe, faith requires not merely a living personal god, but a god on whose love we can rely. Now the god of what has erroneously been called 'natural religion,' is not such a god, as has been observed already. He is a bare notional abstraction, devised to supply a ground and consistency for the truths of reason,......but standing in no direct personal relation to man. He is necessary, indeed, to our existence; but, so far as regards our after-life, it is the same thing whether there be such a god or no. Hence he is not an object of faith, but solely of belief. The reason may be brought to acknowledge him; but he will exercise no more power over the heart and will than any truth of geometry or ontology. If the heart is to be stirred, if the will is to be roused and renewed, faith must have a god to believe in who is not like the god of philosophy—a shadowy complex of negations to the conditions of time and space, shrouded in the abyss of eternity; but a god who cares for his creatures, and watches over them, and has given proof that he does so."—*Victory of Faith*, pp. 140, 141. *Cf.* pp. 122, 123, 130.

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* What follows this extract on pp. 5, 6, should also be carefully marked.

There is in such teaching as this no approximation to any form or modification of that philosophy of Schelling which Coleridge vainly attempted to transform and transfigure into a conformity with the spirit and doctrines of Christianity, and which substitutes for faith in a personal and living God, the "intuition by reason of the Absolute." No, the warm pulses of Hare's living faith would have ceased to beat in the chill and rarefied atmosphere of that transcendental peak of the intuitional philosophy on which Schelling and his followers had chosen their abode.

We fear some of our readers may be disposed to think this discussion more curious than useful, and scarcely necessary in order to form a sufficiently accurate estimate of Hare as a writer and teacher. But we confess that, in our judgment, the point into which we have been inquiring is fundamental. The most vital errors of Coleridge, and of a considerable number of those who profess to belong to his school, are connected with the distinction they make between reason and understanding. This distinction, itself nearly resembling one of the peculiar tenets of the Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, serves them as a stock on which they graft —if we might not more properly say, a root from which they develope—a system of Neo-Platonic doctrine, more or less complete and defined, and which may now take the shape of such a "philosophy of religion" as that which has been taught by Mr. J. D. Morell, or again may be logically carried out into such a scheme of doctrine as that taught by Mr. Maurice in his "Theological Essays," which are only a fair and thorough-going *reductio ad absurdum*, as evangelical and orthodox Christians may be pardoned for considering them, of germinal principles very distinctly to be recognised in Coleridge's writings. It could not, therefore, but be a pertinent and an important inquiry how far Hare agreed with Coleridge on this point. Hare could scarcely have come so near as he does to the Evangelical school, if he had believed in the independent supremacy of reason, apart from the understanding and the revealed word of God, as the power or sense whereby we ascertain and authenticate beauty, truth, and goodness.*

Plato might, by his dialectic science, seek after *τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν*, and no doubt was often able by his "intuitions," common to himself and to others, to expose false and evil notions, and to bring to light that which was good, and beautiful, and true. But surely this is no reason why the admirers of Plato should, at this time of day, strive to establish a system which makes the mind, in its sense of goodness, truth, and beauty, independent of the teachings and corrections of the reflective and logical understanding. No doubt those have erred who have recognised, or seemed by their customary language to recognise, nothing in man but the powers of sensation and of reflection, no intuitive activities and judgments, no primary beliefs, no moral sense; some of whom have reasoned about the soul as if it were merely passive, or at most possessed but a mechanical activity, sustained wholly and solely by influences and impulses from without; while others have seemed to suppose that logic and reasoning were the only powers by which it is to be moulded and formed, to be swayed and controlled. And Coleridge, no doubt, so far did good service as he opposed himself to such notions as these, although he seems to us to have erred in the estimate which he formed of Locke's philosophy as related to these notions, and to have greatly exaggerated the danger on that side of the question, while he rushed, in the other direction, into equally extreme and yet more dangerous error. Hare welcomed Coleridge as taking the lead in a controversy that needed to be fought, but he did not go all lengths with him. What his views were may be partly gathered from the quotations recently given. We add a few illustrative extracts here. Of the first three, taken from the "Guesses at Truth," the first is an apophthegm not from the pen of Hare, but of his brother: there can be no doubt, however, that he fully adopted it as his own.

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* Mr. Maurice, in his "Introduction," which has been several times referred to, assumes the full coincidence of Hare with Coleridge and himself in philosophy. But his arguments are so feeble as to discredit his assertion.

> "The feeling is often the deeper truth; the opinion the more superficial one."—*Guesses at Truth, First Series*, p. 260.
>
> "On the other hand, historians are apt to write mainly from the understanding, and therefore presumptuously and narrow-mindedly. Dwelling amid abstractions, the understanding has no eye for the rich varieties of real life, but only sees its own forms and fictions. Hence no faculty is more monotonous; a Jew's harp itself is scarcely more so; while the imagination embraces and comprehends the full, perfect, and magnificent diapason of nature."—*Ibid.*, p. 399.
>
> "Attempts were made to subject moral and spiritual truths to the self-same processes, which were found to hold good in the material world, but against which they revolted as incompatible with their free nature. Then, that which would not submit to the same strict logical formules, was treated as an outcast from the domain of Reason, and handed over to the empirical Understanding, which judges of expediency, and utility, and the adaptation of means to ends. Sometimes, too, this faculty, which at best is only the prime minister of Reason, its *Maire du Palais*, was confounded with and supplanted it."—*Second Series*, p. 300.

The passages which immediately follow are from the "Contest with Rome," and refer to Dr. Newman:—

> "Logic is ever his favourite weapon, his harlequin's sword, with which he works whatever transformations he pleases. Now logic, it is well known, or, rather, the abuse and perversion of logic, has ever been a fruitful source of all manner of errours. By logical deductions from an abstract conception, which can never at the utmost be more than a shadowy ghost or a skeleton of a living idea, the physical philosophy of antiquity and of the schoolmen was led into those extravagances from which Bacon delivered it. By logical deductions from premises imperfectly apprehended, all the heresies by which the Church has been troubled sprang up……Thus, even in speculative matters, logic is a mere Cyclops, one-eyed, looking straight before it. But still more delusive is its guidance in practical life……The great use of our dialectic faculty is to serve as a corrective for the logical, as we continually see in the Platonic dialogues," &c. —Pp. 107, 108.
>
> "The shallowness of this passage might be deemed marvellous, as proceeding from so acute a logician, were it not continually found that the logical faculty is totally distinct from the apprehensive and the intuitive, and often subversive, or at least perversive, of them."—Page 127.

These passages are not only characteristic of Hare, but express a feeling, or rather a principle, common to the whole Coleridgean school. It must not, however, be supposed that Hare carried his feeling on this point to anything like the absurd lengths to which Maurice goes, who is perpetually pouring contempt on logic, and really seems to consider neither the faculty nor the science as good for anything. On the contrary, Hare was not only himself a master in logic, but his writings abound with allusions which show how highly he valued its right use, and how much he enjoyed its skilful and legitimate display.

We have been considering Hare as a philosopher. He has composed no philosophical treatise; but a truly philosophical spirit pervades all his writings. He is not, indeed, abstruse or abstract; he does not deal in metaphysical terms or transcendental jargon; but apophthegms, maxims, reflections, the fruit of wide reading, deep thinking, keen observation, and intuitive sagacity, aided by a rich fancy, and quickened by a warm and genial heart, attest him to be a true and profound philosopher. His "Guesses at Truth" are a repository of critical essays upon many subjects both of philosophy and literature, intermingled with crystals and gems of philosophic thought or moral sentiment.

What our readers have already learned of Hare will have prepared them to expect that he was one of the finest and most genial of critics. Scarcely anything, except the pure sciences, seems to be out of his range. He appears to be equally familiar with the most various themes, and alike graceful, wise, and witty in handling them all. His versatile genius is equally prepared to discuss poetry and philosophy, or painting and sculpture, or acting and the drama, or oratorios and even operas, while, at another time, his exact erudition is as remarkable as the searching keenness of his criticism, when he is exposing the ignorant errors in a reprint or translation of some old divine or father, printed at the Oxford press!

There can be no doubt that the effect of German philosophy upon criticism has been good as well as evil. It has, indeed, infused in many instances a spirit of presumption, which, under the name of the "higher criticism," has pronounced the most hasty and arrogant, often also exceedingly superficial, sentences, bringing all the history and genius of the past to the bar of its own private and personal tastes and prejudices, under the name of "intuitions." At the same time, it must be admitted that it has led to a profounder bottoming of all critical investigations, and to a recognition of universal laws and principles of thought, feeling, and expression, and of intellectual and moral advancement, which had previously been little adverted to. The modern school of criticism is not content to rest upon or regard merely conventional rules of propriety and elegance. It seeks for a fundamental standard of truth and beauty. In the works of the masters it studies the principles which their style and method exemplify, the laws which they intuitively respected, the "ideas" which unconsciously governed them and moulded their productions.* It strives to transcend the mere form and pressure of the times, and at least approximate to the ascertainment of laws which should regulate, connect, and harmonize all utterances of thought and feeling, all shapings of expression, for all time. Of this profounder and more subtle and piercing criticism, Hare was one of the earliest English exponents. He appropriates the best principles and finest spirit of his German masters, and at the same time leaves all their obscurity behind. What they have suggested, he makes all his own, and at the same time makes it purely English. The "Guesses at Truth" abound with charming exemplifications of his critical principles and method. His disquisitions on the law of human progress, as exemplified in the history of the race, and on the special and distinctive characteristics of the heathen civilizations and of Christian progress, from age to age, are worthy of the translator of Niebuhr and the friend of Bunsen, while all doubtful fatalistic or pantheistic ideas and speculations are avoided. His verbal criticisms, too, are very fine, and remind us that Trench was one of his pupils at Cambridge. His remarks on the relations and peculiar significance of synonymous, or seemingly synonymous, words and phrases, as used in different languages and at different eras of the world's history, are subtle, striking, and sometimes profound. There are also many isolated criticisms, especially of passages in Shakspeare, Milton, and Wordsworth, which are highly acute and suggestive. The criticisms, however, contained in the "Guesses" are of too great length, and at the same time of too close a texture, to admit of quotation either in whole or in part. The *morceaux* we are about to quote from the notes to the "Mission of the Comforter," and from the "Vindication of Luther," may afford some glimpses of his critical principles and method, and show some flashes of his spirit:—

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* Let us here say, however, that we do not believe in the unconsciousness and mere intuitiveness of these operations in men of the very highest genius. We think Hare carries his views too far in this direction. The "understanding" in the Coleridgean sense has fully as much to do with the grandest and most perfect works of genius, as the "reason." The artists are their own critics, and a conscious law unto themselves.

"Able as the *Histoire des Variations* doubtless is, if regarded as the statement and pleading of an unprincipled and unscrupulous advocate, it is anything but a great work. For no work can be great, unless it is written with a paramount love of truth. This is the moral element of all genius; and without it the finest talents are worth little more than a conjuror's sleight of hand."—*Vindication, &c.*, p. 273.

"Alas! it would seem as though the spirit which led scholars to strive after accuracy even in the minutest things, *alacri constantique animo*, were almost extinct."—*Mission, &c. Second Edition*, p. 258.

"I do not make these remarks censoriously. In this age of speed and slovenliness,—of water-colours and lithography and photography,—when everybody has so many things to do, that nobody can do anything, and the only way of keeping the world's wheels in motion is to make matter do the work of mind,—and when the patient and unweariable love of study, which animated men in former generations, and which thought no labour too great to be spent even on minute questions of grammar and orthography, if it did but lead to a satisfactory result, is no longer to be found, owing to the blighting system of using emulation, instead of the love of knowledge, as the main instrument of education,—the reprint of Andrewes is certainly among the more creditable samples of its class. But," &c.—*Ibid.*, p. 299.

"In the recent Oxford edition, the good old English word *consort*, which so happily expresses the combination and union of sweet sounds, and reciprocally gives and receives beauty from its association with the most perfect bonds of human fellowship, has been changed into the modern *concert*, which, I believe, was never used till the eighteenth century, was borrowed from the French and Italian, and, though of questionable origin even there, was assumed, in the prevalent estrangement, not merely from the antiquities, but even from the best ages of our language, to be the genuine form. In language, above all, do we continually see how ignorance and careless presumption, when they fancy they are correcting, are in fact corrupting. Johnson pronounces *consort*, as applied to music, to be 'probably a mistake for *concert*.' It never occurred to him to ask if any English writer, before the year 1700, had ever used *concert*. Whether in history, or in other branches of speculation, we get on ill, when we go backward crabwise, taking the present for our standard, and *measuring ourselves*, and all others, *by ourselves.* This practice, reprehended by St. Paul, will not conduce to our advance in knowledge, any more than in holiness. Even Malone, though a man of much antiquarian reading, and of some learning, fancied he was correcting the text of Shakspeare, when he altered *consort*, in the 'Two Gentlemen of Verona,' act ii., scene 2, into *concert*, declaring himself 'convinced that *consort* was only the old spelling of *concert*,' though how it could be so in every instance, were *concert* the right word, would be inexplicable. Even in the recent reprints of our Bible the same corruption has been introduced in *Ecclesiasticus* xxxii. 5. And most readers would probably deem it a mistake, if they met with the true reading of Milton's beautiful lines :—

> 'O may we soon again renew that song,
> And keep in time with heaven, till God ere long
> To His celestial consort us unite,
> To live with Him and sing in endless morn of light!'

Nay, I should not be surprised if some lynx were to spy out lurking Romanism therein."—*Mission, &c., Note Yf. First Edition*, pp. 949, 950.

The extracts following will not only illustrate his critical temper and faculty, but his large-hearted and catholic admiration of excellence, wherever found, and of every kind.

"Calvin's 'Commentaries,' although they are almost entirely doctrinal and practical, taking little note of critical and philological questions, keep much closer to the text, and make it their one business to bring out the meaning of the words of Scripture with fulness and precision. This they do with the excellence of a master richly endowed with the word of wisdom and with the word of knowledge: and from the exemplary union of a severe masculine understanding with a profound insight into the spiritual depths of the Scriptures, they are especially calculated to be useful in counteracting the erroneous tendencies of an age when we seem about to be inundated with all that is most fantastic and irrational in the exegetical mysticism of the fathers, and are bid to see Divine power in allegorical cobwebs, and heavenly life in artificial flowers."—*Mission of the Comforter, Note H.*

[Luther's words,] "as he himself has somewhere said of St. Paul's words, 'are not dead words, but living creatures, and have hands and feet.' It no longer surprises us that the man who wrote and spoke thus, although no more than a poor monk, should have been mightier than the Pope and the Emperor to boot, with all their hosts ecclesiastical and civil,—that the rivers of living water which issued from him should have swept half Germany, and in course of time the chief part of northern Europe, out of the kingdom of darkness into the region of evangelical light.* No day in spring, when life seems bursting from every bud, and gushing from every pore, is fuller of life than his pages; and if they are not without the strong breezes of spring, these too have to bear their part in the work of purification."—*Mission of the Comforter*, *Note H.*

"Luther, if we take the two masses of his writings," [German and Latin,] "which display different characters of style, according to the persons and objects they are designed for,—in the highest qualities of eloquence, in the faculty of presenting grand truths, moral and spiritual ideas, clearly, vividly, in words which elevate and enlighten men's minds, and stir their hearts, and control their wills, seems to be incomparably superior to Bossuet, almost as superior as Shakspeare to Racine, or as Ulswater to the Serpentine. In fact, when turning from one to the other, I have felt at times as if I were passing out of a gorgeous, crowded drawing-room, with its artificial lights and dizzying sounds, to run up a hill at sunrise.........Bossuet's mind was so uncongenial to Luther's, so artificial, so narrow, sharing in the national incapacity for seeing anything except through a French eye-glass, —his conception of faith, as I have had occasion to remark in previous notes, was so meagre, so alien from Luther's,—and the shackles imposed upon him by his Church so disqualified him for judging fairly of its great enemy, that we need not be surprised at any amount of misunderstanding in him, when he came forward as an advocate in such a cause. Still, however fiercely 'the eagle of Meaux' may have desired to use his beak and claws, he might as well have peckt and clawed at Mount Ararat, as at him whom God was pleased to endow with a mountain of strength, when he ordained that he should rise for the support of the Church out of the flood of darkness and corruption."—*Vindication, &c.*, pp. 13, 14.

These latter quotations have introduced us to Luther, Hare's great hero. The last, indeed, though given as a sample of Hare's critical faculty, is taken from the famous Note W to the "Mission of the Comforter," now published separately under the title of "A Vindication of Luther against his recent English Assailants." Here, then, we pass on, by a natural transition, to consider the claims and merits of Hare as a controversial writer. Of course, his critical faculty is called into play continually when he is writing controversially; nevertheless, as a controversialist he shows powers for which in his criticisms there was little scope. Hare's course as a mere critic ended with his residence at Cambridge. He became a controversialist almost from the beginning of his residence at Herstmonceux, and continued such to the end of his life. More especially after the year 1840, when he was appointed Archdeacon, he felt it to be his duty to take a prominent part in ecclesiastical and theological controversy. Most, if not all, of his charges, however generous in spirit and catholic in their Christian feeling, partook more or less of this character; and to several of these have been appended copious notes. The notes he was preparing to the "Victory of Faith" were, no doubt, largely controversial. The "Contest with Rome," and the "Vindication," just referred to, are his most important writings of this character. In the former of these he sifts Newman's writings, and brings forward weighty and convincing testimony and argument against the doctrines and assumptions of Popery; in the latter he triumphantly vindicates the memory of Luther from the calumnies first published by Bossuet, and recently revived and endorsed, with divers additions and aggravations, by certain English writers. He seizes the assailants of Luther one after another, with a strong, unyielding grip, and holds them fast till he has fairly plucked them bare. In this way he deals with Bossuet, Hallam, Newman, Ward, and Sir W. Hamilton. The last was, of living men, from his position and reputation, the most formidable assailant Luther has had. Upon him, accordingly, Hare bestows the largest share of attention; and most complete and terrible is the castigation he inflicts. Hare possessed the capital advantage over all his opponents, that he was far more completely and intimately acquainted with Luther's history and writings than any of them. Indeed, it is amazing how slight and second-hand was the knowledge which even such men as Hallam and Hamilton possessed of the matters on which they presumed to pronounce, as Hare abundantly demonstrates. Then, he was defending the cause of the highest human liberty, and of truth and heroism, against the cause and kingdom of darkness and bondage, of intellectual and spiritual slavery and death. Such a theme was worthy of Hare's powers, and, which is more to say, his powers are equal to his theme. There is a life and energy about his writings on this theme scarcely to be equalled elsewhere. The pulse and current of Luther's life seem to beat within his heart, and now warm him to an eloquence of the highest strain, and then jet forth in outbreaks of wit, sometimes of classic beauty and vividness, at others of the homeliest and raciest style, but always apt and forcible. His mastery of logic is no less remarkable than his other gifts, though he does not affect logical forms and phrases. Sir W. Hamilton was one of the most celebrated logicians of Britain, as Hare takes care his readers shall not forget; but he found himself foiled at his proper weapon by one of a very different school and training from his own. He was supposed, also, to be a master of *all* erudition; but this imagination Hare effectually dispelled. As a critic Hare may remind us of the skilful and masterly anatomist, but as a controversialist he seems rather like the brilliant swordsman. And Sir W. Hamilton must often have been confounded at the swift and sudden scimitar play by which his thrusts and fences were foiled, and his weapon so often struck from his hand. Or, again, we may admire the taste, the subtilty, the truth, the profundity of Hare's critical analysis and judgments; but, in addition to the same qualities displayed in his controversial writings, we admire the conversational rapidity of retort, the frequent flash of *wit* arising from the encounter of *wits,* and the colloquial but appropriate and effective raciness and homeliness of style. We are reminded by these qualities not only of Luther, but of quaint Latimer. Only Hare is always, however severe or even personal, the gentleman and the scholar; his homeliness is never gross, his quaintness is never violent or eccentric. Almost every kind of sparkling and of eloquent writing may be found in his wonderful "Vindication," except that appropriate to the pulpit, in which, indeed, Hare does not seem to have excelled.* And what is quite as remarkable as any other characteristic of this performance is, that, whatever may be the subject and whatever the variety of style which Hare employs, he generally makes very plain English, the most simple words and the most idiomatic phrases, do his work. Indeed, till we read him, we had no conception what a man of pith and heart, and of real genius and scholarly accomplishment, could achieve with Anglo-Saxon English. We recommend his writings, and especially this "Vindication," to all those among our readers who wish to study the genuine character and proper capabilities of the English tongue. Our space will only allow of our giving a very few samples of what we have been attempting to describe. The specimens which follow are selected,—chiefly because they admit, more readily than most, of being detached for quotation,—out of hundreds scattered thickly over the pages of Hare's controversial writings. And, of course, these, brief as they must of necessity be, can convey no idea of the various and exact learning, and the argumentative power, which distinguish these writings. Before we present the specimens we have selected from the "Vindication," we are tempted to quote one—but one—paragraph from the "Contest with Rome," a work the merit of which is only inferior to that of the "Vindication," in so far as the argument is less continuous, and as the personal and living interest possesses less grandeur and unity.

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* Hare had been quoting an exposition of Luther's on John vii. 37–39, in the course of which he says, "That same word which is preacht has such a hidden power, that, in the devil's kingdom, where he rules mightily, it will sweep devils by heaps out of the heart, as the Elbe sweeps down chaff. He knows well why he calls God's word a river; for it does great things and many: it rushes along," &c.

From the "Contest with Rome," then, we merely quote the following:—

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* The King of Prussia sent Hare his portrait in a gold medallion, as an acknowledgment for this "Vindication," which, our readers are no doubt aware, has acquired a European reputation.

"Dr. Newman, in his *Lectures on Anglicanism*, p. 8, asserts that our Church 'is a thing without a soul, does not contemplate itself, define its intrinsic constitution, or ascertain its position;' that 'it has no traditions; it cannot be said to think; it does not know what it holds, and what it does not; it is not even conscious of its own existence.' As though it were essential to the existence of a soul, that it should be busied in defining its intrinsic constitution, and ascertaining and circumscribing its position. As though it were not the constant characteristic of an energetic genial soul, that it pours itself out in action upon the world without, without wasting its time in defining its intrinsic constitution, or ascertaining its position. As though this itself were not indicative of a checkt, represt action. Is it not the grand and blessed peculiarity of our political constitution, that all our institutions, all our liberties, have grown out of particular emergencies,—that we have never set ourselves down, like our neighbours on the other side of the Channel, to define our intrinsic constitution, and ascertain our position? Yet for this very reason do we understand our position better, because we know it practically, from acting in it,—not speculatively, from theorizing about it. Nay, was not this the spirit and principle of the whole Catholic Church in its best ages? as it continued more or less until the *anti-Catholic Council of Trent set about defining its intrinsic constitution, and ascertaining its position, and building circumvallations about it, wall beyond wall, and bastion beside bastion, with batteries of anathemas mounted upon them desolating the country round.*"—*Contest, &c.*, pp. 144, 145.

The following sentences from the "Vindication" refer to Sir W. Hamilton:—

"Still in one sense the reviewer is not so guilty as he appears. For, strange though it may be deemed, it unquestionably is the fact, as I have already hinted more than once, that he had never set eyes on the original Latin of any of these four sentences. The garbling, the misrepresentation, the mistranslation, are not the reviewer's sin, but Bossuet's, in the second book of whose *Histoire des Variations* the four sentences stand, almost consecutively, though not in the same order, in one page, § XVII. *As a thief is sometimes detected through some flaw in his shoe or boot, which happens to coincide with the footprints about the spot where the robbery was committed, so here we may feel confident that the reviewer, who verily needs an expert policeman to track* *him, took his quotations from Bossuet, because, after the Chinese fashion, they copy Bossuet's faults.*"—Page 211.

The next two passages refer to the frequent vehemence of Luther's language:—

"Moreover, I would contend that common justice requires we should make the amplest allowance for occasional over-vehemence or hastiness of expression, when we consider, not merely the peculiarly energetical tone of his mind, but all the circumstances of his condition,—the darkness out of which he had to work his way, with scarcely any help save that of God's word and Spirit,—the might of the errour he had to fight against, its deadening influence, the abominations it had given birth to, the number of enemies he had to encounter, and the almost superhuman rapidity and vigour with which he carried on his single-handed warfare......When we remember, too, that during this whole time his mind was continually expanding, and that many of these writings were epochal acts in the history of the world, utterances of truths which history has signed, and sealed, and attested with the witness of ten generations,—what can we think of the spirit that would carp, and cavil, and sneer, at a few inconsiderate expressions? *When the world's doom-bell tolls, it must shake the belfry. When the waters burst forth from their frost-bound prison, the ice will crack, not without a noise; and they will probably splash over the banks.*"—Pp. 48, 49.

"These instances are notorious; a multitude of similar ones might be cited from Luther's writings, especially from those belonging to this critical period of his life, when all his powers were stretched beyond themselves by the stress of the conflict. To our nicer ears such expressions may seem in bad taste. Be it so. *When a Titan is walking about among the pigmies, the earth seems to rock beneath his tread. Mont Blanc would be out of keeping in the Regent's Park; and what would be the outcry if it were to toss its head and shake off an avalanche or two!*"—Page 192.

How finely drawn is the following picture of Dr. Newman!—

"When we look back on the author's career, when we reflect how he has gone on year after year sharpening the edge of his already over-keen understanding, casting one truth after another into his logical crucible, and persuading himself that he has dissolved it to atoms, and then exhibiting a like ingenuity in compounding the semblance of truths out of fictions,—when we reflect how in this way he appeared to be gradually losing the faculty of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and the very belief in the existence of any power for discerning truth, nay, as it seemed at times, in the existence of any positive truth to be discerned, and how, taking refuge, as it were, from the encroachments of a universal scepticism, he has at length bowed his neck under a yoke which a man, gifted with such fine qualities of mind and character, could hardly assume till he had put out the eyes of his heart and conscience, as well as his understanding; it is not in scorn and triumph, but in deep sadness and awe, that we repeat, '*Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?*' "*—Pp. 99, 100.

We must find space for the following noble passage, with which we bring our quotations to a close. It will be seen that the contrast is between the Fathers and the Reformers:—

"Although Christianity, being in her essence above the relations of time and space, renders her devout votaries, in a certain sense, independent of them with regard to their own personal spiritual life, yet, when they set themselves to teach or to act upon others, the variable elements of their nature, those which are necessarily moulded and modified by the moral and intellectual powers and agencies they are brought into contact with, come into play. Hence it is next to a moral impossibility, that men living in the decrepitude of the ancient world, under the relaxing and palsying influences of the Roman and Byzantine empires, when all intellectual and moral life was fast waning away, and the grand and stirring ideas and aims which had drawn forth the energies of the classical nations in their prime, had been superseded by rhetorical tumour and allegorical and grammatical trifling, should have mounted to such a pitch of intellectual power as to be beyond the reach of the noblest minds in the age when all the faculties of the new world were bursting into life, and when one region of power after another was laid open to man, and called him to start up and take possession of it,—the whole circuit of the earth he lived in,—the infinitude and the sublimities of the universe in which it is comprised,—the world of Night surpassing that of Day, and swallowing it up in its unfathomable depths—the classical nations rising out of their millennial sleep, with the beauty of their art and of their poetry, and with their heroic glory; while the incipient knowledge of the newly-discovered races tended along therewith to bring out self-consciousness, and to make self-knowledge more distinct,—and the Book of God, speaking in each man's native tongue, became indeed a living book, the Book of Man, revealing the inmost thoughts and purposes of his heart."—Pp. 77, 78.

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* This is the motto to Newman's first "Lecture on Justification."

Here we must stay our hand. It yet remains for us to do what we may be able toward ascertaining the position which Hare held as a religious teacher, and the peculiar characteristics of his theology. To this task we shall devote another chapter, for which the present has prepared the way.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LATE ARCHDEACON HARE AS A THEOLOGIAN.

In attempting to give a fair estimate of Julius Charles Hare, as a religious teacher, we have two functions to perform: the former of minor importance, and which need not detain us long; the latter of main moment. First, we must endeavour to characterize the form and style of his pulpit addresses; then we must consider the quality of the theology which constitutes the substance of his teaching. We have already intimated that we do not rate Hare among the most eloquent and powerful of preachers, though he is, unquestionably, among the purest and most gifted of English writers. Many men have failed as preachers, because they were little aware of the necessary distinction between the style proper for the essay or treatise, which is to be read in private by the student, and that which is appropriate to the lecture or sermon, which is to be delivered before a listening congregation. It appears to us, that Hare failed mainly because he had an exaggerated idea as to what should be the degree of this distinction. His sermons lack closeness and weight of thought; they are too diffuse in style, and too profuse in illustration. The rein is given too freely to all the caprices of the author's fertile fancy; and, at the same time, there is a want of the dignity and solemnity which, whatever may be the plainness of speech, befit the theme and office of the pulpit. Not that there is anything frivolous; not that the writer is not earnest and serious; yet there is, very commonly, a loose *negligé* style of too palpably condescending speech, which must have much diminished the preacher's weight and authority. Of course, this will be seen most distinctly and frequently in the "Parish Sermons," prepared for simple country folk; but something of it is also apparent in his sermons preached before the University, which, with all their learning and thoughtfulness, are very diffuse, rather careless in style, and at times somewhat juvenile in tone. The sort of eulogy which these college sermons have received, certainly does not impress one with the idea that profound and weighty theological thought is extensively in circulation in the English Universities. A part of Hare's fault in this matter is, no doubt, owing to that principle in his philosophy which we have had occasion to note,—that the imagination, in matters of religion, is to teach its truths, no less than the understanding; and that its culture, no less than that of the heart and mind, is a part of the office of a true, deep, and universal religion. We have no disposition to deny this principle; only we think that Hare, having supposed that it had been lost sight of, was tempted to make too much of it. The freshness and fertility of his fancy, and the poetic impulses of his genius, too, would naturally incline him to indulge and expatiate, where no necessity of argument, no cogency of a controlling purpose or idea, compelled him, as in his criticisms and in his controversy, to urge on his forward course. Had Hare, indeed, been an orator,—had passion ruled his intellect, and filled his heart, and prompted his tongue, or had the grand solemnities of revelation fully subdued and inspired his soul,—his fancy would have been made subordinate and subservient. But Hare was not an orator, or a man of passion. The stream of his soul was not a strong river, but a fresh current, flowing, it is true, in a distinct channel, and toward a definite and well-perceived issue, but loving, nevertheless, to meander, "at its own sweet will," among flowery meads and calm, fruitful prospects. We might, perhaps, not be far wrong in saying that Hare was too much of a poet to be an orator. He himself says,* or rather his brother said, and he adopted the sentiment: "Oratory may be symbolized by a warrior's eye, flashing from under a philosopher's brow. But why a warrior's eye rather than a poet's? Because in oratory the will must predominate." Hare, then, was too much of the poet, too little the man of combined will and passion, to be an orator.

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* "Guesses at Truth," First Series, p. 137.

It will not be supposed, from what we have said, that there is not much of eloquence, and more of beauty, in Hare's sermons. Passages of rare beauty abound in them; and not a few may be found of real power and eloquence. Still the texture of his discourses, however brightly coloured, lacks substance. There is not a little also of sameness in the pattern, if we may so speak, of his illustrations; while sometimes his fancies so outrun the natural and the beautiful as to become grotesque.

The following passage would, we should think, be more likely to make his parishioners admire the bright fancy of their Minister, than feel the deadly and loathsome nature of that "evil and bitter" thing against which he was wishing to warn them:—

> "Satan, when he lures people into his prison-house of sin, always tries to make them forget that they are there. He tries, for a while, to make them think that they are in a very pleasant and goodly place. He dazzles their eyes, so that the walls seem to glitter with gold and precious stones; the poisonous plants, which are creeping along the ground, are covered with bright berries and gaudy flowers; and as all the inmates of the prison are beguiled, more or less, by the same delusion, there is no one in the whole company to admonish and warn them where they are."—*Parish Sermons*, vol. i., p. 23.

The conceit about to be quoted is worthy of the patristic age, or would, perhaps, suit better still the rhetoric of Roman hagiologists:—

> "Surely, if we will not even do thus much, we cannot be clusters of the true Vine; we cannot hope that our families will be among those clusters, with which the Vine will adorn itself, when it spreads out its branches through the firmament, and the stars shall drop from their spheres to crown the heads of Christ's saints."—*Ibid.*, p. 382.

Not a few samples of the same sort of fruit might have been gathered, with the least possible trouble, from the second volume of these "Parish Sermons," which, as a whole, indeed, is inferior to the first. At the same time, these volumes contain many fine specimens of homely, yet often beautiful, practical preaching; and some of the more contemplative discourses, which treat of the ways of Providence, and the blessings and duties of life, have a quiet power of thought, and a rich, yet chaste, beauty of illustration, which, in sermon-writing, we scarcely know where else to match. Among these, we would particularly direct attention to the sermon on "Harvest Parables," in the second volume.

We alluded, at the beginning of this paper, to the *form*, as well as the *style*, of Hare's sermons. Those of our readers who are at all acquainted with the modern school of preachers in the English Church, will expect to hear that these sermons have no formal divisions or obvious plan. This is not so insignificant a point as might be supposed. As, in the ages when logical forms and methods ruled in the ascendant, divisions and subdivisions were multiplied, every truth affirmed was traced backward to its cause or reason, and onward to its effect or consequence, and every kind was distinguished as to genus and species; so those who decry or slight logic, and who, above all, dislike its application to the science of theology, shun every appearance of division or formal distinction in their discourses. They preach the Gospel "broadly" and generally. They present its facts in a somewhat superficial way; they explain its narratives not *too* minutely, for this would not accord either with their doctrinal haziness and generality, or with their loose notions as to "inspiration;" they enforce its duties in their more practical aspect; but they do not preach its doctrines in their strict, mutual harmony, or in their precise adaptation to the condition and wants of man. To do this, would involve the need of logical distinctions and deductions, and would bring them, before they were aware, within the forbidden circle of systematic theology. An outline or plan, distinctly stated, would suggest to their hearers, as one principle or position after another came forth to view, or as fact after fact was named, all sorts of questions as to the whence? the how? the why? the wherefore? to attempt to meet which would not agree with the views of those who belong to the "Broad Church," and who glory in a vague, unsystematized theology. Now, though Hare was far more logical and doctrinal, far less vague, and more evangelical, than most others of this school; yet to this school he did belong, as we are about to show forthwith. His sermons, accordingly, though they have generally a more obvious plan, and are more concerned in the statement and discussion of the great ground truths of theology, and the gracious provisions of the Gospel, than most of those of his fellows, are yet, on the whole, theologically considered, somewhat superficial and unsatisfactory, and systematically avoid everything like express divisions and logical forms. Had this not been the case, they would, probably, have been less diffuse, and much more cogent and effective. After all, there is more in a method than is commonly supposed. If the preachers of the seventeenth century had been less minute and multifarious in their logical distinctions and divisions, the world would have been saved a vast amount of worthless quibbling, wearisome repetition, and irreverent conjecture and conclusion. So now, the absence of logical method from so much modern preaching serves to hide the vagueness and slightness of its theology, and its deficiency of faith and feeling as to the most fundamental truths of the Gospel.

What was Hare's faith, and the substance of his teaching as to these fundamental truths, we now pass on to inquire. *A priori,* as we intimated in a former chapter, we might seem to be warranted in coming to the conclusion that he was very far from being right in this matter. We are willing to leave out of account the laudatory way in which he often refers to Maurice, which may, perhaps, be accounted for, without supposing him to be agreed with that writer on the points on which the latter is so widely astray, especially when we remember the relationship between the two, and that Maurice had not fully and distinctly disclosed his heretical views at the time when Hare made those laudatory references. But, apart from this, Hare's frequent and emphatic mention of Coleridge, as his master, in regard to the highest aspects not only of philosophy, but of theology, might lead us very naturally and reasonably to infer that he must be nearly, if not altogether, as far off from evangelical orthodoxy as that philosopher. We have seen, indeed, that, in reference to philosophy, however Hare might agree with Coleridge in general tone of feeling, in taste and tendency; however much he might admire his intuitive sagacity, his profound penetration, his piercing subtilty of distinction and insight, the moral dignity and purity of his tone as a teacher, his wide compass of inquiry, and his catholic sympathies; however heartily he might welcome his leadership against the materialist and utilitarian philosophies which had been in vogue; yet, in fact, he does not seem to have accepted, to their full extent, the special dogmas of Coleridge's metaphysics. And hence we might be disposed to infer beforehand, that, so far as the theological tenets of Coleridge were particularly dependent upon these dogmas, Hare would, probably, differ from him. On his doctrine of the Logos, for instance, as in some way identified, connaturally and alike, with all men, and as being the light of Reason in every man; and on those other subtle, abstruse, mystical, and incomprehensible doctrines, which, if they appeared at all, only just peeped out in his "Aids to Reflection," but were more fully dwelt upon—explained, we can scarcely say—in notes and appendices to later publications; we should have no right to assume that Hare agreed with Coleridge. Most men, indeed, if they had differed from Coleridge on these points, and yet would express their high admiration of his philosophy and theology, would have been careful, at the same time, to put in a disclaimer, so far as these points were concerned; but this does not seem to have been Hare's way. He was on the look-out for points of agreement with others, and was eager to consent and applaud. The points of difference he did not care to discriminate, unless compelled; nor would he allow any man, whose views on essential points he believed to be right, to be condemned because of logical consequences deducible from some of the tenets which he held. We think he carried this much too far; but our present purpose is only to note the thing itself, as helping to account for his undiscriminating eulogy of Coleridge. Still, after every abatement has been made, we cannot but believe that, in some main principles, there must have been an agreement between the theology of Hare and of Coleridge; otherwise, such language as we are about to quote can have no meaning. In his "Life of Sterling," Hare tells us, that when Sterling was a young man, the influence of Coleridge was the principal means by which there was wrought in his mind "a temporary reconciliation with that which is best and soundest in the faith and institutions of his countrymen." (Page 128.) He "dedicated, with deep reverence and thankfulness," his "Mission of the Comforter" to the "honoured memory" of Coleridge, "the Christian philosopher; who, through dark and winding paths of speculation, was led to the light, in order that others, by his guidance, might reach that light, without passing through the darkness;" and described himself as "one of the many pupils whom his writings have helpt to discern the sacred concord and unity of human and Divine truth." In a similar strain of reverent eulogy, he speaks, in the preface to this work, of the "great religious philosopher," "the main work of whose life was to spiritualize not only our philosophy, but our theology; to raise them both above the empiricism into which they had been dwindling, and to *set them free from the technical trammels of logical systems.*" This last clause deserves note.

The elementary and popular (we use the word, of course, only *comparatively*) teaching of Coleridge on theology is contained in his "Aids to Reflection." No one can be said to agree with Coleridge at all on theology, who does not accord with the main principles laid down there; and in that work it is well known that Coleridge teaches a theology differing from what is ordinarily understood to be "evangelical orthodoxy," in regard to the doctrines of the atonement, and of justification by faith. On these momentous points, then, we must expect to find that Hare differed, more or less widely, from the evangelical doctrine. But Coleridge's views as to inspiration are also intimated in that work, and are pretty fully explained in another, (the "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit,") the general teaching of which Hare has referred to in his "Life of Sterling," in a manner which seems to imply approval. This, then, will be another main point to which we must direct our attention.

But, before we proceed to examine Hare's views on these very important points, let us draw a wide distinction between his teaching and that of such writers as Maurice. Though scarcely to be called, in the full sense, an evangelical believer and teacher of Christianity, Hare *was* distinctively a Christian, an "orthodox" Christian, in the *broad* sense, and a devout and earnest one. He believed in the Christian Trinity, not in a Neo-Platonic triad;* his teaching is clear and decisive as to man's fallen condition; and his sense of the sinful taint and corruption of our nature seems to have been exceedingly deep and vivid; it meets us continually in his writings, and is expressed in every variety of emphatic and impressive statement and appeal. He neither denies nor ignores, though he does not often dwell upon, the rectoral character of God as the pure and holy Judge; he teaches that there will be a day of final judgment, and that there will be a separate lot and blessing for the righteous in heaven, while the wicked will be punished in hell. There is no glimpse of anything bordering upon Universalism in his writings. He teaches fully, and with great earnestness and enlargement, the doctrine of sanctification by the power of the Holy Ghost as the privilege of all who are pardoned through faith in Christ, and the absolute need of faith in Christ in order to sanctification.

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* So we would still hope: and indeed we feel persuaded, that he cannot have believed in the Neo-Platonic Triad. The following passage confirms to us this persuasion. "At Alexandria it was attempted to show what system of truths would arise from this union of the human reason with the divine; and ever since, from Origen down to Schleiermacher and Hegel and Schelling, the highest endeavour of the greatest philosophers has been to Christianize their philosophy; *although, in so doing, they have often* been deluded into substituting a fiction of their own, some phantom of logical abstractions, or some idol of a deified Nature, for the living God of the Gospel." (*Guesses, &c., Second Series*, p. 26.) Yet we should scarcely, perhaps, have felt warranted to speak so confidently as to the character of Hare's positive belief in the Trinity, if, before writing what is in the text, we had sufficiently weighed the purport of Note AEa in the First Edition of the "Mission of the Comforter." In this Hare characterizes as a "precious note" one of Coleridge's, in which the Trinity is resolved into the unity of will blending into one, "Being, Mind, Love, in action, ideas, distinguishable, though not divisible," God being "the Cohesion and the Oneness of all things." What Coleridge here intended, will be sufficiently clear to those who have read our chapter upon him. Here he, at least, is speaking as a Neo-Platonizing Sabellian. And surely Hare must have known what he meant. We feel it necessary further to add here, that the recent publication of "God in History," by Professor Bunsen, must not only greatly grieve and disappoint those who had cherished the hope that, with all his rationalistic laxity,—the vice of his education and of the national intellectualism of Germany,—he was yet at heart an orthodox Trinitarian Christian and believer in revelation; but must also reflect unpleasant doubts as to the secret and inner creed of Archdeacon Hare, who was his cherished and inti-

It is impossible for us to illustrate all these particulars by quotations from Hare's writings; but we feel that we should not do justice to him, if we neglected to give our readers an opportunity of judging for themselves,—by one or two pregnant quotations, relating to the grand, fundamental truth of man's fallen and sinful condition before God, and need of the Holy Ghost to quicken him anew,—how widely apart was Hare's theological position from that of Maurice, notwithstanding that both avowed themselves disciples of Coleridge, that each praises the other's writings, particularly Hare several of Maurice's, and that they were intimate friends and nearly related by marriage.

mate friend, in fellowship of understanding as well as feeling. Hare, however, admits in one place, as many another profound thinker might honestly do, that he had felt the "fascination of Pantheism." He was likely, therefore, to have much sympathy for those whose intellect was still entangled in its meshes, especially if he perceived their heart yearning, amid all the doubts of their struggling intellect, after a personal God and a living Saviour. In this way we can explain his intimate fellowship with Bunsen, as a religious friend no less than as a scholar and thinker, without feeling ourselves compelled to recede from the ground we have taken in the text. Hare must be judged by the plain doctrine of his Sermons, especially the "Victory of Faith," and the "Mission of the Comforter;" and the teaching of these is, with the exceptions indicated in the text, uniformly and unambiguously biblical and orthodox. There is no *double-entendre* in them which may mean Neo-Platonism or Pantheism.

Hare tells us (and this is in direct contradiction to Maurice's teaching) that the "condition of man after the Fall was as nothing in comparison with his first glory;" and speaks of a "living communion with God, such as he had enjoyed in Paradise, and had lost by the Fall." He says, that "the innocence of childhood is nothing more than a bud with a worm gnawing at its heart, and which the first blast of temptation is sure to nip." He speaks of man's nature as "shattered by the Fall, and rotted by selfishness," so that "its unity and harmony" are "utterly destroyed." He says, "There is a taint of sin in our hearts, which runs through all our thoughts and feelings, through all our words and deeds." * More at large, he thus deals with the fearful mystery of sin and evil in the world:—

"Whether we look north or south, east or west, without or within, we see evil. If we say, as some have foolishly said, that it is the growth of civilization, that it arises from the perverse institutions of society, and that it would not be found in man if he were but in a state of nature; if we resolve to fly from civilized society, and take the wings of the morning, and abide in the uttermost parts of the savage wilderness, even there, whatever and whomever we may see will bear the scar and mark of evil, like the mark which was set upon Cain. If, on the other hand, we fancy, as others have no less foolishly fancied, that evil springs wholly from ignorance; and that the laws of man, and the arts of man, and the craft of man, will be able to overcome and get the better of it, then we need only turn our eyes toward those nations which have made the greatest advance in knowledge; and we shall find that, so far as that advance has been made by man and by human means only, while men have advanced in knowledge, they have also advanced in wickedness, and gone on devising new vices and abominations before unheard of. How evil came into the world, we know not; but that it is there, we all of us know far too well," &c.—*Parish Sermons*, vol. ii., pp. 139, 140.

"Why should I refuse to tell a lie, when by so doing I should save the life of a father or a brother? *Because*, a philosopher replies, *I am bound to revere the dignity of the human soul.* But what is the dignity of the human soul, except as the soul which God made, and Christ has redeemed? It is the dignity of the foundling, which knows not its birthplace or its parentage; of a pauper, clothed in rags, the faded relics of bygone glory; the dignity of a lackey, that dogs the heels of custom and opinion; the dignity of a cripple, bloated and maimed by the consequences of its own intemperance, and only enabled to walk by the crutch of some lifeless maxim. What is such dignity worth? and how many drops of blood will it outweigh? Might it not be deemed an excess of vanity to prize it above the life of a worm?"—*Parish Sermons*, vol. ii., p. 313.

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* "Parish Sermons," vol. ii., pp. 113, 116; vol. i., pp. 28, 323; and vol. ii., p. 131.

The last paragraph, it will be observed, refers to man as conceived of by a godless philosophy; man, as apart from the grand truths of revelation and redemption. And these extracts, taken together, may give a fair, though scarcely an adequate, idea of Hare's doctrine and manner of speech, in regard to the fallen and sinful condition of man. Surely it must be admitted, however much we lament his deficiencies as to some points of evangelical doctrine, that he who wrote in such a style was an earnest Christian, as far removed from the mere philosopher, as from the formalist, or the dry doctrine-monger. Coleridge's writings show nothing like the above; and Maurice's style of doctrine is very different. As to Hare's teaching on the other points recently enumerated, on which he agrees with orthodox and evangelical believers in general, we beg to refer to his "Mission of the Comforter," *passim*, to the last sermon of his "Victory of Faith," and to his "Parish Sermons," vol. i., pp. 164, 417, and vol. ii., pp. 219, 307.

We have made these preliminary admissions in simple justice to the distinguished and noble-hearted man, whose writings we have undertaken to review. It is our earnest wish to be strictly impartial. We have no sympathy whatever with that principle, which has so extensively obtained in all controversial writing, and especially in theological discussion, that it is wise and fair, so far as this can be discreetly and safely done, to ignore, in a writer whose errors you undertake to expose, whatever is good, and wise, and

(a) All guilt involves some concurren
of the will" — John Wesley

true; and we are conscious that our personal bias is all in favour of Archdeacon Hare: still we should not perform our duty, if we omitted to note, that even in the extracts which we have given, excellent as these are, so far as they go, there is yet a defect, more easily to be felt, perhaps, than defined. Sin is viewed rather as a disease and misfortune, than as a transgression of the Divine law, and as involving guilt. The preacher mourns over it, subjectively considered, as a tendency and habit, producing discord with God and nature, and bringing with it wretchedness; but he does not, as a witness for God, denounce it in its objective character, as a guilty violation of God's holy revealed will. He speaks of it rather in the sentimental view of a poet-philosopher, than as a preacher of righteousness. Nor do we find that he anywhere brings out to view the doctrine of imputed guilt; that the *race* is treated as guilty, in consequence of Adam's sin and fall, without the admission (a) of which, in some form, we fear that the blessed doctrine of atonement for sinners, through the Saviour's obedience unto death, cannot be well sustained.

In fact, it could not be expected that Hare should be full and explicit in his doctrine of sin and guilt, unless he had been thoroughly evangelical as to the grand, central doctrine of atonement. This, however, was not the case. Like Maurice, he chooses to use the verb *atone* frequently—indeed, except in his "Parish Sermons," ordinarily, if not only—in the obsolete sense of "to make at one, to reconcile." Once, in the Authorized Version of the New Testament, the word *atonement* is unquestionably used either instead of *reconciliation*, or, at any rate, where *reconciliation* (understood as the consequence of *atonement*) would have been a more correct rendering. But it is equally certain, that as used ordinarily in the Bible, and in reference to the purpose and effect of the sacrifices under the law, *expiation* and not *reconciliation* is intended by the word. Of course, the recent customary use of the word in the sense of *reconcile*, by Hare, Maurice, and a few more, does not, of itself, affect the scriptural doctrine of atonement, or even go any way toward proving that those who thus use it differ from others in their view of the doctrine in question. Still, supposing that they do differ, it is clear that their peculiar use of the word may stand in relation to their peculiar doctrine; and such is, in fact, the case. Not admitting that the scriptural doctrine of atonement involves essentially the idea of expiation, believing that the reconciliation of man to God is not brought about in virtue of the expiatory character and merit of Christ's vicarious sufferings and death, they wish to dissociate the idea of expiation from the customary use of the word *atonement;* and, to this end, they carefully and continually use the word in the direct and simple sense of "reconciliation." If their view is correct, we do not know that we have any right to blame their device. That their view, however, is not correct, we shall, in later chapters, give our reasons for believing. Our present business is to show, that Hare agrees too nearly with his master, Coleridge, on this point.

His avowed relations to Coleridge, and the use of the word *atone,* in the sense we have just adverted to, would, of themselves, almost suffice to convince us that this must be the case. Yet, under the influence of evangelical feelings, and, perhaps, when rising fresh, not only from the study of his Greek Testament, but from the perusal of the writings of Luther and Calvin, or of the holy Leighton, so nearly does Hare approach, in many places, to the language and doctrine of the Reformers, and the best evangelical divines of his own Church, that it requires a careful collation of passages, and nice and narrow examination, to see, oftentimes, how and wherein he falls short of the full standard of evangelical orthodoxy. Moreover, in his "Notes to the Mission of the Comforter," he not only *homologates,* (to borrow a convenient word from Scotch Presbyterianism,) in terms of warm and emphatic approval, the spiritual and self-abasing doctrines of Augustine and the Reformers, but he speaks very highly indeed of Anselm, as the first who brought out into distinct view the union of the

Divine and the human natures in the person of Christ, and the bearing of this on the satisfaction which He made for sin. It will be found, however, that he does not directly cite, or, at least, that he never cites in such a way as to appropriate, the distinct expositions given by these writers of their doctrine of satisfaction and atonement; and when he expressly states his own views, they do not accurately and fully accord with theirs. His language is often ambiguous, and might well bear the orthodox evangelical sense; his teaching sometimes approximates very nearly to the full standard of evangelical truth: nevertheless, he never does actually and distinctly enounce the doctrine of vicarious and expiatory suffering, while, in a number of passages, he either teaches what is irreconcilable with this doctrine, or what is so essentially and critically defective as to furnish convincing, though negative, evidence that he did not hold it.

The following passage might easily be supposed to be truly evangelical in its sense; yet those who are acquainted with the modern schools of theology, know that even some Unitarians would find little difficulty in adopting its language. Maurice, too, contrives to use language little dissimilar.

> "We must be buried by baptism into the death of Christ, before we can rise again in newness of life. We must be justified through faith in the death of Christ, before we can be sanctified by the indwelling of His Spirit. The spirit of sanctification is only given to those who have already been washed from their sins in the all-purifying blood of the Lamb."—*Mission, &c.,* p. 25.

We shall see reason presently to conclude that, in using this language, Hare meant no more than that "the blood of the Lamb," as declaring the mercy and goodwill of God toward sinners, and as thus operating morally, through the power of the convincing and sanctifying Spirit, upon the conscience and affections of the sinner, "washes" and "purifies from sin," not as directly expiating the guilt of sin, and satisfying the justice of God, and as thus laying the ground and preparing the way for the work of progressive sanctification and of final redemption.

There is another passage, however, so strongly evangelical in its language, that we find it difficult to understand how Hare could have explained away its meaning:—

"In that all sinned, all became subject to death; to immediate, sure, everlasting death. Only because the eternal Son of God vouchsafed to suffer death in the stead of all mankind,—He whose death far outweighed the deaths of millions of millions,—was the sentence which condemned all mankind to death cancelled and recalled."—*Parish Sermons*, vol. ii., p. 216.

There are truly evangelical teachers who would, probably, hesitate to employ phraseology such as this, so easily to be interpreted as sanctioning the view which regards the death of Christ as an arithmetical or commercial equivalent for the eternal sufferings of all mankind. Certain it is that, in its ordinary and obvious acceptation, it contradicts the general tenor, as well as many exact and specific statements, of Hare's doctrinal writings. It will be observed that the passage occurs in his "Parish Sermons," in which he naturally endeavoured to accommodate himself to the ideas and feelings of the common people. We have been obliged to conclude, on evidence immediately to be presented, that, by this popularised and evangelical language, all that he meant to say was, that Christ died to deliver sinners from their spiritual death, and that His death, in its moral power and spiritual efficacy, as a fact, as the greatest fact, in the world's history, far outweighed the curse and evil attending upon the inward soul-death of the millions of mankind.

Let us hear Hare on the "Cross of Christ," a testing subject; and let our readers judge whether he could have believed in the expiatory character of the death of Christ, who, on such a theme, had no more to say, no plainer, fuller, more pointed, more home-coming doctrine to preach to guilty sinners, than that which follows:—

"It is at the foot of the cross that we most deeply and thoroughly feel the sin of not believing in Him, who came down from heaven to die upon that cross for us. It is at the foot of the cross that we feel all the hatefulness of sin, which could not be removed from the souls of men, except by the death of the Son of God. It is at the foot of the cross, when the consummating trial of death is past—when He whose every word has manifested the Divine power of love to overcome sin's fiercest and subtlest temptations, has given up the ghost—that, with the centurion, we recognise the perfect righteousness of Christ; and as the purpose for which He was lifted up was that He might become our righteousness, and draw us to partake in the righteousness which He had obtained for us; so it is at the foot of the cross that we feel how we are admitted to a share in the righteousness of Christ. Thus, too, if, standing at the foot of the cross, we raise our eyes to Him who was nailed thereon; if, in the light of the Spirit, we behold Him there lifted up as our righteousness; if we call to remembrance what He left, and what He embraced, for our sakes; if we thus fix the earnest gaze of our hearts, and souls, and minds on the glory of God, as manifested in the cross of Christ; then, when our eyes drop from thence on the things of this world, we cannot fail to discern how the prince of this world has been judged."—*Ibid.*, pp. 136, 137.

The doctrine of substitution has, no doubt, been miserably distorted and perverted by vulgar fanatics and high Antinomians; yet must it be upheld as the central and most essential among the fundamental doctrines of evangelical, as distinguished from catholic, orthodoxy. It has been too often degraded, also, by good and useful men, who have represented the holy Judge as acting on mere personal and (as it were,—let the word be forgiven us) selfish grounds; and as exacting from the Saviour, as the condition of man's redemption, a rigid *quid pro quo*, a commercial equivalent. Such views, however, have never been sanctioned by the great and profound divines, from whom evangelical theology has derived its strength, and by whom its principles have been expounded and sustained. Of late years they have been held by a continually decreasing number; nor are they to be met with in those modern works, such as the well-known English standards of Magee and Pye Smith, in which the doctrine of vicarious and expiatory sacrifice has been so learnedly and ably sustained. Yet, to the whole school of Coleridge there is no greater horror than this doctrine of substitution, however taught; though it is so inwoven into Scripture phraseology, and so craved for by the guilty conscience of men, that they themselves find it next to impossible to teach any of the most vital and characteristic truths of theology, without continually expressing themselves in language which seems to imply it. Sterling was a disciple of Coleridge, and a friend of Hare's. He had left his curacy under Hare, in 1834, on account of his health; being at that time, according to Hare's standard, a sound and orthodox Christian believer. In the following year, when, if he had begun his descent on that incline, which years later conducted him to Straussianism, he can *but* have begun it; and does not appear to have in any degree materially altered his views, on theological subjects, from what they were the year before; we find him writing to Hare as follows, in reference to Milman's "History of the Jews:" "On sacrifices he seems to have nothing of the least interest to offer; though I think he does keep clear of the ghastly speculations of Magee, and of most of our modern orthodox Brahmins."*

The meaning of this is as obvious as its injustice is glaring. All are "Brahmins," however cautious and moderate in their expressions, who believe in the proper piacular character of the Jewish sacrifices, and of the death of our Lord. No one can have held the doctrine of substitution more warily, or expressed it in a form less likely to be repulsive, than Magee; but his sin was that he held the root of the matter so firmly, and defended the "orthodox" doctrine of sacrifice so ably; therefore he is a Brahmin, and teaches *ghastly* theology. We remember that Maurice, in his "Essays," similarly singles out Magee as a mark for his sneers. Now, far be it from us to make a man responsible for the sins of his friend; we have shown no disposition to do this. But we cannot but conclude that Hare agreed to a certain extent with his *ci-devant* Curate;

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* HARE'S "Life of Sterling," p. 72.

both from the fact, that while Sterling held such views he chose him to be his Curate, and because, in quoting this letter to himself, he enters no *caveat*, and gives no intimation of anything like doubt or dissent. About the same time, moreover, Sterling writes to Hare again, as follows: "I find myself more and more attracted toward the divines who occupy themselves much in setting forth the depth and extent of sin, as a fact of human nature; though, *as you may suppose*, far from satisfied with the Calvinistic theories as to the Divine purposes and the process of redemption. I do not find Tholuck as full or satisfactory as I could wish in this last matter; the doctrine of substitution appearing in him with too much nakedness." *

Yes, there is the stumbling-block with all who have belonged to the Coleridge school,—the doctrine of substitution. Tholuck is too evangelical for them. The doctrine of substitution, it cannot be denied, does seem to be in the Bible; but it must be veiled; it must not be understood or taught in its plain sense; it must, in fact, be explained away. Often it seems likely to prove too strong for Hare; the Bible and the Spirit of God concur in driving him to imply and almost to teach it: but, when it becomes necessary either explicitly to affirm or to evade it, when a statement of doctrine upon the subject, *apparently* explicit and definitive, must be given, Hare in no case expressly utters it.

In fact, his "understanding,"—to adopt such phraseology as he himself might have used in a similar case, —his "understanding," beset with prejudices, and trained in a presumptuous philosophy, refused to adopt or admit truths, which his higher and truer "reason," in conjunction with his conscience, inclined and urged him to confess. His reason and conscience would have taught him the need of expiation for his sin, and made him welcome the doctrine of a sinless Substitute, who was made sin for him, that he might be made the righteousness of God through Him; but his biassed and mistrained understanding refused to accept the doctrine of piacular sacrifice, and did violence to itself, and his whole inward man, by explaining away the doctrine of the substitution of Christ, the great and holy Mediator, as suffering the penalty of law instead of man.

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* HARE's "Life of Sterling," p. 75.

It will be necessary for us to show what was Hare's view of sacrifice. On this point, too, he does not always express himself consistently. The truth, which was working at his heart and conscience, struggled with the notions which his understanding had embraced. When, for instance, in the sermon on "The Law of Self-Sacrifice," (*Sermons preacht on Particular Occasions*, p. 253,) he tells us that, in the humiliation and abasement of the Son of God, "the justice of God was won by the self-sacrifice of His love, to make a sacrifice of itself," we might easily suppose him to be an orthodox evangelical, using a novel mode of expression; but in the following quotation from the "Victory of Faith," where he is evidently expressing his deliberate opinions, carefully and definitely, we find the distinctive evangelical view wanting, and an incongruous doctrine present:—

> "One [way set before the Jews] was the way of sacrifice, by which expiation and atonement were to be made; and which was to be a type and sign of the slaying and offering up of the carnal will, the carnal nature to God."—Page 156.

Now this is precisely the theory of sacrifice which has been maintained in Germany with great ability by Bähr, and which Maurice has adopted into his recent work on sacrifice. It makes the Jewish sacrifices to be no longer typical of the penal sufferings and death which Christ endured on behalf of sinners, but merely of His own self-sacrifice, which gave the character to his whole life, shining only with a peculiar transcendency in His death. It is true that with this typical purpose and central meaning of the sacrificial rites, Hare connects, as does also Bähr, a number of sentiments suitable to the occasions and the offerings;—sentiments which were associated with the rites in the mind of the offerers, and some of which were specially appropriate to certain kinds of offering, as thank-offerings, sin-offerings, trespass-offerings, &c. (Page 157.) But most carefully does he exclude all direct and proper typical reference to the great Sacrifice on Calvary. Thus he takes out the very heart of the whole matter, and affords the clearest evidence that he was not an orthodox evangelical teacher. To the same effect, in his sermon on the "Unity of the Church," he says, that "the lesson of the cross" was, (he names, he intimates, *no other*,) that men are "to draw nigh to God, not by this work or by that work, not by the sacrifice of this thing or that, but by the entire sacrifice and resignation of their whole being to the will of God." In this way, "through Christ, and through Him alone, they have power to approach to the one God and Father of all." *

In the second volume of the "Parish Sermons," Hare has two sermons on critical texts. One, the eighteenth, is on 2 Cor. viii. 9: "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though He was rich," &c.; the other, the twentieth, on John xix. 30: "When Jesus, therefore, had received the vinegar, He said, *It is finished*." In these sermons, had his creed been fully evangelical, it would have been impossible for him to have helped making some reference to the vicarious character of Christ's sufferings; but there is no such reference. In the latter of these sermons, especially, we should have looked for evangelical doctrine. The doctrine which Hare preaches, however, is such as follows:—

> "All that He came to do by action had already been finisht. But......His great work was to be completed and made perfect, *as every truly great work must be*, by suffering. For no work can be really great unless it be against the course of the world, &c......nor *unless we manifest our own sense of its greatness, by our readiness to give up our own personal interests, and pleasures, and comforts, and to endure hardship, and pain, and bereavement, and death itself, for the sake of its accomplishment. Thus it was* by losing His own life in every possible way—by the agony in the garden; by the flight and denial of those whom He had chosen out of the world to be His companions and friends;

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* "Mission," &c. First Edition, p. 281. This sermon does not seem to have been reprinted in the new editions of Hare's works. It well deserves to be. See *ante*, p. 53.

by the mockery and cruelty of those whom His goodness and purity rendered more bitter against Him; by the frantic and murderous cries of the people, whom He had loaded with every earthly benefit, and whom He desired to crown with eternal blessings; and by the closing sufferings on the cross—that Jesus was to gain his own life, and the everlasting life of all who will believe in Him. All this, then, the whole work of the redemption of mankind, does our Lord in the text declare to be finished."—Pp. 388, 389.

This doctrine is, indeed, deplorably defective; and there is much more in the same strain in this sermon, in which, contrary to the apparent tenor of some former quotations, the death of Christ is regarded as merely the crowning act of His life; displaying, as in a grand symbolic reality, that which had ever been the inner principle of all His actions; and having a moral power, in connexion with the grace of the Holy Ghost, to exercise a transforming influence upon the character and course of all who rightly regard it; "becoming thus," to quote Hare's words, "the teeming parent of countless *works of the same kind*, the first in an endless chain that should girdle the earth, and stretch through all ages."

On the whole, we can come to no conclusion, but that Hare was decidedly non-evangelical on this grand doctrine of atonement, though we rejoice in believing that the faith of his heart was often better than the doctrine of his head. If we have seemed to labour this point, it has been because Hare has been not unfrequently claimed by evangelical Church-of-England journals, ("The Christian Observer" and "Church of England Quarterly," for example,) as belonging to their party; is counted as such by many of the Clergy of his own Church, and by other parties has been generally held to occupy at least a doubtful position. His expressions, indeed, often approach to evangelical orthodoxy; he had strong sympathies in favour of the old-fashioned evangelical truths; but fundamentally and intellectually he was, we grieve to repeat, not orthodox in his evangelical creed. Mr. Maurice, indeed, his brother-in-law and intimate friend, has recently claimed him as a full disciple of the Coleridgean school, and as perfectly according with his own theology. As, however, he has given no evidence of this, of any weight, we shall not yet give up our cherished belief in the evangelical sympathies and general orthodoxy of Julius Hare.

There exists an intimate connexion between the doctrine of a vicarious atonement for sin, and that of justification by faith. Hare, indeed, disbelieved the former, and yet, in a sense, believed the latter. But we must distinguish in what sense. Christian faith, according to him, signifies a general persuasion of God's good will to man, as manifested in the incarnation, the life and death, of his Son. When a sinner becomes persuaded of this, his own attitude toward God becomes that of gratitude and trust; his affections are set right: and at the same time that he thus believes and trusts in God the Father, through Christ, he becomes an actual recipient of His pardoning love, and of a growing influence of the Holy Spirit. He has put away his rebellion and his unbelief; and God at once puts away His anger. The sinner is now justified; he is set right with God. From this time forth he is in process of sanctification. *All this* Hare seems to call the work of *regeneration;* nor does he draw the distinction anywhere, so far as we have noted, between regeneration and sanctification.

Such a doctrine is rather one of regeneration and sanctification by faith, than of justification by faith, in the ordinary Protestant sense. Faith is supposed to bring the sinner into appropriate spiritual dispositions toward God, as his Maker, Judge, and Redeemer; and thereupon God is represented as sending down upon the sinner both the light of His countenance and the hallowing influences of His Spirit. Faith, in fact, operates morally upon the believer, producing in him such a state of feeling as is congruous to the Father's purposes of love, and to the operation of the indwelling, hallowing Spirit. Whereas, according to the true Reformation doctrine, such as it is taught, for example, in the Homilies of the Church of England, justifying faith is understood to be exercised specifically in Christ, as by His death making expiation and satisfaction for the sinner's guilt; or (to put the same idea in another light) in God's covenant with mankind through Christ, as assuring to them pardon for the sake of Christ's death; and this faith, whatever may be its congruity *as* a condition, is yet viewed *merely* as a condition of justification.

Justification, again, according to the same doctrine, the doctrine of the Reformation, is viewed as a change, primarily and properly, not of disposition or principle on man's part, but merely of relation; "as a relative, not a real, change," to use the established phraseology. Only, coinstantaneously with the exercise of justifying faith on the part of the sinner, and the correspondent act of pardon or justification on the part of God, there is believed to be conveyed the special and covenanted gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby the sinner becomes "a new creature."

Hare talks much, indeed, about Christ as the sinner's righteousness; but with him this seems to be but a compendious expression, which must be taken to signify, that the faith in the life, and especially in the death, of Christ, the Son of God, is the origin of the sinner's righteousness; and, further, that the righteousness of Christ, as the God-Man, becomes both the standard and source of the believer's growing righteousness; or, in a word, that the righteousness which was manifested in Christ, as God Incarnate, and the righteousness which is derived from Him, constitute the only ground and source of righteousness to the sinner. Christ is thus his righteousness; and his only trust and hope must be in standing thus related to Christ. In this sense, to quote Hare's words, the believer is "to seek, through faith, to be justified by the blood of Christ;" [that is, he is to be brought to right feelings toward God, and a sense of acceptance before Him, through a contemplation of the love of God to man, particularly as shown in the death of Christ, the God-Man, for sinners;] "and casting off all pretensions to any righteousness of his own," [as if his mere unhelped and isolated nature could bring forth righteousness,] he is "to put on His perfect righteousness;" [that is, to gain, by his faith and love, and the help of the Holy Spirit, a growing conformity to that righteousness of Christ, which is the standard of perfection for humanity.]*

It might be inferred from this, as was, in fact, the case, that Hare was no believer in instantaneous conversion or regeneration. A grand central fact not being presented as the one object for the faith of the penitent sinner to fix upon, and an act of hearty affiance in the blood of Christ as our expiatory sacrifice not being made the immediate condition of justification, and antecedent of regeneration, there is not the same critical hinge on which the whole work of salvation turns. The faith required is rather passive and receptive than active and appropriating, and, therefore, the operation is less a matter of distinct consciousness, and the crisis less marked. A certain act of faith, a particular exercise of affiance, is not made epochal, vital, determinative. Faith is rather a disposition which is induced, a habit which is formed, and which respects the whole revelation of God in Christ. It does, indeed, view the death of Christ as the crowning act of His life, and that in which He most fully showed forth the nature and love of the Father, and as therefore demanding a more reverent and grateful regard than any other fact in the history of Christ; yet it does not look upon this event as standing toward the sin and guilt of mankind in a relation altogether peculiar and unique. This habit of faith is therefore gradually acquired. There is, indeed, a season of conviction and repentance, during which the habit of a grateful, confiding faith is but in process of formation; and when, in its darker character of guilty fear, this has passed away, through the prevalence of faith, there is then realized a "peace and joy through believing," and the abiding indwelling of the Holy Ghost; but still the seasons and experiences, thus distinguished, melt and pass into each other. In some souls, indeed, the crisis of conviction may be much keener than in others, and the contrast between the different stages and seasons more marked. This, in a fine passage, Hare describes to have been the case with Luther, and to be ordinarily the experience of "spirits of a peculiar depth and earnestness." "The conscience," he says, "thus stirred and shaken, in its agony and bloody sweat, will often, for a while, reject all consolation, and is unable to discern the angel coming to strengthen it through the thickness of the surrounding night." But still this admission does not alter his view of the principles and process involved in justification and regeneration. Most strongly does he lay it down in his "Parish Sermons," that those who assert "that they received Christ at such or such a moment, contradict our Lord's declaration that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation." We need scarcely add that in this point he agreed with Coleridge.*

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* "Mission of the Comforter," p. 30.

It is pleasing to find, notwithstanding Hare's particular views on this point, two cases delightfully narrated in the first volume of his "Parish Sermons," which are evidently instances of genuine conversion and of blessed religious experience, although the reflection of a hazy doctrine may be observed in the character of some portion of the experience in both instances.

We know not whether it is much to the purpose to observe, that in one place, in his notes to the "Mission of the Comforter," Hare seems dispose to defend, and almost to identify himself with, the "Evangelicals;" any more than to note, on the contrary, that in his "Contest with Rome," he aims against the same party a significant sneer at "Exeter Hall," and, in his "Vindication of Luther," tells Mr. Ward, that for him to boast as if he had damaged the reputation of Luther, when he has only hit certain peculiarities of the modern Evangelicals, was much as if "Thersites had boasted of having run his spear through Hector, because he had spit at his Lycian auxiliaries." It is certain, that while Hare, with his large heart and devout feeling, saw much to agree with in the doctrine, spirit, and purpose of the evangelical Low-Church party in the Church of England, there was also not a little in their creed, prejudices, and tendencies, as a party, with which it could not be expected that he would sympathize. With his anti-evangelical philosophy, he could not sympathize with all in them which was sound and right: at the same time, we cannot but think, that some part of that which he must have disliked in them was wrong, the result of a narrow and somewhat superficial theology, for the most part highly Calvinistic and enthusiastically pre-millenarian, and of very defective knowledge and training in Biblical criticism.*

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* See the "Victory of Faith," *passim*, but particularly the last sermon in the course; "Mission of the Comforter," vol. ii., pp. 25, 30, 102–3, 106–7, 137, 508, First Edition; "Parish Sermons," vol. i., pp. 34, 35, 75, 76, 142, 449.

Hare's views on the subject of inspiration are the next, and the only other main point to which we shall refer. It is well known how lax were the teachings of Coleridge on this subject, and it is to be feared that Hare's views differed from his rather in degree than in kind. Though we have not found reason for believing that Hare adopted, to the full extent, the views held by Coleridge, and many others of the same school, as to the power and authority of the intuitive reason, yet, on the whole, he is disposed to magnify the intuitive power and faculty of the soul in comparison with the capabilities and functions of the understanding. This tendency naturally, if not inevitably, leads to the depression of the authority of the Bible, considered as an exact revelation and standard of objective truth. Its spirit, and the main purport of its teaching, are recognised by the reason as true and Divine, and constrain the allegiance of the conscience; but if salvation and sanctification were made to depend, in any important degree, upon the letter and precise statements of the Word of God, then the understanding, with its logical processes and discussions, would come to hold too important a relation to the believer's spiritual development. In fact, it will

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* "Mission," &c., First Edition, p. 557; "Contest with Rome," p. 230; "Vindication of Luther," p. 109.

Inspiration not "verbal dictation"

be seen at once, that a logical and systematic theology, constituted out of a number of definite objective truths, upon which a Christian must anchor his faith and hope, becomes a necessity, if the strict doctrine of inspiration, which holds every part of the word of God to be fully and exactly true, is maintained. This doctrine, therefore, will not accord with the theology of those who make faith to be, to repeat the language we recently used, rather passive and receptive than active and appropriating; and sanctification rather to be, from first to last, an unconscious spiritual process wrought by the progressive assimilation (so to speak) of certain grand ideas, than dependent, at any time, upon the hearty and active reception and appropriation of certain objective truths and distinct utterances of grace and love. Hare, indeed, as he admits more objectiveness into his theology of faith than most others of his school, seems, in like manner, to deal more reverently with the word of God. Whatever may have been his theory on the case, he was a diligent and loving student of the sacred text, and delighted himself in its explicit revelations of truth and promise. Still there are indications, that his views in regard to inspiration were far from sound. We do not find fault with his severe handling of the theory of verbal dictation;—for so it ought to be called, and not "verbal inspiration;"—though we have a right to complain that he, as well as Maurice, follows Coleridge in ignoring any other view, as opposed to their own, besides this. But we do deplore, that while he denounces this theory as if it were the only one known in England, he nowhere condescends even to hint at the outline of a better. We are yet more concerned to observe, that in his "Life of Sterling," he refers to Coleridge's "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," in such a way as, while no *caveat* is entered against any part of it, to intimate a general approval of its purport; and that, in consistency with this, he makes light, in his "Letter to the Editor of the English Review," of such matters as discrepancies in the Evangelists, "which may, indeed, perplex those who cling to the vulgar notion of literal inspiration; but, when we take a correcter view, are *wholly immaterial;*" adding that "the correction of our views on inspiration would remove a number of stumbling-blocks which now beset our students of theology, and which they cannot get over except by wilfully closing their eyes to them." Yet, the very discrepancy here specially referred to by Hare, (that found in the history of the Gergesene demoniac,) and which he agrees with Olshausen in considering equally irreconcilable and "immaterial," is not admitted to be any real discrepancy by Stier, an exegete not inferior to Olshausen, and rated very high by Hare himself. No doubt it is to such a philosophy as that of Coleridge's on the subject of inspiration, a philosophy borrowed, like most of Coleridge's, from Germany, that Hare refers in his Preface to the "Mission of the Comforter," when he says that in Germany the champions of the truth defend it, "not by shutting their eyes to its difficulties, and hooting at its adversaries, but by calmly refuting those adversaries, and solving the difficulties, with the help of weapons derived from a higher philology and philosophy." We confess that we have met with nothing in all Hare's writings to us so distressing as these passages on the subject of inspiration.

Akin to his views on this subject are those which he seems to have held in relation to miracles. Undoubtedly these, and the other external evidences of Christianity, were, by the Grotian school, insisted upon far too exclusively. Even Chalmers, also, has confessed, that at one time he placed too main a reliance on this branch of evidence. But Coleridge and his school place miracles too low by far, scarcely admitting them to have any importance whatever as evidence of the divinity of Christianity. They have authority, in Coleridge's view, only as authenticated and accepted by the Reason; they are not allowed to be the seal of God to the validity of the commission of those by whom they were wrought. How far Hare went along with Coleridge in this view we know not, but there is enough evidence to show that at least he shared in the general bias of his school.*

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* See "Mission of the Comforter," Second Edition, p. 354; "Guesses at Truth," First Series, p. 385.

Liberal as Hare was, he was a thorough Church-of-England man. He loved to preach upon the subject of her main festivals; and to trace the order of her services through the year, as illustrating the life and offices of Christ. Indeed, as we remarked in a former chapter, the Anglican Church arrangements and formularies are peculiarly suited to the principles and predilections of the Broad Churchman, who dwells so fondly upon the life and human character of our Lord, while he ordinarily avoids the theology of guilt and ransom, of law and expiation, and, indeed, doctrinal theology in general. But, though a Church-of-England man, Hare was no believer in sacramental salvation in any form; which he speaks of as a doctrine of "magical powers and acts." His phraseology on the subject of baptism may sometimes seem obscure or ambiguous; but careful readers will discover, that, at any rate, what he means can be nothing like Tractarianism.

We feel that we have by no means done justice to this distinguished writer. We should have had an easier task, if he had been a man of less comprehensive cultivation, and less catholic sympathies. But it is hard to form, and harder still, within reasonable compass, to furnish, a fair estimate of a man who seems to have been equally familiar with profane and with sacred studies; with ancient and modern history and philosophy; with Fathers, Schoolmen, Mystics, Reformers, Puritan and Church-of-England divines, German Philosophy and Theology, and British Poetry and Literature; who could criticize with equal ability a play or a metaphysical argument, an opera or a political treatise; who was an equally good judge of a fine old painting or a fine old folio; who had sympathies which linked him with all tendencies, tempers, and ages,—only never with meanness or vice; who, in his theological writings, quoted, with almost equal relish, Tauler or Calvin, Andrewes or Leighton, Donne or Baxter, Matthew Henry or Neander, while, above all, he studied and honoured Luther and Coleridge; who now verges on Mysticism, then speaks out in the strong dialect of Lutheran Evangelism, and again philosophizes in the spirit of Coleridge's better and more genial vein; who here winds his way in brilliant allegory, and elsewhere writes in a practical style of unequalled pith and point. Take him for all in all, he was, perhaps, the richest, freshest, and most genial among English writers of our time, on moral and religious subjects; and, much as we regret his serious deficiencies on some vital points, yet we cannot but be thankful that, in his case, a soul of such various and exquisite endowments was so deeply swayed by genuine and unsectarian piety.

Yet it must not be forgotten in reading his writings, that Hare, with all his excellences and accomplishments, with all his wisdom and eloquence and Christian feeling, *was* seriously defective in his views of those doctrines which constitute the very heart of Christianity. Strength of intellect was his; yet was his mind not so strong as his spirit was genial, nor was his insight so profound as his apprehension was quick and subtle. His perception of analogies and harmonies was wonderfully keen, because sedulously—we might almost say, passionately—cultured; but for a philosopher, and a theologian especially, the faculty and habit of perceiving and discriminating differences are not less necessary. The faculty Hare undoubtedly possessed; and in regard to certain subjects of criticism,—literary, philosophical, and ecclesiastical,—he exercised it with great effect, as his "Guesses at Truth," his "Vindication of Luther," and his "Contest with Rome," abundantly show: yet it was his habit and propensity, on the whole, and especially in regard to matters of theology, rather to note agreements than differences. He seems to have shrunk from minute distinction and discrimination on questions of Christian faith and orthodoxy. His doctrinal theology was vague and broad. Hence the incautious and undiscriminating praise which he has bestowed upon such writers as Coleridge and Maurice, not to refer to certain German philosophers and theologians of a very dubious character. That Hare, by his writings, has been a benefactor to his race, is not to be doubted, at least by us; but, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that he has added weight and authority to opinions, to writers, and to a school of theology, from which great and vital danger is to be feared to the best interests of Protestants. Perhaps, indeed, between the prevalence of semi-Popery on the one hand, and an uncritical and narrow Evangelism on the other, with Neology, unchecked and unanswered by either party, but making its inroads upon both, there may be some reason for thankfulness in the consideration that the latitudinarian section of the Church of England, heterodox as are many of its tendencies, is by no means an unmixed evil. We trust it will force Tractarianism to give up its blind hold of tradition, and the Evangelical school to apply themselves to a profound and critical study of Scripture and theology. But, in any case, it is a thing to be noted, how rapidly this school has advanced in power and public influence during the last few years. Had Hare been living now, he might have easily found organs in which to express his views. A strange amalgam the party seems to be, of semi-infidelity, High-Churchism, social benevolence, and real religious liberality and zeal, not without some considerable leaven, here and there, of evangelical truth and feeling. Out of it will come forth good and evil, not a little. Meanwhile, let the orthodox watch it, in a spirit at once wary and liberal; equally ready to learn from what is good, and to contend against what is evil. Assured we are that the noblest and best of the party has gone from the strife of time to a peaceful land of truth and love. Had he lived longer, he might have receded more and more from his friends; and have still more fully outgrown the anti-evangelical prejudices and tendencies of the philosophy to which he had addicted himself.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE REV. F. D. MAURICE.

Mr. Maurice was educated a Universalist and Unitarian. This appears from an interesting letter to a friend, published in the correspondence between himself and Dr. Jelf, the Principal of King's College; which gives an account of the steps by which he arrived at his present convictions. When, however, as we learn from the same record, he began to "think and feel for himself," he doubted whether the Supreme Governor was the mere personified Good Nature that Universalists and Unitarians supposed him to be. Nor could he accept the Unitarian interpretation, or rather distortion, of the sense of *αἰώνιος*, (*eternal* or *everlasting*,) in Matt. xxv. 46. He says of himself, at this time, "I despised the Universalist and Unitarian theories as weak: I do not know that I found anything at all better." After a while, he "began in earnest to seek God for himself;" and then found that "selfishness" was the bane and plague of his nature, and that it was impossible for him "to trust in any Being who did not hate selfishness, and desire to raise His creatures out of it." Such a Being seemed to him equally to differ from the "mere image of good nature" of the Universalists, and from the "mere Sovereign" of the Calvinists. Such a Being he thought he found in the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." In Him he could trust as his Father, and as "One absolute in goodness." Believing thus in the Father, he tells us that he could not but accept the Son; and, believing in the Father and the Son, he found himself also compelled to "confess a Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son, distinct from them, perfectly one with them." These convictions, he informs us, "he did not receive of man, neither was taught them;" that is to say, the process was purely subjective. The voice and teaching of revelation seem to have had very little authority in this matter. He believed in God's revelation just so far as this seemed to tally with his own personal needs and convictions.

Having thus begun by believing in God, because, and *merely* because, he believed in himself, it was natural to expect that his faith in Divine revelation would terminate where his own subjective feelings or convictions refused any further to follow. Hence, having accepted as the object of his trust a Being whose character corresponded with his own standard and idea of "absolute goodness," he found it impossible to attribute to this Being any quality or procedure which he conceived to be incompatible with such "absolute goodness." On this ground, though he felt compelled to believe in a God whose love wars with selfishness, and whose good is ever striving to oppose and extirpate evil, and who therefore meets and visits selfishness, or sin, (terms which, according to him, are precise equivalents,) with present counteraction and discouragement, and will continue to do so ever and everywhere so long as such selfishness, or sin, shall have any place in the universe,—yet, the idea of a God of law and judgment, who visits, in any case, past transgression with present and future fixed and irreversible *punishment*, was an idea which he could not but discard as inconsistent with his own conception of "absolute goodness;" that is to say, he had no feeling for the majesty of law in the Governor of the universe. The thought of the Governor was lost in that of the Father; and the righteousness which dispenses penalties or rewards according to the character and conduct of the subjects, became, to his view, a dark and ungodlike shadow, which must fly before the face of the Divine charity.

Under the influence of such preconceptions as these, we learn, from the letter to which we have referred, that Mr. Maurice long ago decided against the doctrine of eternal punishment. But the same strain of thought and feeling led him also, very consistently, to deny the eternity of rewards as judicially fixed and determined. In a word, he seems to have given up, from an early period of his career, the idea that the present life is a probation, and that hereafter there will be a judicial settlement of all cases. He has not found himself able to acquiesce in the all but universal faith and tradition, that there is to come, sooner or later, a judicial review of the past, and allotment for the future. The only judgment he knows is a living, self-manifesting power, which operates perpetually and universally through the laws according to which God regulates all things. Probation, according to him, is either done away, or it is protracted through eternity. Meantime he cherishes the trust that, in the end, love will prevail everywhere, and for ever, over all evil.

To reconcile these ideas with Scripture might seem difficult: but, according to the process of Mr. Maurice's convictions, they must be true, independently of Scripture teaching or authority; and therefore Scripture *must* be reconciled to *them*. How this is to be done we shall come to see more particularly by and by. Meantime, we subjoin, in a note, the cardinal conclusions at which Mr. Maurice, at so early a stage of his course,—when he "began in earnest to seek God for himself,"—had arrived on some of the points we have opened, as these conclusions are given by himself in the afore-mentioned letter.*

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* "My duty, then, I feel is this: 1. To assert that which I know,—that which God has revealed,—His absolute, universal, love, in all possible ways, and without any limitation. 2. To tell myself and all men, that to know this love, and to be moulded by it, is the blessing we are to seek. 3. To say that this is eternal life. 4. To say that the want of it is eternal death. 5. To say that if they believe in the Son of God, they have eternal life. 6. To say that if they have not the Son of God, they have not life. 7. Not to say who has not the Son of God, because I do not know. 8. Not to say how long any one may remain in eternal death, because I do not know. 9. Not to say that all will necessarily be raised out of eternal death, because I do not know. 10. Not to judge any man before the time, or to judge other men at all, because Christ has said, 'Judge not, that ye be not judged.' 11. Not to play with Scripture, by quoting passages which have not the slightest connexion with the subject; such as, 'Where the tree falleth it shall lie.' 12. Not to invent a scheme of purgatory, and to take upon myself the office of Divine Judge. 13. Not to deny God a right of using punishments, at any time or anywhere, for the reformation of His creatures. 14. Not to contradict Christ's words, 'These shall be beaten with few, these with many stripes,' for the sake of maintaining a theory of the equality of sins. 15. Not to think any punishment of God's so great as His saying, 'Let them alone.'"

At what time precisely Mr. Maurice worked out for himself thus far his peculiar scheme of doctrinal and speculative opinions, we have not the means of ascertaining; but we may fairly conjecture within certain limits. It appears that he matriculated, in the first instance, at Cambridge, where he came under the influence of Hare, but left without taking his degree, as at that time he could not conscientiously sign the Thirty-nine Articles. Subsequently, however, through the writings of Coleridge, as it is said, he so modified his own views, or learnt so to interpret the Articles, that he found himself able to subscribe these. Thereupon he repaired to Oxford, and graduated at that University. It must then have been, we may suppose, at about the period between his leaving Cambridge, and his repairing to Oxford, that his doctrinal conclusions were finally settled. For some thirty years past he has probably thought very much as he thinks now. But the wonder of the case is, how, notwithstanding his acceptance, in a philosophic and non-evangelic sense, of the doctrine of the Trinity, he could suppose himself, while holding such views, to be much less disqualified than he would have been as a Unitarian Universalist for entering the Church of England. Assuredly such doctrines as his are opposed to those which form the root and life of all the doctrinal and devotional formularies of that Church. Indeed, he must have subscribed the Thirty-nine Articles in a sense which could scarcely have been understood as agreeing with even the most general meaning and intent of those by whom they were drawn up, and by whom they were adopted and authenticated. It appears, however, from his letter in reply to Dr. Jelf, that in the year 1845 he wrote a pamphlet, in which he argued that it ought not to be held needful that the Articles should be subscribed in the sense which they may undoubtedly have borne when they were drawn up. And hence we can the more easily understand how he found himself able to sign these formularies without scruple, and can estimate the significance of the fact, that his first publication, issued in the year 1835, was entitled, "Subscription no Bondage."

A still more puzzling point is, how a clergyman of earnest spirit, popular sympathies, and forcible genius, holding such views, could, from year to year, be advanced in the Church, and ultimately promoted to positions of great responsibility and commanding influence, in the very halls where, with a more than ordinary religious strictness, the rising youth, and especially the embryo Clergy of that Church, receive their mental and moral training. Somewhere there must have been great carelessness or laxity in this matter. It is true that Mr. Maurice's views have been very little understood till within the last few years; indeed, even the "Essays" leave them obscure in many respects; and though the "Unity of the New Testament," published since the author's dismissal from his Professorship at King's College, discloses, in plain terms, the philosophical or theosophical basis on which his theology rests, and helps us clearly to understand its spirit and scope, yet neither that work nor any of Mr. Maurice's works can be said to furnish a definite statement, or a systematic evolution, of his theological opinions. Still, his "Kingdom of Christ," the *second* edition of which was published in the year 1842, does furnish so full and detailed a view of the relative position which the writer's special mysticism holds in regard to Quakerism, Evangelical opinions, (as he chooses to understand them,) Unitarianism, Anglican High-Churchism, Popery, and Infidel philosophies, and of its practical aspects and results, if regarded as a system of theology, as to leave no excuse for such entire ignorance respecting the character and tendencies of Mr. Maurice's views as *ought to be* implied by his appointment to a theological Professorship in a highly orthodox Anglican College, and as *is* implied in Dr. Jelf's published correspondence on occasion of his dismissal. Though, in the remarkable work to which we have referred, Mr. Maurice's views are but superficially stated,—by no means unfolded from their principles,—and are often exhibited in their merely negative aspects, when we might have looked for positive definition and exposition; and though his language, with all its directness and easy flow, is very often characteristically obscure, because implying throughout a philosophy which has never been explained; yet, no competent divine could read the two volumes carefully, without being convinced that the writer was anything but orthodox. Throughout, they teach or imply that peculiar view of the preliminary justification and regeneration of humanity, abstractly and universally, in Christ, which is now known as characteristic of the Maurice-Kingsley School. Of course, also, they everywhere either ignore, or misrepresent and deny, the doctrine of atonement through the meritorious and expiatory death of Christ. Nor could a thoughtful and well-informed theologian have failed to detect in these volumes traces, by no means obscure, of that universalism and that doctrine of eternal life and death, on account of which the author was, more than a dozen years afterwards, to be dismissed from his Professorship. Indeed, by one who is acquainted with the history and principles of the mediæval mystical theology, and, in particular, with that form of it which has been revived by Coleridge and his followers, these volumes will be seen to contain the germ and outline of nearly all that has since been published either by Maurice or by Kingsley. They show that, so many years ago, the views of the author were matured and fully developed. All that is to be found in the famous "Essays," is implicitly contained here, and not *much* more obscurely taught than in the "Essays" themselves; and here is the distinct outline of those recent works on the "Unity of the New Testament" and the "Gospel of St. John," which, together, form a whole, and which, taken in connexion with the "Kingdom of Christ," the "Essays," and the "Doctrine of Sacrifice," may perhaps be said to furnish a complete view of Mr. Maurice's theology.

Moreover, we find from a volume entitled, "Christmas Day and other Sermons," published in 1843, that so early as August, 1835, he preached a sermon at Southampton, ("The Kingdom which cannot be moved,") in which he lays down theological principles essentially the same with those which are now characteristic of his teaching; and that in 1839 he was regularly engaged in delivering to the afflicted inmates of Guy's Hospital, of which institution he was at that time Chaplain, doctrinal expositions which embodied, with sufficient distinctness, his peculiar views, as to atonement, justification, and regeneration; though, of course, in sermons intended for such an audience, a veil is thrown over his esoteric philosophy, and the profounder meaning and aspects of his theology are not distinctly brought out. A little later, also, he published his "Warburtonian Lectures," on the Epistle to the Hebrews; in which volume the doctrine of expiatory atonement is silently set aside, although Christ's priesthood and sacrifice are of course largely treated of. Again, in his volume on the "Old Testament," published somewhat later, the doctrine of the fall of man is ingeniously and subtilely put to rest; and a system of doctrine is sometimes laid down, and sometimes assumed, exactly coincident with the teachings of his former works on the points we have specified.

Nor in any of his works will anything be found of a contrary character, or of a truly orthodox or evangelical colour. Much there is that is benevolent, wise, beautiful, and eloquent; there is much earnest, practical teaching, specially appropriate to the civil and economical needs of the present time. Seldom has any one been found who could, by the light of the Divine records of the Old Testament, read more searching, faithful, and impressive lessons upon the subject of relative duties to men of every grade and class: indeed, as the earnest and eloquent interpreter and spokesman of the lessons of sacred history, he has rarely been equalled. Seldom, if ever, has there been a teacher more deeply impressed with the fact, that Jehovah is the living and ruling God of men and of the universe, nor one better able and more earnestly resolved to impress this fact as a living truth upon the hearts of all that listened to him. Yet, with all this, Mr. Maurice is never and nowhere the preacher of a Gospel of salvation to a guilty and fallen race, through faith in the atoning merits of Christ's blood. Never does he preach to a sinful world of a future judgment, or exhort men "to flee from the wrath to come." Whatever else he may preach, he does *not* preach Christ's Gospel. In this respect he has been consistent from first to last: while, to refer to a different but yet a kindred point, his views on the subject of inspiration—particularly of the prophetic inspiration, as they are developed more especially in his work on "the Prophets and Kings"—are so lax and singular, that if they had been found in the work of a German Professor, they would have been branded as outrageous Rationalism. And yet, notwithstanding all this, Mr. Maurice was successively promoted to be Professor of English Literature, Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and even (*mirabile dictu!*) Professor of Divinity, at King's College, London. Long ago he exchanged his chaplaincy of the maimed and diseased inmates at Guy's Hospital for the chaplaincy of the learned and influential Society of Barristers, at Lincoln's Inn.

It was scarcely to be anticipated, however, that this course could continue for ever. Whatever may have been the negligence of the leading authorities connected with King's College, they are, no doubt, and have been, strict Church-of-England men; and whatever may be the comprehensive liberalism of that Church, she could scarcely, in an earnest season of thought like the present, tolerate in her chief places of official influence and duty tenets so glaringly contrary to her system of doctrines as those which we have found that Mr. Maurice had long held. Negative heresy she might not bestir herself to detect or analyse; but positive out-spokenness in vital heresy is a different matter. A century ago, a deist might be a Bishop, and a Unitarian stand high in preferment in the Anglican Church. But things are different now. Then, out of Methodism, there was scarcely any earnestness extant, whether in religion or aught else. Now, the world is full of energy, and the age teems with earnest spirits. Now, sincerity, whether in error or in truth, for evil or for good, is counted the "one thing needful," and earnestness is rated as heroism. All parties agree that institutions must work out their own meaning; and that boards and faculties must appoint teachers and professors, who shall substantially and fairly represent the views and convictions of those that appoint them. It was, therefore, impossible, after Mr. Maurice, in his "Essays," had fully disclosed the singularity and heterodoxy of his views on every point of theology, (the Trinity, we shall show, can by no means be considered an exception,) that he could much longer retain his functions as Professor of Divinity in so strict a Church-of-England institution as King's College.

But however came Mr. Maurice to be appointed Professor of Divinity in this College? is a question which our wondering readers will ask. We certainly cannot pretend to answer this question. Only we have heard that Mr. Maurice first entered the College under the patronage of the late Bishop of London; and *his* bill of health would probably be considered as establishing his Anglican orthodoxy for not a few years to come. Then we are sure that Dr. Jelf, the Principal of the College, had not read (though perhaps he may have looked into) Mr. Maurice's books. The tone of his letter to Mr. Maurice is sufficient proof of this; and Mr. Maurice even taunts him with it, and tells him, that in 1846, when he solicited him to accept the Professorship of Theology, he might have been aware, "if he had ever read one of his books," of some of those heterodox views which, as recently disclosed at full length, had so much surprised and scandalized him. Indeed, Dr. Jelf did not read anything of the famous "Essays" until some considerable time after their publication, nor until his attention was specifically and authoritatively called to them by his diocesan, the Bishop of London; and even then he only read the last Essay, containing one, and that not the most vital or radical, of his many heresies: and on the merits of this particular Essay, and in reference to this single heresy, was the case of the Professor adjudged, under the direction of Dr. Jelf, and Mr. Maurice deprived of his Professorship. And yet Mr. Maurice had long been a most popular and influential writer, and had dealt in his writings with subjects most vitally connected with divinity and the theological interpretation of Scripture. So much pains had the Principal taken to satisfy himself as to the competency of his Professor of Divinity!

Nothing can excuse such negligence as this. We suppose, however, that Mr. Maurice, having once or twice signed the Thirty-nine Articles, having entered King's College with the recommendation of his able and vigilant diocesan,—the same who at length called Dr. Jelf's attention to his heterodoxy,—having proved himself an accomplished teacher, and gained a high reputation among a certain class as an earnest and practical preacher, and having acquired, in a singular degree, the warm and affectionate personal esteem of those whom he had been accustomed to teach,—was naturally, and without investigation, advanced from stage to stage in his official position at the College, till, at last, he was promoted to the Professorship of Divinity.

The Bishop of London seems to have called Dr. Jelf's attention to Mr. Maurice's Essays about Midsummer of 1853. In a note, dated "Christ Church, Oxford, July 8th, 1853," Dr. Jelf informs his "dear Professor Maurice" that his "attention had been called, by high authority, to the conclusion of the last of his Theological Essays, lately published;" that he had read the Essay, and was of opinion that therein he "seemed to throw an atmosphere of doubt on the simple meaning of the word *eternal*, and to convey a general notion of ultimate salvation for all." Thus originated the correspondence between Dr. Jelf and Mr. Maurice, in the course of which Mr. Maurice communicated to Dr. Jelf that interesting letter to a friend, from which we quoted some time back, and in which he recounts the process of his transition from Unitarian and Universalist views to the position he has since occupied. After Dr. Jelf, by a preliminary correspondence, had satisfied himself as to what Mr. Maurice's meaning was in the Essay he had referred to, he prepared and sent to Mr. Maurice a long letter, in which he refuted the views of his correspondent, showed their contrariety to the teaching of Scripture and of the Church of England, and intimated to him that, on the grounds of the argument drawn out in the letter, he should feel it his duty to submit the question of Mr. Maurice's further continuance in office to the Council of the College.* This letter of Dr. Jelf's was communicated to Mr. Maurice in printed slips, piece-meal, as it was written, (being considered as a sort of informal indictment,) in order that he might have full opportunity to prepare a reply to it; and on October 14th, after three months' correspondence and delay, the whole case, including a final letter from Mr. Maurice, in reply to Dr. Jelf, was laid before the Council of King's College. The Council, at an adjourned meeting, held October 28th, "pronounced," to quote Mr. Maurice's own account, "the opinions expressed and the doubts indicated in the 'Essays' and the correspondence respecting future punishments and the final issues of the day of judgment, to be of dangerous tendency, and likely to unsettle the minds of the theological students;" and "decided, further, that his continuance as Professor would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the College." From that day the Professor's lectures, both on "Ecclesiastical History" and on "Divinity," came to an end.

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* In this closing letter, Dr. Jelf says, "A privilege, for which there is no precedent in our Church, has been accorded to King's College, namely, that of founding, with the full sanction of all the Bishops, a theological department; with the understanding that twenty-six Bishops will accept the certificate of the Principal, presented by a candidate for holy orders, in lieu of a university degree;" and adds, "A college so trusted and privileged must not permit its orthodoxy to be even suspected." And yet Dr. Jelf rested in ignorance as to the substance, tendency, and merits of the theological publications of his Professor of Divinity; one singular instance of which occurs in this very letter. Writing of the Articles of the Church of England, he says, "There are several other theological truths which are also omitted, because there was no occasion to speak of them. The compendium, for instance, contains no assertion—at least in direct terms, *eo nomine*—of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures: nor is there any allusion in the present text of the Articles to the general resurrection of all men, with their bodies, at Christ's coming: yet you would not call *those* open questions; you would not say that a theological Professor who disputes either of those truths can be safely trusted to teach the students in the theological department of King's College." Now, a more curiously unfortunate *argumentum ad hominem* than this, as addressed to Mr. Maurice, it would be difficult to imagine; for, as to the inspiration of the Scriptures, it is manifest, not only from the "Essays," but from the "Kingdom of Christ," published so many years ago, and from several others of his previous works, to which he himself refers in a note to the "Essays," (p. 323,) that Mr. Maurice does not believe in this tenet in any other sense than that in which a Rationalist might profess to believe in it,—that is, he does not believe the inspiration of the sacred writers to differ, in any essential particular, from that teaching of the Spirit of which a pious peasant may be conscious, while reading those Scriptures; and as to the general resurrection of all men, with their bodies, and Christ's second coming to judge the quick and the dead, these are tenets which, in the "Essays," Mr. Maurice boldly and altogether repudiates.

It will be observed, from the above account, that the decision of the Council was founded upon Mr. Maurice's opinions relating to only one point—and that, however momentous, not the most central or essential—of his theological opinions; a point, indeed, which was, in the original edition of the Essays, only brought in incidentally, or at least secondarily, in the latter part of his Essay on the "Trinity in Unity." It appears that this was the only point to which a certain "high authority" had called the Principal's attention; and though, at first, as we gather from the printed correspondence, the Principal very naturally resolved, and indeed engaged to Mr. Maurice, that he would carefully read the whole volume, in order the more safely and accurately to form his judgment upon the case, yet afterward it is evident that he judged it better to confine his attention to the particular Essay to which he had been originally pointed. On every account we think this is to be lamented: the controversy was thus not only narrowed, but distorted, and a doctrine was made primary and central, which gave Mr. Maurice every advantage in the sight of mere secularists and half-believers, and which even the profound believer would always require to be viewed in its connexion with and dependence upon the truly central truths which form the very heart and essence of Christianity. Very possibly it might have been inconvenient to take up the grand doctrine of the atonement, with its associated doctrines of human depravity, justification, and regeneration, as the root of the whole matter. Perhaps on these doctrines some of Mr. Maurice's colleagues, and of the members of the Council, may have been divided in opinion; and it might possibly be found even that views were held, as to more than one of them, by some of those involved in the responsibility of this matter, which are far from agreeing with the evangelical orthodoxy of the Reformers.

There is another thing to be noted. Dr. Blomfield, the late Bishop of London, thought it his duty to direct the Principal's attention to the Professor's heterodoxy; but Mr. Maurice is still a fully accredited clergyman of the Church of England, within the diocese of London, and still holds the chaplaincy of Lincoln's Inn: so that the Bishop was either powerless in this case, or shrunk from an invidious responsibility in his own person which, notwithstanding, he felt bound to lay on another; or he thought that heterodoxy, though it may disqualify a clergyman for a professorship, does not disqualify him for the office of the public ministry. We believe the truth to be, that, as Mr. Maurice has subscribed the Articles and formularies of the Church, and holds to them, (even to the Athanasian Creed,) in a sense, the Bishop was practically powerless. The Gorham case would be a very trifle to a leviathan affair like this of Maurice, embracing so many particulars of doctrine, and involving distinctions and reasonings so subtle and abstract.

CHAPTER VIII.

MR. MAURICE'S PHILOSOPHY THE BASIS OF HIS THEOLOGY.*

Mr. Maurice's "Essays," published six years ago, have already been followed by four considerable volumes of theological teaching from his prolific pen, besides some

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*1. *The Kingdom of Christ: or, Hints to a Quaker, respecting the Principles, Constitution, and Ordinances of the Catholic Church.* By Frederick Denison Maurice, M.A., Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, and Professor of English Literature and History in King's College, London. Two Vols. Second Edition. London. 1842.
2. *Christmas-Day and other Sermons.* By F. D. Maurice, M.A., Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, &c. 1843.
3. *The Religions of the World.* By F. D. Maurice, &c.
4. *On the Epistle to the Hebrews.* By F. D. Maurice, &c.
5. *On the Old Testament.* By F. D. Maurice, &c.
6. *Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament.* By F. D. Maurice, &c.
7. *Lectures on the Ecclesiastical History of the First and Second Centuries.* By F. D. Maurice, M.A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. 1854.
8. *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Part I. Ancient Philosophy.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. Third Edition, revised. 1856.
9. *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Part II. Philosophy of the First Six Centuries.* Second Edition. 1856.
10. *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. Part III. Mediæval Philosophy.* 1856.
11. *Theological Essays.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. Second Edition, with a new Preface, and other Additions. 1854.
12. *Grounds for laying before the Council of King's College, London, certain Statements contained in a recent Publication, entitled, "Theological Essays. By the Rev. F. D. Maurice, M.A., Professor of Divinity in King's College."* By R. W. Jelf, D.D., Principal of the College, and Canon of Christ's Church. 1853.
13. *The Word "Eternal," and the Punishment of the Wicked: a Letter to the Rev. Dr. Jelf, &c.* By F. D. Maurice, M.A., Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. 1853.
14. *The Unity of the New Testament: a Synopsis of the first three Gospels, and of the Epistles of St. James, St. Jude, St. Peter, and St. Paul.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. 1854.
15. *The Doctrine of Sacrifice.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. 1854.
16. *The Gospel of St. John. A Series of Discourses.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. 1857.
17. *The Epistles of St. John. A Series of Lectures on Christian Ethics.* By F. D. Maurice, &c. 1857.

minor series of sermons, a learned volume on "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," a volume of lectures on Ecclesiastical History, and another on "Learning and Working" and on "The Religion of Rome." One of these four theological volumes is on the "Doctrine of Sacrifice," and is specially examined in a later chapter. The others are on the "Unity of the New Testament," on the "Gospel of St. John," and on the "Epistles of St. John;" the two former constituting, in reality, but one whole, and the last completing his systematic review of the books of Scripture, both of the Old and New Testaments, the Apocalypse only excepted. (Of the Apocalypse, according to his view of it, Mr. Maurice gives an analysis in his Lectures on Ecclesiastical History.) The first of these three volumes is bulky, and not particularly popular in its method; and neither of them, nor all together, will supersede the "Essays," which furnish, in moderate compass, both a popular and, so far as regards its practical character and relative aspects, a complete sketch of Mr. Maurice's theology. There is, therefore, no need to recast the matter which follows in this and the next chapter, though the greater part of it was originally published four years ago. The materials on which it was founded remain substantially unaltered. "The Unity of the New Testament" was already published, at that time, and furnished important aid in the illustration of the real character of the views contained in the "Essays." Some additional illustrations, derived chiefly from the volume on Sacrifice, have been inserted in the text, and some others, taken, for the most part, from the work on the "Kingdom of Christ," and that on "The Gospel of St. John," have been thrown into the form of notes and appendices. "The Kingdom of Christ," indeed, Mr. Maurice's earliest work of any magnitude, is also one of the most important that he has published. It is certainly the most complete and comprehensive, though not so detailed on points of theology as the "Essays," nor so attractive in style, nor so animated and impressive in tone and feeling; and though, also, it by no means discloses the most profound and peculiar principles of his theosophy so clearly as the "Unity of the New Testament." *

At the time when the chief part of the two following chapters was first published in the pages of a Quarterly Review, Mr. Maurice's critics appeared to be all at fault in respect to the real meaning and purport of his views. Very many held to the belief, that, except in regard to the doctrine of future punishment, he was, at least in the broad Anglican and Trinitarian sense, an orthodox Christian; and no one seemed to have a suspicion that the esoteric doctrine of his school, concealed under pseudo-Christian and pseudo-orthodox phrases, was nothing else than a Neo-Platonic Realism and theosophy. Since the article was published, which now appears as the substance of these chapters, the view therein explained has become extensively understood; and wherever it is understood, it is accepted. A little before the publication of the article in the "London Quarterly," January, 1855, a paper on Kingsley had appeared in the "National Review," which should be as well informed as any journal on the peculiarities of all semi-Unitarian philosophical schools of pseudo-Christianity. Yet in that article no hint is given to show that the writer apprehended the innermost principles of that theology, or rather theosophy, which is common to Messrs Maurice and Kingsley, and which pervades all the writings of the latter no less than of the former. But, in an able article in the same journal, published in October, 1856, and entitled "Personal Influences on our Present Theology," the writer "insulates the one character—of *Religious Realism*—which," as he says, "is the inner essence of the philosophical and theological system of Coleridge," and which we shall show to be the living seed of its development in the school of Mr. Maurice, adding the just remark, that "it is chiefly from inapprehension of this character, and from the inveterate training of the English mind in the opposite habit of thought, that so many readers complain of obscurity in the writings of the Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn."

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* The dedication to the Rev. Derwent Coleridge, (son of the philosopher,) which is prefixed to the Second Edition of this work, is remarkable for the full statement which it contains of the manner in which Coleridge's writings had influenced the author's own mental and moral developement, and, to a considerable extent, not merely impressed, but moulded, his philosophical and theological views, in all their breadth. At the same time it appears, from this interesting self-revelation, that Mr. Maurice never had any personal acquaintance with the Highgate seer.

We have said that the remark we have quoted in the last sentence is just. At the same time, there is no doubt that Mr. Maurice could have made his real and innermost meaning plainer to ordinary readers, if he had so pleased. He has had his own reasons for preferring ambiguity and equivocation to definite explanation and distinct utterance. He has been trying, for years past, gradually to train and prepare the mind of Britain's earnest and intelligent youth to receive these doctrines. But, for such doctrines to be received with any degree of real intelligence and conscious mastery, a different sort of preparation is needful. They require to be scientifically defined; and yet, if so defined, their scholastic abstruseness would repulse the popular reader. Even the powers of Mr. Maurice are inadequate to the task of putting such speculations into a popular form. Hence, between unwillingness to take off the veil too soon or too fully, and inability to illuminate for popular inspection the essential obscurity of his theosophy, his real meaning remained, for most readers, impenetrable; and the "Essays" came upon a public unprepared, after all the lessons which had been given it, fully to understand or receive them.

Mr. Maurice's "Essays" profess to exhibit a complete summary of his views on the whole round of Christian doctrine: they are his doctrinal manifesto, and contain his confession of faith. In this character they possess a peculiar interest and importance. Almost as soon, too, as they were published, they passed from the desk of the critic and theologian into the hands of many of the more cultivated and inquiring among general readers, especially of the younger class. In particular, we are well informed that not a few Christian young people, of both sexes, seemed to find in them much to admire. This made it a matter of importance that they should understand what that teaching really meant, by which they allowed themselves to be charmed. We cannot but assume that they did not understand this; for they certainly would not have professed to admire that which is not, in any true sense, Christian teaching, but anti-Christian philosophy. Nor can we wonder that they failed to perceive the real drift of the "Essays." Even Dr. Candlish, admirably as he has refuted Mr. Maurice's particular misrepresentations of evangelical doctrine, and exposed the fallacy of many of his dogmas, and tracked the mazes of his surface-sophistry, has failed to discover the principles from which all his teachings flow, and to unfold, from the root upwards, the logical order and connexion of the whole. He has missed the *double entendre* of Mr. Maurice's doctrinal statements; and though he perceives and meets, most effectually, their negative and destructive import, he has not apprehended their positive ground and meaning. The same has been the case, so far as we know, with Mr. Maurice's other critics. To understand Mr. Maurice, his writings at large must be carefully studied. He never defines. Logic, as an instrument of exposition or conviction, he eschews with undisguised contempt. His teaching is practical, not scholastic or scientific. His principles are involved in his teaching, and must, by careful analysis, be deduced from it. They are never explicitly laid down. Herein, no doubt, is a sort of wisdom; for, in fact, there lies underneath all his speculations, and moral teachings, a *philosophy* so abstruse and unfamiliar,—a philosophy of the old heathen world, with which none but a few scholars, of late time, have been much acquainted, and the whole character of which is utterly opposed to the tendencies of modern thought and progress, at least in Britain,—that the unprepared or hasty reader finds himself perpetually mystified and perplexed by phrases and allusions to which he can affix no definite meaning, or by expressions to which the author seems to give some occult sense, altogether different from that which they convey to himself. The secret is, that Mr. Maurice is a Platonic or semi-Platonic Realist. A sort of Platonism is his fundamental creed; and his Christianity is adjusted accordingly. His nomenclature is Christian; but his characteristic ideas are those of the pagan philosophy. Hence, in his writings, there is that perpetual ambiguity—that *double entendre*—of which we have spoken. The names and phrases which he uses mean one thing to the common Christian reader, and another to himself and the adepts of his school. Hence, too, his systematic avoidance of any thing like definition or logical deduction. Nothing can less endure the light than Platonic Realism. Attempt to define it, and it either appears, to the unsophisticated understanding, to be grossly absurd, or most repulsively and impenetrably abstruse. It was the misty refuge of Philosophy struggling with the inexplicable mysteries which shroud the union of sense and spirit, before she had been taught the limits of speculation. It was, also, one of the expedients by which, before Revelation had made known to all men the creative glory of the "I AM," the overpowered intellect of man thought to explain the origin, and so lessen the wonder, of the universe.

And if we are not surprised that our young friends, who incline to Maurice, have not understood him thoroughly, neither do we wonder that they have found in him something to admire. He is, in general, an eminently pure, fresh, and engaging writer. Then, apart from his bigoted and unfair treatment of those whom he calls "the Evangelicals," and of their faith, his sympathies are, in a high degree, catholic and generous. His motto is "charity;" and this is always a taking motto. He feels a keen and kindly interest in all that affects humanity. Narrowness and injustice of every kind he abhors. He would make art, science, laws, and religion, all tributary to the elevation and consolation of all men, whatever their character or position. His God and Father, though *not* the Christian God and Father, is yet a Being whom he has invested with many—*not* all—of the attributes of the God of the Bible; and he believes in Him, and teaches concerning Him, as a God nigh at hand, and not afar off,—living and working in and through all things, redressing evil, and imparting good, and speaking to the hearts of all men. It is true, that, pure as his style is, and simple as is his language, yet his meaning is often very hazy: there seems to be not a little of mysticism and paradox about his teaching: pure English sentences gush forth with easy eloquence, but it is very hard to fix and retain the sense of the pleasing flow; there is a wavering ambiguity which quite dazzles the mind of the inquirer; and at times there seems to be an impenetrable obscurity. But, to some readers, all this will be rather a charm than a perplexity. What is more pleasant, to minds of a certain sort, than to yield themselves up, without any trouble of thought, to the influence of a dreamy stream of well-composed, well-sounding sentences? Besides, after all, this sort of thing is by no means all that is found in these "Essays." Mr. Maurice is not only, whenever possible, a very practical writer; but, in this volume, he has stretched to the uttermost the licence of discursiveness which the "Essay" permits. Hence he can at will relieve a subject, which might have been otherwise dry or obscure, by sallies and excursions having the least possible connexion with the general tenor of his theme. Then, to crown all, when a Clergyman, an ex-Professor of Literature and of Divinity,—a man eminent in his position, of great general influence, especially with the young and enthusiastic portion of the more cultivated classes of society, and greatly beloved by most of those who are personally acquainted with him,—comes forth as the assailant of received opinions in theology, as the apostle of what he represents to be a kindlier and more generous creed, as the satirist of that which he stigmatizes as a selfish, bigoted, and evil superstition, and then is called to suffer the "martyrdom" of dismissal from his Professorship, because of the freedom he has used, how many eager and sympathetic spirits, besides free-thinkers, scoffers, and half-believers, will be not only resolved to hear, but predisposed to favour and admire, such a man! It must be admitted, too, that the manner in which the vital doctrines of evangelical religion have too often been stated and explained by men of low and coarse intellect, or of fanatical temper or creed, has given too much occasion for *some* of the satire and invective in which Mr. Maurice has indulged. He has, however, assailed with impartial hostility and contempt the whole evangelical school, and made it sufficiently plain, that his antipathy is not merely against the exaggeration or perversion of evangelical doctrines, but against the essential doctrines themselves; and that, for the purpose of bringing these into discredit, he is determined to exhibit them in the most distorted and repulsive form. Mr. Maurice, as we have seen, was brought up a Unitarian and Universalist. And it is very clear that, though he has accepted, as a part of his faith, the doctrine of a (neo-Platonic) Trinity, yet he has never been more than half purged of his old leaven. The bitter spirit of Belsham rules him, whenever he refers to what evangelical Christians believe in as the "doctrines of the cross." Nor are his representations of these doctrines any other than new editions of the old calumnies, which have been the common stock of pagan antagonists of Christianity, of Deists, and of Socinians, from the days of Celsus downwards.

The "Essays," our readers are, of course, aware, were written for the special purpose of converting Unitarians to Trinitarian Christianity. From what we have just said, it will be seen that their author might well suppose himself to possess peculiar advantages of position for accomplishing this object. To bring Unitarians over to his own views respecting Christianity would seem to be a much less arduous undertaking, than to convert them to the doctrines of evangelical orthodoxy. Already he could meet them fully half-way. On the doctrines of human depravity and the atonement, he and they were substantially agreed. Herein the grand stumbling-block—that doctrine of "Christ crucified," which has ever been "foolishness" to the wisdom of this world—was already taken away. The humbling *moral* mystery of Revelation, that which the pride of man abhors to stoop so low as to acknowledge, being thus removed, the *natural* mystery of the Godhead,—the Trinity in unity,—and the mystery of the Incarnation, would alone remain. And if he could prove to Unitarians,—not that these mysteries are revealed in Scripture, and *how* they are taught therein, (for such a method of argument would not avail against Unitarian Rationalism,)—but that, according to his view of them, they correspond to the cravings and anticipations of man's nature, and satisfy the yearnings of his spirit, he would have overcome them on their own ground. This, accordingly, is what he has attempted in the "Essays." He does not argue *from*, though he occasionally condescends to argue *to*, the Bible. He stands with Unitarians upon the common ground of Rationalism. From his own published correspondence, it appears that, when he abandoned Unitarianism,* he did so, not at all in obedience to the authority of Divine Revelation, but merely on certain subjective grounds. His faith, from the first, stood not in the power of God, but in the wisdom of man. His belief in the Trinity, in the sense in which he does believe in it, was based upon abstract *à priori* grounds of reason. His belief in the Incarnation rests upon similar grounds. He has ever felt himself at liberty to reject, and has ever rejected, all mysteries which his reason did not endorse, or which his own heart refused to admit. Being thus at one with those among whom he received his early training, in temper and general principles, it is evident that, in endeavouring to win Unitarians to his own views, his aim would be to show how, under and by means of a Trinitarian *formula,* he could bring out, more fully than Unitarians themselves, such results as a Unitarian would be prepared to welcome; to show that the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, although mysteries of course, are yet agreeable to the philosophy and consciousness and to the cravings of the human spirit; and that, at the same time, the reception of these mysteries, while it greatly heightens our conception of human dignity and our estimate of human capability, needs not imply any oppressive moral mystery, such as the hereditary guilt and depravity of mankind before God, the need of a suffering Substitute and Saviour, and of an inward regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and the endless punishment of those who, in this life, refuse to turn to God. Such, accordingly, we shall find, is Mr. Maurice's plan. Of course, we do not mean to imply that, in such a course of argument and exposition, all must be false, and nothing just or valuable. Far from it. The mysteries of our faith are, no doubt, in agreement with the deepest and truest wants of our spirit, rightly understood; and the doctrines of the Gospel may be shown to exalt, as much as they humble, human nature. But such arguments, we think, are of necessity precarious, when adduced *à priori.* And a treatise based merely upon a process of reasoning or speculation, such as we have indicated, must, even so far as it is true, be vitally defective; while, from the point of view which Mr. Maurice occupies, with his preconceptions and foregone conclusions, no evangelical Christian can doubt that error, as well as defect, must vitiate all his discussions and conclusions. Nor, even so far as he may prevail over Unitarianism in this argument, can we think the victory to be of any great importance. That which he concedes to Unitarians is so much more considerable and essential than that which he holds against them, that we can conceive of few besides himself remaining just where he remains. The rejection of the moral mystery of the Atonement will be easily, and indeed logically, followed by the rejection of the natural mystery of the Incarnation, and this by the rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity. Or, if not, it will be little matter. A mere belief in a Divine Triad, such as a Neo-Platonizing Swedenborgian might readily have yielded, will hardly transform a Deist into a Christian; and a mere belief in the union of the Divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ, altogether apart from a believing reception of the great evangelical truths which hang upon the fact of the Incarnation, will hardly quicken a Unitarian faith into vital Christianity.

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* It is worthy of remark that both Coleridge and Maurice, the master and the disciple, had been at one time Unitarians, and that both continued to stand on what was really Unitarian ground after they became professedly Trinitarian and orthodox.

Having thus slightly indicated the purpose and method of the "Essays," we must proceed to an examination of their substance. They deal, as we have said, with the whole round of theology. In reference to every point there is much negative and destructive criticism. In this consists the mischief of the volume. Mr. Maurice's positive teaching is too subtle in its sense, and too hazy and ambiguous in its expression, to do much evil. And if he spoke out his meaning plainly, we do not anticipate that anything so abstruse as his semi-Platonic theology, or rather theosophy, would be likely to gain popular acceptance. But his sneers are plain enough; his sarcasms need no interpreter; and his discursive eloquence, large sympathies, and sanguine views, when referring to the practical affairs and popular topics of the day, are likely to recommend to a crowd of readers every thing in his book which they can understand, while they will be content to admire and applaud that which passes beyond their comprehension. His negative creed is, however, all grounded upon his positive faith. The sarcasms which *all* can understand, are the defences of the philosophy which *none* can understand. His opposition to evangelical truth grows out of an esoteric doctrine, the secret of which only a few would even profess to be able to penetrate.

To show the foundations of Mr. Maurice's philosophy or theosophy, we must refer to one or two of his other works. We have stated that he is a Platonic or semi-Platonic Realist. What this means we shall not ourselves risk explaining, just at present. We believe that, if the genius of any man is able to invest an obscure subject with light, to make shadow look like substance, or a thing unintelligible seem to be intelligible, Mr. Maurice can do this. We shall, therefore, give to him and to our readers the benefit of his own description of the creation of abstract ideas, as anterior to the creation of individual things.* He would have us believe, that it is of the creation of such pre-existent ideas that Moses speaks in the first two chapters of Genesis. The work from which we quote is entitled, "On the Old Testament," and consists of a course of sermons on the Pentateuch and the Book of Judges.

"First of all 'God made man in His own image, male and female created He them;' *afterwards*, it is said, He made '*a* man out of the dust of the ground, and breathed into *his* nostrils the breath of life.' If we follow the letter of these passages, and do not endeavour to put any notions of our own into them, we shall be led, I think, naturally to the conclusion, that the former words have to do with the *species*, as we should say, if we must have logical phrases, (which I would rather avoid, if it were possible,) and that the other has to do with an *individual*, with the first man of the race. This, I think, is the inference that we should all draw, if the mere words were set before us without any context: it gains strength the more we study the context......What I wish you particularly to notice is, that the part of the record which speaks of man ideally, according to his place with reference to the rest of the universe, according to his position with reference to God, is the part which expressly belongs to the history of CREATION; that the bringing forth of man in *this* sense is the work of the sixth day."—*On the Old Testament*, pp. 3, 4.

Then follows a passage in which he disavows the phraseology both of the Realists and the Nominalists. He adds, however,—

"Extend this thought, which seems to arise inevitably out of the story of the creation of *man*, as Moses delivers it, to the rest of that universe of which he regards man as the climax, and we are forced to the conclusion that in the one case, as in the other, it is not the visible material thing of which the historian is speaking, but that which lies below the visible material thing, and constitutes the substance which it shows forth."—*Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

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* As to these "ideas," see *ante*, page 3.

Comparing with the history of the Creation in Gen. i. what is said in Gen. ii. 5, 6, he concludes,—

"We are compelled, then, to consider the creation of herbs and flowers, as well as the creation of beasts and birds and fishes, which is recorded in the previous chapter, as the bringing forth of kinds and orders, such as they were according to the mind of God, not of actual separate phenomenal existences, such as they present themselves to the senses of man."—*Ibid.*, p. 6.

Subsequently he teaches, as might have been expected, that the days and the week spoken of in Gen. i. and ii. refer not to real, but to ideal, time; that is, as he himself explains it, to no time at all. This whole ideal creation is lifted out of the sphere of actual events into that region which is above time, or change, or succession: in other words, this ideal creation (?) took place in eternity.*

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* All these notions are borrowed from Philo, "the father of New Platonism," as Mr. Kingsley calls him. Most palpable evidence of this is furnished in Professor Jowett's Essay on Philo (contained in the first volume of his work on St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians, Romans, and Galatians). Mr. Jowett, indeed, makes no reference to Mr. Maurice's speculations, and may not have had any remembrance of them in his mind. But two or three brief extracts will show how striking is the coincidence between the exposition of the Alexandrian Jew and that of the Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn.

"From a comparison of the commentary on the next chapter, (with that on Gen. i.,) it appears that Philo is here speaking, not of the actual, but of the ideal, man. Finding, in chap. ii., a recommencement of the history of the creation of man, he knew no way to account for it except by this distinction."

This is obviously identical with the first extract from Mr. Maurice given in the text.

Again, writes Mr. Jowett,—

"At verses 4 (and 5) of chap. ii., Philo dwells on the form of the sentence...'The heavens and the earth when they were created...and every plant of the field *before* it was in the earth, and every herb of the field *before* it grew.' This, he says, refers to the intellectual [or 'intelligible'] world, which was completed *before* the actual world came into existence."

This is plainly identical with the last extract quoted in the text.

Once more, Mr. Jowett says,—

"Still confining himself to the intellectual world, Philo goes on to re-

Some of our readers may think this to be utterly incomprehensible; so, we confess, do we. But it is undoubtedly neither better nor worse than the Platonic doctrine of ideas,—"that doctrine of ideas," as Mr. Maurice himself says, in his "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," (Part I., p. 147,) "which constitutes the most native and peculiar portion of Plato's philosophy, that which may not wrongly be called its purely Platonic portion." These are "the forms, permanent and unchangeable, in which that which *is*" (not that which *seems to sense*) "manifests itself as it *is*" (not as it *seems*). They are "eternal as well as substantial," and dwell "in the region of pure Being, in which the inner mind dwells," even in "the absolute and perfect Being, in whose mind they all dwelt, and in whose eternity alone they can be thought or dreamed of as eternal." (*Ibid.*, p. 149.)

From the last few words which we have quoted, our readers may begin to see how Mr. Maurice's Platonic philosophy lays the ground of his theology. Some of the later Platonists, it is said, gave to these "ideas," these "substantial forms," a separate, though not independent, existence from eternity. They were absurd enough to conceive of these abstractions as living things, and, as such, they called them "eternal gods." They were of the number of those,—

> "Who [could reduce all things to acts,
> And] *knew their nature by abstracts;*
> Where *truth in person does appear,*
> Like words congeal'd in northern air;
> * * * * *
> Deep-sighted in *intelligences,*
> *Ideas,* atoms, influences;
> And much of *Terra Incognita,*
> *The' 'intelligible' world,* could say."

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mark, that the words 'in the beginning' (ἐν ἀρχῇ) must be explained not of time, for time had not yet come into existence, but of number and order."

This coincides with the last sentence we have written in the text above.

So absolutely has Mr. Maurice followed Philo the Jew, in adapting his Platonism to the Mosaic cosmogony.

Some have supposed that Plato himself held similar views. Mosheim seems to have proved that in the "Timæus" he speaks of "the eternal forms or ideas of all things, according to whose exemplar he supposed the Supreme Being to have made the world," as *ἀΐδιοι θεοί*, "eternal gods." Notwithstanding, Mosheim agrees with Cudworth so far as to maintain the conclusion, which we have already stated in Mr. Maurice's words, that these eternal entities, or gods, or whatever else Plato might call them, which together made up what was called in Platonic language the "*intelligible* model-world," as distinguished from the visible and sensible world, were placed by him not without, but "within, God and the Divine Intelligence;" or, as Mr. Maurice phrases it, within the "region of pure Being," the "permanent and all-containing substance." Still, however, if the whole structure of the Platonic philosophy is not to be resolved into mere smoke, if this elaborate system was not a mere wordy pretence, if Plato and his scholars had any meaning or sincerity in their philosophical speculations, we are compelled to believe that these abstract forms or ideas were conceived by them as real entities, having a substantial existence and proper essence of their own; indeed, as *the* real entities, of which the phenomena of the material and sensible world are but the shadowy resemblances.* Nor can Mr. Maurice's "ideas" be understood as different from these, since he tells us they are *substantial* and *created.* They "lie below the visible material things," he says, "and constitute the substance which these show forth." We confess that this doctrine of "intelligibles" and "ideas" seems to us to be as darkly unintelligible as it is possible for any jargon to be. A creation in eternity; a creation of ideas in the Divine Mind; a creation of ideas in the Divine Mind which are real entities and essences, having a distinct *status* and virtue of their own, and destined, in time, to receive appropriate and specific material embodiments;—here is an ascending scale of absurdities that perfectly bewilder and confound our understanding. Our business, however, is not to discuss the Platonic philosophy, but to show its connexion with Mr. Maurice's theology. Our way to do this is now made plain.

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* Hence this ideal system is described as Platonic *realism.* Abstract ideas are not mere *names* (as the Nominalists held); they are *things,* eternal and immutable. The spirit of man may obtain a glimpse of them, and thus pass beyond *sense-perception,* into the sphere of *knowledge.*

The later or New Platonists, who flourished after Christianity had begun to prevail over heathen philosophy, believed in a sort of Triad or Trinity of Divine hypostases. Cudworth and many others have thought, though, as we believe, upon insufficient evidence, that Plato himself held a similar belief. We have no need to debate this point. What is to our purpose is, to remark that the eternal forms or ideas of which we have spoken, were placed by Plato and his followers in "that one perfect intellect," the Divine "Reason or Word," (the *Nous*, or λογισμός,) which has been considered as "the second hypostasis" of the Platonic Trinity, and "which they supposed to have contained the 'intelligible' world from all eternity." This, also, is Mr. Maurice's view, though nowhere explicitly stated by him; and here we find the key to his whole theology.* The Son of God, in his nomenclature, corresponds to the divine *Nous* of the Neo-Platonists. Taking this idea with them as a clue, our readers will see a peculiar meaning in the following passage, which we cite from the same volume from which we quoted the passages referring to the ideal Creation :—

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* See, on the subject of the foregoing passages, MAURICE's "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," Part I., pp. 145–150; CUDWORTH's "Intellectual System," with MOSHEIM's Notes translated, Tegg's Edition, 1845, vol. ii., pp. 350–353, 367–369, 386, 387, 403–405; RITTER's "History of Philosophy," translated by MORRISON, published by Bohn, 1846, vol. ii., pp. 264–271, 294–297, and vol. iv., pp. 568–573; LEWES's "Biographical History of Philosophy," last Edition, pp. 269–278; and MATTER's "Histoire de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie," tome iii., livre vi., chap. 11. We will quote one passage from the exposition which the last-named author gives of Plotinus' philosophy. "The Reason contains the intellectual [or 'intelligible'] world, the true and primary world, the pure and unalterable whole of being, the life eternal and the knowledge which embraces all. In the Reason is the type after which the sensible world has been made, the perfect, eternal type. Therein is neither time, nor space, nor change; therein is eternity, of which time is an image. Reason is the radiant image of the perfect, which it unceasingly contemplates." Such is the Plotinian conception of the universal, all-entering, impersonal (yet hypostasized) Reason. It is impossible not to see that Maurice has endeavoured to adapt this conception to his own theory, as regards the Personal Logos, whom he believes in as the Son of God.

> "I ask you not to believe that a man was able to frustrate the purposes of God, not to think that the world was created in Adam, or stood in his obedience, when the Scriptures of the New Testament, illustrating those of the Old, teach us that it stood and stands in the obedience of God's well-beloved Son, the real image of the Father, *the real bond of human society, and of the whole universe*, who was to be manifested in the fulness of time, *as that which He had always been*, namely, the original and archetype of human nature," &c.—*On the Old Testament*, pp. 40, 41.

With this passage may also be compared pp. 37, (*ad fin.*,) 38, and 40, of the same volume, as supplying illustration of the Realism which leads Mr. Maurice to consider all qualities of human nature as directly derived, by *participation* or *emanation*, *not* by *creation*, properly so understood, from the Divine Being, of whom he speaks, in true Platonic phrase, as the Archetype of all things. Subsequently, in the same volume, the Son of God is spoken of as "He in whom God formed all men to be brothers ; so that he who sheds the blood of another, sheds his own ;" as "He from whom came the life, the faith, the hope, the love of all who had strength to believe that God was their Creator, and Preserver, and Deliverer," "in whom God could look upon them, and they could look upon God." (Pp. 58, 59.)

But it is in Mr. Maurice's later works, published since his dismissal from King's College, especially "The Unity of the New Testament," that we shall find his view of the relation of the Son of God to humanity—upon which must, of course, depend the whole of his theological system—most clearly and boldly stated. The mist with which he has so long invested his doctrine is now beginning to clear away. There is no longer any very cogent reason why he should not speak out. Let our readers attentively ponder the following passages.

We commence with a sentence taken from Mr. Maurice's analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, as given in the work we have just named. It occurs in that part of the analysis which refers to the fifth chapter, and indicates the principle on which he expounds the whole of the Epistle, disallowing, and altogether setting aside, the hitherto received idea, that, in this Epistle, St. Paul unfolds a provision of mercy and salvation for a fallen and guilty race.

> "I look upon Christ's death and resurrection as revelations of *the Son of God, in whom all things had stood from the first, in whom God had looked upon His creature man from the first.*" —*Unity of the New Testament*, p. 367.

Our next quotation is from the "Doctrine of Sacrifice." Its phraseology is not a little remarkable.

> "'His eyes were as a flame of fire; and on His head were many crowns; and He had a name written that no man knew but He Himself.' That—that is what you want; that is what you are trying to conceive of; *because He has first conceived you and your whole race.*"—*Doctrine of Sacrifice*, p. 312.

The same idea is very distinctly presented in one of Mr. Maurice's latest works.

> "The Eternal Word is affirmed to be that form or type after whom the Divine Artist fashioned the whole universe."—*Epistles of St. John*, p. 131.

The Neo-Platonism of these passages cannot be doubted. "The Son of God" is plainly made equivalent to the Divine *Nous* of the Neo-Platonists, in whom the "intelligible world," the "eternal forms or ideas of all things," were made to dwell.

How this principle bears upon the condition and relations of the human race, will begin to be apparent from the following quotations.

Writing on Matthew xxiv. and xxv., Mr. Maurice says of the "Son of Man,"—

> "*When He utters the words, 'Inasmuch as ye did it to one of the least of these, ye did it to Me,' He proclaimed that which is the* VERY TRUTH OF HUMAN EXISTENCE......HE ACTUALLY IS ONE WITH EVERY MAN. *He is come to proclaim that He is, by*

His incarnation and His death. He did judge the old world according to this law."—*Unity of the New Testament*, pp. 219, 220.

Expounding Phil. ii., he says,—

"The likeness of *men* stands in vivid contrast to the form of *God*. He was the original man, the type of all creation; as it is expressed in the Epistle to the Colossians, 'the first-born of every creature.' Now He assumes the condition of individual men; He puts on the fleshy accidents which belonged to them, as He had before stood to them in the closest spiritual relation."—*Doctrine, &c.*, p. 221.

Again, he says,—

"The Son was really in Saul of Tarsus, and he only became Paul the converted when that Son was *revealed* in him."—*Ibid.*, p. xxi., Introduction.

"Christ is in every man......All may call upon God as a reconciled Father. Human beings are redeemed,—not in consequence of any act they have done, of any faith they have exercised; their faith is to be grounded on a foregone conclusion; their acts are to be the fruits of a state they already possess."—*Ibid.*, p. xxiv.

Speaking of the connexion between the Passover and the Eucharist, he thus expresses himself:—

"Beneath the Jewish kingdom there did actually lie another and a deeper one: its national sacraments contain the idea of some more real sacrament grounded upon *an actual relationship between the Son of God and*" [not, be it observed, *believers*, but] "*human creatures, of the most intimate kind which language can express,—a relationship implying the closest communion of inward life, of inward love.*"—*Unity of the New Testament*, pp. 146, 147.*

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* With the foregoing quotation let the following passage from Coleridge be compared. It refers to the passage of Scripture, "Thou bearest not the root, but the root thee." (Rom. xi. 18.) "But remember,—a yet deeper and more momentous sense is conveyed in these words. Christ—the Logos—*Deitas Objectiva*, centred humanity (always pre-existing in the *Pleroma*) in his life, and so became the light, *i.e.*, the Reason [Logos], of mankind. This eternal (*i.e.*, timeless) act He manifested in time,—σὰρξ ἐγένετο, and dwelt among us, as individual man, in order that He might dwell in all His elect, as the root of the Divine humanity in them."—Note, of date 1825, in "The Friend," vol. ii., p. 172. Fourth Edition. 1844.

See also the quotations from Coleridge already given on pp. 20, 21.

A most remarkable piece of Neo-Platonism is the following :—

> "The little child, the humblest human creature, was dear to His Father in heaven. He did not look upon it merely as a fallen, corrupted thing. *Its angel, its pure original type, that which it was created to be, was ever present with Him, was ever looking up into His face.*"—*Ibid.*, pp. 205, 206.

This can only mean that the archetype of every human being is contained in, or perfectly identified with, the one Archetype of all things,—the Son of God, and *in Him* was ever looking up into the Father's face.*

Mr. Maurice's exposition of the general purport of the Epistle to the Ephesians is full of the same principle. We quote from it the following passages :—

> "What St. Paul asserts on behalf of himself and the little band of those who had turned to God, and believed in Christ, was a share in the *privileges of humanity, as that is created, elected, known by God in Christ.*"—*Unity of the New Testament*, p. 526.
>
> "*Beginning from that highest ground before the Fall, before the Creation, he had seen God creating all things in Christ*, God purposing to gather up all things in Christ, *men standing only in virtue of God's election of them in Christ......In Him, whether circumcised or uncircumcised, they are one*, BY THE LAW OF THEIR CREATION."—Pp. 536, 537.

The word *creation* is in the Bible, and therefore Mr. Maurice must force it into his service, if he is to pass for a Christian. But, in fact, the true idea of creation can have no place in his system; and the expressions which he makes use of, in attempting to accommodate Scripture language to his views, are most incongruous. To speak of "God's creating all things in Christ," must imply, according to the only true and proper sense of the words, that God created Christ. This, however, is not Mr. Maurice's meaning. Men and all things "have stood in Christ from the first," that is, from eternity. "From the first God has looked upon His creature man in Christ." Here there can be no idea of creation, properly so called. The system is rather one of emanation.* By an eternal act, the Son has proceeded from the Father, and simultaneously all things, that is, the eternal forms and archetypes of all things, have been made by the Father to dwell in the Son. Again, by a process of emanation from the Son, not of creation, these eternal forms and archetypes have from the first, or, at least, since time began, been coming forth into phenomenal existence. This is uncouth language, we know. But it is only by such language that it is possible to express at all the uncouth and impossible conceptions of this semi-Platonic theosophy. In some such sense as we have thus expressed, Mr. Maurice would have us to understand that all men are "created," "elected," and "known" by the Father, in Christ. Similarly he speaks, in the "Essays," (p. 204,) of all men as "created, redeemed, justified," by God in Christ. They were *created* in Christ from eternity (!); their creation *was* their election; as created in Christ, they were known in Him; being known in Him, they are in Him justified and redeemed. As their creation does not refer to the beginning of the race on earth, and implies no period in the antecedent eternity when the creatures began to be; so their election is one which implies no rejection of any, their justification implies no condemnation for any, and their redemption implies neither ruin nor risk for any.

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* Nearly every notion contained in the foregoing extracts finds its original in the writings of Philo, as may be seen from Mr. Jowett's Essay already referred to. In particular the idea contained in the last extract, and the phraseology employed, are derived from the speculations of the Platonizing Jew, who speaks of the Platonic "types," sometimes as "powers," sometimes as "angels," and says that they "abide in the Word."—JOWETT, vol. i., pp. 386, 387.

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* "For what is 'eternal creation' but the union of two words, the ideas of which are utterly incongruous? Or, in what way can that which existed from all eternity, and always depended upon God, be made to appear to be founded according to certain laws, and in a particular order? But the [Neo-] Platonic Doctors, not content with these considerations, take a more subtle course," &c.—Mosheim's Dissertation on Creation out of Nothing, in Cudworth's "Intellectual System," vol. iii., p. 218.

"The Reason and the Soul are only principles" (*i. e.*, only powers or forces) "on the theory of emanation, which excludes all idea of creation, of deliberation, of will, of activity, of production."—Matter's "History of the School of Alexandria," vol. iii., book vi., chap. 7.

"'Let there be light, and there was light.' Such is the style in Moses! Here there is simplicity;—the word, the thought, and the intelligence remain one with the Supreme Principle, and are not individually personified (hypostasiées); there is really creation, and not emanation."—*Ibid.*, chap. 10.

"Plotinus only employs the word *made* (πεποίηκεν) catachrestically," &c.—*Ibid.*

As we are about to analyse, at some length, the "Essays," we shall only quote one sentence here, as an instance of the way in which the principle we have been bringing into light pervades the teaching of the volume:—

> "How impossible was it, then, for him (St. Paul) to receive baptism as if it were merely the outward badge of a profession, a sign which separated the sect of the Nazarenes from other Jews, or other men! *If it marked him out as a Christian, that was because it denoted that he would no more be the member of any sect, of any partial society whatever; that he was claiming his relation to the Son of God, the Head of the whole human race. It must import his belief that this Son of God, and not Adam, was the true root of humanity;*[*] *that from Him, and not from any ancestor, each man derived his life."—Essays*, pp. 201, 202.

It will at once be seen that the principle which we have been endeavouring to exhibit, overturns the whole of Christian theology from its foundations. God the Father is no longer regarded, in any proper sense, as the Creator of man, and the Moral Governor of a world of subject and guilty creatures. He is *merely* the Father of all men in Christ the Son. Mankind are His sons, not by adoption or by grace, but by nature. Their sonship, too, can never be disannulled or done away. They can never be, for a moment, separated from the Son. Their personality is *of* Him and *in* Him, and, in Mr. Maurice's scheme, can neither be, nor be conceived of, apart from Him. This, as we shall see by and by, is the uniform doctrine of the "Essays." Being thus necessarily and essentially one with the Son, and in Him united to the Father, no atonement, in the proper sense of that word, can be needed to bring nigh those who never can be far off; and no judicial condemnation can be pronounced on those who must ever be identified with the Son.

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[*] "Root of humanity." This is Coleridge's phrase, as quoted in the note two pages back. In Maurice it is perpetually recurring.

The Son of God, on this scheme, is the Mediator between God and man, not in virtue of the covenant of grace, not because man's fall had rendered a Redeemer necessary, but from eternity, and in virtue of what may be called his natural relationship to both God and man.* The Incarnation is not the ground of Christ's mediatorial exaltation, but merely a consequence and particular manifestation of that natural and aboriginal relationship. By His Incarnation the Son of God did but manifest that identity which had ever subsisted between Himself and man, exhibit the ideal perfection of man's nature in His own person, and, by His example, show to all men how they should triumph over selfishness and evil. As the mediatorial reign of the Son does not, on Mr. Maurice's scheme, look back to Bethlehem and Calvary, so neither does it look forward to its consummation at the "Great Assize,"—the Judgment Day. For the Son to doom and dismiss to punishment any sinners of mankind, would be for Him to doom and put away Himself. The Son is, indeed, the Judge, now and always; He will be such for ever. But He will never pronounce a final sentence on either the righteous or the wicked. And if there will be no day of general judgment, neither of course will there be a Resurrection Day. This, we need scarcely inform our readers, is the plain teaching of the "Essays."

There is, indeed, sin, that is, selfishness; and there is a spirit of evil, Mr. Maurice teaches, which tempts to sin. But there is no "disease of nature," or "corruption of the blood," to remove or remedy. There is no judicial sentence of God to annul or avert. God, indeed, disapproves of all that is selfish and unlovely in man, and wishes its removal. But he retains no indignation for a broken *law:* His *only* law—not legislative, but impulsive; not an objective rule, but a subjective principle—is the law of love, seeking to do away with evil in us and in all. All pains and sorrows and sufferings, of whatever kind, here and hereafter, are not punishments, but fatherly chastisements, flowing from this law, and intended merely to amend and reclaim.* No sooner, therefore, does the sinner relinquish his selfishness, than God's purpose is entirely accomplished. The pristine dignity of man is restored. Not at any time can man be so far from God as to be nearer to Satan.† The Son of God is ever more intimately near to man than the Spirit of evil. And when man sees how near the Son of God is to him, when he perceives how He is one with himself, and lies at the root of his humanity, and how in Him he cannot but be one with the Father also, and embraced in the Father's love, then man gains his right place, and all is well.

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* See "Unity of the New Testament," p. 358.

What relation is to be assigned to the Holy Spirit in this theology, it is not easy to discover from what Mr. Maurice says on the subject. To us He appears to be put in the place of the Neo-Platonic soul of all things.‡ All distinctions are done away between the justified and the unjustified, the regenerate and the unregenerate. All men are equally justified in Christ, and all partake of the same regeneration which has come upon the world because of the appearance of the Son of God in human nature. The Church is but the world opening its eyes to the light which shines impartially around all, and to the privileges which are equally the right and possession of all. All men are alike, though not all equally, "inspired." There are none to whom the Spirit is given, as He is not given to the world. Pagan prophets and philosophers were moved by the same *afflatus* that stirred the souls of Hebrew Seers and Christian Apostles. What relic, then, is left of the Christian doctrine of the influences of the Holy Spirit? The only fit description of His power and working, on this scheme, is that of the Roman poet :—

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* "In the first place, there runs through all the views of Plato, a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of Divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial *κάθαρσις*. This arises partly from his conception of the Divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, insomuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath, or its results, inapplicable to Deity,—from the latter, because, in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connexion as incidental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat, its inalienable rights."—W. ARCHER BUTLER'S "Lectures," &c., vol. ii., pp. 306–7.

See also the quotation from the same volume given *ante*, p. 1.

† See Note A, at the end of Chapter IX., on Mr. Maurice's idea of Satan,—the selfish spirit, or principle of evil.

‡ See CUDWORTH'S "Intellectual System," vol. ii., p. 177, for a general view of what has been called "the Platonic Trinity." A particular and very valuable disquisition on the Neo-Platonic Triad, with which Mr. Maurice's Trinity remarkably coincides, will be found in RITTER, vol. iv., pp. 564–578. See, especially, on the "Soul of the Universe," pp. 573–578. See also LEWES' Biog. Hist. Phil., pp. 269–275, and *ante*, pp. 5, 6.

> "*Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus*
> *Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.*
> *Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantûm,*
> *Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus.*"
> *Æneid*, vi., 726–729.*

The outline which has now been given of Mr. Maurice's philosophico-theological doctrines will be tested, illustrated, and established in the following chapter by an examination of the "Essays," and in several Supplementary Notes by a special consideration of various critical points, as treated not only in the "Essays," but in other works of Mr. Maurice. The radical principle, the fruitful Neo-Platonic germ of mystical doctrine, out of which the whole scheme naturally and logically unfolds, has been already discovered and demonstrated.

Those who are at all acquainted with the history of mysticism, will have recognised several systems with which this modern mysticism has points in common. The resemblance to the "Quaker" tenet of the indwelling Word, the Light and Life of Men, is very apparent; and in his "Kingdom of Christ, or Hints to a Quaker," is broadly and strongly recognised by Mr. Maurice. But it would be easy to show that Mr. Maurice's scheme, as truly set forth in this and the next chapter, is yet more strongly tinctured with Behmenism than with Quakerism. It would have led us somewhat out of our way to exhibit all the coincidences between the theology of the Coleridgean philosopher and of the ignorant German shoemaker, who strove in the darkness of his unaided thought to solve the mysteries of the universe, and fell back, naturally enough, into the errors of struggling heathen speculators; who also, in a spirit of absurdity much more difficult to be understood, invented a *German* Cabbalism, founded on the text, not of the original Scripture, of which of course he knew nothing, but of Luther's translation, and discovered all the mysteries of creation and life, God and man, nature and grace, in the letters and syllables of this German version. Is it not strange that such illiterate and hare-brained enthusiasts as Fox and Behmen should have been numbered among the favourite instructors of Coleridge? * The followers of Coleridge, however, it seems, remain true to their master in this respect also, and hold Fox and Behmen in a sort of reverence. In his doctrine of the Trinity, his identification of all men with the Son, his views as to the atonement, and also on other points, to which reference may be made in the next chapter, Behmen's theology closely coincides with that of our modern illuminati; and we have been often tempted to exclaim, when reading Mr. Maurice's speculations, as John Wesley did in reading some passages in the later writings of William Law,—"Behmenish, void, and vain!"

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* See Note B, at the end of Chapter IX., on Mr. Maurice's doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

Swedenborg was an enthusiast of a very different order from Behmen or Fox; yet there are many points of resemblance between his system and that of the former. We have already pointed out the agreement between him and Coleridge, as to one of the main roots of the Coleridgean theosophy, and shall have occasion to note other coincidences between his imaginations and developed Coleridgism as it appears in the writings of Maurice.

Still stronger, however, than any affinity we have hitherto indicated, is the resemblance between the system now under review, and that of the mediæval German mystics, from whom, indeed, it is most probable that Behmen had remotely and indirectly derived the main points of his own theology, as Fox may have similarly derived his from the early Anabaptists, who themselves had been impregnated from the same mystic fountain. For the Middle-Age mysticism was very widely spread. It was the natural reaction, in the days when the grand and simple teachings of a vernacular Bible were not known, from a formal and ceremonial religion of show, mumming, and task-work. It was related to the heathen Popery of the day, as the philosophy of Greece to the pagan ceremonial and mythology of Greece's later age. But as the world was more earnest than in pagan times; as the energy of that Christian life wherewith it had long been leavened, could not be altogether repressed in its working, even by the hard and dark tyranny of a selfish and superstitious World-Church which was growing continually less Christian; therefore, this struggling Middle-Age philosophy, seeking to find a heart in things and a ground of truth, wrought more widely and deeply among the masses of the people, (we speak principally of the Teutonic races,) than philosophy had ever done in Greece. Like the Greek philosophy, it had its "sophists," whose doctrines struck at the root of all truth and morality, and its true philosophers, earnestly craving and reverently seeking for the truth. There were the "free spirits," and there were the "brethren of the common lot;" Eckart and Tauler; the utter Pantheists, and those who, though not free from a pantheistic tincture in their philosophy, yet were devout believers in a personal God of truth and righteousness. But even the best and most enlightened among them, even such as Tauler and Ruysbröek, could not rise above the clouds and darkness of that dense atmosphere in which they lived. Heathen philosophy, coming down to them through the writings of certain (so called) Christian philosophers and theologians of earlier ages, most of whom were strongly infected with the taint of Alexandrian Pantheism, exercised an influence over their views and speculations not less powerful than the Scriptures themselves, costly, and scarce, and little understood as these were in that day. That rank Pantheist, the pseudo-Dionysius, is quoted even by the author of that most famous, purest, and most elevated, of Middle-Age mystical treatises, the "German Theology," as "*Saint* Dionysius;" and Boëthius, whose Christianity has been and is still a matter of so much controversy,—whose strongly paganish affinities even Mr. Maurice admits,*—is reverently cited as a "Doctor." It is not surprising, then, that those who, amid a darkness little relieved by any properly Christian light, and with only such teachers in philosophy as derived their own views, to a great extent, from the ages before Christ's coming, sought to understand the mystery of Being, should have fallen, more or less consciously and distinctly, into that Pantheistic philosophy, which, Coleridge himself has said, "is the inevitable result of all consequent reasoning, in which the intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than itself can supply, and weens to possess within itself the centre of its own system."† Much as Hare was disposed to favour these mystics, he substantially admits what we have now been stating. "Many," he says, "may, by a happy illogicalness, contrive to hold large portions of Christian truth, along with doctrines which, if pushed to their extreme, would militate against it. This was the case, for instance, with many of the great mystics, from Tauler down to Behmen and Angelus Silesius, in whose philosophy there was always a tendency, often a very strong one, to Pantheism, yet whose hearts were temples of deep and fervent devotion." ‡

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* See the "*Biographia Literaria*," chap. ix.

This pantheizing mysticism settled itself deeply into the heart of Teutonic Pietism. The Reformation absorbed its best elements; but did not exhaust its power. Its worst residuum combined, for a time, with Anabaptism. But many of its elements, both better and worse, passed into the hereditary life and traditional tendencies of the German nations.

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* See MAURICE'S "Mediæval Philosophy."

† COLERIDGE'S "*Biographia Literaria*," vol. i., p. 154, *note*.

‡ "Mission of the Comforter," note H, p. 293. Edition of 1850.

Now with the better forms of this mediæval mysticism, the system of Maurice and Kingsley almost exactly coincides. The agreement between the theology of these Coleridgean mystics and that of Ruysbröek,—as this latter is represented both by Ullmann, in his "Reformers before the Reformation," and by Mr. Vaughan, in his "Hours with the Mystics,"—is most remarkable; and any one who wishes to understand the pedigree and derivation of the modern mysticism, should attentively study the first fifty or sixty pages of the second volume of Ullmann's work, and the first of Mr. Vaughan's volumes.

But the great fountain from which all this mysticism was originally impregnated, was the Alexandrian Neo-Platonism. Through Clement of Alexandria, Origen, the so-called Dionysius Areopagiticus, Boëthius, Johannes Scotus Erigena, the two Saint Victors, and other less known links, a chain and succession was sustained between the speculations of Philo, Plotinus, and others of the later Platonists, and the mediæval mystics of whom we have spoken. That Maurice and Kingsley have been directly influenced by the German mystics, cannot be doubted. The coincidence in doctrine of the modern with the mediæval mysticism; the part which Kingsley has recently taken in connexion with the publication of the "German Theology," and Tauler's "Sermons," as translated into English by Miss Winkworth; and many hints and allusions scattered through the writings both of Maurice and of Kingsley, afford ample evidence of this. That Coleridge also drew from the same source we know by his own statements. But, especially, it is certain, as has already been shown in part, and will be made still more evident in the following chapters, that both Coleridge and his true followers, Maurice and Kingsley, have derived many of their ideas immediately from the speculations of Philo and Plotinus. Hence the strong resemblance between their theology and that of Origen, as in part shown by Dr. Jelf in his pamphlet, and as admitted by Mr. Maurice. They have drawn from the same Alexandrian sources as the learned and devout but heretical Presbyter.

Let us add, in closing this chapter, that the common characteristic of all these forms of mysticism, and, indeed, of mysticism in every form, is, that the line which separates Divine illumination and influence from human knowledge and personality is lost sight of; and, of course, the more completely and permanently this line is allowed to evanish, the more nearly does any system of mysticism approach to that dark shadow-land of Pantheism to which all such systems naturally tend, and where all forms, whether of seeming truth or supposed error, melt away into atheistic indistinction.

CHAPTER IX.

MR. MAURICE'S THEOLOGY.

In the foregoing chapter we have sketched the main features of the system which is expounded in the "Essays." The analysis which we are about to give of that work will illustrate and confirm what we have written. Though Mr. Maurice has not logically unfolded his system from its principles, he has yet given a very orderly and complete exhibition of its practical bearing on faith and morals. The following is the scheme of his "Essays," in which we need not wonder that the subjects of the Holy Spirit and the Trinity in Unity are postponed almost to the last:—"I. On Charity. II. On Sin. III. On the Evil Spirit. IV. On the Sense of Righteousness in Men, and their Discovery of a Redeemer. V. On the Son of God. VI. On the Incarnation. VII. On the Atonement. VIII. On the Resurrection of the Son of God from Death, the Grave, and Hell. IX. On Justification by Faith. X. On Regeneration. XI. On the Ascension of Christ. XII. On the Judgment Day. XIII. On Inspiration. XIV. On the Personality and Teaching of the Holy Spirit. XV. On the Unity of the Church. XVI. On the Trinity in Unity. Concluding Essay: On eternal Life and eternal Death."

The first Essay—"On Charity"—professes to announce the *moral principle* upon which Mr. Maurice's structure of theological speculations rests. It is a singular specimen of vagueness, confusion, and easy assumption. We shall not, however, attempt to criticize it in detail. The noblest masters of Christian theology have ever taught that love is the foundation and fountain of the Divine acts. Mr. Maurice prefers to speak of the "Divine charity," rather than of the "love of God." This is not altogether without significance. What is more to be noted, however, is, that though he admits "that there is much in the feelings, which we of this age associate with the word 'charity,' that is artificial, fantastical, morbid," (page 5,) he somewhat scornfully declines to define what he means by it.

If the modern Rationalist or Deist chooses to understand St. Paul, in the thirteenth chapter of the First of Corinthians, as exalting charity to the disparagement of faith, and as teaching that charity, in the modern infidel or semi-infidel sense, is the sum of religion, and the one thing needful, Mr. Maurice will not contend with him; he would think it "impertinent and unchristian," to show him how far he had misunderstood the sense of the Apostle. He, indeed, "does not deny that there is much in the feelings which we of this age associate with the word *charity*, that is artificial, fantastical, morbid." (Page 5.) Notwithstanding, he feels compelled to "suppose that inspired language is the most inclusive and comprehensive of all language; that Divine truth lies beneath all the imperfect forms of truth which men have perceived,—sustaining them, not contradicting them." (Page 3.) Which last sentence must be taken to mean,—if it means anything at all to his purpose,—that every word and phrase of Scripture includes whatever sense any man thinks himself at liberty to put upon it, however "artificial, fantastical, or morbid." To deny this paradox is, he informs us, (page 3,) "practically to deny that the language of Scripture is inspired, and that the truth which that language expresses is Divine."* This is a summary of the argument, if such it may be styled, pursued through several pages of vague and paradoxical sophistry, by which Mr. Maurice endeavours to make it appear reasonable and right to decline all definition of that "Divine Charity" which he represents as "the ground upon which all things in heaven and earth rest, as the centre round which they revolve."

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* All who are in any degree familiar with Platonic phraseology will at once recognise the mintage of such expressions as we quote from this Essay. Throughout the volume Platonism rules. Platonism, however, in a gown and cassock, expounding Christian theology, is so unwonted a sight, that the fact, so evident, when pointed out, seems to have been little suspected by Mr. Maurice's readers. Here we will only cite two sentences from his own exposition of Platonism, in illustration of the Platonic character of some of the expressions above cited. "Whatever man has found an expression for in language, whatever man has pursued as an object in life, there is in *that* a truth, a substance, which may be distinguished from the lying phantom that surrounds and counterfeits it." "If the language of men contained such words as 'just,' 'merciful,' 'good,' if it attributed these names to certain

Of course, with this understanding, Mr. Maurice may find little difficulty in fixing the stigma of uncharitableness on that evangelical scheme of doctrine which he so much dislikes. So also, if he makes no attempt to prove, he can at least easily assume, that his own theology is in accordance with the true conception of the Divine charity. But how, under such conditions, and while no attempt has been made to ascertain what "charity" means, the mere acceptance, in any sense we may most naturally affix to the words, of the principle,—"Charity is the ground and centre of the universe; God is charity,"—can "restore that *distinctness* which our theology is said to have lost," is what we are unable to understand, though we can easily see how it might "reconcile theology with that *comprehension*" of which Mr. Maurice "is in search." (Page 9.)

But if charity *were* to be defined, then we imagine Mr. Maurice and ourselves would at once be at issue as to the definition, though both might agree that "Charity is the ground upon which all things in heaven and earth rest, and the centre round which they revolve." If, as Dr. Candlish has well remarked, charity is understood, whether as described by St. Paul in the passage to which we have referred, or as employed by St. John to denote the character of the Divine Being, to be "inclusive of," or at least necessarily to imply, "truth, justice, and holiness," then we are agreed with Mr. Maurice. But "if it is not to be so understood, we

acts, then, whether these words had been understood or no, whether they had been rightly applied or no, there was a reality corresponding to them, there was a 'justice,' a 'mercy,' a 'goodness,' and all these centred and united themselves in the Being." ("Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy," part i., pp. 145, 146.) We doubt, however, whether Plato would have endorsed such an argument as that given in the text.

must refuse to start from a belief essentially defective and one-sided."

At the close of this Essay, as of all or nearly all the rest, Mr. Maurice makes an application of what he has written to those for whose benefit these Essays were undertaken,—to the Unitarians, both of "the old" and "the modern school." In so doing, he delivers some effective strokes at the weak points of their creed and teaching, which, however, we have not space to instance, any more than to point out the numerous and sometimes fantastic sophisms forming the tissue into which his general argument is woven, or the misrepresentations which constitute the basis of his declamations, and on which depends the point of his sarcasms, against evangelical orthodoxy. Once for all, we may say, that in this analysis we cannot turn out of our way, either to pick out the gems of sentiment and expression which often shine in his pages, or to hunt his evasions, contradictions, and fallacies through all their turns and windings, till we have fairly tracked them home. It is, however, important for us to note, as throwing light upon his own relations to some of the staple doctrines of Unitarianism, that, in the application with which he closes this his first Essay, he expresses his obligations to the older Unitarians for their "denunciations" against "the general faith of Christendom," "as cruel, immoral, inconsistent with any full and honest acknowledgment of the Divine unity, still more of the Divine love." He receives these denunciations as "blessings from God," because "he has been compelled to confess," that "great portions of these charges are well founded," and "the evidence for them irresistible." (Page 12.)

Theology, as the science of the relations between Deity and humanity, having, according to Mr. Maurice, its primary source in the nature of God, that is, in the Divine Charity, finds its secondary spring in the nature of man; and, this latter having come to be conditioned by the existing fact of SIN, *this*, accordingly, is the subject of the second Essay.

Mr. Maurice thinks that Clergymen are too apt to "take it for granted, that their congregations understand what they mean when they speak of SIN;" but doubts whether Clergymen themselves "quite understand what they mean by it," and directs them "to attend more to the doubts and objections of others," that these may "assist in clearing and deepening their own thoughts."

These "doubts and objections" he represents as often taking such a form as this. (Here we take the liberty of compressing his language.) Men say, "We know what crimes are, and we understand that they spring from certain habits which have grown up in the character. We understand, too, that for the crimes there are penalties awarded by legislation, and that the cure of the habits from which they spring is to be wrought by moral influences, the nature of which is taught by ethics: but when your theology speaks of something besides these, which you call 'SIN,' and which you say is committed against God, we know not what this means. Does God require anything expressly and exclusively for Himself? Is not this a merely heathenish notion of the Deity, which, with all its evil consequences, your Christianity thus sanctions and fosters? Does God require of man any thing beyond justice and mercy, good feeling and good doing towards his fellow men? And if not, are not legislation and ethics enough for us, without any concern about theology or sin?"

To these objections Mr. Maurice first gives what he assumes to be the answer of orthodoxy, and then gives his own. The former is as follows:—

> "The Commandments speak of a duty towards God, as well as of a duty towards our neighbour; there is no reason why He from whom we receive all things should not demand something in return. *A priori*, we could not in the least tell whether He would or not; if He did, it would be reasonable to expect that He would enforce very heavy punishments upon our failure, especially if it might have been avoided; those punishments may be infinite;......and, if we have any authority for supposing they will be so, we ought to do any thing, rather than incur so tremendous a risk."—Page 20.

And this is Mr. Maurice's representation, the best and only one he has to give, of the "general faith of Christendom," of evangelical "orthodoxy," of the theology of Howe, and Barrow, and Leighton, and Robert Hall, and Chalmers, on the subject of sin and its demerit! No wonder such answers to the objections he had put, if he ever really heard such, "satisfied him very ill." But, surely, he must know better than to believe that such is the standard theology of evangelical divines. These hold that the theology of sin and punishment rests upon the same essential principles, which form the only sure ground of legislation and ethics among men. Is not God a Governor, and, as such, must He not, *for the sake of those He governs,* sustain the majesty of law? Does not even love—the "Divine Charity"—demand this at His hands? Are not love and obedience to Himself the very conditions of universal well-being, as well as of individual happiness? And does He not show Himself to be the Guardian of His creatures' interests and happiness, by making every wrong done by any to his fellow, to be a wrong done to Himself? Surely, it is thus that Evangelicals speak of the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," and on such principles that they would answer the objections which Mr. Maurice has stated. Whereas he makes them to represent the Divine Being as only a mightier, an almighty, Power of Selfishness; as claiming, from *merely* personal motives, a certain tale of service from His creatures; and as determined, from similar motives, to have His dues, or to be avenged! And, meanwhile, the subjects of this Being, vacillating between miserable fear and inglorious hope, are to perform their taskwork for Him day by day!

Such is the picture which Mr. Maurice dares to draw, continually, throughout this volume, of the God of Christendom. If this *is our* God, Mr. Maurice's indignation is far too tame, his sarcasms are too mild, and the loose, smart, sneering talk, upon this point, which he indulges in not infrequently elsewhere as well as in this Essay, is sadly out of place.

But we must give his own reply to the objections which he had stated. Of course it is not a logical or categorical reply,—this is never to be expected of him,—but he intends it to be practical and sufficient.

"At some moment,—it may be one of weakness and sorrow; it may also be when he is full of energy, and set upon a distinct and decided purpose,—a man may be forced to feel, '*I* did this act, *I* thought this thought; it was a wrong act, it was a wrong thought, and it was *mine.* The world about me took no account of it. I can resolve it into no habits or motives; or, if I can, the analysis does not help me in the least. Whatever the habit was, I wore the habit; whatever the motive was, I was the mover!' At such a moment there will rush in upon him a multitude of strange thoughts, of indefinite fears. There will come a sense of eternity,—dark, unfathomable, hopeless,—such as he fancied he had left years behind him, amidst the pictures of his nursery. That eternity will stand face to face with him; it will look like anything but a picture; it will present itself to him as the hardest, driest reality; there will be no *images* of torture and death. '*What matter where, if I be still the same?*' This question will be the torture; all death lies in that. Yes, brother, such a death that you will gladly fly from it to any devices which men have thought of, for making their gods gracious,—to any penances which they have invented, for the purpose of taking vengeance on themselves......And why? Because any thing is better than the presence of this dark self; I cannot bear to be dogged by that night and day, to feel its presence when in company, and when I am alone, to hear its voice whispering to me, 'Whithersoever thou goest, I shall go. Thou wilt part with all things else, but not with me. There will come a day when thou canst wander out in a beautiful world no longer, when thou must be at home with me.'

"This vision is more terrible than all which the fancy of Priests has ever conjured up. He who has encountered it, is beginning to know what sin is, as no words or definitions can teach it him. When once he arrives at the conviction, 'I am the tormentor; evil lies not in some accidents, but in me,' he is no more in the circle of outward acts, outward rules, outward punishments; he is no more in the circle of tendencies, inclinations, habits, and the discipline which is appropriate to them. He has come unawares into a more inward circle, a very close, narrow, dismal one, in which he cannot rest, out of which he must emerge. And I am certain he can only emerge out of it, when he begins to say, 'I have sinned against some being, not against society merely, not against my own nature merely, but against another to whom I was bound!' And the emancipation will not be complete, till he is able to say,—giving the words their full and natural meaning,—'FATHER, I have sinned against *Thee*.'"—Pp. 22, 23.

This is an eloquent strain, as all must feel; but it does not meet the difficulties which had been previously raised, and which it was intended to meet. The very question to be answered was, "What *is* sin?" "In what sense are men to be understood as offenders, not merely against (natural) law, or ethical morality, but specifically against God?" "What *are* God's claims upon man, and upon what are they founded?" It is no answer to these questions to say, that, at some time or other, man must and will be brought to feel that he has sinned, and that the only relief from the oppressive sense of his sin will be in the confession that he has sinned, not only against nature and society, but against a Being and a Father. Surely such a mere evasion as this will be as little taken for an answer by the objectors, as that miserable travestie of evangelical arguments upon this point, with which Mr. Maurice professed himself so "ill satisfied."

Mr. Maurice describes the experience of the man who begins to know what sin is, as opening with the thought, "*I* did this act, *I* thought this thought; it was a wrong act, it was a wrong thought, and it was *mine*." Well, but the objector's question is, "*What is* wrong? Wherein does wrong consist? And *why* is this wrong?" This is that which Mr. Maurice charges others with not being able to tell, and upon which he gave us reason to expect that he would pour a peculiar illumination. But, after much flourish of trumpets, literally nothing is said to the purpose. He tells us, indeed, that he who has experienced what he describes, "is beginning to know what sin is, as no words or definitions can teach it him." This might be all very well, if he had not given us reason to expect something like a definition of what it is. But if he raises certain objections, and blames others for not attending to them, and for not being able to answer them, he will hardly be suffered, at the very moment when his own answer should be forthcoming, to ride away upon so lame an excuse as this. The truth is, that the only answer which can be given to the question, "What is sin?" is the plain and sufficient answer of the Scriptures, "Sin is the transgression of the law." But this is an answer which Mr. Maurice would not give. Law, as an objective rule, has no place in his system. Yet what, but a law, known and violated, can explain the conviction, "FATHER, I have sinned against *Thee?*" This expression means, if it means any thing, that there are claims which have not been rendered, duties which have not been performed, in regard to God our Father. The sum of these claims and duties is the law of God, as made known to man, whether that law has been only written upon the heart, or also made known by revelation.

But Mr. Maurice's "sin" is sin which implies no guilt; and which, therefore, must, if possible, be conceived of apart from law. Hence his difficulty in defining what it is. Hence his evasion in this place. Hence, also, a few pages farther on, when, in another connexion, he does venture on a definition of sin, he tells us that the "sense of sin is *essentially* the sense of solitude, isolation, distinct individual responsibility," (page 29,)—that is, of course, sin is "*essentially* solitude, isolation, distinct individual responsibility"! And this blank absurdity is his final conclusion, this is his "consciousness" and "intuition" upon the subject! He has refused the guidance of the word of God; and to this sheer darkness does his subjective speculation conduct him.*

But another question is suggested by one passage in the quotation we have given. As the sense of wrongness must spring from some prior ground,—the sense of sin against God from some prior relation between God and man, which man has at the same time known and violated; so this sense of present wrongness, this consciousness of present sin, must in some way connect itself also with our prospects and expectations for the future. This Mr. Maurice feels; and hence he speaks of the "multitude of strange thoughts, of indefinite fears;" of the "sense of eternity,—dark, unfathomable, hopeless;"—which "rush in" upon him who feels his sin. This sounds something like an approximation to orthodoxy: it seems, at first sight, to refer to the sinner's fears of punishment, to be inflicted upon him for his sin by Him against whom he has so grievously offended; and, so understood, the words find an echo in the conscience of every sinner. Hence the power with which they come home, when first read, upon the heart and conscience. But this is *not* Mr. Maurice's meaning, as appears from his subsequent explanation of his own idea. All that he means by the words which he has used, is the fear which the sinner has of being left alone with himself, "in solitude, isolation, and distinct individual responsibility." But we cannot understand even this sense of fear, on Mr. Maurice's hypothesis. If there is no prior law, the violation of which implies guilt, we are at a loss to understand what is the meaning of *responsibility*. If there are no distinct claims, which God has made known and insisted on, we cannot conceive how there can be any sense of sin, as against God, or of wrongness, in our relations to Him. And, apart from all these things, we cannot understand why the moral state of any man, whatever it may be, should seem to him wrong, or inspire him with any sense of fear. Nor do we believe any man would or could have any foreboding as to the dark future, *merely* from fear of his own companionship, if conscience were not dreaded as the voice of God, and if it were not felt that the justice of God would people with penal horrors even the darkness and loneliness of his own consciousness. We believe it to be impossible for Mr. Maurice, or any other man, to separate the fears of sinners, as to the future, from the law and justice of that God who is at once their Father and their Judge.

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* In another work Mr. Maurice speaks of sin as "selfishness, the want of understanding that we are members of a kind"!—*Epistles of St. John*, p. 60.

Mr. Maurice, however, not only persuades himself that such a separation may and should be made, but that preaching is really and rightly effective, just in proportion as, in the minds of preachers and hearers, such a separation is actually made. All that is to be done is, to tell men that they are "in a wrong state; that hell is about them; that God would bring them into a right state; that He would save them out of that hell." (Page 26.) Their sin must be shown against God's love; the darkness against the light. Until this takes place, men "dwell in twilight; all ghosts of the past, all phantoms of the future, walk by them." What they need is, to "come out of the twilight." In order to this, "the darkness which is blended with the light must, in some way, be shown in deadly contrast with it; the opposites must be seen one against the other." (*Ibid.*) And this is the process of conversion! The light, though it be that which makes known God's love, is yet, it would seem, equally with the darkness, to be found *in* man. There is no impartation to his nature from without, no *special* conviction or illumination of the Spirit. Both darkness and light exist together blended in the spirit of man: these constituents must be separated from each other,—as the hydrogen and oxygen may be separated, which, in combination, make up water,—and then there is evolved the change which we call "conversion." It was in this way, it appears, that "Kingswood colliers," and "dry, hard, formal" men, and "contented, self-righteous boasters," were "roused" and changed under the "sermons of Methodist Preachers" in the last century. The Preacher talked of an "infinite sin and an infinite love," of a "wrong state," a present "hell about" the sinner, and God's will to "save men out of that hell." Whatever more than this the Preacher might say, this was the main and essential part of his message,—that which convinced the conscience, and was the means of effecting true conversion. All beyond and besides—all that spoke of future "punishment" and every other doctrine, such as we know to have been included in the Methodist Gospel—Mr. Maurice quietly generalises as "vanities and confusions," coming from "dreams" or doctrinal "crudities:" or, at the best, they were but the forms out of which the "conscience "translated" the essential truths above stated. And when the conversion was effected, it amounted to this: The sinner had—

> "escaped from the twilight; he had seen the opposite forms of light and darkness, no longer miserably confused together. Good was all good; evil was all evil. There was war in heaven and earth between them: in him, even in him, where the battle had been fiercest,—the odds against the good greatest,—good had gotten the victory."—Pp. 26, 27.

Such was Methodist preaching,—the preaching of the Wesleys, of Whitefield, of Walsh,—and such were Methodist conversions! Not a single objective truth entered into the essence of their Gospel: the claims of the law, the atoning merits of Christ, the terrors of the coming judgment, had really nothing to do, as such, with the wonderful effects which followed the Methodist ministrations. At best, they were only the forms by the use of which the preacher conveyed the truths, that his hearers were—not in danger at all of God's wrath, but—in a "wrong state;" unhappy in themselves, and out of unison with God their Father; and that God was unspeakably willing to put them right. A sense of guilt because of law broken, and a dread of judgment in proportion to that guilt, at the hands of the Lawgiver;—these contributed no part whatever towards the change actually wrought on the sinner: they were, no doubt, "confusions" or "dreams." The doctrines of the *need*, and of the *gracious provision*, of an *Atoning Sacrifice* for the sins of men, were no special element, no element at all, in the marvellous power of the Methodist Gospel. These were vain "crudities." A simple announcement of God's infinite willingness to make all sinners right and happy, would directly, and without any "confusion" or error intermingled, have wrought the same effect. And when the conversion was completed, all that the sinner was conscious of was, that the twilight of his soul had been decomposed, that he had seen light and seen darkness, and that, as a necessary consequence of such a revelation in himself, the light had vanquished the darkness; the good in him had gotten the victory over the evil. Where, in all this, is the bliss of pardon, the sense of regeneration from above, the Methodist experience of "righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost?" *

The subject of Essay III. is the "Evil Spirit." In the preceding Essay, Mr. Maurice had stated that the—

> "sense of a sin intricately, inseparably interwoven with the very fibres of their being, of a sin which they cannot get rid of without destroying themselves, haunts" and "besets all" men. —Page 25.

This, of course, is a fact which must be accounted for; and the object of the present Essay is, to account for it, without admitting the hereditary depravity of

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* "To use arts of terror or persuasion," says Mr. Maurice elsewhere, "for the purpose of inducing men of one class or another to care for their souls, would be natural and reasonable, if we were not entrusted with a message from God, that He cares more for their souls and bodies than they or we care for them. If that message is committed to us, surely our business is to deliver it; to set forth the signs and tokens which God has given that it is a true message, and that He will make it effectual; to expect more from His revelation of Himself, than from any brilliancy of speech or wisdom that the most skilful or powerful preacher has attained."—Preface to *Sermons on the Worship of God and Fellowship among Men.* By the Rev. F. D. Maurice, J. L. Davies, and others.

To use rhetorical "arts" or artifices "of terror or persuasion," is what we are not disposed to defend; but the sentiment conveyed in this extract is fully broad enough to condemn the method of St. Paul, who says, "Knowing therefore the fear of the Lord, [as the Judge and Searcher of hearts, see v. 10,] we persuade men.......We are ambassadors instead of Christ, as though God did beseech you by us. We pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." (2 Cor. v. 11, 20.) And certainly, if the old Methodist preaching were, from whatever causes, really effectual and soul-saving, no preaching can be less likely to be effectual than such as is described in the words of Mr. Maurice just given, as none could be more entirely unlike the preaching of the early Methodists. The doctrine implied in the extract, indeed, seems to us not materially to differ from fatalistic optimism.

human nature. Mr. Maurice's solution of the case is, that all the actual sin or "pravity" of mankind is to be traced, ultimately and really, to the solicitations of an "evil spirit," ("the spirit of selfishness,") taking advantage of circumstances to operate upon a nature which, though not sinful or fallen in itself, is yet susceptible of sinfulness, that is, of selfishness.

> "I believe," he says, "it is the spirit within me which feels the inclination" (to evil): "I believe it is a spirit speaking to my spirit who stirs up the inclination."—Page 49. "This tempter speaks to me, to myself, to the will; over *that* he has established his tyranny; all things in nature, with the soul and the body, have partaken, and do partake, of the slavery to which the man himself has submitted."—Page 45.

This is his explanation of "pravity, or depravity,—affix to it the epithets 'universal,' 'absolute,' or any you please." (Page 49.) He strangely supposes, moreover, that he thus explains "the deepest problem in metaphysics, the one which so many professional metaphysicians relinquish as desperate," the "origin of evil." (Pages 41, 33.) He is particularly confident—indeed, almost garrulously boastful—of his success in having solved this deepest of problems; whereas, in fact, he has never touched it. Singular enough, that he should not have perceived that, unless he means to teach Manichæism, the origin of evil is the very mystery involved in the existence of the "evil spirit," at least *as* an evil spirit. He supposes, also, that this hypothesis will remove all difficulty from the doctrine of the freedom of the will. But, surely, it is just as hard to explain how the free wills of all mankind, undepraved and undebilitated by any hereditary disease or corruption, can be subject to the tyranny of the evil spirit, as it is to harmonize the doctrine of the freedom of the will with that of the connate depravity of man. Indeed, as Dr. Candlish very ably argues, that tremendous and universal tyranny of the evil spirit over mankind, which Mr. Maurice asserts, and to which he attributes that "pravity," or "infection of nature," (page 48,) in all men, which he so freely admits, is utterly unaccountable and inconceivable, unless there were an original proneness in human nature to yield to such a tyranny, unless, that is, human nature were in itself fallen and depraved. So that the very doctrine which Mr. Maurice wishes to get rid of becomes necessary, in order to supplement his own hypothesis. The doctrine of the "evil spirit," as he teaches it, fails altogether to explain the facts of the case; and we are compelled still to believe, not only that we have the world and the devil, but also the flesh, to contend against; and this, not in the accommodated sense in which Mr. Maurice chooses sometimes to employ the word "flesh," (page 53,) but in the sense of the Apostle, when he teaches that "the mind of the flesh" ("the carnal mind") "is enmity against God." (Rom. viii. 7.)

It will be seen that, as to the existence and agency of the evil spirit, Mr. Maurice, if we take his language in its obvious sense, would seem to be diametrically opposed to the Unitarians.* At the same time, however, it must be remarked, that his opposition in this particular arises from his determination to hold fast that common ground of agreement between himself and them,—the denial of the fallen condition and hereditary depravity of the human race. He feels, more powerfully than Unitarians, the force of the appeal made by the orthodox to the facts of man's sinful and lamentable condition; he agrees with the orthodox in refusing to trace the actually prevailing sinfulness of man to the mere force of circumstances,—a point on which he writes in this Essay ably and eloquently; but he thinks that, notwithstanding, he may hold, with the Unitarian, the untainted integrity of man's nature, if he only throw the *onus* of all that is evil and contradictory in man's condition upon the evil spirit. How his theory fails to agree with the facts, we have just seen.

Out of the many misconceptions of the true evangelical doctrine on the subject of human depravity, which are contained in this Essay, we can only notice one. The author "discards and anathematizes the horrible notion, which has haunted moralists, divines, and practical men, that pravity is the law of our being, and not the perpetual tendency to struggle against the law of our being." (Page 45.) Evangelical divines of authority are not accustomed to speak of pravity as *the* "law of our being," nor as a law at all, in any other sense that that in which St. Paul uses the word, when he says, "I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." (Rom. vii. 23.) Pravity may be either affirmed or denied to be the law of our being, according to the double sense in which Mr. Maurice himself uses the word "natural," at page 232 of these very Essays.

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* But, for another view of this subject, see Note A, at the end of this chapter, on "Mr. Maurice's Idea of Satan."

> "It may in the most true sense be said, that we are only in our *natural*, that is to say, in our orderly and reasonable state, when everything within us is preserving its subordination to its righteous Ruler. It can be said, with equal truth,—and one assertion illustrates, instead of contradicting, the other,—that *naturally*, that is to say, when we follow our own inclinations, when we set up to govern ourselves, and forget that there is a supernatural government established within us, we become disorganized and bestial."

Surely, this last sentence is nearly equivalent to saying that, in one sense, to be "disorganized and bestial" is the law of our nature.

From "Sin" and the "Evil Spirit" the Essayist leads us on, by a natural transition, to the subjects of "Righteousness" and the "Redeemer." Essay IV. is entitled, "On the Sense of Righteousness in Men, and their Discovery of a Redeemer." The basis of this singular production is the experience of Job, which is made to be the type of that of all men. In Job righteousness and sin struggle, but righteousness prevails. Job makes "the discovery" of a Redeemer, in whom he is righteous, and from whom his righteousness is derived. All men have, in like manner, a Redeemer in and with themselves, if they could only be brought to "discover" it. This Redeemer is the Son of God, "the Root of our humanity." The whole process, in Job and in them, is merely subjective. There is no revelation to them of a Redeemer, *ab extra,* thought of in this Essay.

But, instead of attempting to give anything like an analysis of that which to us appears by far the most obscure of all the Essays, and which we must be candid enough to confess that, after all our efforts, we are not perfectly able to comprehend, we shall give a summary of extracts, which will present a fair idea of the scope and general plan of the Essay. Some particular expressions we have put in italics.

"There are great alternations of feeling [in Job's experience]. The deepest acknowledgments of sin come forth from his heart. But he speaks as if his righteousness were deeper and more grounded than that. Sin cleaves very close to him; it seems as if it were part of himself, almost as if it were himself. But his righteousness belongs to him still more entirely. However strange the paradox, it is more *himself* than even that is.......So also of the suffering. He has wonderful intuitions, ever and anon, of the mercy and goodness of God.......And yet, why does this happen to him?......There is that about him from which he feels that he ought to be delivered, an anguish of body and soul, which he cannot reconcile with the goodness he yet clings to and trusts in.

"There comes a moment in the life of Job, when these two thoughts, the thought of a *righteousness within him,* which is mightier than the evil, the thought of some deliverance from his suffering, which should be also a justification of God, are brought together in his mind. He exclaims, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth.'......He expects that this Redeemer will stand at the latter day upon the earth. But he evidently does not rest upon an expectation.......His Redeemer 'lives.' He is with him now. Therefore he calls upon his friends to say, whether they do not see that he has the root of the matter in him.

"At length we are told, God answers Job out of the whirlwind.......A wonderful conclusion follows. God justifies the complaining man, more than those who had pleaded so earnestly for His power and providence. They are forgiven when *he* prays for them. And the last days of Job are better than the beginning."—Pp. 57–59.*

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* Job, however, was constrained to say, after God had answered him:— "Who is he that hideth counsel without knowledge? therefore have I

"I believe most Clergymen, most religious persons, who have conversed at all seriously with men of any class, from the most refined to the most ignorant, in any state of mind, from that of the most contented Pharisee to that of the lowest criminal, have another test of the authenticity of the Book as a record of actual humanity. *They hear from one and from all, in some language or other, the assertion of a righteousness which they are sure is theirs, and which cannot be taken from them.* They may call themselves 'miserable sinners;' some of them may feel that they are so; some may tremble at the judgment which they think is coming upon them. But in all there is a secret reserve of belief, that there is that in them which is not sin, which is the very opposite of sin. When you tell them the feeling is very wrong, that 'God be merciful to me' is the only true prayer, that God's law is very holy, that they have violated it, *and so forth*,—they will listen, they may assent. From prudence or deference to you, they may suppress the offensive phrase, or change their tone. *Those will not be the best and honestest who do so*.......Each man has got this sense of righteousness, whether he realizes it distinctly, or indistinctly; whether he expresses it courageously, or keeps it to himself."—Pp. 60, 61.

"Not less true is it, that each man has that other conviction which Job uttered so manfully, that pain is an evil and comes from an enemy, and is contrary to the nature and reason of things......The witness of the conscience,—of the whole man,—on this point, is too strong for any cool disinterested reflections."—Page 61.

"We say we wish to bring the sinner, weary, heavy-laden, and hopeless, to Christ.......Do we not really believe that Christ was, before He took human flesh, and dwelt among us? Do we not suppose that He actually conversed with Prophets and Patriarchs, and made them aware of His presence? Or is this a mere arid dogma, which we prove out of Pearson, and which has nothing to do with our inmost convictions, with our very life? How has it become so? Is it not because we do not accept *the New-Testament explanation of these appearances and manifestations?* because we do not believe that Christ is in every man; the source of all light that ever visits him, the root of all the righteous thoughts and acts that he is ever able to conceive or do?"—Page 64.

uttered what I understood not.......I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear: but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." (Job xlii. 3, 5, 6.).

"We say boldly to the man who declares that he has a righteousness which no one shall remove from him, 'That is true. You have such a righteousness. It is deeper than all the iniquity which is in you. It lies at the very ground of your existence. And this righteousness dwells not merely in a law which is condemning you, it dwells in a Person in whom you may trust. The righteous Lord of man is with you……nigh you, at your heart.'

"Again, you maintain that the pain you are suffering is not good, but ill, a sign of wrong and disorder…….Even so, hold fast that conviction…….It is a bondage, the sign that a tyrant has in some way intruded himself into this earth of ours. But you are permitted to suffer" it, "just that you may attain to the knowledge of another fact,—that there is a Redeemer, that He lives, that He is the stronger. That righteous King of your heart, whom you have felt to be so near with you, so one with you, that you could hardly help identifying Him with yourself even while you confessed that you were so evil, He is the Redeemer as well as the Lord of you and of man.

"You have had, in those hours [of suffering,] a glimpse into the deep mystery, how God may use the consequences * of the evil to which you have yielded,—and can make also the deliverance, if it be at present only a partial one, from those consequences,—instruments in your emancipation from the evil itself; because, through His discipline, these have become the means of leading you to the apprehension of Himself, and of that daysman between us and Him, whom Job saw that he needed, and who must be as much yours as He was his."—Pp. 66–68.

There is no need for us to be at the trouble of criticizing such a scheme of exposition as the above. Its author has no argument to offer in its favour. His appeal is merely to man's consciousness. Our appeal against him is both to consciousness and to the whole strain and teaching of Divine revelation, from which the tenor of Mr. Maurice's speculation is utterly alien. He may call such writing as the above "philosophy," if he pleases; —men in general will think much of it mere mysticism and jargon;—but assuredly, whatever it is, it bears no resemblance to Christ's Gospel, as taught either by Himself or by His Apostles. We may just note, before

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* But what is meant above, when it is said that these consequences are from an "enemy," a "tyrant?" Mr. Maurice is not a Manichee!

we pass on, that here comes, for the first time, into something like distinct view, that identification of all men with the Son of God as the "Root of their humanity," which we have stated to lie at the basis of Mr. Maurice's theory.

This comes more fully out in Essays V. and VI., on the "Son of God," and the "Incarnation." The "Son of God" is taken to be the true ideal, of whom all the ideal sons of the gods and redeemers of heathen mythologies were poor counterfeits; and thus the doctrine of the Son of God, as the Redeemer of man, is represented as meeting the instincts and anticipations of humanity,—a view in which, undoubtedly, there is important truth. The purport of the last Essay is, in this connexion, rehearsed. In reference to Job, it is stated that, with all his consciousness of evil, there "was strangely mixed the assurance that there was a righteousness which he could actually claim as his," and that "there was, in some mysterious manner, a Redeemer,—an actual person connected with him,—one who, he was sure, lived; one who was the root of his being; one in whom he *was* righteous." (Page 81.) This Redeemer, it is then argued, who is thus one with man, and with all men, this Son of God, who is "the ground of humanity," must be at the same time one with God.

> "He must be spiritual, like that Being; for it is the spirit, and not the sense, of the sufferer, which confesses Him. And whatever righteousness and goodness are perceived by the erring, trusting, and broken-hearted penitent to be in the one—speaking to his sorrows and wants—must be the image and reflex of an absolute righteousness and grace in the other, which he could only adore."—Page 84.

There is much to admire, and quite as much to question, in this Essay. We pass on, however, to the next, just quoting, ere we do so, one of those strange assertions which serve to show still more clearly that Neo-Platonic principle, as to the relation of humanity to the Son of God, which is the real basis of Mr. Maurice's theology. "In HIM, and for Him, *we were created*: this is our doctrine, or rather the doctrine of St. Paul!" (Page 94.)

The Essay (VI.) on the "Incarnation" carries forward the views more or less developed in the two previous Essays. The main idea is, that the Incarnation meets and satisfies the instincts and wants of humanity. The Essayist works this out, of course, with his characteristic vagueness and discursiveness, yet often with great eloquence and power. Indeed, in this Essay he seems to put forth all his ability. We can only, however, select for notice a few of the points which mark the *peculiarity* of his views on this subject; for most, if not all, of the true things he says on the general doctrine of the incarnation, have been often, though, perhaps, not often so eloquently, said before. We observe, then, that he ignores the fact of our Lord's miraculous conception, which, according to all orthodox schemes of doctrine, stands in essential and vital relation to all the purposes of His incarnation; whether He be regarded as our Exemplar, or as our Sacrificial Substitute. In fact, the miraculous conception is a superfluity,* on Mr. Maurice's scheme, according to which the nature of man, as he is actually born into the world, is not regarded as fallen or corrupt. Hence there is an ominous significancy in the language which he uses in regard to the temptation of Christ:—

> "We cannot and dare not think that there is an actual spirit striking at the deepest root of our being, if we do not believe that righteousness is mightier, or if we suppose that it has only a distant abstract superiority; not one which has been ascertained in an actual trial. *If we suppose that the Son of God had any advantage in that trial, any power, save that which came from simple trust in His Father, from the refusal to make or prove Himself His Son, instead of depending on His word and pledge, we shall not feel that a real victory has been won.*"—Pp. 110, 111.

Further, as a sample of Mr. Maurice's style of exegesis, as well as an additional illustration of his views as to the relation of the Son of God to humanity, we must give an extract from his explanation of John the

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* So Coleridge talks of the miraculous conception of our Lord, as an awkward excrescence of the faith, of which we were better rid.—"Confessions," p. 133.

Baptist's message, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," as interpreted by that other passage in the Gospel, in which it is said of John, that "he came to bear witness of the LIGHT, that all men through Him might believe." The "innermost force" of the former passage, as thus interpreted, and rendered free from all "vagueness," is,—

> "There is a light within you, close to you. Do you know it? Are you coming to it?......O turn to it!......I mean that this light comes from a Person—from the King and Lord of your heart and spirit—from the Word—the Son of God. When I say, 'Repent;' I say, Turn and confess His presence. You have always had it with you. You have been unmindful of it."—Page 117.

A marvellous exposition this of "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand!"

The way is now made plain to undertake the discussion of the cardinal doctrine of Christianity,—the Atonement for mankind, effected by the Incarnate Son of God. Accordingly, the "Atonement" is the subject of Essay VII. Here, then, we have arrived at the heart of the matter. And, whatever may be the case with our readers, we ourselves are weary of our task. We thought the old fight with the pale demon of Belshamite Unitarianism was at an end. We should scarcely have believed it possible, that this controversy should be revived in the present age,—above all, by a Clergyman of the Church of England. But so it is, and we must even address ourselves to our labour. We shall endeavour to give an analysis of the Essay, as brief as is compatible with a clear and sufficient discussion of the subject.

"It will be evident, I hope," says Mr. Maurice, "by this time, on what grounds I object to the so-called 'theology of consciousness.'" Certainly, nothing could have been to us less evident; nor could any quiet assumption have taken us more entirely by surprise, than that which is involved in this sentence. Nothing can be more evident, on the contrary, than that Mr. Maurice's whole theology is based upon the mere authority of consciousness. The revelation, indeed, he *professes* to find in the Divine word; but the authority and divinity of that revelation he would establish, in every case, by an appeal to consciousness. His arguments are all subjective. Nay, even his theology, though he borrows its general outline and his nomenclature from Scripture, is yet, in substance, woven altogether out of man's mere philosophy, and is, therefore, but a particular interpretation and theory of "consciousness." But in thus, for once, discrediting the "theology of consciousness," Mr. Maurice has a special end to answer. He is aware that the theology which he calls "popular," while professing to derive all its substance and authority directly from Scripture, is yet accustomed to appeal, in confirmation of its teachings, to the consciousness and conscience of humanity. The force of this appeal it is his wish, by a preliminary *caveat*, to nullify. Accordingly, he endeavours to show how the understanding may, from various strange, conflicting "consciousnesses," deduce equally various and conflicting theologies, all alike out of harmony with the truth, and yet to each of which the conscience may be brought to give its sanction. Of course, as a general statement, this is true; and it is a truth of which Mr. Maurice's own scheme of theology is a remarkable exemplification. But in his manner of illustrating this general truth, Mr. Maurice, as usual, interweaves his statements with insinuations and censures, which give a most unfair impression of evangelical theology, and are intended to make it evident that this is one of the most comprehensive, complicated, and offensive systems of theological error, which man has ever contrived. The "Priests of Christendom" come in for the heaviest share of that condemnation which he ever assumes a right to apportion, *ex cathedrâ*, whether evidence in favour of the condemned has been heard or not. Evangelical theology is made to take rank with the inventions of heathen "Priests," as a false and repulsive distortion of the truth, adapted to meet the demands of a perverted or misinterpreted consciousness. No sooner, however, has Mr. Maurice thus endeavoured beforehand to silence the argument from consciousness and conscience, on the part of his opponents, than, with the utmost *sang-froid* and complacence, he proceeds to turn the self-same argument against the "popular" theology. He feels no difficulty or inconsistency in adopting the language of "those who cry for a theology based upon consciousness, which shall supersede the theology of Christendom," and who affirm that—

> "The doctrines respecting sacrifice and atonement which prevail in Christendom, darken the sense of right and wrong in the minds of Christians; bewilder their understandings; sanction the most false conceptions concerning sin, the most cruel conceptions concerning God. The conscience of human beings is in revolt against them. Civil authority owns that it can defend them no longer. Ecclesiastical authority tries to defend them. ……But they are doomed; *texts of Scripture will not preserve from burial that which is already dead.* No appeal to the verdict of centuries will galvanize doctrines which do not represent our convictions."—Page 131.

"On this point," indeed, Mr. Maurice says, "I join issue with them." But he immediately adds, in order that all may understand that he only joins issue on the point as to whether the views condemned are Christian theology, or not,—

> "I say that they are right in imputing to Romanists and Protestants a set of notions—some of them common to both, some peculiar to each—which deserve the epithets they bestow on it; which outrage the conscience, which misrepresent the character of God, which generate a fearful amount of insincere belief, of positive infidelity,—also, I think, of immorality,"… and "are becoming more and more intolerable to earnest and thoughtful men."—Page 132.

Then follows some account of the "natural history" of these notions, as developed first in Popery, and then among Protestants. On the former of these heads we shall offer no remarks, though the view given of Luther's protest is very defective. In dealing with the second, Mr. Maurice gives, in the first place, a version of the "popular" doctrine of the Atonement. This is, of course, represented in the most obnoxious form; yet it is easily seen, that what he wishes to bring into discredit, is precisely that view of the vicarious death of Christ for the sins of the human family, which is held in common by all evangelical schools. He then urges the usual Socinian objections against this view. The following is the latter half of the paragraph:—

> "We can forgive a fellow-creature a wrong done to us, without exacting an equivalent for it; we blame ourselves if we do not; we think we are offending against Christ's command, who said, 'Be ye merciful, as your Father in Heaven is merciful,' if we do not. We do not feel that punishment is a satisfaction to our minds; we are ashamed of ourselves, when we consider it is. We may suffer a criminal to be punished, but it is that we may do him good, or assert a principle. And if that is our object, we do not suffer an innocent person to prevent the guilty from enduring the consequences of his guilt, by taking them upon himself......Should we attribute to God what would be unrighteousness in us?"—Pp. 137, 138.

These are stale objections; they have been answered a thousand times. It is not now our object to expose their fallacy, as we are at present dealing with Mr. Maurice's *peculiar* views. In a later part of this volume, when we come to consider Mr. Jowett's theological opinions, we shall have to restate the orthodox argument in defence of the great doctrine of Atonement, and may then find it desirable to bestow some attention upon them. Here, however, let it be observed, in passing, how Mr. Maurice insinuates the gross libel that, according to evangelical theology, "the punishment" of sinners is a "satisfaction to the mind" of God. Mr. Maurice cannot but know that the punishment of offenders against the Divine Law, according to the teaching of those whom he opposes, is intended to "enforce a principle"; that, viz., of the supreme Right of the Divine Governor, and the supreme goodness and authority of the Divine Law. And if, by accepting the substitution of Christ for these offenders, this "principle" is more impressively and beneficially enforced than it could be by the punishment of the offenders themselves, who will venture to deny the "righteousness" of such a procedure, or to limit the process of the Divine

Government of the world in all things by the precise and literal analogy of the ordinary proceedings of human governments? *

He proceeds to say, that "debates are going on in every corner of our land, suggested by these difficulties," although "Clergymen are very anxious to stifle" all discussion on the subject. And then he announces his own Gospel on the subject of atonement.† Let us hear him:—

> "The broad, simple Gospel, that God has set forth His Son as the propitiation for sin,—that He has offered Himself for the sins of the world,—meets all the desires of these heart-stricken sinners. It declares the fulness of God's love, sets forth the Mediator in whom they are at one with the Father. It brings Divine love and human suffering into direct and actual union. It shows Him who is one with God and one with man, perfectly giving up that self-will which had been the cause of all men's crimes, and all their misery. Here is, indeed, a brazen Serpent, to which one dying from the bite of the old serpent can look, and be healed. The more that brazen Serpent is lifted up, the more may we look for health and renovation to the whole of humanity, and to every one of its palsied and withered limbs."—Page 141.

Certainly, "the broad, simple Gospel" set forth in the first sentence of this paragraph will meet all the desires of sinners, if understood aright. But the sense must be explained. Sinners cannot be satisfied with vague and general statements, which, for aught they can tell, may *not* meet their case. They must know what Mr. Maurice means by a "propitiation for their sin," and they must see *on what principle* Jesus Christ was made such a propitiation; otherwise there can be no intelligent faith, no hearty trust. It is not, after all, the *mere name* of JESUS which will make men happy or holy, not the mere assurance that, in some sense or other, He is made for them a propitiation. They must understand how His propitiation answers to their sin and guilt and misery. They must see how and why "God can be just, and the Justifier of him who believeth in Jesus." We more than doubt whether Mr. Maurice's assurance to sinners who feel themselves sinful, miserable, and undone, that, the Son of God being the Root of humanity, they are righteous in Him, and that He, as such, is, and always has been, "the Mediator in whom they *are* at one with the Father," will ever quiet the clamour of their conscience, change the state of their hearts, or persuade them, spite of their conscious and miserable alienation from God, into the belief that they are His happy, reconciled, accepted children. It is true, indeed, that the incarnation of the Son of God "brings Divine Love and human suffering into direct and actual union," and "shows Him who is one with God and one with man, perfectly giving up self-will;" but even the brightness and purity of Christ's example will be powerless, of itself, to charm away the misery of a stricken sinner, or to change his evil into good. Nor can the love of God, as exhibited in the person and life of Christ, avail aught to these ends, unless there be a principle of application, on the ground of which the sinner can infer that that love can extend pardon to his case.

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* See Note C, at the end of this chapter.

† On all this see the writings of Maurice's master, COLERIDGE, "Aids to Reflection," pp. 240–261.

Mr. Maurice appends, by way of supplement, certain additional lessons, to be learned "from the cross of Christ, apparently of a different kind."

> "Since nowhere is the contrast between infinite love and infinite evil brought before us as it is there, we have the fullest right to affirm that the cross exhibits the wrath of God against sin, and the endurance of that wrath by the well-beloved Son. ......The endurance of that wrath, or punishment, by Christ, came from His acknowledging that it proceeded from love, and His willingness that it should not be quenched till it had effected its full loving purpose," and was "the proof that He bore, in the truest and strictest sense, the sins of the world, feeling them with that anguish with which only a perfectly pure and perfectly sympathizing Being can feel the sins of others. Whatever diminished His purity diminished His *sympathy*."—Page 141.

So the whole of Christ's mental anguish was "*sympathy;*" *thus* He "bore, in the truest and strictest sense, the sins of the world." Thus He fulfilled the saying of the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world." This "sympathy" was what the sufferings and death of the animal victims under the law prefigured. And, it would seem, the sufferings which Christ in His crucifixion endured at the hands of men, were "the wrath of God against sin," or, at any rate, the full and immediate expression of that wrath. And this is Mr. Maurice's doctrine of the atonement!

The Essayist then proceeds to announce six principles, by means of which he expects completely to explode the evangelical doctrine of the atonement. We do not, however, feel it necessary to state distinctly, and refute *seriatim,* these principles, which are specimens of divinity as extraordinary, we imagine, as were ever published by a Professor. We single out for quotation the third of them, which Mr. Maurice thus states:—

> "It is confessed by all orthodox schools, that Christ was actually the Lord of men, the King of their spirits, the Source of all the light that ever visited them, the Person for whom all nations longed as their Head and Deliverer, the Root of righteousness in each man. The Bible speaks of His being revealed in this character; of the mystery, which had been hid from ages and generations, being made known by His incarnation. If we speak of Christ as taking upon Him the sins of men by some artificial substitution, we deny that He is their actual representative."—Page 144.

Our readers, by this time, will have got light enough upon Mr. Maurice's scheme, to perceive what is the purport of this strange sentence. "The Son of God, and not Adam," as he says in another Essay, (page 202,) "was the true Root of humanity;" and, *as such, not* as the Second Adam, He was "the Head of the whole human race." So that, on Mr. Maurice's theory, Christ could as little be the Substitute, or, by any subsequent and superinduced relation, the Representative, of the race, as could the first Adam. He is not, in virtue of His vicarious death, the mediatorial Representative and Head of the human family, but, by a sort of natural and original relationship, He is its "Root" and "actual Representative." *As such,* He is "the Root of righteousness *in* each man." "In this character," Mr. Maurice would have us believe, "the Bible speaks of His being revealed;" and *this* is "the mystery," which, "having been hid from ages and from generations," was "made known by His incarnation." We shall not do our readers the injustice of attempting to refute such a "principle" as this. But we may observe, that it is certainly not in this sense that *any* "orthodox school" has believed in the mediatorial Headship of Christ.

The Eighth Essay, on "The Resurrection of the Son of God from Death, the Grave, and Hell," is far too singular a specimen of theology and exegesis, from a Professor of Divinity in the Anglican Church, to be passed over without a specific notice. It is not an easy matter, so far to master our author's meaning, as to be able to give an outline of it; but the following sketch will, we believe, convey a fair general view of his scheme. It appears, then, 1. That death is not the separation of soul and body; there is no such separation: death, whatever it means, affects equally both soul and body. 2. The *body* never dies; what the earth "encloses, devours, and assimilates,"—what we call the *remains* of a person, is not the body, any more than it is the spirit, but mere earthy "*corruption,*"—a "shameful" additament to the system, the result of our sins.* So that whatever the doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead" may mean, it does not mean that any thing will rise hereafter from the grave. 3. When it is said that "Christ's flesh," or, as Mr. Maurice chooses to quote, His "*body,* saw no corruption," what we are to learn from the text is, merely that, as Christ is the normal and representative Man, the body of man universally is insured from decay,—"*redeemed from* corruption." From this view it must obviously follow, though Mr. Maurice does not state the consequence, that Christ left His "remains" in the tomb, and that the body with which He rose from the tomb, was not the very flesh and blood in which He had walked the earth.* 4. *There will never be any general resurrection or judgment.* No such doctrine as that of a future general resurrection is taught in 1 Cor. xv. "The voice of the archangel and the trump of God,—the last trump,"—mean merely such warnings as are given to nations of judgment coming upon them, and such as "sound in the ears of each individual man," when made to feel that, "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, by a fit of apoplexy, by the dagger of an assassin, the vesture of mortality which hides the light of Christ from his spirit, might drop off from him, and he might be changed." And "when eloquent preachers tell us that all personal and family visitations are messages from heaven, trumpets of the archangel calling to repentance,"—if they mean this only in a "metaphorical," not in a "real," sense, they misrepresent the meaning of the Apostle, and are but "fiddling while Rome is burning." (!) (Pp. 173–177.) So the "twinkling of an eye" means the "moment" of "change" in death. (Page 172.) 5. As there is no general resurrection, but death and resurrection are precisely the same, it follows that there is *no intermediate state.* "Hades," or "hell," may mean, "the abyss of space." (Pp. 161, 162.) As it has hitherto been ordinarily understood, it has been only a pagan dream, or a frightful Jewish vision, the offspring of ignorance and fear, or a Christian delusion grounded upon these. 6. Lastly, as to the final lot and abode of the righteous,—heaven and hell,—it appears that these, as distinctly shaped and allotted for the one class and the other, *have no existence.* They are just the righteousness of the righteous, and the wickedness of the wicked, *so long as* these may continue. Mr. Maurice knows nothing of any separation of the one class from the other. "*Every where* sympathy, fellowship, affection, must be the condition of right human existence; selfishness, its plague and contradiction." (Page 184.) And the strife of mingled good and evil, for aught our author has to teach us, may be carried on for ever.

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* Page 169. To us this notion seems strangely incongruous with the whole tenor of Mr. Maurice's theology.

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* Our well-informed readers will perceive how closely this consequence of Mr. Maurice's scheme, as well as the whole bearing of what he says in reference to the "shameful" and corruptible flesh and blood we wear, allies his speculations on this subject to the Gnostic heresy, against which he talks so greatly. His notion, however, on the subject of the "body" with which the soul will be invested when it quits the flesh, is really derived, like the rest of his system, from the (Neo-) Platonic philosophy. See CUDWORTH'S "Intellectual System," vol. iii., pp. 269, *et seq.*, and MOSHEIM'S acute and learned note, pp. 276, *et seq.* We add here an illustrative extract from the "Unity of the New Testament," which confirms the inference we have deduced in the text: "The sense of a body [the body of our Lord] delivered from the chains of death, essentially the same as it was before, using naturally, as its own, powers which had been hidden, or had only occasionally come forth, is one part—not the only, or perhaps the chief, part—of the revelation. Its capacity of vanishing and of re-appearing is felt to indicate the possibility of a spiritual presence, which may be continually near, and in which men may be meant ever to abide."—"Unity of the New Testament," pp. 301, 302.

We may properly note here, also, that Behmen believed in the revival, within the regenerate, of a certain internal or angelic body. Weigel, before Behmen, had taught that Christ had a two-fold body, one truly human, another, called the heavenly, a procession from the Divine Nature. ("Hours with the Mystics," vol. ii., pp. 93, 94.) There is a strong resemblance, also, in these speculations of Mr. Maurice, to the fantasies of Swedenborg.

On this point Mr. Maurice has gone beyond his Unitarian friends in the work of destruction, and he entreats them to give up the belief in a general resurrection, and a judgment to come,—almost the last vestige of *revealed doctrine* which they hold in common with the orthodox.

The two next Essays (IX. and X.) are on the subjects of Justification and Regeneration. Our readers will anticipate what is the teaching of these Essays. All men are possessed of a preliminary justification, and partake of a common regeneration in Christ. There is "a righteousness for them, one and all, *not as separate creatures,* but as members of a body." ("Unity of the New Testament," p. 543.) The Incarnation was, in Christ's life and death, and especially in His resurrection, the manifestation of that righteousness, and therefore the justification of the race. It was, at the same time, the inauguration of a new era, and the spring of new influences, for the race; and, therefore, in Christ, as God incarnate, humanity is not only justified, but regenerate.

Our space will only permit us here to give a few extracts, by way of confirming and illustrating the view we have presented. In the former Essay, after saying that Romanists have made baptism, Protestants faith, to be the distinction between one class of mankind and another, and both with equally immoral and pernicious effects, Mr. Maurice goes on to give his own "wider ground,"—a ground, not of separation, but of union, from which he thinks the "eternal distinctions which God has Himself established, will become clear to us." (Page 199.) This ground is, that "God, having justified His Son by raising Him from the dead, *in that act* justified *the race* for which Christ died;" (page 202;) that, "Christ being the *actual* Mediator between God and man, His resurrection declared that God *confessed* Him in that character, and, thereby, *confessed men to be righteous in Him;*" (page 203;) that "it must be the right and duty of men, at all times, to turn to Him in whom they ARE *created, redeemed, justified.*" (Page 204.) "St. Paul," we are told, "takes it for granted that this justification of the Son of God and the Son of Man was his own justification,—his own because he *was a man;*" he "was assured that his justification was the justification of *each man.*" (Page 201.) This is the "one foundation" which God "has laid for a universal Church:"—

> "He has established the great distinctions, that there is, in every man, a spirit which seeks righteousness, and a flesh which stoops to evil; that there is, with every man, the Christ, who would quicken his spirit, and deliver his soul and body out of death; and, with every man, an evil power, who tempts him to become the slave of his flesh, and so to destroy his soul and body; that in Christ, the true Lord of their spirits, men are claimed as sons of God, and that they, by distrusting Him, and yielding to the devil, become utterly unlike Him, forming themselves in the image of the father whom they have chosen. And we, for these great practical Divine contrasts, which will be brought out in the clear light of God's judgment-day, and which nothing in earth, or heaven, or hell, can alter or modify, must have our own sets of spiritual and carnal men; of those who can make it clear to us that they believe, and of those who

cannot; divisions which are so many premiums to hypocrisy," &c., &c.......“ Most assuredly the curse of God is upon these Protestant devices."*—Pp. 205, 206.

The Essay on Regeneration (X.) has a sort of plan, but can scarcely be said to contain any thing like either argument or exposition. There is need to beware, in this as in other Essays, of Mr. Maurice's ambiguities and word-juggleries. He can talk, at times, as if he believed in the peculiar efficacy of faith, though, in truth, he believes faith to be an accident and consequence in our condition, altogether secondary to that antecedent and independent justification and regeneration, of which all men are, at all times, possessed in Christ. So he condescends, also, to speak of himself as adhering to, and upholding, "baptismal regeneration;" though he ought to know full well, that in no ordinary or honest sense of this phrase is it possible for him to believe in any such doctrine.

The following citations exhibit the specific doctrine of the Essay :—

"The Son of Man......has come to claim men as spiritual beings, capable of this spiritual life, inheritors of this spiritual kingdom. Baptism declares this to be their proper and Divine constitution in Christ. All who receive it, claim the kingdom which God has declared to be theirs. *They take up their rights* AS SPIRITUAL BEINGS. He bestows His Spirit upon them, that they may enjoy these rights; that they may be as much born into the light of heaven, into the light of God's countenance, as the child is born out of the womb into the light of the sun." [Only that they have never been in the darkness of the womb; for, as Mr. Maurice adds,] "That countenance *is shining* upon them, the Spirit is with them to open their eyes, that they may take in the light of it."—Pp. 229, 230.

All the good of Christianity is traced to the belief, all the evil to the unbelief, in "Christ as the Regenerator of humanity." (Pp. 240–246.) The former of these principles is otherwise described as "the Church's faith in its Divine birth, in its *regenerate position*, in God's calling;" (page 242;) as "the faith of God having regenerated the world in Christ;" (page 244;) as the belief that "Christ came into the world to regenerate all human society, all the forms of life, all civil order, all domestic relationships;" (pp. 245, 246;) and that "the *body* and the *earth* are as much redeemed and regenerated by Him, as our spirits or intellectual powers." (Page 246.) "A man who fully believes in Christ's regeneration," it is added, "must regard every physical study as a sacred study, physiology as the most sacred of all." (*Ibid.*) This belief implies, that "we regard Christ as the Restorer of humanity to its true and proper condition, as the King of kings and Lord of lords, as the Head and Bond of a universal brotherhood;" (page 248;) and that we assert Him as "the spiritual Root and Ground of society." (Page 249.)*

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* The whole paragraph is most offensive; we have but quoted a sample. Elsewhere, in this same Essay, Mr. Maurice defines the faith of Evangelicals to be, "a persuasion that God will not punish us hereafter......*because we have that persuasion*." (Page 197.) This is one of his current misrepresentations.

We need not say that we, too, believe in Christ as the Regenerator of humanity, and as the Head and Ruler of the race; but we believe that this regeneration extends, in its proper fulness of meaning, only to those who exercise a living faith in Christ; not that it is a regeneration which has place alike in all men. We believe that it implies a real and vital change in the character of those who receive it; that it is, indeed, a new birth, a birth of the Holy Ghost; not that it merely works and is evidenced by our recognition of our relation to Christ, the Son of God; by our opening our eyes to perceive the light which, all the while, has been shining around us.

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* Further light will be thrown upon the passages quoted above, and upon Mr. Maurice's general scheme, by the following quotations from the "Unity of the New Testament." "It had been shown him, (St. Paul,) that the Gentiles *are* [not *should be*, according to our version] fellow-heirs, and of the same body......*The Gospel with which St. Paul was intrusted* was good news to men, not of something which was coming to them, *but of their actual state, of that state which belongs to them, but which they do not recognise.*" "The danger lay in their thinking they were to create a state for themselves, instead of accepting one and abiding in it." "All the exhortations which follow, to the very end of the Epistle [to the Ephesians], assume, as their groundwork, that the true state of man, and, consequently, their state, is now revealed in Christ; that *a Divine illumination was all about them and within them; and that, if they did not live in it, if their lives were not clear and orderly, it was because they were shutting their eyes.*"—Pp. 536, 537, 540, 541.

No doubt, also, the Second Adam may, in a still wider sense, be called the Regenerator of humanity. The Christian life is a blessing to many more besides truly spiritual Christians. The "leaven" of Christian thought, principle, and feeling, having once been cast into the "lump" of humanity, cannot fail or cease to move and stir, ever more deeply and widely, among the whole mass. The *race* is undoubtedly in process of being educated and elevated. Christendom, as a whole, has been raised to a level incomparably higher than ever was or could have been reached by civilized heathendom as a whole. The beginning of Christianity *was* a new birth, and the beginning of a new life, for humanity. The regeneration and sanctification of human life—individual, family, and national—is advancing. The kingdom of Christ is to rule over all. That which is now the mightiest element in modern progress and in true civilization, is to assert its living divinity, to absorb all things into its sphere, and to penetrate all things with its life. All this we believe; but not that *every man is*, by his eternal constitution in Christ, necessarily and indefeasibly regenerate, if he did but see it, and a child created and adopted in Christ, if he would only think so.*

Essay XI. teaches that the ascended Christ is every where invisibly yet *corporeally* present with all men; and thus endeavours to harmonize the Romanist and Protestant doctrines as to His real presence in the Eucharist. (!) Essay XII., on the Judgment-Day, taking, for one of its mottoes, the article in the Creed, "From thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead," teaches, as our readers will have been prepared to expect, that there will be no day of judgment; that Christ is ever descending, as Judge, into the spirits of men, but will never descend from His seat in the heavens to meet and sentence the assembled myriads of our race. It is full of the most incredible misrepresentations of the orthodox views on these heads, —as "fantastic, figurative, inoperative,"—as "thought necessary to produce terror in the minds of thieves and vagabonds;" whereas "the constabulary force" would be "a more useful, effectual, and, also, a more godly instrument," with much more to a similar purpose. When St. Paul says, "We must all appear before the Judgment-Seat of Christ," the meaning is, that we must all "be manifested" in the daylight of Gospel truth and revelation.*

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* See Note D, at the end of this chapter, on Mr. Maurice's views as to "the World, the Church, and the Sacraments."

The general character of the four following Essays, (XIII. to XVI.,) on "Inspiration," the "Personality and Teaching of the Holy Spirit," the "Unity of the Church," and the "Trinity in Unity," will be inferred from what has been already seen of the principles and development of Mr. Maurice's theological system. The inspiration of the written word is put on a par with that of all pious, truth-loving persons who read that word, and so its authority is done away;† the Holy Ghost is supposed to inspire and teach all, but not allowed to regenerate or sanctify in any special sense, nor made, in any sense, dependent, in His operations, on the procuring merit of Christ's death, or the special faith of the recipient;‡ the unity of the Church is a mere abstraction, to be believed in as ours in Christ, possibly to be fulfilled one day in the visible unity and fellowship of the whole human family, but not in any other sense to be realized in any community or communities, visible or invisible, on earth or in heaven;§ and the doctrine of the Trinity is so taught, as to imply no peculiar harmony between the mutual relations and specific offices of the Divine Persons and the work of human redemption, except, indeed, in so far as, upon Mr. Maurice's scheme, the incarnation of the Son of God, as the Head and Exemplar of humanity, was the natural, if not the necessary, consequence of His eternal and essential relation to the race, as its Original and Root.

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* See, for another, the Scripture view, Dean Trench's sermon on this text. ("Five Sermons, preached before the University of Cambridge.")

† See an extract in Note E, at the end of this chapter, from a sermon of Mr. Maurice's on "The Bible."

‡ See Note B, at the end of this chapter, on Mr. Maurice's doctrine of the Holy Spirit.

§ See Note D, at the end of this chapter, "The World, the Church, and the Sacraments."

We come now to the last Essay. This was not published in the first edition of the "Essays;" but its outline or rudiment was appended as a sort of Supplement to the Essay on the "Unity of the Church." It was this particular portion of that Essay to which Dr. Jelf's attention was directed by the Bishop of London, and which led to Mr. Maurice's dismissal from King's College. The author has, on this account, been led to expand and more distinctly develope his views, and to publish them in the form of a separate Essay. We have already indicated, in general, the nature and the grounds of his views on this subject. To believe in a judicial sentence of the Divine Being upon any man, however he may have sinned, or in retributive punishment at all, is incompatible with the whole tenor of his scheme; according to which, God is never a Judge, but always and only a Father; according to which, the *only* law of government in the universe is an operative principle of love, striving to get the better of evil. Mr. Maurice believes in *chastisement*, (*παιδεία*,) but not in *punishment* (*κόλασις*). These two things, however, are contrasted in Scripture; they are described by different and appropriate words; and *punishment* is represented as the final work to which the Father and Judge of all resorts, when chastisement has proved vain, and the time of trial is at an end. (Matt. xxv. 46.)

Here, then, is our fundamental difference with Mr. Maurice. We believe—we do not think it needful to prove—that the Scriptures teach that God governs the universe by law, and that there will come a day of final judgment, when all shall appear before Christ, to "receive the things done in the body, according to that which they have done, whether it be good or bad."

It seems to us that—if this doctrine were done away

—there would, indeed, be realized Mr. Maurice's present hell, and that this present hell, without any sentence or superadded punishment, would grow worse and worse for ever. In this connexion, Dr. Jelf's words, in his official letter to Mr. Maurice, seem to be well worth quoting:—

> "Men, *as it is*, with the trammels of the old-fashioned faith still upon them, find it difficult enough to resist temptation, not only to ordinary sin, but to great and inhuman crimes. Yet it cannot be doubted, that many a one who dies in the Lord will primarily have owed his salvation to a fear of the Divine sanctions of religion, which God's power and grace have impressed upon his mind. The fear of hell has, by God's grace, turned him from sin, and opened his eyes to the joys of heaven. But the men who shall have learnt about 'an abyss of love,' men nominally Christians, perhaps reconciled to Christianity by this very relaxation, will feel themselves enabled to commit any species of wickedness, and yet hope for heaven at the last. It will be with sin, as it is with so many other things in this day, a question of profit and loss:—so much present intense sensual enjoyment, so much revenge, the gains of this robbery, the hatred glutted by that murder, *on the one side;* all present profits, as it were, palpable to sense: *on the other*, the dim prospect of a futurity which, with or without bodily torment, will consist chiefly in the 'being without God,' 'being wholly separated from love, becoming wholly immersed in selfishness and hatred,' 'the vision of being left alone;' and yet, through the dark vista of these 'eternal' horrors, the hope of ultimate salvation beams upon the lost sinner; there is an 'abyss of love' below the 'abyss of death;' he may be 'content to be lost in that.'" —*Jelf's Grounds, &c.*, pp. 59, 60.

Dr. Jelf refers in the above quotation to what Mr. Maurice had said in his correspondence, as well as to his teaching in the "Essays." The following passage, however, from the expanded Essay will illustrate the force and pertinence of his remarks:—

> "I ask no one to pronounce, for I dare not pronounce myself, what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to the loving will of God. There are times when they seem to me—thinking of myself more than of others—almost infinite. But I know that there is something which must be infinite. I am

obliged to believe in an abyss of love which is deeper than the abyss of death; I dare not lose faith in that love. I sink into death, eternal death, if I do. I must feel that this love is compassing the universe. More about it I cannot know. But God knows I leave myself and all to Him."—Page 476.

With this we cannot but connect another remarkable passage,—perhaps the most remarkable, bearing upon this subject, in the volume,—which occurs in Mr. Maurice's explanation of our Lord's descending "into hell."

"I accept" [these words] "as news that there is no corner of God's universe over which His love has not brooded, none over which the Son of God and the Son of Man has not asserted His dominion. I claim a right to tell this news to every peasant and beggar of the land. I may bid him rejoice and give thanks, and sing merry songs to the God who made him, because *there is nothing created, which his Lord and Master has not redeemed,* of which He is not the King."—Page 162.

If this is true doctrine, not only the peasant and the beggar, but the cold-blooded murderer, the brutal ravisher, the most fiendish of slave-drivers, all the children of the devil on earth, and all the demons of hell, may "rejoice and sing merry songs" together. Hell may hold carnival on earth to the glory of the God of heaven. This does not seem to be the way in which our loving Saviour and His Apostles preached to sinners; nor from the general proclamation of such a gospel as this could we expect any thing but a fearful increase of reckless wickedness.

We cannot but feel, indeed, that the question of eternal punishment is a deep and awful mystery. There are few, if any, earnest Christians, combining thoughtfulness with sensibility, who have not felt this, even to agony. We are not of the number who could dismiss such a subject with cold logic, without a pang or a sigh. But we feel, too, that the present condition of mankind is surrounded by melancholy mysteries. There are depths on every side of us, so unfathomably profound, and yet disclosing so much of mournful meaning, that *mere* reason is appalled and staggers at their contemplation. To our thinking, however, the world, as Mr. Maurice sees it, contains as many of these mysteries and apparent contradictions as our own vision seems to discern. Nor does his view of the future, according to which light and darkness, good and evil, blessing and curse, are still to struggle on, possibly for ever, seem to us at all more free from difficulty than that which he rejects, while it certainly suggests unspeakably less of hope and comfort for the servants of God. Christians now look forward to a haven of eternal rest after the troubled and stormy voyage of life; but Mr. Maurice condemns them to the prospect of a never-ending liability to tempest, reef, and quicksand. The soldier of Christ has been accustomed to hope that, when this life is past, his campaigning in the open field, in the midst of snares, and in the presence of enemies, will be exchanged for a secure abode within the walls of the New Jerusalem, and in the presence of his God and King; but, according to the gospel which Mr. Maurice proclaims, he may find no end of his perils, and no limit to his conflicts. Our only wisdom, on such a subject as this,—one inconceivably too vast, comprehensive, and complicated, for our short-sighted and feeble-armed reason to master,—is to hear what God the Lord says unto us, in the profound conviction that the "Judge of all the earth will do right." *

But Mr. Maurice would bring the feelings and judgment of man to pronounce upon this matter. What the Scripture says, is with him a subordinate question. He avoids, however, all consideration, in any shape, of that which we have stated to be the fundamental point in controversy between himself and the orthodox,—whether the Divine Government is carried on with or without an external law, and the correspondent penalties and sanctions. His philosophy settles this matter for him, and therefore he will not allow it to be debated. Instead of fairly discussing it, he takes an easier and more convenient plan. He draws the most unfair caricatures of the views of "Evangelicals" on the subject

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* All this, too, is Behmenish.—"Hours with the Mystics," book viii., chap. 8.

of eternal punishment, and thus tries to settle the point by an *argumentum ad invidiam*. Some of the views he attributes to "Evangelicals" at large, may, perhaps, be held by some Supralapsarian Calvinists; but others are too extreme, even for them. We cull a few specimens from what might afford materials for a large anthology. The following, then, is represented as the doctrine of evangelical Christians:—

"'*Understand, sinners, whatever be your offences, whatever your temptations, the same irremediable anguish is prepared for you all.*'……With us there is only one dark abyss of torment and sin for all who, in the course of threescore years and ten, have not been brought to believe things which they could not believe, or have never learnt; who have not abstained from acts which they have been taught from their youth up to commit."—Page 444.

"Men are *not* regarded as *rejecting the counsel of God against themselves.* GOD IS REPRESENTED AS THE DESTROYER. Nay, divines go the length of asserting—even taking it for granted—that our Lord Himself taught this lesson, when He said, '*And I say unto you, my friends, Be not afraid of them which kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do; but I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: fear Him which, after He hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear Him. Are not five sparrows, &c.……Fear not therefore: ye are of more value than many sparrows.*' We are come to such a pass, as actually to suppose that Christ tells those whom He calls His friends, not to be afraid of the poor and feeble enemies who can only kill the body, but of that greater enemy who can destroy their very selves, and that this enemy is not the devil...but that God who cares for the sparrows!"—Page 469.

A precious specimen this, surely, of theological knowledge and candour, and critical acumen! Christ, as readers of this scripture have hitherto understood, teaches His disciples so to fear—and at the same time so to trust in—God, as to fear none else. But Mr. Maurice makes Him teach them to fear the devil, yea, to fear *him*,—not to resist him and triumph over him,—and to fear him as having power to kill and to cast into hell! In the next page, he represents the evangelical version of Christ's message to man as being,—

"'Your Father has created multitudes whom He means to perish for ever and ever. By My agony and bloody sweat, by My cross and passion, I have induced Him, in the case of an inconceivably small minority, to *forego that design.*'"—Page 470.

Alas! alas! that Mr. Maurice should have dared to write a calumny so false and fearful!

But, after all, the one question as to the point of everlasting punishment is, "What saith the Lord?" All antecedent presumptions must give way before His voice. Does Scripture, then, affirm, or not, the everlasting punishment of the finally impenitent?

On this question we do not need to enter into any discussion. Its decision does not rest upon any one text of Scripture merely; there are scores of texts which, in every variety of phrase, affirm, or imply, the endless punishment of the finally impenitent. If any of our readers lack full satisfaction on this subject, they may find it in Dr. Candlish's work. Mr. Maurice confines his attention to one text, (Matt. xxv. 46,) as if there were no other which seemed to teach the doctrine. He endeavours to get rid of the force of this passage by giving to the word *αἰώνιος*, "eternal," a sense exclusive of any idea of duration. He lays it down that, as applied to the nature of God, the word bears such a sense; and that it must bear the same sense, to whatever subject it may be applied. But it is manifestly impossible that the word should bear *that* sense, when applied either to the life of the righteous, or to the punishment of the wicked. It is vain, too, for Mr. Maurice, rejecting that sense of *αἰώνιος* which he admits to have been the ordinary one, to attempt to fix upon it a subtle and abstruse meaning, such as philosophers, schoolmen, and some divines have endeavoured, indeed, to conceive of, but which is quite beyond the reach of the plain people whom the Scriptures were mainly intended to bless; and has never, either in Greek, Latin, or English, been included in the obvious and usual meaning either of this word, or of its equivalents, *æternus* and *eternal*. Mr. Maurice's proof-text for the sense he gives, is John xvii. 3. It would be easy to show that his sense can scarcely be made to suit these words; while the ordinary sense gives a fully adequate meaning to the verse. The knowledge of the true God and of Jesus Christ *is* life, in the best and highest sense, the life of eternity,—a life, that is, which fills eternity. "This," we think, "is life eternal." We do not so "throw this idea into the future," as to "project it into a distant world." (Page 475.) On the contrary, we believe that this *is* life eternal,—"the earnest of our inheritance,"—and that even now the life of the Christian "is hid with Christ in God," and he drinks of that fountain, of the streams of which he is to drink for ever. And thus understanding the saying of our Lord, we do not feel as if we, in any degree, "shrivelled" or "contracted" its glorious sense. (Page 461.)*

We have now completed our task. The Preface to the Second Edition of these Essays contains matter both suggestive and offensive; but we have no space for any observations even on Mr. Maurice's characteristic and most extraordinary Note on the Creeds, and especially the Athanasian Creed. It appears, even these may be expounded so as to harmonize with his views!

We have shown the influence of Mr. Maurice's philosophy, or theosophy, upon his theology. We have traced his system to its first principles. We have proved that it is based upon true Platonism; but that some of its developments coincide rather with Neo-Platonism. The idea of a personal Trinity is one distinctively Christian; but Mr. Maurice has followed the Neo-Platonists in his method of adjusting this idea to Platonism. The system which results from this interpretation of Christianity by Platonism, we cannot regard as a Christian system.† The vital and characteristic doctrines of Christianity are metamorphosed and dislocated. They are bleached into the pale complexion of Platonism or Neo-Platonism; and their relations to each other, as well as to man, and God, and the Bible, are essentially altered. The odour of grace is exhaled; the blood of atonement is exhausted of all value or efficacy. According to Mr. Maurice, Moses teaches Platonism in the first chapters of Genesis, and implies the truth of this philosophy throughout. All Hebrew theology was, in effect, grounded upon it; Jesus of Nazareth and St. Paul, in their most wonderful sayings, teach nothing which is not virtually included in it. Thus, Christianity is but the supplement to that "wisdom" by which the Greek philosopher "searched," "found out," and "knew God;" and Plato becomes twin-prophet with Moses, and author of a philosophy which sustains on its foundation the later and more complete developments which were effected by the Prophet of Nazareth and His Apostles.

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* Mr. Maurice supposes the popular misapprehension (as he believes it to be) of the sense of the word *eternal* to be derived from Locke's philosophy; against which he writes strongly and strangely. Herein he follows Coleridge. ("Aids to Reflection," vol. i., p. 311.) His notions as to *eternity*, &c., we need hardly say, are Kanti-Coleridgean.

† See Note F, at the end of this chapter, on "Mr. Maurice's misleading Use of High-Church Phraseology."

Let the Christians of England be aware of this new, complex, and deadly heresy, which is little better than a modern Gnosticism of a refined character. At present, the morals of this system are pure; but it is as capable of being perverted to the worst immorality, as the most Antinomian Gnosticism of former times.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO CHAPTERS VIII. AND IX.

Note A, pp. 151, 172.—*Mr. Maurice's Idea of Satan, the Selfish Spirit or Principle of Evil.*

Is his Satan a mere personified principle? or is Mr. Maurice a Manichee? In the text, at pages 151 and 172, we have given what *seem* to be Mr. Maurice's views as to the nature and operation of the Evil Spirit, and what have, we believe, hitherto passed current as such among those who have studied his writings. Thus the writer of the article in the "National Review," (October, 1856,) to which we have already referred, says of Maurice, very strikingly, "Pushing the claims of a diabolical being far into the evil phenomena of our nature, and those of a Divine Being over the whole of the good, he thins away the space for the free human personality, till it becomes at times quite evanescent." We confess, however, that the more we examine and reflect, the more we are compelled to doubt whether he really believes at all in a personal Spirit of Evil. We know not how to avoid coming to the conclusion that his Evil Spirit is but the personification of that Self-Will in each man, which Mr. Maurice believes to be the common tempter of all.

1. For, first, the belief in an individual Satan is totally inconsistent with the essential principles of Mr. Maurice's philosophy. Erigena might as consistently have believed in an individual Spirit of Evil, as a thorough-going Neo-Platonic Realist like Mr. Maurice. Coleridge discarded any such belief, and so, to be consistent, ought Mr. Maurice to do. His theory is that all intelligence and personality must ever emanate from, and depend upon, the personal Reason, the Word and Son of God, and that in Him all creatures have ever subsisted. Now, the Spirit of Selfishness, according to his definition and description, must be essentially and only evil. As such, how can his intelligence and personality emanate from the Son of God? How can there be a vital connexion still and ever maintained between him, as a creature, and the Word in Whom he essentially subsists? Is Christ also *his* Righteousness? is he, too, regenerate in Him? May *he* "*take up his rights* AS A SPIRITUAL BEING?" (*Supra*, p. 190.) Do the words quoted at p. 196 apply to him? They must do if he is a creature, if he is an individual intelligence; for they declare that "there is nothing created, which the Lord and Master has not redeemed."

2. It follows that if Mr. Maurice believes at all in a personal Satan, a fallen Spirit of Evil, he cannot mean a being altogether evil; Christ must be even *his* Righteousness and Redeemer. But no language could assert more strongly or unambiguously than Mr. Maurice's the unmixedly and essentially evil nature of the Spirit of Evil, as a "Spirit directly and absolutely opposed to the Father of Light, to the God of absolute goodness and love," as "the Spirit of selfishness," and "*the* enemy of man." ("Essays," pp. 44–46.) What other conclusion, then, can we come to, but that in such language as this he simply means to isolate and personify individual selfishness as the principle of all sin and the universal besetment of mankind?

3. We have been exceedingly reluctant to come to this conclusion, but the more we consider the matter, the more inevitable it appears to us. We were very loth to think that a writer with candour and honesty perpetually

on his lips, and who resents so passionately whatever appears like an imputation on his perfect integrity and transparency, could have been so grossly disingenuous as he has been, if our conclusion is correct. How far it is confirmed by the following extracts, in addition to those given in the text, let the reader judge. That some of the expressions to be quoted are utterly uncandid and misleading, if Mr. Maurice really holds the view we are attributing to him, we are sorrowfully aware. But yet the total impression left upon us by the repeated perusal of the passages coincides with the conclusion we have indicated.

"A person who has lived with Christ, and been a minister and apostle of Christ, and yet sinks into a separate self-existence, answers to the Scripture definition and idea of a devil."—*Gospel of St. John*, p. 204.

"Baptism implies the acknowledgment of an evil spiritual agent...... Baptism asserts for each man that he is taken into union with a Divine Person, and by virtue of that union is emancipated from his evil *Nature.* There is a society for mankind which is constituted and held together in that person, and he who enters this society is emancipated from the *World,* the society which is bound together in the acknowledgment of, and subjection to, the evil selfish tendencies of each man's nature......Has not the experience of mankind proved it to be impossible to contemplate the antagonist forms of evil, without ascending to the belief of an evil which has impregnated those forms, and which can exist apart from them?......We cannot deny the facts of misery and evil which thrust themselves upon our notice. We feel that we must refer them to a cause. But not daring to look steadily at the idea of an evil *will,* and to contemplate it in the light of a perfectly pure and holy will, we fancy that the powers which are exerted for an evil end are evil......The imagination has revenged itself for the denial of an evil Spirit, by turning all the forms of Society and of nature into evil. ......Men have a common friend and a common enemy; but the enemy has been vanquished, has been declared to have no right or property in any human creature, in any one corner of the universe; his power is conferred by our faithlessness; it is only by making a lie that we come under the dominion of the father of lies. Yet men *may* be making lies......Every one, therefore, has a devil to fight with, as well as a world and a flesh."—*Kingdom of Christ*, vol. i., pp. 417–420.

"Whence came this mind in them, this will, this spirit? Jesus tells them plainly. 'There is a mind, a will, a spirit, which from the beginning has been a man-slayer, has compassed the destruction of the man in each man. There is a mind, a will, a spirit, who has been from the beginning a liar, who would not stand in the truth.'"

"I know well—we all know—what use has been made, and is made, and will be made, of this expression, 'from the beginning.' 'Lo, then,' the objector exclaims, 'there is a second god, another creator, coming into existence with the good God.' If this is not Manichæism, what is? The answer is simply an appeal to the words as they appear on the face of the book. '*He stood not in the truth.*' There was, then, a truth to stand in; there was a truth to revolt from. The name 'murderer' implies a life to be taken away; the name 'liar' implies a contradiction of that which is. Yes, it implies that the evil spirit is this, and *only* this; it implies that the murderer is the author of no life; it implies that the liar has called nothing that *is* into existence. You ask, 'What is Manichæism *but* this?' I answer, 'It is exactly the reverse of this. It affirms that the evil power *does* produce some life; that some part of creation may be ascribed to him; and those who shrink from speaking of '*him*'—those who will not admit a devil at all—do, unawares, let this Manichæism continually into their thoughts, into their acts, into their words. They may talk of universal benevolence, but facts are too strong for them. They meet evil everywhere; they meet it in themselves. They do not like to say, 'It is an evil will to which I am yielding up my will. Because men are obeying this evil will, therefore there is misery and ugliness in this blessed and beautiful world.' ......There has been from the beginning of man's existence on this earth, and there still is, a murderer, who is seeking to sever him from his proper life: there has been from the beginning of man's existence upon earth, and there still is, a liar, who is seeking to persuade men that God is not all good; that He is not all true; that He is not the Father of their spirits; that it is not His will that they should know Him and be like Him. This liar has been listened to, and is listened to; and men may become so penetrated with his false and mendacious spirit, that they shall become in very deed his children, entirely fashioned into his likeness, understanding no lessons but his."—*Gospel of St. John*, pp. 252–254.

This last extract is a sad jumble. Its constituent parts are by no means all of them consistent either with each other, or with what Mr. Maurice teaches elsewhere. In particular, the phrase, "from the beginning," is distinctly taken in one sense at the beginning of the extract, and in another at the close. Mr. Maurice probably means the former to be understood as its strict sense; the latter as a convenient accommodation. Moreover, it is manifestly inconsistent for Mr. Maurice to speak of the "liar from the beginning," who *never* stood in the truth, as if he might "revolt from the truth." This is just an orthodox phrase thrown in, as so very many are in Mr. Maurice's writings, apparently for no other reason but to balk the too critical reader who, in tracking his meaning through his labyrinths of words, might be running too keenly on the true scent. But, notwithstanding these confusions, there is one dominant strain of statement in the extract, which can only admit of one of two explanations. He admits, in effect, that the evil spirit of which he speaks has existed "from the beginning," in the most absolute sense; so that had he been a creator, had sin and evil been anything positive, Mr. Maurice's faith could not be distinguished from Manichæism. He does not pretend that his Satan is a creature, a fallen angel, a perverted spirit; and it is evident that he conceives of the evil spirit of which he speaks as only and essentially evil. Spite, therefore, of all the very flimsy sophistry by which he tries to fend off such a conclusion, we cannot but say, that if this *his* Spirit of Evil, this "liar" and "murderer," and father of lies and murderers, is really an individual and personal intelligence, Mr. Maurice is what we have intimated, in a note to the text, (p. 176,) that his theory, fully and consistently carried out, would imply him to be,—no other than a nineteenth-century Manichee. Could there ever be trifling more puerile than to say, that provided we do not hold sin and evil, metaphysically defined, to be something positive, and provided we do not believe that Ahriman, the Spirit of Evil, created positively evil and malignant entities, we may believe in the existence, "from the beginning," of an uncreated malignant Spirit of Evil, the father of selfishness and misery, of lies and all cruelties, the great antagonist of God and good, the common enemy of earth and heaven, without being liable to the imputation of Manichæism?

But if Mr. Maurice repudiates, as he no doubt honestly would, the imputation of believing in an uncreated personal Spirit of Evil, the only remaining interpretation to be put on this whole passage is that other which we have already suggested. It refers, we must then conclude, to the personified principle of Self and Self-seeking, which, as one and alike in all men, and as necessarily awaking, sooner or later, within every intelligent creature, as a consequence of his personality, to tempt him, with more or less force, to live to himself and not to his Heavenly Father, to live to himself and not for his fellow-creatures, is insulated and bodied forth as the common tempter of mankind, and is thus conceived to have tempted, but to have been vanquished by, the Blessed Lord Himself. The use of the personal pronouns *who* and *he*, in reference to such a personified principle, especially in the promiscuous way in which Mr. Maurice has used them, is, indeed, harsh and misleading. But we presume that Mr. Maurice would have a quibble ready, if charged with improper and deceptive phraseology in regard to this point, and would allege that this principle or spirit, yielded to, *becomes* the man himself, passes into his own personality, and becomes identified with his individuality, and that then the personal terms which apply to the man, may be applied to the spirit which possesses him. For our parts, however, we denounce all such word-play as dishonest and false, and as claiming no remote kinship with the "father of lies" himself.

On the whole, we think that the view now indicated is the one which best explains Mr. Maurice's usual language on this point, and is most consistent with his whole scheme. Sure we are, that there is no alternative between his holding such a view, and being, in the sense already explained, virtually and substantially a Manichee.

Since the former part of this note was written, *i.e.*, since the first edition of this volume was published, Mr. Maurice has written somewhat at large, and with much seeming explicitness, on the subject of the Evil Spirit, and in particular has made some remarks which might seem to throw a new light on his view of the passages with which he deals in the extract last given from his work on the Gospel of St. John. In his twelfth lecture on the *Epistles of St. John*, the text being 1 John iii. 7–11, he tells us that in his early youth he did not believe that "one who sins, or goes astray from God, does so by listening to the voice of a spirit who accuses or slanders God;" that such a notion he considered, as he had been taught to consider it, a vulgar fable; but that now he does believe in the existence of an Evil Spirit, of "a common enemy plotting against us all, making use of every man's peculiar gift, or characteristic, which is meant for his blessing, to work his ruin, accusing our Father in heaven to us all, accusing every brother to another; persuading each of us that he is not a child of God, that he does not belong to a family of brothers."

He further speaks of "the Son of Man as the justifier of each of us from the torments of his own conscience," whatever that particular and studied form of words may mean, and of "the Evil Spirit as ever seeking to darken and disturb our consciences."

Now, nothing surely can seem to a plain man more explicit and decisive than this language, and on first reading it we felt staggered in our previous judgment. On careful consideration, however, reviewing again the whole subject, comparing what is here said with such passages as have been quoted in the former part of this note, and with the whole analogy of Maurice's doctrine, regarding too the particular turn of the phrases employed, we have been compelled to fall back upon the same conclusion at which we had previously arrived, as expressed in the last paragraph but one of the original note. This conclusion is further strengthened by a comparison of some of the language used in subsequent Lectures of the volume from which we have last quoted. Let our readers consider how far a writer can go in personifying dispositions and principles, who can pen the passages following:—

"Whatever form a lie happens to take, the lie itself is spiritual and not material, *the product of a bad spirit*, and to be denounced in that character." —*Epistles of St. John*, p. 224.

"The world has its own *spirit* too, or rather a legion of spirits, which fulfil its commands and take possession of its servants. All *those tempers* which lead men to worship what they see, or to worship themselves, or to pursue some vision of selfish glory and happiness, *are such spirits;* mighty over our feeble wills, but not so mighty as the Spirit of God," &c.—*Epistles of St. John*, p. 228.

With which may be compared the following passage from another of Mr. Maurice's works:—

"The more one considers that those lies which connect themselves with the name of God are the most inward, essential, radical, of all lies, that they are those which enter into the spirit of a man, and corrupt and destroy him, and that all outward lies of act and word are their progeny; the more one is compelled to talk of a spirit of lies, to talk of it as penetrating the habits and temper of an age, as coming forth in innumerable forms, but as concentrated in the religious impostors, in those who abuse spiritual influences and terrors to fleshly and earthly purposes. The Spirit with which Christ was anointed is given to men to deliver them from the spirit of lies, to cast *him* out," &c.—*Lectures on Ecclesiastical History*, p. 303.

Unless we are greatly mistaken—by the Evil Spirit, the spirit of selfishness or evil, viewed specifically as "Diabolos the accuser," as "the devil who accuses God to man, man to God, and man to man," (*Epistles of St. John*, pp. 185, 186, 190, 191,) Mr. Maurice, if he were precisely to define his meaning, would have us to understand the disposition which leads or tempts any man to deny or doubt of either his own interest or that of any other man in the love of God, either his own relation or that of any other man to Christ the Word, the Original and the Saviour of mankind. This is his esoteric meaning.

Mr. Maurice is very indignant, in the preface to his "Mediæval Philosophy," with those who charge him with using words in an ambiguous sense; yet in the immediate context he, in effect, admits that this is his practice.

"We are commanded, under the penalty of being called dishonest traffickers with words, palterers with them in a double sense, to take them at exactly their market value, though one is not informed at what *bourse* that value is settled, or which of the varying reports that every sect and school puts forth about it, we are to assume as the authentic one."

Assuredly, an honest writer will either "take" and circulate "words at their market value," or he will by some specific information, or by the unmistakeable requirements of his context, let it be clearly understood what peculiar meaning he puts upon them. Our complaint is that Mr. Maurice does neither the one nor the other. Very softly indeed did the late accomplished author of "Hours with the Mystics" express himself, in his review of the "Mediæval Philosophy;" had he studied Mr. Maurice's writings more closely and thoroughly, he would have used stronger language; when he said, "Mr. Maurice's mind is remarkable for a peculiar kind of subtilty, which, at first sight, or to an unfriendly critic, looks very like sophistry. He is disposed to presume, at the first glance, that the common acceptation of a word is more likely to be the wrong one than the right. To rescue us from the tyranny of a one-sided use of any particular term, he will invest it with a sense quite different; apparently opposed, perhaps. This procedure puzzles people; it throws an air of paradox and uncertainty over what he says. The reader is not sure of the meaning the author attaches to words that look, on the page, plain and simple enough."—*R. A. Vaughan's Remains*, vol. ii., p. 349.

In this note, a sense of what is due to truth has compelled us to probe searchingly and to condemn sternly; yet, we are not disposed to say that Mr. Maurice ought to be visited with punishment so severe as that which he has himself adjudged against transgressors of the class to which he belongs. Strange must be the power of self-delusion which could embolden such a writer as Mr. Maurice to say, "I hold cheating with words to be in all respects more wicked as well as more mischievous than cheating with cards. ......It is to abuse the holiest and divinest instrument, to make the whole commerce of life suspicious, to lead the most earnest men to despair of attaining the only object which is worth living for. If the man who cheats with cards is banished from the fellowship of his own class, ought not the other to be excommunicated by all good men?" How strange again, that the man who could write these words, should in the very next words add, "But to be *accused* of cheating with words is a very different thing; for that we ought all of us to be prepared!" Does Mr. Maurice really consider what he writes? If the last words are true, if all good men are to expect to be accused of cheating with words, if to be so accused is rather a presumption of a man's goodness, then who is to carry into effect the excommunication of which he spoke before? But is it a fact that the best and most honest men are those most accused of cheating with words? We have not found it so. But, of a truth, Mr. Maurice is so accused, and commonly.

Note B, pp. 152, 193.—*Mr. Maurice's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit.*

MR. MAURICE's Essay on this subject is in the highest degree vague, and more can scarcely be said in reference to it than is said in the text at pp. 152 and 193. Nor is it easy from all his writings put together to collect much upon this subject that is definite. The following extracts from the "Kingdom of Christ" are less diffuse and more explicit than any other passages of which we have taken account.

"We believe that the Spirit of God is the awakener, the only awakener, of the spirit in man: that the will and reason not called forth by Him must remain for ever the torpid, helpless victims of nature and sense. We believe that unless the Spirit of God give these powers their direction, they will only minister to that which they are meant to rule, only rivet the bondage which it is their privilege to break. We believe that whoever, in past ages, either in heathen or Jewish lands, used them aright, was taught and enabled so to use them, and, in proportion as he used them aright, confessed the inspiration. We believe that it is our privilege to exercise them, as they could not be exercised by Heathens, or even by Jews, because it is our privilege to know that there is a living Person actuating and governing them; and to know what manner of person He is, of whom He is the Spirit, from whom He proceeds, with whom He dwells......We believe that we must attribute every act of our minds, every exercise of our affections, every energy of our will, to this Spirit: if the purpose to which we direct them be wrong, still the gift and power are His, that purpose only ours; if it be right, we shall own that of it also He is the author. We believe again that every operation in nature, the growth of every tree, the budding of every flower, should be referred to the influence of Him who first moved [upon] the face of the waters: but we do not call this a spiritual influence, because, though wrought by a spiritual Being, it is wrought upon unspiritual subjects, upon things, and not upon persons."—*Kingdom of Christ*, vol. ii., pp. 37, 38.

Mr. Maurice draws a strong contrast between the prophetic spirit of the Old Testament and that abiding inspiration of men which is, in his view, the characteristic promise and privilege of the Christian dispensation, "the dispensation of the Spirit." With this reference he says, "But *the deeper, the diviner faculty, is the more universal; this belongs to me as a man; this is the privilege of my race:* the other is specially imparted to me for wise and gracious purposes; distinguishing me from my fellows; to be received as an awful trust; to be used for their benefit."—*Ibid.*, vol. ii., pp. 175, 176.

"Whatever system, then, teaches that a Minister is NOT *publicly, and openly, and once for all* endowed with certain powers and faculties for his work, these powers being sustained within him by the constant presence of Him who bestows them; whatever system conveys the notion, that the Minister, being such by virtue of his inward call, is either then invested with the requisite gifts, or receives them afterwards, from time to time, by sudden movements and inspirations, we affirm is essentially an Old Testament system."—*Ibid.*, pp. 178, 179.

The last citation might be from a Popish ecclesiastic. It is strange that Mr. Maurice cannot write consistently and candidly. He does not, of course, and cannot, believe that the mere service of ordination or consecration confers anything upon a man which he had not before, except church-authority. Such a belief would be glaringly inconsistent with the whole strain of his philosophy and theology, and with the known opinions of all his school. But, in trying to write as a thorough-going and, as far as possible, orthodox Anglican Churchman, he is perpetually using phrases which, from him, are altogether misleading, and which are repugnant to all the context of his disquisitions. What Mr. Maurice does mean is to deny that an inward call and special qualifications are necessary for a Minister of the New Testament. Such—as this and as the preceding extracts show—is his doctrine of the Holy Ghost. A few pages farther on he refers to the fact that the Quakers have very commonly given up the doctrine of the Personality of the Holy Ghost, and attributes it to their holding the necessity of a special inward call to teach and preach. But is he really so hood-winked as not to perceive that the reason of this fact is not found in anything in which the Quakers differ from himself, but in that common tenet in which he and they agree? The doctrine of the indwelling living Word takes the place of the doctrine of the indwelling Spirit. The Spirit is left without any special office or relation to the great new life of Christianity, and to the operations of that dispensation which is called after His own name.

Note C, p. 183.—*Mr. Maurice's Misrepresentations of the Doctrine of Atonement.*

MR. MAURICE himself at times finds that, in order to make his own theory level to the acceptance of ordinary men, it must be placed before them in the form of a doctrine of substitution or imputation.

"We are very apt," he says, "to think thus: 'We belong to a guilty race. God looks upon us all as sinners. But perchance I may get Him to treat me differently; I may procure a separate pardon.' No! that will not do. There is selfishness, there is separation from thy brother, there is the very essence of sin in that thought. . . You are not looked upon as a sinful race; you are looked upon as a race of which Christ, the Son of God, is the Head. *When He offered Himself to God, He took away the sin of the world.* We have no right to consider ourselves sinners, seeing we are united in Him."—*Epistles of St. John*, p. 110.

Now what is this but a doctrine of imputation? If it is not, the distinction is far too fine and nice for the plain working man, to whom these words of Mr. Maurice's were spoken, to be able to appreciate it. What twisting of words and what subtlety of thought must it cost the writer to find a sense for the words which we have printed in italics, and their immediate context, which shall exclude the idea of substitution or imputation! According to the fair and proper sense of the quotation, it makes Mr. Maurice's universalism, no less than the evangelical doctrine of redemption, to rest upon the foundation of a mediatorial substitution. Yet he sneers at the evangelical doctrine as grounded upon a supposed fiction, as representing God to look upon men as other than they really are. He indeed will say that, according to his theology, men are of and in Christ *by nature.* Be it so; yet are they not sinners in and of themselves? Are not their sins real, and is not their guilt real? If so, then it still comes to the same thing. Their personal guilt is lost sight of, their "sin is taken away," they are forgiven and renewed, for the sake of Him with whom they are one. His righteousness is imputed to them.

But, for a positive and articulate defence of the evangelical doctrine of atonement against such objections as those contained in the quotation from Mr. Maurice, the reader is referred to the fifteenth chapter of this volume.

In reference to that customary misrepresentation of the orthodox doctrine of atonement, of which we have spoken in the text, (p. 182,) as a "gross libel," let us here quote a pertinent paragraph from Mr. Macdonnell's able and valuable volume, the "Donnellan Lecture" for 1858.

"If you examine his (Mr. Maurice's) book on the 'Doctrine of Sacrifice,' and his other writings on the same subject, especially his Theological Essays, (Essay VII., on the Atonement,) you will find that he continually puts forward two points as those most requisite to be dwelt upon at the present day, and insists upon them with the air of an original discoverer. The first of these is, that the incarnation and death of Christ originated in the Father's will and love, and were not (according to what he calls the '*heathen notion*') a mode of changing the Father's will. It is hard at first to see the necessity for insisting so warmly on this; for it would be difficult to find any respectable writer on the Atonement who taught otherwise, or was not as ready as he is to echo the words of Scripture, that it was 'God' who 'so loved the world that *He gave* His only begotten Son;' that it was God who 'sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins;' and that 'we love

Him *because He first loved us.*' We may say in the words of Magee, [the great theologian, whom Mr. Maurice specially singles out for reprobation, (Essays, pp. 148–9,)] 'The sacrifice was never deemed by any one who did not wish to calumniate the doctrine of the atonement, to have *made* God placable; but merely viewed as the *means* appointed by Divine wisdom, through which to bestow forgiveness; and agreeably to this, do we not find this sacrifice everywhere spoken of as ordained by God Himself?'

"Another point insisted on by Maurice is, that God does not 'delight' in suffering, or take pleasure in the death of Christ. But, surely, if others dwell less on this, and assert it less warmly, it is only because they do not dream of it being questioned, or think it necessary to prove what seems almost self-evident."—*Donnellan Lecture*, 1858, pp. 92, 93.

Mr. Macdonnell also quotes a sentence from *Greyson's Correspondence*, which we must be permitted likewise to quote.

"Now for your fancy sketch. You say, that according to the 'current' notions of Christians, 'God is represented, in moody inexorable wrath, as *averse* to save man till, Moloch-like, He was unjustly propitiated by innocent blood; till Christ's sufferings wrung from Him a sullen and ungracious pardon.' Who can believe this, you ask? Who, indeed! *I* cannot, for one; but then I know of no one else who does."—*Greyson's Correspondence*, vol. i., p. 296.

Let us add here, in reference to the latter part of the paragraph in the text to which this note relates, that, on the subjects both of the Atonement and the Judgment, Mr. Maurice's old friend and *quondam* fellow-collegian at Cambridge, and colleague in office as one of the Professors at King's College, London,—we refer to Dean Trench,—has lately published beautiful and powerful sermons ("Five Sermons Preached at Cambridge"). *These* at least give no uncertain sound; and after these surely Mr. Maurice will desist from such rancorous caricatures of evangelical theology as he has been accustomed to indulge in. If he has no respect to others,—or if he has hitherto been really ignorant about the whole matter,—surely he must feel bound at any rate to read and to respect Dean Trench.

Note D, pp. 192, 193.—*The World, the Church, and the Sacraments.*

According to Mr. Maurice, the Church is human society conceived as essentially constituted in Christ, its Root and Head, and as impregnated with His life; the World is human society, viewed merely in its relations to time and sense, and conceived as an embodiment of selfishness in respect to its self-organization and to its generally accepted habits and maxims. The Church and the World consist numerically of the same *persons;* the distinction between them is one of *principles.* Every man is a member of the Church, because he cannot but be a member of Christ; but he is also of the world, so far as he yields to the rule of selfishness. If any number of men, believing themselves to be true Christians, unite together, call themselves "a church," and refuse to consider each and all of their fellows as belonging equally to Christ's Church, these men thus uniting to the exclusion of others, are acting out the selfish, separatist, proud, spirit of the world, and their (so-called) Church is a "world-church." The flock of which the Lord Jesus is the Shepherd is all mankind. All men "hear His voice, and He knows them, and they follow Him." For, explains Mr. Maurice, and repeats his explanation, "I say, this sheep is the 'true man in us.'" (Gospel of

St. John. Discourse xix. "The Shepherd and the Sheep.") Baptism and the Eucharist are the symbols of this universal society. The former shows forth that in Him we are washed and holy, "created, redeemed, and justified." The Eucharist declares that He is everywhere present with each of us, or more strictly, we with Him, in His entire Power and Person, that we, in realizing His presence, become spiritually partakers of His flesh and blood, *i.e.*, of His Divine-human life. The analogy between this and the Popish theory is very obvious; and it is easy to see how the Neo-Platonist may simulate the phraseology of the Tractarian school. Yet the fundamental principles and real meaning of the two theories are "wide as the poles asunder."

This universal Church, in its process of evolution and self-manifestation, grew out of the national church-life of Judaism, and expanded into the various national church-lives of Christendom. Its constitution was declared in the Incarnation, when the Root of Humanity came forth into human life as also the Head and Regenerator of the race. It has since then continued to manifest itself, in its manifold unity, wherever the idea of Christianity and its sacramental institutions have been preserved. The only Church, however, which, by remaining truly national, has remained in the purest and fullest sense Christian, is that of England. This alone requires the utterance of no Shibboleth, excludes no man from its pale, recognises fully the holiness and supremacy of law, and the distinctness and sanctity of national life, and yet knows no spiritual head but Christ, nor any spiritual life but what is derived directly from the Spirit of Christ.

It would be easy, but tedious, to unravel this ingenious web of sophistry, and to refute its positions in detail. But the simple exposition will be quite equivalent to a refutation with most of our readers. We wish to show *what* Maurice's scheme of doctrine really is, and then we have no fear of its doing any great amount of mischief. We proceed, therefore, to adduce a few extracts which may serve to establish and illustrate the foregoing statement.

"While this universal society, according to the historical conception of it, grew out of the Jewish family and nation, it is, according to the theological conception of it, the root of both. 'That,' says Aristotle, 'which is first as cause is last in discovery.' And this beautiful formula is translated into life and reality in the letter to the Ephesians, when St. Paul tells them that they were created in Christ before all worlds, and when he speaks of the transcendent economy as being gradually revealed to the Apostles and Prophets by the Spirit."—*Kingdom of Christ*, vol. i., p. 372.

"There are two possible forms of a universal society, one of which is destructive of the family and national principle, the other the expansion of them. The first of these is that which in Scripture is called THIS WORLD; the latter is that which in Scripture is called THE CHURCH."—*Ibid.*, p. 379.

"There must be a heavenly, spiritual, real Kingdom, against which all evil men, just in so far forth as they are evil, are rebelling; and into subjection to which all converted men, in so far forth as they are converted, are brought."—*Ibid.*, p. 406.

"The world contains the elements of which the Church is composed. In the Church, these elements are penetrated by a uniting, reconciling, power. The Church is, therefore, human society in its normal state; the World that same society irregular and abnormal. The world is the Church without God; the Church is the world restored to its relation with God, taken back by Him into the state for which He created it."—*Essays, &c.*, pp. 403, 404.

Baptism is a witness for "Jews, Pagans, and Turks. 'There is a fellowship for you as well as us. We have no rights which you have not.' But it must mean more than this. It must mean, 'The Kingdom is in you as in us. You, too, are members of Christ, children of God.'"—*Kingdom of Christ*, vol i., p. 411.

"As to the effect of Baptism: I have contended that Baptism affirms a man to be in a certain state, and affirms the presence of a Spirit with him, who is able and willing to uphold him in that state, and to bring his life into accordance with it."—*Ibid.*, p. 424.

"It is supposed that the man acquires something for himself in the instant of Baptism, that he is endowed with heavenly virtues, that he is, in himself, separately considered, a new creature. By this opinion the Romanist supposes that he exalts Baptism. He seems to me utterly to degrade it and rob it of its meaning. He turns a *sacrament* into an *event*. He supposes the redemption of Christ to be exhausted by a certain gift, while the Bible represents it as bringing men into an eternal and indissoluble fellowship."—*Kingdom of Christ*, p. 428.

For a view of Mr. Maurice's theory, as it relates to the Eucharist, to National Churches, and especially to the English Church, we must refer to his "Kingdom of Christ," vol. ii.

Note E, p. 193.—*In Illustration of Mr. Maurice's Views as to Inspiration, and the Office of the Bible.*

In a little volume on "The Worship of God," &c., from which we have already quoted, (see p. 170,) Mr. Maurice has a sermon on the Bible. It is the final sermon in the volume. In it occurs the following extraordinary passage,—

"Yes, Brethren, that is the message which the Bible has brought to men in the past ages; which it brings to them now. Sometimes when a poor and ignorant man opens it at home or hears it read in Church, he says to himself, 'How am I to understand that? What a large book it is! What a number of people it speaks of, about whom I know very little, and shall never have time to learn much! Then what disputes about the sense of it!... ...With what part am I to begin? Where am I to end?' What I answer the poor man is, The Bible begins with the living God, and ends with the living God. The Bible is to tell thee that God knows thee, cares for thee, seeks after thee; that thou mayest seek God, come to God, know God. Because the Bible has told poor men this, therefore they have clung to it; its words have entered their hearts, have brought light to their hearts. It speaks not of dead letters, but of a living Person; of what He is, of what He does. There is its strength, there is its charm. And so it gets a thousand interpreters for itself. It is written about families. Every one who tries to be faithful in his family, gets an interpretation of the Bible. It is written about nations. Every one who tries to be a good citizen, a good soldier, a good tradesman, a good mechanic, gets an interpretation. And in its turn the Bible interprets all that goes on in the family and the nation, all the greatest events and the commonest events. Poverty and the Bible, sickness and the Bible, sin and the Bible, death and the Bible, interpret each other. For Christ bore our poverty, our sickness, our death, our sins......The Bible is a book of Life. Learning about words and letters may be a great help to life, but it can never set aside, or take the place of, God's discipline of life. Therefore, I say, ask the Bible to tell you about the Beginning and End of

Worship; and it will tell you one and all; whatever portion of it you may read; though you may only be able to snatch up a few texts here and there. For in very deed you are not asking the Bible to teach you this; you are asking the Everlasting God. The Bible conains this promise, *They shall be all taught of God……They shall all know me, from the least to the greatest* ……Do you think there is any better thing for us than to know God? Do you think He cannot make all know Him? Be sure it is we who are not minded to keep Him in our knowledge."—*Sermons on Worship*, pp. 145–148.

We have made free to abridge this extract; for to transcribe all the needless words which Mr. Maurice employs in that profluent and redundant style of over-simple talk, which (of late years more than formerly) he affects in preaching to the common people, would be a most tedious penance. But we have left Mr. Maurice's own words and his full sense. We have omitted nothing that might have served to qualify or complete the sentiments above expressed. And now we may fairly ask, What is the outcome of all this jargon? Surely, the only lessons which it can be intended to convey are the following:—

The use of the Bible is merely to testify, in general, that there is a living God, our Creator and Governor; Who has instituted families and nations; Who sent into this world Christ, His Son, to bear our nature, to feel our sorrows, and to pass through the like worldly conditions with ourselves; Who cares for men in all circumstances of life: and to teach men to go to God, at all times, as their living Friend and Father. Having done this, the Bible has done all; and, whether a man understands its teaching further than this, is a matter of no great account. The Bible has led him to God, and now he can do without the Bible. He has a source of wisdom higher and more direct than "dead letters." He needs not to pore over or discuss texts. If, in reading them, he mistakes or cannot make out their meaning, this is of small importance. God is his teacher; life and experience furnish him with a lesson-book. The plain man is taught now as inspired men were taught of old; taught about the same things, and taught in the same way.

Note F, p. 200.—*Mr. Maurice's misleading Use of High-Church Phraseology.*

We have already, in Note D, referred to one instance of this, as regards the efficacy of ordination and consecration. But it is especially conspicuous in his language relating to Baptism. The explicit quotations given at the close of the last Note demonstrate the radical incompatibility of his views with those of High-Churchmen on this point. Yet not only in the Essay on Regeneration, (see p. 190 of this volume,) but repeatedly elsewhere, especially in his "Kingdom of Christ," he speaks as if he were, on this point, an "orthodox High-Churchman." He, in effect, declares his belief in the doctrine of "Baptismal Regeneration;" (vol. i., p. 405;) he admits the truth of the Dissenters' charge, that "the idea of Baptismal Regeneration is the idea of our liturgy." (Vol. ii., p. 459.) Yet, in reality, he only believes baptism to be *declaratory* of the essential and indefeasible union of all men with Christ, and in Him with His Father and theirs. (See "Kingdom of Christ," vol. i., p. 383.) To believe men to be really born again in baptism, would be to contradict all his scheme, "to turn," we quote his own words, "a *sacrament* into an *event*."

Similarly to affirm or imply, as he does repeatedly, that men are adopted into Christ in baptism, (*ibid.*, vol. i., pp. 381–412,) is to use inexcusably misleading language. Children by creation in Christ who have never been disinherited or even separated from their Father, cannot be said to be *adopted* at any time or in any ordinance.

On the same principle of accommodation which leads Mr. Maurice to use such phraseology as this, he invariably styles the Ministers of his Church *Priests.* As such he maintains that they celebrate and show forth in the Eucharist a real sacrifice: but the simple question is, Do they offer a sacrifice, and offer it in behalf of others? To which question Mr. Maurice can only answer, *No.* So he *affirms* that they have a real absolving power; but when he explains himself, all he means turns out to be that, in their ministerial capacity, they make a representative declaration, as if in Christ's name, of His unfailing and perpetual willingness to pardon and absolve all that come to Him. As if each Christian had not the power and right to say as much to his fellows. Mr. Maurice's Priests are Priests who offer no sacrifice, and possess no power to mediate on behalf of their fellow-men, but simply teach, exhort, and encourage, by formula and in "symbol."—*Kingdom of Christ,* vol. ii., pp. 190–220.

CHAPTER X.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF KINGSLEY'S GENIUS AND WRITINGS.*

BRITAIN has, at the present day, no more remarkable writer than CHARLES KINGSLEY; and there are few who have more powerfully influenced the temper and opinions of the times, both for good and for evil. His profession, as every body knows, is that of an Anglican Clergyman; but his performances are far more various than would be expected from such a fact; and his powers are as versatile and distinguished as his per-

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*1. *The Saint's Tragedy.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUN., Rector of Eversley. With a Preface by PROFESSOR MAURICE. Second Edition. London: J. W. Parker and Son. 1851.

2. *Yeast: A Problem.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUN. Fourth Edition. Parker. 1859.

3. *Alton Locke: Tailor and Poet. An Autobiography.* By the REV. CHARLES KINGSLEY. Chapman and Hall. 1856.

4. *Hypatia: or, New Foes with an Old Face.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUN. Third Edition. Parker. 1858.

5. *Westward Ho.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. One Vol. Third Edition. Cambridge: Macmillan. 1857.

6. *Phaethon: or, Loose Thoughts for Loose Thinkers.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. Third Edition. Macmillan. 1859.

7. *Glaucus: or, The Wonders of the Shore.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. Third Edition. Macmillan. 1858.

8. *Alexandria and her Schools. Being Four Lectures delivered at the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh. With a Preface.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. Macmillan. 1854.

9. *Twenty-Five Village Sermons.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, JUN., Rector of Eversley, Hants, and Canon of Middleham, Yorkshire. Fifth Edition. Parker. 1858.

10. *Sermons on National Subjects, preached in a Village Church.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. London: Griffin and Co. 1852.

11. *Sermons on National Subjects.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. Second Series. Griffin. 1854.

12. *Sermons for the Times.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY, &c. Second Edition. Parker. 1858.

13. *Fraser's Magazine for September*, 1856. *Article on Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics.* By C. K.

14. *Andromeda and other Poems.* By CHARLES KINGSLEY. Second Edition. Parker. 1858.

formances are various. He seems to have begun his career of avowed authorship as a dramatic poet; he has subsequently appeared as a novelist, naturalist, preacher, and lecturer on philosophy. In all these departments he has shown himself to possess no ordinary gifts. His poetry is often exquisite; his pathos as a novelist is at once manly and most deeply moving, while his dramatic power is great. As a naturalist, for truth, beauty, and vividness of minute description, he is equal to the late Hugh Miller, and far superior in the free and affluent eloquence which revels in rich discourse upon the aspects and relations of the present scene or subject. He is one of the plainest, most practical, and most powerful of preachers,—allowances being made for what we consider the grave errors of his theology; and few men can excel him as a popular expositor and historian of philosophy. In his philosophical and theological views he seems perfectly to accord with his friend Maurice, who is, we believe, several years his senior, and who introduced Kingsley's "Saint's Tragedy" to the public by a preface, which is one of his best pieces of writing. But in clearness and force of intellect, and in power of eloquence, Maurice is, in our judgment, greatly inferior to his younger friend. He is frequently misty, redundant, circuitous, and evasive: Kingsley is clear, direct, and forcible, cuts his way boldly and honestly to his meaning; and, if he is finally obscure, this seldom, if ever, arises either from want of power to see and explain, or from studied evasion or reserve, but from the positive obscurity of the subject. For mastery of the English language—with the exception of some small blunders in ordinary grammar, such as the use of *him* and *us* for *he* and *we*, and of *or* continually for *nor*, which philosophers like Coleridge, and university graduates like Kingsley, seem to have a special licence to make—we hardly know where to find his equal. Perhaps his too great admiration of Carlyle has somewhat tinged the style of his novels, and the vapid mannerisms of Maurice have, we think, sometimes infected that of his sermons. Occasionally, too, his earnestness is in some danger of degenerating into rant. But these are only occasional and inconsiderable blemishes.

Some of our readers, we dare say, will be scandalized at the idea of a clergyman appearing in such a variety of characters as an author, and especially at his being a writer of novels. Mr. Kingsley, however, as we shall presently see, has his own theory as well as practice on this subject. And we must do him the justice to say, that his novels, whatever may be their faults and errors, are full of earnest moral purpose. They are intended to be auxiliary to his sermons, and to expound his philosophy; he is the preacher or teacher in those no less than in these. Indeed, one chief reason, in our opinion, of their defects as works of art is, that the writer cannot sufficiently forget his preaching purpose. He is too much in earnest about projects and theories of his own, to merge his individuality in that of his characters. Thackeray sets himself, with fixed purpose and complete self-mastery, to reflect upon his page the phases of society as it is. He controls into a rigid calm the moral impulses of his nature while he writes; his scorn at meanness, and indignation at wrong-doing, are implied in the faithful picture which his pencil draws, or concentrated into a sentence of biting satire. While he is giving permanent body and form to the scenes which glow upon the mirror of his imagination, the artist holds his own breath, for fear its warmth should dim the reflection. While he gazes upon the images on the surface of the still lake, he dreads lest any wind or gusty air should rise to disturb and distort the figures and scenery on which he looks. But Kingsley does not write fiction on this plan. His talkers and actors are intended to represent different parts and aspects of the many-sided message which he has to utter, or to exhibit the errors—as he considers them—which he has sworn to resist. Hence his own strong feelings often break forth in the speech of his characters. Some swell out a tone too grand and high, or speak what happened to strike *him* at the moment as fit to be said, but was not so likely to have been thought and said by them; or, on the other hand, are, by the caricature of his prejudice and dislike, made to utter sentiments neither consistent with their own position and character, nor with those of the party they represent. For a similar reason, when the great moral purpose of any of his works has been once brought clearly and fully out, Mr. Kingsley's patience seems to be expended; he will not take time or trouble to weave his piece fairly to an end, but breaks the threads, or winds them up in an uncouth knot, and so concludes his work. All his fictions show something, more or less, of this, in their contempt of probabilities as to plot or catastrophe; but in "Yeast" it appears most conspicuously. That Mr. Kingsley *can* conceive and carry through a powerful and consistent character, will be doubted by none who have read "Alton Locke," with its grand Carlylish picture of the old Scotch Chartist *doctrinaire*, Sandy Mackaye. But he is too much in earnest to teach his peculiar Gospel, is too powerfully pressed in spirit by the problems of the world and of this age, to have either the calmness or the leisure necessary for the production of a profoundly truthful and consistent work of imagination. He is a preacher, an orator, a lyric poet, nay, a dramatic scene-painter of rare powers, who can enter into the hearts of other men, and even resuscitate the long-dead past in living reality, and in all its quaint bright detail of fashion and colouring; but he has not yet so schooled and mastered himself as to be a perfect craftsman of either prose or poetic fiction. The subjectivity of his deep, vivid, passionate nature will burst forth, and mar the coherency and finish of the pictured procession of characters and events in the actual world which he has essayed to draw. He fails not from defect of either knowledge or power, but of the requisite temper and self-command.*

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* Mr. Kingley's last novel, "Two Years Ago," has been published since the above was written. Considered merely as a work of art, it presents some important features of improvement as compared with his previous fictions. Its plot possesses unity and completeness; the interest is well sustained to the end; and—saving the mystery which still hangs about those creatures and playthings of the author's fancy, Claude Mellot and Sabina, whom Mr. Kingsley brings over, without introduction, from "Yeast"

If we look at the substance and moral or philosophical character of Mr. Kingsley's writings, perhaps there is nothing by which they are so obviously and pervasively distinguished as what we may call their *humanity*,—the fellow-feeling which they show with "all sorts and conditions of men," and especially the sympathy which they breathe with every form of sorrow and distress. Their author knows how to "rejoice with those that rejoice;" his soul is kindled into flame by every deed or call of heroism; but most of all does he seem constrained to "weep with those that weep," and to denounce with indignant and unsparing eloquence the different forms of neglect, oppression, and wrong under which the poor or the afflicted groan.

Akin to the human sympathy which distinguishes Mr. Kingsley's writing are the views which he everywhere inculcates as to the *beauty and sanctity of human relations*, those especially which are connected with family and national life. There is not one of his works which does not distinctly and emphatically imply how

into this story—the end of the book is the end of the tale. Then, and not before, its moral is worked out, and its interest exhausted. The only exception to this is, that the introductory chapter, no part of the tale proper, and evidently written last, throws out a few hints as to the personal history of one or two of the characters which are never fully explained. The incidents, too, are generally sufficiently probable, though Tom Thurnall's adventures and escapes are surely somewhat too many and too strange even for these days of wild roving and daring enterprise. We find, also, less of passionate rant and extravagance than in some of Mr. Kingsley's former writings. But, with all this improvement in the management of his subject, his readers will not, we think, be of opinion that "Two Years Ago" is the finest of his productions. There are exquisite scenes and powerful passages in "Yeast" not to be equalled in these volumes; while there is no approach to the overmastering power of some of the chapters in "Alton Locke." Mr. Kingsley, moreover, has allowed his love of natural scenery and of landscape word-painting to carry him away. There are many pages of very fine writing in these volumes which are altogether superfluous and out of place. The landscape painted is often no appropriate background to the action of the novel. It neither accords nor contrasts, it in no way heightens or relieves. It neither affects the actors nor illustrates the action. We do not say that this is always, but it is often, the case. The painting is merely a side-view, very beautiful indeed, but which we have no wish to dwell upon, because it hinders us from following the course of the story, in whose characters we have become interested. After all, there must be some limit to the liberty of authors who mix landscape-painting with story-telling, since there cannot but be a limit to the patience of readers.

strongly he cherishes these views. In his Dedication of "Hypatia," in particular, to "his father and his mother," he commends to their special consideration "the view of human relationships which is set forth in it;" and in the Preface he speaks of "family and national life," as the "two Divine roots of the Church, severed from which she is sure to wither away into that most godless and cruel of spectres, a religious world." Such a "religious world" he finds already realised in fully developed Popery, which ignores national life, and sets aside national distinctions; which profanes the very idea of the family, and scorns, blasphemes, and tramples under foot all family ties, duties, and claims. On these, rather than upon more special doctrinal grounds,—in reference to which, indeed, Mr. Kingsley would probably be quite as likely to approximate to Popery as to agree with Evangelical Protestantism,—he shows in all his writings *a strong antipathy to the system of the Romish Church.* We need scarcely name "Westward Ho" in evidence of the intense and quasi-puritanical abhorrence with which he regards the "Spaniard and the Pope;" while his "Saint's Tragedy"—a work of no ordinary genius and power—was written for the purpose of showing the ruinous practical effect upon family purity and happiness, and upon national morality, of the doctrines of celibacy and auricular confession. Scarcely less intense than his dislike of Popery is his *antipathy against Calvinism.* We do not know what form Calvinism may assume in the country parishes of Hampshire among Baptists and Independents, nor have we a familiar acquaintance with the sort of doctrinal statements which constitute the staple of evangelical theology, as taught by the Calvinistic Low-Church clergyman; but to us Mr. Kingsley's descriptions of the doctrines he opposes seem like gross caricatures. And we cannot but fear, notwithstanding the favourable aspect in which he appears, in several instances,—especially in connexion with the character of Tregarva, the Cornishman, in "Yeast,"—to represent Wesleyan Methodist teaching, that his antipathy against those essential doctrines of Christianity which true Arminianism maintains, would be scarcely less vehement, and not less profound, than against any coarse material Calvinistic or quasi-Calvinistic perversions of them. Or, to put the matter still more strongly, we cannot but fear that Mr. Kingsley is as really and as deeply opposed to such liberal orthodoxy as that of the late accomplished Professor Archer Butler, as to the doctrines of the most ultra Church Calvinist of the extremest section of the "Record" school, or to those of a Gadsby or Spurgeon among Dissenters. This doctrinal bias comes out very strongly in all the volumes he has published, whether sermons or fictions, with perhaps the exception of the "Saint's Tragedy;" but in none, we think, so offensively as in "Alton Locke."* Underlying all these characteristics, and accounting for them in some degree, is that peculiar variation of the Neo-Platonic theosophy, baptized with a Christian nomenclature, and to some extent regenerated by a Christian spirit and sympathy, which is common to Kingsley and Maurice, and which is partly a theory to justify, and partly a philosophy which dictates, the doctrinal peculiarities of these Clergymen, and of their school. This theosophy is expounded in "Yeast," "Alton Locke," and "Hypatia;" it appears in that clever and charming, but unsatisfactory, performance, "Phaethon;" it is implied in his "Sermons;" it is pretty fully exhibited in his Alexandrian "Lectures."

The charm which a *humanity* so intense and benevolent as that we have described, united to such genius and eloquence, imparts to Mr. Kingsley's writings, is very great. We do not envy the heart or the head of that man, however he may differ from Mr. Kingsley in philosophy or theology, who can read his works without feeling for him, on many accounts, both admiration and love. Nor can we hesitate to say that, in respect to the particular characteristic of which we are now speaking, we not only sympathize strongly with the spirit and purpose of his writings, but are convinced of the truth of the representations which they contain, and agree, to a considerable extent, with the views they advocate. Mr. Kingsley has used as much diligence, and shown as penetrating a keenness of insight, in observing and inquiring, in reading and making research among documents and Blue Books, as to the condition of the depressed classes of his countrymen, as when studying mediæval lore to understand the heart of mystics and Roman saints, or poring over musty, half-forgotten historians of Church and State in the fourth and fifth centuries, to acquaint himself with the struggles of the beset and dying Pagan Empire, and of the young, but already corrupt, the semi-paganised, but yet victorious, Church. He has entered into the heart of the working man, and has taken pains to know the circumstances of those who are oppressed by grinding and hopeless poverty. He has shown the pitiful hardships and cruel glaring inequalities which have driven many an honest man to bitter discontent and political Chartism,—hardships and inequalities which no man with the faith and love of a Christian ought to believe to be either right or necessary. He has taught, as no one had done before, the more fortunately circumstanced to put themselves in the place of their poor brethren, and ask themselves how, under their circumstances, they would feel and act. He has contributed to produce the conviction which is taking root deep and strong, that the condition of things to which we have referred ought to be remedied, and must. If things are now amending, this is, in some degree, due to his pleadings and example. Powerful co-worker has he been, though operating from a different angle, and in a somewhat different way, with such men as the Earl of Shaftesbury and Lord Robert Grosvenor. Poor sweated slop-workers; sempstresses and shirt-makers driven by poverty to despair or sin; stunted, degraded, hopeless field-labourers; such as these owe to him a debt which cannot be weighed. It was time, indeed, fourteen years ago, that some one should rise, in the spirit of Isaiah or Jeremiah of old, to plead the cause of the poor, and needy, and oppressed. The social and political machine was working with a force and swiftness never before approached. It was pouring wealth untold into the laps of some, and was raising many more from poverty to competence; but, at the same time, there were multitudes who, beneath its ponderous wheels, were being crushed, and mangled, and destroyed. It seemed as if Mammon had assumed the character of Moloch; as if his priests and many of their aids and dependents grew fat and wealthy, at the cost of crowds of victims who were immolated before his shrine. And, alas! there were Malthusians and political economists who said that thus it must be; that these were the laws of society and civilization; that is, if they believed in the name, that they were the laws of God. A shallow and heartless optimism reconciled even the just and benevolent to what they supposed to be a sad necessity, and served many as a plea for callous indifference. The famous maxim, "We must buy in the cheapest, and sell in the dearest, market," which should never have been laid down except with proper restrictions and qualifications, was exalted into a law of ethics, and quoted as if that—and not, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"—had been the Divine summary of relative morality. Thus a formula which, nakedly put, may be the maxim of an unqualified and remorseless selfishness, which ignores not only charity but equity, was constituted into the standard of commercial integrity and honour, and was used as a defence for every enormity of greedy speculation and overreaching competition. Here was a warranty for gambling in railway shares; for hoarding corn in the season of famine, till rats had consumed what starving peasants wanted; for cutting down wages as low as possible, even though the families of the workmen should starve and die, not because the masters could not themselves afford to give more, but because their helpless men had no remedy against them, if they gave less. All such things as these were, and too often are still, unblushingly justified on the principles of political economy. That is, commercial selfishness has been wrought into a system; its principles and results have been defined, and classified, and reduced to formulæ; and then these are quoted as facts and "laws," in justification of the evils which they represent. Meantime the Gospel, we are told, has nothing to do with political economy; and integrity is made to consist not in doing to others as we would that they should do to us, but in taking care never to go so far in selfishness and greed as to become thief or knave in legal construction.

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* We may be reminded that in "Alton Locke" and elsewhere Mr. Kingsley must not be made responsible for all the sentiments of his characters. Our answer is, that we hold him responsible for the general lesson and tendency of his works; and for such particular statements as express the deliberate and revised judgment of those whom he represents as either the evangelists or the confirmed and purified recipients and disciples of his own special philanthropy and theosophy.

It was against such principles of political economy and commercial morality as these that Mr. Kingsley began, some dozen years ago, to lift up his voice with almost prophetic sternness, and pathos, and power. In whichever direction he looked, he saw lamentable evils and distresses. Never does poverty appear so lean, and yellow, and withered, as in the glare of splendour and luxury. Rentals had trebled within fifty years, and yet wages to southern labourers remained unimproved. Proprietors had become more wealthy than Doges were in the times of old; farmers were advancing both in intelligence and opulence; but the ploughman was still a serf in all but name. He was as hopelessly degraded as in the days of the Edwards, and far more consciously and painfully depressed, in comparison with all around him: he was less fully fed than his forefathers were when their diet was black bread, and they fattened their geese upon the common; not cleanlier housed than in the times when dainty niceness and modern refinement were as unknown in castle and in hall as in the labourer's cot; embittered and despairing to hear of progress which he might not hope to share,—of liberty which brought scant privilege and no chance of elevation to him or his,—of education and books which if his children tasted at the village school, it would only be to render them more sadly sensible thereafter of the poverty which forbad them to hope to possess even the cheapest books worth reading, and of the drudgery which would leave them no time to keep up the little knowledge they might once have gained.

If possible, it was a yet more hideous injustice and wrong, that contractors, slop-sellers, and outfitters should be amassing immense fortunes, with an unprecedented rapidity, precisely because and by means of a system which depressed grade beneath grade of the men they employed, till the lowest stratum of those upon whose powers and labour they reared their colossal fortunes were literally reduced to starvation and to death. In the light of eternity and of God's judgment-day, some of these "masters" will be counted far more cruel and infamous than the Tartar conqueror who left, for his monument at Bagdat, a vast pyramid of human skulls. Our readers must not suppose that we exaggerate. They will not have forgotten—though, alas! such things we too easily forget—the Letters of the correspondents of the "Morning Chronicle." And the Reports of the *Sanitary Commission*, with the Blue Books on Education, show that, though much has been done and is doing to amend the condition of things we have indicated, much yet remains to be done. It was time that these iniquities should be exposed; that property should be made to understand its Christian duties; that the law of God and His Gospel should be applied to the relations of national life. There were many landlords and employers who needed to be taught that their dependents are their brethren, and that they *are* their "brothers' keepers;" that they owe moral, religious, and charitable obligations to those around them, and this in proportion to the influence they have over them, and the benefit they derive from them; that they are *not* the absolute proprietors of their wealth or their land, but only stewards acting for God, for the nation, and for their fellows around them; and that they have *not* a right to do "what and how they will with their own." We who write thus are neither Communists nor

Radicals; we have no faith in universal suffrage, or even household suffrage; we do not believe in "small farms," or expect much from the allotment system. But we do hold that no man ought to be hopelessly depressed by pinching poverty; we would contend that every British child ought to have the means of securing comfort, and of rising to the position which his character and ability fit him to fulfil. We believe that this is the purpose of the Divine Ruler, and that Christian principle, actuating all in their respective spheres,—our clergymen, our legislators, our capitalists, our tradesmen and operatives,—will bring this about. We believe in education, rightly and religiously conducted; in the need and blessing of machinery; in the duties and mission of capital; in the rights and brotherhood of labour; in "godliness, brotherly-kindness, and charity." We should not probably go the full length of Mr. Kingsley's views in reference to the co-operative association of labourers; but still we think that, even in this respect, his proposals have not been without a good result; that though such associations are not likely generally to succeed, or to enter at any time into extensive competition with the interests of capitalists, (nor is it to be desired that they should,) yet the influence of even a few such working associations would go far towards checking the evil effects of capitalist monopoly and middle-men oppression, and would be the means, in proportion to their success, of powerfully developing among working men honour, mutual trust and forbearance, industry and self-reliance, hope and self-respect. We rejoice, in concert with Mr. Kingsley, as he has expressed himself in some of his later writings, to know that, during the last ten years, the condition of the labouring classes has been greatly ameliorated. There are many wise heads and benevolent hearts thinking and working for them. There are not a few admirable landlords; agricultural wages have advanced; education makes progress, and is of a better quality than was formerly known; employers of labour are awaking to a sense of their responsibility. But still very much remains to be accomplished; and some that should know better are strangely and shamefully callous to the claims of humanity and duty. In particular, to quote Mr. Kingsley's words in his new preface to the last edition of *Yeast*,—words of the truth of which the readers of the daily journals must have been made aware, and which those who are familiarly acquainted with the general condition of our rural villages must know for themselves to be true,—" sanitary reform and cottage improvement throughout the country districts are going on at a fearfully slow rate. Here and there high-hearted landlords, like the Duke of Bedford, are doing their duty like men; but, in general, the apathy of the educated classes is most disgraceful." London, too, so far as respects provision for the wants of its labouring population, is probably, on the whole, in no better condition than it was twenty years ago—perhaps it may be in a worse. Nothing, at any rate, can be conceived more terrible and humiliating than the condition of things described, only two years ago, by Dr. Letheby in his " Report (1857) on the Sanitary Condition of the Poor in the East of London."

Such are our views. We did not learn them from Mr. Kingsley; but they have been much deepened and confirmed during our study of his writings. In these chapters our direct and dominant aim is not to criticize or illustrate his literary and artistic genius, but to estimate aright the moral character and purpose of what he has written. As Mr. Kingsley is not a mere artist, but wishes to be a reformer, and never ceases to be a preacher, it ought to be, and it is, our main object to consider his principles and his qualifications in these respects. Hence, in selecting passages for quotation, we shall not cull literary beauties, or suffer ourselves to be attracted by his unrivalled descriptions of scenery, his bursts of declamatory eloquence, his exquisite strains of pathetic or passionate poetry and snatches of lyric song, or any thing which is merely ideal or imaginative, but shall confine ourselves to such passages as will directly and distinctly illustrate his moral, political, philosophical, or theological views.

The following extract from the "Saint's Tragedy" is plain, homely prose,—one of the very few prose scenes in that fine dramatic poem; but we introduce it here as illustrative of the remarks we have just been making upon Mr. Kingsley's *humanity*. It will show, too, how he hits modern blots in a drama representing events of the Middle Age. The scene is laid in Thuringia; the time is the former part of the thirteenth century. Count Walter Varila, and Count Hugo, vassals of Lewis, the Landgrave of Thuringia, together with an Abbot and Count, are conversing in a chamber of the castle about the doings of the Landgravine during a season of famine and extreme distress.

"*C. Wal.* What would you say to the Princess, who talks of breaking up all her parks to wheat next year?

"*3rd Count.* Ask her to take on the thirty families, who were just going to tramp off those three hundred acres into the Rhine-land, if she had not kept them in both senses this winter, and left them on my hands; once beggars, always beggars.

"*C. Hugo.* Well, I'm a practical man, and I say, the sharper the famine, the higher are prices; and the higher I sell, the more I can spend: so the money circulates, Sir,—that's the word,—like water, sure to run downwards again; and so it's as broad as it's long; and here's a health—if there was any beer—to the farmer's friends, 'A bloody war and a wet harvest.'

"*Abbot.* Strongly put, though correctly. For the self-interest of each it is, which produces in the aggregate the happy equilibrium of all.

"*C. Wal.* Well, the world is right well made, that's certain; and He who made the Jews' sin our salvation may bring plenty out of famine, and comfort out of covetousness. But look you, Sirs, private selfishness may be public weal, and yet private selfishness be just as surely damned, for all that.

"*3rd Count.* I hold, Sir, that every alms is a fresh badge of slavery.

"*C. Wal.* I don't deny it.

"*3rd Count.* Then teach them independence.

"*C. Wal.* How? By tempting them to turn thieves, when begging fails? By keeping their stomachs just at desperation-point? By starving them out here, to march off, starving all the way, to some town, in search of employment, of which, if they find it, they know no more than my horse? Likely! No, Sir, to make men of them, put them not out of the reach, but out of the need, of charity.

"*3rd Count.* And how, prithee? By teaching them, like our fair Landgravine, to open their mouths for all that drops? Thuringia is become a kennel of beggars in her hands.

"*C. Wal.* In hers? In ours, Sir!

"*Abbot.* Idleness, Sir, deceit, and immorality, are the three children of this same barbarous self-indulgence in alms-giving. Leave the poor alone. Let want teach them the need of self-exertion, and misery prove the foolishness of crime......

"*C. Wal.* I heard a shrewd sermon the other day on that same idleness and immorality text of the Abbot's. 'T was Conrad, the Princess's director, preached it. And a fashionable cap it is, though it will fit more than will like to wear it. Shall I give it you? Shall I preach?

"*C. H.* A tub for Varila! Stand on the table, now, toss back thy hood like any Franciscan, and preach away.

"*C. Wal.* Idleness, quoth he,—Conrad, mind you,—idleness and immorality? Where have they learnt them, but from you nobles? There was a saucy monk, for you. But there's worse coming. Religion? said he, how can they respect it, when they see you, 'their betters,' fattening on church lands, neglecting sacraments, defying excommunications, trading in benefices, hiring the clergy for your puppets and flatterers; making the ministry, the episcopate itself, a lumber-room wherein to stow away the idiots and spendthrifts of your families, the confidants of your mistresses, the cast-off pedagogues of your boys?

"*Omnes.* The scoundrel!

"*C. Wal.* Was he not? But hear again. Immorality? roars he; and who has corrupted them but you? Have not you made every castle a weed-bed from which the newest corruptions of the Court stick, like thistle-down, about the empty heads of stable-boys and serving-maids? Have you not kept the poor worse housed than your dogs and your horses, worse fed than your pigs and your sheep? Is there an ancient house among you, again, of which village gossips do not whisper some dark story of lust and oppression, of decrepit debauchery, of hereditary doom?

"*Omnes.* We'll hang this monk.

"*C. Wal.* Hear me out, and you'll burn him. His sermon was like a hail-storm, the tail of the shower the sharpest. Idleness? he asked next of us all: How will they work, when they see you landlords sitting idle above them, in a fool's paradise of luxury and riot, never looking down but to squeeze from them an extra drop of honey, like sheep-boys stuffing themselves with blackberries while the sheep are licking up flukes in every ditch? And now you wish to leave the poor man in the slough, whither your neglect and your example have betrayed him, and made his too apt scholarship the excuse for your own remorseless greed? As a Christian, I am ashamed of you all: as a Churchman, doubly ashamed of those Prelates, hired stalking-horses of the rich, who would fain gloss over their own sloth and cowardice with the wisdom which cometh not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish; aping the heartless cant of an aristocracy who made them, use them, and despise them. That was his sermon."—Pp. 83–87.

That the political economy in the preceding extract is altogether an anachronism there can be no doubt; Mr. Kingsley knew well enough that he was putting modern ideas into the mouths of his characters; but this only makes the extract serve more aptly our purpose in introducing it.

In the first edition of this work we gave an extract from "Alton Locke." It was that grand and tender passage in which the author describes the visit which Sandy Mackaye and Alton Locke together paid to the poor dying girl with her sisters and mother in a garret in St. Giles',—a passage unsurpassed in English, so far as we know, for pathos, for pictorial and dramatic power, and for passionate eloquence; and, alas! alas! which derives its deepest power to move, and its highest merit as writing, from its utter truthfulness. But as "Alton Locke" is, or may be, at its present low price, in everybody's hands, we have, with not a little reluctance, decided to omit that extract from this edition.

The following brief quotations from "Yeast" truly depict the condition of the southern farm-labourer,—"worse housed than the dogs and the horses, worse fed than the pigs and the sheep." The principal speaker is Tregarva, the Cornish gamekeeper, and the interlocutor is Lancelot Smith, the hero of the story.

"'I'm beginning to fancy strangely, in spite of all the preachers say, that before ever you can make them Christians, you must make them men and women.'

"'Are they not so already?'

"'O, Sir, go and see! How can a man be a man in those crowded styes, sleeping packed together like Irish pigs in a steamer, never out of fear of want, never knowing any higher amusement than the beer-shop?......Go and see! Ask that sweet, heavenly angel, Miss Honoria, and she, too, will tell you. I think, sometimes, if she had been born and bred like her father's tenants' daughters, to sleep where they sleep, and hear the talk they hear, and see the things they see, what would she have been now?'"—*Yeast*, pp. 78, 79.*

"'Can't they read? Can't they practise light and interesting handicrafts at home, as the German peasantry do?'

"'Who'll teach 'em, Sir? From the plough-tail to the reaping-hook, and back again, is all they know. Besides, Sir, they are not like us Cornish; they are a stupid, pig-headed generation at the best, these south-countrymen. They 're grown-up babies, who want the parson and the squire to be leading them, and preaching to them, and spurring them on, and coaxing them up, every moment. And as for scholarship, Sir, a boy leaves school at nine or ten to follow the horses; and between that time and his wedding-day* he forgets every word he ever learnt, and becomes for the most part as thorough a heathen savage at heart as those wild Indians in the Brazils used to be......As for reading, Sir, did you ever do a good day's farm-work in your life? If you had, man or boy, you would not have been game for much reading when you got home; you would do just what these poor fellows do,—tumble into bed at eight o'clock, hardly waiting to take your clothes off, knowing that you must turn up again at five o'clock the next morning to get a breakfast of bread, and perhaps a dab of the squire's dripping, and then back to work again......There 's many a boy, as their mothers will tell you, comes home, night after night, too tired to eat their suppers, and tumble, fasting, to bed, in the same foul shirt which they 've been working in all day, never changing their rag of calico from week's-end to week's-end, or washing the skin that 's under it once in seven years.' "—*Yeast*, pp. 214–216.

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* The same thought, salutary, though very painful and humbling, is powerfully put by Mr. Kingsley in his song of "The Bad Squire," originally published in "Yeast," but now also contained in the author's little volume of collected poems.

"Packed in one reeking chamber,
Man, maid, mother, and little ones lay;
While the rain pattered in on the rotting bride-bed,
And the walls let in the day.

* * * * *

"We quarrelled like brutes, and who wonders?
What self-respect could we keep?
Worse housed than your hacks and your pointers,
Worse fed than your hogs and your sheep!

"Our daughters, with base-born babies,
Have wandered away in their shame;
If your misses had slept, squire, where they did,
Your misses might do the same."

With one extract more we close this part of our subject. Lancelot Smith has been asked what limit he would put to education, and replies as follows:—

" 'The capacities of each man. If man living in civilized society has one right which he can demand, it is this, that the State which exists by his labour shall enable him to develope, or, at least, not hinder his developing, his whole faculties to their very utmost, however lofty that may be. While a man who might be an author remains a spade-drudge, or a journeyman while he has capacities for a master; while any man able to rise in life remains by social circumstances lower than he is willing to place himself, that man has right to complain of the State's injustice and neglect.' "—*Yeast*, p. 110.*

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* Ten or a dozen years ago, in most of the southern and south-midland counties there were from forty-eight to fifty *per cent.* of the married couples who could not sign their names in the parish register.

Recent statistics, so far as they throw light upon the condition of education in the same districts of the country, do not permit us to suppose that there has been in this respect any great improvement. We may note that in 1855, as appears from the returns published by the Registrar General, the average *for all England* of married people who could not sign their names was 35.35, more than one-third!

Mr. Kingsley has done excellent service by the views which he delights to give of the sanctity and blessedness of family duties and relationships; but as his ideas on this subject are not, as to their substance and practical meaning, peculiar either to himself in particular, or to the school to which he belongs, we shall not dwell upon them.† As to "national life," Mr. Kingsley's views are no more to be considered peculiar and distinctive than as to the family-institute. What the single banyan pillar-stem is to the pillared and multitudinous banyan tree, such is the family to the nation. As each man, worthy to be called a man, has his peculiar genius and character, as families and clans, if not degenerate and worthless, have their hereditary and distinctive spirit and temperament, so each nation, each aggregate of families belonging to one race, has its national life and idiosyncrasy, of which it is blind folly in rulers to take no note, and which it is infatuated oppression to attempt by force to suppress, coerce, or destroy. Such views as these are expounded not only by Anglican Neo-Platonists, like Maurice and Kingsley, but by such a High-Churchman as Bishop Wilberforce, and by so popular and well known a journal as the "Illustrated News." They do not, indeed, go so far as to assert the permanence and inconvertibility of nationalities. Even the "Leader" newspaper, with all its admiration of Kossuth and Mazzini, would perhaps hardly go this length. The history of the past, from the extinction of the nation of Nimrod, to the fall of the Roman Empire, is sufficient to confute such a view. And perhaps we should be mistaken if we were to infer from Mr. Kingsley's language that this is his belief. But what is certainly peculiar in his opinions as to the points we have referred to is, that he looks upon "the offices of husband, wife, and parent, as spiritual, sacramental, *Divine, eternal;*"* that he believes that in heaven the angels both marry and are given in marriage, mystically and spiritually; † and that he asserts "national life" to be "a spiritual and indefeasible existence." ‡ All this will be recognised by the initiated as a part of the same Neo-Platonic mysticism which teaches that the invisible and archetypal world, of which "the visible world is in some mysterious way a pattern or symbol," is "the cause and the ground" of all outward things; that "it was the cause of them at first, and is the cause of them now, even to the budding of every flower, and the falling of every pebble to the ground; and therefore, that having been before this visible world, it will be after it, and endure just as real, living, and eternal, though matter were annihilated to-morrow." § Hence Mr. Kingsley, in his dedication of "Hypatia" to his parents, significantly speaks of his own relationship to them as [only] "*seeming* to have begun with birth," as that "which cannot die with death," but is "spiritual, indefeasible, eternal in the heavens with that God from whom every fatherhood in heaven and earth is named." In perfect consistency with all this, in the first paragraph of his "Lectures on Alexandria and her Schools," he gives a definition which implies that whatever will endure for ever must have been without a beginning.

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* See Supplementary Note at the end of this chapter.

† Dr. Harris, in his "Patriarchy," has shown how an orthodox Christian divine and philosopher can write upon this theme. All, and more than all, that others have said, is there said by him, and better said than by any other. The main subject of the volume is the family-institute, as affording a life-discipline for the individual, and furnishing the conditions and the training necessary for the education and development of the race.

We have already indicated the special grounds upon which Mr. Kingsley opposes and denounces Popery.

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* "Saint's Tragedy," p. xxiii.

† "Are united in pairs in some marriage bond," &c.—"Yeast," p. 120.

‡ "Alexandria," &c., p. xxii.

§ Article by Kingsley, on Vaughan's "Hours with the Mystics," in "Fraser's Magazine" for September, 1856.

Merely upon these grounds we think that he is fully warranted in his dislike of that unclean and oppressive system; and we have no disposition to inquire how far upon certain points of doctrine he is probably disposed to sympathize with the teachings of the Romish Church. Those who know the history of Origen's opinions, and how far, "heretic" though he might be, he contributed towards moulding patristic and Romanist theology, will easily understand whereabout the points of approximation will be found between Romish doctrine and the speculations of one who has so much in common with Origen as Mr. Kingsley. But we cannot pass over his antipathy to evangelical theology, which is not less intense than his abhorrence of ecclesiastical Popery, without a few remarks upon this very obvious and prevalent characteristic of his writings. The best thing we can hope is, that he is really unacquainted with the theology which he caricatures. We are not concerned, indeed, to defend Calvinism, high or low. Yet we are bound to stigmatize as utterly false and unworthy such pictures of Baptist Ministers and Missionaries as those contained in "Alton Locke." How *could* Mr. Kingsley write as he has there done, while the names of Robert Hall, and of Carey and Marshman, still live in brightness, and their memories in undying fragrance? High and antinomian Calvinism we abominate as heartily as Mr. Kingsley. We grieve, too, over the prevalent Calvinism, narrow, weakly sentimental, and ill-informed as it is, of the Evangelical section of the Church of England, from which we cannot but consider Broad Churchism to be in part a reaction. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that Howe and Owen, that Bishop Hall, as well as Baxter, that Doddridge and Chalmers, were Calvinistic theologians. God send us such masters as these to rule and order the strife of the present age! Our quarrel with Mr. Kingsley is, that—Calvinism apart—he misrepresents evangelical theology, as such. He knows no type of evangelical orthodoxy but one; and that is so far from being the normal type, that it is an extreme and unwarrantable caricature.* There will, indeed, remain awful and insoluble difficulties and mysteries,

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* In "Two Years Ago" Mr. Kingsley justifies the suspicion we had expressed in page 221, that his antipathy against the doctrines of evangelical Arminianism "would be scarcely less vehement, and not less profound, than against any coarse material Calvinistic or quasi-Calvinistic perversions" of evangelical truth. In this work he seems to aim more especially at bringing into discredit what he supposes to be the vulgar Methodist type of evangelical doctrine. For this purpose, he has selected for exposure the theology and worship of a denomination called *Brianites*, (more properly *O'Brienites*,) or *Bible-Christians* (the name they themselves affect). These religionists had for their reputed head and founder one O'Brien, who had been, we believe, a Wesleyan Local Preacher, but who before long found himself unable to agree with his followers, and emigrated to America. They were not, as a sect, separatists from Wesleyan Methodism, though collaterally derived from that body. They retain the Wesleyan institution of class-meeting, and profess in general to adhere to the characteristic theology of John Wesley. They are found in considerable numbers in the south-west of England, but are little known anywhere else. They are, in fact, in that part of the country, very much what the "Ranters" or "Primitive Methodists," as they call themselves, are in the more midland counties of England; and it seems a pity that two denominations so nearly resembling each other should not be united.

Now why has Mr. Kingsley selected, as the objects of his satire and invective, these obscure and humble sectaries, scarcely one of whom will probably ever be the better or the worse for the publication of a volume quite out of their range of reading? We fear his purpose was, through them, to caricature and discredit what most of his readers will certainly take to be the popular version of Wesleyan theology, and the ordinary type of Wesleyan devotional fervours. Hence he represents them, not only as a sort of "Methodists," but as the "*soi-disant* followers of John Wesley;" the latter of which phrases implies more than is strictly true: for they do not even profess to be, in more than a very loose and general sense, "the followers of John Wesley." But the whole thing is, as we trust, too gross to pass. We shall not take Mr. Kingsley's authority as to the doctrines of the "Brianites;" for he sometimes makes them talk like fierce Calvinistic Antinomians, and certainly they do not err on the side of Calvinism.

But, in fact, there is sufficient evidence that Mr. Kingsley is not as well acquainted as he ought to be with the subject on which he has undertaken to write. He assumes to know the west country thoroughly. He does thoroughly understand, we doubt not, its geology and its natural history; and some personal acquaintance also he must have had with its people. But he cannot be widely or exactly informed as to its religious condition. If he has (as we have) the pleasure of being acquainted with that persevering and able naturalist and surgeon, from whom one of those rare animalcules is named, which he represents Tom Thurnall as having given to Major Campbell, that gentleman would be able to enlighten his darkness on some of these points. What intelligent Cornishman, for instance, would not smile at the mistake which can represent those whom Mr. Kingsley calls the "Brianites," as the principal Dissenters in a Cornish fishing-town of 1,500 inhabitants, whatever theological system may be adopted; while, if all are rejected, heaven and earth, time and eternity, will become a universal seething chaos of mystery. Mr. Kingsley's faith, with its eternal archetypal and invisible world, its Divine emanations, its quasi-pantheistic identification of God and man, its unbeginning life, its angel marriages, its "spiritual, Divine, and eternal" human relationships, will scarcely be supposed to be encumbered with fewer difficulties than that of ordinary Christians. Indeed, even with regard to the special mysteries which environ the doctrines of guilt and of redemption, Mr. Kingsley is compelled, in spite of all his struggles, to settle substantially upon much the same ground as evangelical Christians. They believe in the fall and depravity of universal man as indisputable facts. He avouches, distinctly and emphatically, and in not a few places, his belief in the same doctrines. In this respect, indeed, his theology favourably contrasts with that of Mr. Jowett. Nor could evangelical Christians easily find more bold and impressive descriptions of the temper and temptations of the "flesh with its affections and lusts," than are given by him in several of his sermons. Such being his views, he surely cannot object if they, following the language of Scrip-

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the only others being, as it would seem, the "Teetotal Methodists?" Mr. Kingsley should certainly have known that there is no town, scarcely a village, of any consideration in Cornwall where the Wesleyan Methodists are not the predominant religious denomination. He needs also to learn that itinerant Ministers are not called "local preachers," but that the latter are a distinct class of lay preachers, whether among the Wesleyans or the O'Brienites. We mention these points because they show how little Mr. Kingsley knows of the affairs of the denominations about which he has taken upon himself to write; and because even strangers to Methodism will be the better prepared, after this demonstration of Mr. Kingsley's ignorance on these points, to refuse all credit to his evil insinuations, and to reject the odious caricature he has given of Wesleyan life and doctrine. If this is the method adopted by our latitudinarian author to propitiate orthodox Churchmen and to render Dissent odious, he has only succeeded in betraying an unworthy design, which no literary skill has enabled him either to cover or effect. Nor can all the noble and tender passages in "Two Years Ago," and the wholesome and manly lessons which it contains, avail to redeem it from the discredit of gross exaggeration and a bitter anti-sectarian (and therefore sectarian) spirit.

ture, should speak of mankind as "children of disobedience," and, in a just sense, "children of wrath." But they, no less than he, believe that "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," and that these "children of wrath" are also children of mercy. Let us add, further, that they, no more than he, if—with John Wesley, Robert Hall, and Richard Watson—they have accepted the theology of John Howe's "Living Temple," believe, as he in several places implies that they do, that men are born "children of the devil;" * although they cannot hesitate to believe that our Lord spoke truly and justly when He thus denominated those who resolutely hardened themselves against His truth and grace. (Mat. xiii. 38; John viii. 44; *cf.* 1 John iii. 8.) The most profound evangelical theologians have, with one consent, regarded human depravity as a disease and perversity of the will, infecting, from that centre, the whole nature; the faculties, susceptibilities, and passions in themselves being not evil, but, if wielded by a right and holy will, if sanctified and controlled by the Spirit of God, right and good. It is the sinful and selfish will which disorders and depraves the nature. The Holy Spirit, casting out self-will, and implanting the victorious love of a pardoning God and Father, regenerates the man, transforms Saul of Tarsus into Paul the Apostle, and brings forth to view, and out into life and deed, that ideal man, that "good creature of God," which, beneath all the tyranny of "the old man," exists in every human being.† Thus is renewed that image of God in man which even sin and the fall had not absolutely and utterly obliterated. With these views evangelical Christians can heartily adopt those lines of Kingsley's own, in which he opposes the Romish system of making saints by trampling ruthlessly on all the passions and feelings of our kind.

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* "Yeast," p. 247.

† For surely we must hold that every human soul, in so far as it is the creation of God, is good. The evil is not derived from Him. Every character and idiosyncrasy has its purpose, which only Divine grace can bring clearly and fully out,—and its place, which only the same grace can enable it to fill.

"Yet why so harsh? why with remorseless knife
Home to the stem prune back each bough and bud?
I thought, the task of education was
To strengthen, not to crush; to train and feed
Each subject toward fulfilment of its nature,
According to the mind of God, revealed
In laws, congenital with every kind
And character of man."—*Saint's Tragedy*, p. 134.

Another cardinal doctrine of evangelical theology is, that man is an intelligent and moral being, the conscious and responsible subject of Divine government, and, as such, liable to reward or punishment, according to his behaviour. No one supposes that the knowledge of his duty would be of itself sufficient to secure the obedience of fallen man. Motives must be superadded, to deter from disobedience, and to induce to righteousness. Government is not conceivable except under these conditions. The Gospel reveals no glimmer of hope beyond the bounds of this probationary state to those who die impenitent and rebellious. On the contrary, it threatens all such with "everlasting punishment," with "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and the glory of His power." All this is undeniable. There can be no doubt, indeed, that Mr. Kingsley, mystic as he is, leans to the doctrine of the mystics on the subject of obedience without respect to any hope of reward. He pours contempt on that piety which is nourished by the blessed hope of heavenly rest and happiness, as is natural for one who has no heaven of rest and consummation to preach. He caricatures and sneers at the doctrine of eternal punishment. But yet, in all this, he is ever contradicting himself. He dares not apply to the training of children the same principles which, *at times*, he seems to advocate for the training of men. He preaches, more emphatically and eloquently than most men, the *present* rewards of godliness, and the necessary curse and punishment which, even in this life, attend upon sin. He not only admits, but proclaims, that the consequences of our conduct in this life must follow us into the life to come. Nay, when preaching directly from the text of Scripture,—and he is a closer and more faithful expositor than most writers of sermons among the Anglican clergy;—when explaining and enforcing to village congregations the very words and message of the Gospel; when thus, as a "preacher of righteousness," confronting, in its coarse reality, the sin, and vice, and selfishness of the land; he finds himself compelled to put aside the cloudy veil of his philosophy, and to address the sinners before him in that broad and common-place "Galilæan dialect," which alone they could understand and feel. On these occasions he too must preach "righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come." Nay, however inconsistent it may be with his philosophy, or with the anti-evangelical sneers in which elsewhere he indulges, he does most plainly and emphatically denounce "eternal damnation," and "everlasting punishment," against impenitent sinners. To this point we may have occasion to refer again presently.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER X.

On the means of Elevating the Character and Condition of the English Poor.

In an article contributed to the "London Review" for October, 1858, the author has laid before the public some views which he strongly holds as to the best means, apart from distinct evangelical labour, of elevating "the Character and Condition of the English Poor." Perhaps an extract, indicating one of the main conclusions arrived at in this article, may not be unfitly inserted here as a supplementary note bearing directly on the matters referred to in the former part of the foregoing chapter. In his preface to the New Edition of "Yeast," Mr. Kingsley has spoken admiringly of "Lord Shaftesbury's truly noble speech on Sanitary Reform," and referred to it as "a striking proof of the extent to which the Evangelical leaders have given in their adherence to those scientific laws, the original preachers of which have been called, by his Lordship's party, heretics and infidels, materialists and rationalists." These last are not wise words. The whole of Lord Shaftesbury's enlightened and philanthropic course is in proof, that whatever may have been the case with the narrow and uninformed, whether of the Evangelical School, or of that High-Church party which, in the bitterness of his wrath at Evangelicals, Mr. Kingsley seems at present disposed to favour so highly to the disparagement of their opponents, the real principles of no party of which Lord Shaftesbury has been an acknowledged leader, can have been hostile to "scientific laws." A perusal of the article to which we have referred, and which was published before Lord Shaftesbury delivered his speech, might, perhaps, further aid in showing Mr. Kingsley that Evangelical journals and Evangelical parties are not less disposed than Broad Churchmen to work by, and in submission to, scientific laws. It is, indeed, a merit of Mr. Kingsley and Mr. Maurice, that they have shown—the former indirectly but powerfully, the latter expressly in his Lectures on Learning and Working—that any scheme of amelioration for the lowest classes of England which depends for its success merely, or very mainly, upon the education of the young children, without concerning itself, at least equally, about the social, sanitary, and civil condition of the parents, must be altogether insufficient. But they are not the only persons who understand this, nor is their school the only school in which this is taught.

"We wish to look at this subject with perfect fairness. Our object is to understand precisely in what the English labourers are lacking, and what is likely to be the means of adding this to them. We find that, in a word, all they lack is frugality and providence, with the prospect of an independent provision, to be attained by the exercise of these qualities, and which may be enjoyed by them in the time of their old age. All that they want belongs to the ordinary character of hundreds of thousands of peasantry in western and central Europe, who, in respect of the value of their labour, and likewise of the weekly income which, estimated according to a money-value, that labour brings them in, are decidedly inferior to our own countrymen. To what is this striking contrast owing? Not to religious causes, assuredly; (the difference, indeed, is found among both Protestants and Papists;) not to the nature of the general laws, morals, and government of the continental countries, as compared with our own. Nay, in all these respects, Protestant and free Britain must be held by us to have greatly the advantage over all continental lands. Not to the inferior demand for labour in this country, or to our inferior productiveness, either in agriculture or manufactures. In these respects, likewise, we are without competitors. As little can the good effect which we mark on the Continent be attributed to a centralized police system. For police, though it may repress crime, can never teach frugality or self-respect. The only cause to which we can refer the difference is that to which, in this article, we have directed the attention of our readers. Are we then to rest content that, in regard to this vital point, great and wealthy Britain should be a sad and shameful spectacle and exception in the eyes of Europe? Are we still to go on, at a charge of five millions a year in mere poor-rates, not to speak of our enormous expense for criminal provision, which is itself mainly owing to the same cause,—are we to go on providing reservoirs for this deep and wide overflow of pauperism, and doing nothing more? Or shall we not rather try to check it at its fountain, and absorb it in its course? Unhappily, as matters stand, the very provision we make for the wants of our pauper population tends to aggravate that desperate recklessness from which our pauperism, for the most part, springs.

"Again we say that we have no wish to set up the condition of Switzerland or of France, as it stands, as a model for admiration......We have no desire that the next English census should show the same result as the last French; or that all the frame of social life, especially so far as the questions connected with marriage are concerned, should be so thoroughly demoralized as is the case through a great portion of the Continent, especially some of those parts of it, the social economy of which Mr. Kay so highly lauds. We believe, on the contrary, that for a large community to be compelled, from prudential motives, all but uniformly to postpone marriage to a late period must be a fruitful source of frightful immorality. But, on the other hand, over-early marriages, recklessly contracted between raw youths of twenty and girls of seventeen, are an evil scarcely, if at all, of less magnitude than the other. The former is the continental evil, where the subdivision of land universally obtains; the latter is the Irish and English evil, where the old law of entail still prevails to so large an extent, and where peasants possess no property, and no prospect of being able to realise any. A certain combination or compromise, in which the two conditions meet and check each other, would furnish the proper medium. But what we wish to particularize is the powerful prudential habit which is implied by such a uniform postponement of marriage as is the rule in Switzerland, and in many parts of France. The very quality in which our peasantry are so wanting, is possessed by the peasantry of these districts almost in excess. 'This class of the inhabitants,' says Mr. Laing, 'would no more think of marrying without means to live in a decent way, than any gentleman's sons or daughters in England.'......

"Already the law of entail has been modified in England. There can no longer now be a rigid entail in perpetuity......In Ireland the impending ruin of the country compelled a bold and startling breach upon all entailed rights, the success of which has led to further legislation for that country in the same direction. The principle of feudalism is, therefore, entirely broken down; but in detail much more requires to be done, in order to gain the needful practical fruits of liberty, so far as regards the land. There are municipal boroughs which on one side are completely barred up and restrained from development, because the land is tied up in entail, or because the proprietor does not choose to sell. This is really a monstrous injustice. And throughout the countless villages of England, the all but universal rule is that no land is to be bought by any poor man. To us nothing seems more fundamentally necessary in a free country, or more evidently clear, than that the law ought to give to every borough the absolute right, as it would do to a railway company, of purchasing from any and every proprietor whatever land may be needed for the convenient accommodation of its resident population in the way of house and garden room, and for the health and recreation of its inhabitants in the way of squares or parks. As little can we doubt that, in some way, there should be secured for every village or township the means of providing every inhabitant with a comfortable home, whether he choose to rent it or to purchase it as his own. That the owners of property should have the power to limit the cottage accommodation, according to their will, or that they should, by the nature of their tenure, be prevented from selling ground on which poor men may make themselves a home, is what we are fully persuaded the English people will not much longer bear. Where there is a will, there is a way; and whatever difficulties there may be in finding out a method of adjustment, the thing must certainly be accomplished. The Poor Law organization, in connexion with a system of land tribunals, would probably afford the basis on which a scheme of parochial or township management and authority, as to such points as these, might be constructed. And the long-demanded registry of titles will make transfer of property easy and cheap, and its tenure sure.

"England is the country of compromises and amalgamations. Our population is a rich amalgam; our constitution is a system of compromises. Our judicial procedures and our legislation are full of compromises; our Church, as by law established, is a compromise founded upon a compromise. And we apprehend that in this matter likewise the English solution of present difficulties must eventually take the form of compromise. Unlike most other countries of Europe where the peasantry have been fully emancipated from oppression and from prædial ties, England will retain her wealthy landed aristocracy, as the Corinthian capital of her column, as the diadem upon her head. She will also retain her large and wealthy agricultural tenants, a race of men of whom she has great reason to be proud, the fit appendage and counterpart of her nobility. Many of these will, no doubt, to some considerable extent, become proprietors of land. In the neighbourhood of large towns, and where the land is particularly rich and profitable, a smaller class of farms will be in great request, manageable by men of moderate capital and great skill or energy. As agricultural intelligence and science grow up to something like maturity, and become diffused through the agricultural community, and as capital becomes more abundant, a class of freeholders, cultivating their own estates of moderate size, will emulate in wealth and prosperity the large tenant farmers. Large farms will come to be worked by *firms* in partnership, and a class of able managers will be employed, who will often rise to the position of partners. Small farms will be rare, and only tenanted to profit by men of more than ordinary skill, science, and personal energy, who, by means of these, may be able to work their way upward to larger holdings. There will be countless multitudes of small tenements, with a few acres of ground attached, which will be owned and occupied by peasant labourers, whose sons are mostly employed as labourers upon large neighbouring farms, and by operatives or small shopkeepers who have invested their savings in their purchase. We hold that every labourer ought to be able, if he has the means, to purchase a cottage and a small plot of land, so as to provide himself a home. The man that toils upon the ground has a right to have his own home there. The dependence of labourers upon miserable cottage vacancies, and the insufficient number as well as accommodation of the rural cottages, compelling indecent habits and a disgusting overcrowding of the inmates, are nuisances and shames that need at once to be remedied. After one generation had provided themselves with cottage homes and gardens, the increase in demand for them would not be very great. And what more beautiful sight than to see the domain of the wealthy landowner belted round by border-lines of cottages, the property of a happy, thrifty, and independent peasantry, whose families gain their living by working on the estate? There is nothing incompatible and impracticable in this. It would still be open to the landlord to build and let cottages, if he pleased. And if they were such as the Duke of Bedford and Lord Leicester have built for their labourers, the peasants might, if they had security against sudden ejectment, in some instances prefer renting such tenements to buying or building their own. The competition, in these cases, would be wholesome.

"The effect of such a reform as we advocate would not only be to set before the young labourer an object to save for,—a worthy hope and ambition which he might reasonably expect to attain,—thus tending to make him frugal and provident; it would *also* effect a revolution in the dwellings of the poor throughout the rural districts. Let any one compare the homes of the peasant proprietors of the Rhineland, of Switzerland, of the Tyrol, or of the Norman Isles, with the hovels of too many of our peasantry, and he will see what nations and races not so fond of comfort as we English are reputed to be will do for themselves, when they feel that they are building, enlarging, improving, beautifying their own homes. Here, then, would come in another grand educational influence, without the co-operation of which much of the instruction bestowed in schools must be in vain.

"The operation of all this upon the labourer's hopes and views for his family will be apparent. The peasant proprietors of Switzerland set a high value on education for their children; they know its worth. Let a man have a chance of rising a little way in the world, of leaving a place and a name behind for his family, and helping to set them a little higher than he has climbed himself; such a man will know how to prize a practical school training for his children. In fact, let frugality, providence, and an honourable ambition, once be developed in the character of the poor man; and he cannot but begin intelligently and far-sightedly to regard the future career of his offspring. How can the hopeless, reckless, from-hand-to-mouth labourer be expected to care for his child's education?

"This refers to the *peasantry* of the country. But whatever acts upon their character, must re-act upon the character of the town operatives. Besides, these also would be acted upon directly by such reforms as have been indicated. There are few working men to whom the prospect of an easy investment of their money in land or houses would not prove much more stimulating than the premium offered by the Savings' Bank. Moreover, better cottages in the country would lead to better cottages in towns. In towns, however, other things ought to be done. Corporations should do their duty, by securing a full proportion of comfortable separate cottages, with yards or gardens, as far as possible, for the use of the labouring population; and by enforcing the strictest regulations and scrutiny in regard to lodging-houses. London has set a sad example, in building handsome streets and forgetting to provide cheap and clean and wholesome accommodation for the poor. For how much of the dreadful demoralisation of London and our large towns generally is this sort of neglect to blame! Assuredly, education in many cases will be of little purpose so long as our slums and courts, and many-storied tenements in low neighbourhoods, remain as they are. *Their* education is undoing the Christian school education."

CHAPTER XI.

KINGSLEY'S PHILOSOPHY.

By the foregoing remarks we have cleared the way for that which is the special object of these chapters, an examination of Mr. Kingsley's philosophy, especially as related to his theology. The bearing of the one of these upon the other has been already implied, and will appear more distinctly as we proceed. Our readers, generally, are aware of the relation in which Mr. Kingsley stands to Mr. Maurice. The two names are commonly, and justly, coupled together. Their philosophy is one. We do not know one particular in which they disagree. Mr. Kingsley, indeed, speaks out more plainly than his more cautious and cloudy friend. His philosophy is more strongly defined; and yet, strange to say, his theology has far more of evangelical savour and spirit. As a necessary consequence, he is more frequently and obviously inconsistent. His philosophy and his theology are often at variance. Mr. Maurice is only able to avoid this by "putting a veil upon his face," whether he appears as the philosophical *mystophantes*, or as the theologian. He has set himself, moreover, to produce a systematic synthesis of his philosophy and theology, in the form of a volume of "Essays;" the result of which could only be such an amalgam as, if it were to retain any colour or semblance of Christianity, could not but be full of ambiguity and obscurity. Mr. Kingsley's attempts at the same kind of thing, which are to be found in "Yeast," "Alton Locke," and "Hypatia," are fragmentary and partial. In his lectures on "Alexandria and her Schools," he is distinctively a philosopher, and his theology only slightly appears. In his "Sermons" he is *mainly* a practical Christian preacher, and his philosophy only "crops out" in places, or is recognisable here and there in tints and veins. Notwithstanding, however, such differences of form and manner in these two writers, we doubt if there is a single doctrine distinctive of the one which is not also taught, expressly or by implication, in the writings of the other.

We have already indicated, in the third chapter of this volume, (see p. 40,) that there is an important distinction between the Neo-Platonized Christianity of Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley, and the pantheistic idealism of Mr. Jowett. The Neo-Platonizers do, it must be conceded, believe in a personal, living, loving, God and Father. Nevertheless, it is not to be supposed that their philosophy is free from that pantheistic spirit which is so characteristic of modern transcendentalism. Indeed, we do not see how any Neo-Platonized philosophy can be free from Pantheism. All ancient physical philosophy was at least implicitly pantheistic, as all physical philosophy must be which knows nothing of proper creation. All speculation upon the causes and laws of life and being must be pantheistic, which does not take as its first postulate the principle implied in the sublime saying of the Psalmist: "He spake, and it was done: He commanded, and it stood fast." Incapable of the idea of a true creation, the unaided human mind vainly attempts, by theories of emanation, participation, diffusion, and the like, to bridge the gulf between the Eternal Self-Existent and the phenomenal and changing world. Mere philosophy could never conceive of a creation out of nothing, and therefore imagined that all things must be *developed out of God.* So the world was but the Divine Being coming forth from darkness into light, and from quiescence into activity. Thus, as Coleridge has put it, "the inevitable result of all consequent reasoning, in which the intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than itself can supply, and weens to possess within itself the centre of its own system, is—and from Zeno the Eleatic" (he might have said, from Thales the Milesian) "to Spinoza, and from Spinoza to the Schellings, Okens, and their adherents of the present day, ever has been—Pantheism under one or other of its modes, *the least* *repulsive of which"*—these are weighty and memorable words—"*differs from the rest, not in its consequences, which are one and the same in all, and in all alike are practically atheistic, but only as it may express the striving of the philosopher himself to hide these consequences from his own mind.*"* Platonism is by no means an exception to this rule. Indeed, its pre-existent archetypal world, its doctrine of "participation," its "soul of the world," its metempsychosis, mark it out as affording a most congenial basis for a fully developed system of Pantheism.† And when this philosophy had been impregnated by the oriental theory of emanations, such as we now find in the Brahminical and Persian theosophies, no wonder that there grew up, under the hands of subtle Alexandrian speculators, so artificial and complete a pantheistic philosophy as that of the Neo-Platonists. That this philosophy was essentially and characteristically a Pantheism, none can dispute; least of all, the author of "Hypatia,"‡ though this fact is kept a good deal out of sight in the Alexandrian "Lectures." The philosophy of Schelling, "the Plotinus of Germany," as he has been called, was, in many respects, identical with that of the Neo-Platonists, and, as we have the just cited authority of his follower, Coleridge, for affirming, was not less truly pantheistic. Coleridge himself endeavoured to combine and harmonize the Neo-Platonism of Schelling with Christianity; but that in this he failed is, we think, very evident from his own admissions in his comments on Schelling's philosophy, written in his later years, and published posthumously by his daughter, as an Appendix to the "*Biographia Literaria.*" These comments show, that he shrunk from the logical consequences and development of those very principles of Schelling's philosophy which, in his earlier years, he had adopted as his own, perceiving them to be inconsistent with the personality of God, and with the free-will of man. On this point the remarks of his accomplished and lamented daughter are very important. They occur in a note to chapter ix. of the "*Biographia Literaria,*" and are as follows:—

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* "*Biographia Literaria.*" Aldine Edition, vol. i., p. 154, *note.* Also "The Friend," vol. iii., p. 214. Edition of 1844.

† See Note at the end of this chapter, on "The Pantheism of Ancient Philosophy."

‡ See the philosophical prelection which Mr. Kingsley has put into the mouth of the celebrated virgin philosopher of Alexandria, in the first volume of "Hypatia," pp. 177–190. First Edition.

> "In the preceding chapter Mr. C. speaks of Schelling's philosophy as if it had his entire approval, and had been adopted by him in its whole extent. Yet it is certain that, soon after the completion of the '*Biographia Literaria,*' he became dissatisfied with the system, considered as a fundamental and comprehensive scheme, intended to exhibit the relations of God to the world and man. He objected to it as essentially pantheistic...... To Mr. C. it appeared, as originally set forth, to labour under deep deficiencies,—to be radically inconsistent with a belief in God, as Himself moral and intelligent—as beyond and above the world—as the Supreme Mind to which the human mind owes homage and fealty,—inconsistent with any just view and deep sense of the moral and spiritual being of man."—*Biographia Literaria*, vol. i., p. 170.

This is a monitory paragraph, especially as Coleridge was never able to find a better transcendentalism to substitute for that which, being weighed in the balances, was found wanting. The only extant "system of philosophy of S. T. C." is that which he at length confessed to be "essentially pantheistic." It is clear in what "succession" of philosophical teachers Neo-Platonists must take their place. Plato, Plotinus, the pseudo-Dionysius, Erigena, Schelling, and Coleridge, —these are the links in their chain of philosophical descent. Their predecessors, at least, have all been in the pantheistic vein, down to Coleridge himself. Will the present race of Neo-Platonists be better able to reconcile their philosophy with their Christianity than was such a thinker as Coleridge?

Our last words, however, have assumed the fundamental Neo-Platonism of Mr. Kingsley. Of this we shall now proceed to exhibit the proofs, referring for this purpose, principally, to his "Lectures" on the

Schools of Alexandria, where, as might be expected, he teaches his philosophy most distinctly and expressly.

"The father of Neo-Platonism," says Mr. Kingsley, "was Philo the Jew." Of his philosophy it is said by Mr. Jowett, who is better able than most men to give a judgment upon such a point as this, that "it was Judaism and Platonism at once; the strangest eclectic philosophy that the world ever saw; the belief in a personal God assimilated to the doctrine of ideas." He adds, most significantly, "*Like modern theologians* who have fallen under the influence of systems of philosophy in the interpretation of Scripture, Philo applied the Neo-Platonism of his day to the interpretation of the Mosaic writings."* Philonism was, in fact, a compound of Platonism, Orientalism, and Judaism; and if its author were not singly and absolutely "the father of Alexandrian Neo-Platonism," he was at any rate one of its earliest and most distinguished pioneers. Now, to the master-principle of Philo's philosophy Mr. Kingsley gives in his adhesion, with sufficient distinctness, at page 79 of his "Lectures," implying there his agreement with Philo, when "he seemed to himself to find in the sacred books of his nation that which agreed with the deepest discoveries of Greek philosophy; which explained and corroborated them." What were these "deepest discoveries of Greek philosophy," to obtain for which the sanction of his sacred books Philo put to so much torture the writings of Moses and the Prophets? What but the really pantheistic idealism of Plato? Accepting this, Philo gave up, *ipso facto*, the doctrine of a true creation, which he most elaborately yet absurdly explains away, after a fashion which Mr. Maurice has not disdained servilely to follow, and launched forth into a shoreless sea of wild speculation about "ideas," and "archetypes," and "powers," exchanging the glory of the Creator for such shadowy subtleties of thought as that the "Logos" was the "idea of ideas" and "archetype of archetypes." How bold and far gone Mr. Kingsley is in his quasi-Christian Philonizing, may be judged from the following extract:—

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* Jowett, vol. i., pp. 367, 369.

> "I cannot think that he" (Philo) "was unfair in supposing that he might hold at the same time the Jewish belief concerning creation, and the Platonic doctrine of the real existence of archetypal ideas, both of moral and of physical phenomena. I do not mean that such a conception was present consciously to the mind of the old Jews, as it was most certainly to St. Paul, a practised Platonic dialectician; but it seems to me, as to Philo, to be a fair, perhaps a necessary, corollary from the Genetic philosophy both of Moses and of Solomon."—*Alexandria and her Schools*, p. 89.

But, further, there can be no doubt that the writings of Philo directly influenced the theology and biblical exegesis of the Alexandrian Christian fathers. It is, besides, certain that the doctrinal development of Christianity, especially at Alexandria, was very early infected and corrupted, though it may, at the same time, have been, in some respects, beneficially expanded, by contact with pagan philosophy, and in particular with the current forms of Platonism. Justin Martyr was a Platonist before he was converted to Christianity. Pantænus was an Eclectic strongly tinged with Platonism. Origen and Clement of Alexandria, who succeeded to the teaching and ideas of Pantænus, carried his Platonism to a fuller development. As in the days before the Flood, so now, in a figurative sense, "the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair:" the doctrines of Christ were wedded to plausible human philosophies, and the progeny were gigantic growths of error. All the learning and piety of Origen can scarcely throw into shade the perilous heresies of which he was the father. It is precisely, however, with these half-paganised Christian "philosophers" that Mr. Kingsley sympathizes and accords. "They absorbed," he thinks, "into the sphere of Christianity all which was most valuable in the philosophies of Greece and Egypt,"*—the theories, that is to say, of archetypal ideas and of Divine emanations. They "presented Christianity to the minds of cultivated and scientific men in the only form in which it would have satisfied their philosophic aspirations;" they "made the best, perhaps the only, attempt yet made by men, to proclaim a true world-philosophy."* In other words, and to borrow the language of Coleridge in reference to another subject, they "paganised Christianity to christen paganism." ✓ The words which we have quoted from Kingsley—and others, full to the same effect, will occur in future quotations—imply not only a general approbation of the philosophized Christianity of these Alexandrian teachers, but a particular approval and acceptance of those philosophical theories, derived from Greece and Egypt, which they adopted from their predecessors and contemporaries of the heathen school of Neo-Platonism. It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain what, in the judgment of Mr. Kingsley, was the philosophical substratum common to both the Christian and the heathen schools of Alexandrian Neo-Platonism; for this must also be the foundation of his Neo-Platonized theology.

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* "Hypatia," Preface.

Now it is one purpose of Mr. Kingsley's "Lectures" on the Alexandrian Schools to define the distinctions which separated the Christian from the heathen Neo-Platonists. He admits that the two schools had "a common ground," that they had "many points in common," and that "during the whole period of their existence" they were mutually borrowing from each other."† The question then forces itself upon us, What could the Alexandrian Christians borrow from the heathen Neo-Platonism,—above all, how could they agree with it on many points,—without introducing into Christianity elements essentially pantheistic? Mr. Kingsley, indeed, keeps out of sight altogether the great and glaring fact,—elsewhere very distinctly admitted by him in several of his works, and otherwise indisputable,—that the heathen Neo-Platonism was essentially and thoroughly pantheistic. In a course of Lectures on the great fountain of scientific and fully-developed Pantheism, he scarcely ever refers to the subject of Pantheism. A casual and otherwise uninformed reader would certainly go through these Lectures without any other idea but that the Alexandrian Neo-Platonist philosophers were generally, like Philo the Jew, believers in a personal God; and that their philosophy included the most characteristic doctrines of Christianity, and approached it very nearly in purity and elevation. This defect in Mr. Kingsley's treatment of the subject, whether it proceeds from an intentional reserve or from inadvertence, is very significant. In any case, it obliges us to conclude that his sympathies in favour of heathen Neo-Platonism are too strong, and that his sense of its essential heathenish deficiency is far too weak.

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* "Alexandria and her Schools," p. 131. † *Ibid.*, pp. 80–82, 100.

It would have been well if Mr. Kingsley had expressed himself more definitely as to the "many points in common" by which the Christian and the heathen Neo-Platonisms were allied to each other. One common point is found in the belief that "the Logos or Dæmon speaks to the Reason of man;" but then this point, it is also implied, was common to Hindooism as well as to the Alexandrian schools.* If so, of course it is not a Christian idea of a personal Teacher of persons, but a principle of Oriental Pantheism. Connect with this "belief" that principle of Philo's philosophy already referred to,—that "the Logos" (whether personal, as Philo *inconsistently* believed, or impersonal, as heathen Alexandrians and Hindoos believed) was the great Pan-Archetype, "the idea of ideas," in whom or in which the super-sensible world subsisted;—and we shall have fixed two "common points" in the two Alexandrian Platonisms. And then, if we add to these points what is contained in the following passage, we shall have a view of all "the common ground," so far as Mr. Kingsley describes it, pertaining to these schools.

> "I do not say that there is, or ought to be, a Christian Metaphysic. I am speaking, as you know, merely as a historian, dealing with facts; and I say that there was one; as

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[*] "Alexandria and her Schools," p. 97.

profound, as scientific, as severe, as that of the Pagan Neo-Platonists; starting, indeed, as I shall show hereafter, on many points from common ground with theirs. One can hardly doubt, I should fancy, that many parts of St. John's Gospel and Epistles, whatever view we may take of them, if they are to be called anything, are to be called metaphysic and philosophic. And one can no more doubt that before writing them he had studied Philo, and was expanding Philo's thought in the direction which seemed fit to him, than we can doubt it of the earlier Neo-Platonists. The technical language is often identical; so are the primary ideas from which he starts, howsoever widely the conclusions may differ. If Plotinus considered himself an intellectual disciple of Plato, so did Origen and Clemens. And I must, as I said before, speak of both, or of neither. My only hope of escaping delicate ground lies in the *curious fact, that rightly or wrongly, the form in which Christianity presented itself to the old Alexandrian thinkers was so utterly different from the popular conception of it in modern England, that one may very likely be able to tell what little one knows about it, almost without mentioning a single doctrine which now influences the religious world.*

"But far greater is my fear, that to a modern British auditory, trained in the school of Locke, much of ancient thought, heathen as well as Christian, may seem so utterly the product of the imagination, so utterly without any corresponding reality in the universe, as to look like mere unintelligible madness. Still, I must try; only entreating my hearers to consider, that how much soever we may honour Locke and his great Scotch followers, we are not bound to believe them either infallible, or altogether world-embracing; that there have been other methods than theirs of conceiving the Unseen; that *the common ground from which both Christian and Heathen Alexandrians start, is not merely a private vagary of their own; but one which has been accepted undoubtingly, under so many various forms, by so many different races, as to give something of an inductive probability that it is not a mere dream, but may be a right and true instinct of the human mind.* I mean the belief that the things which we see—nature and all her phenomena—are temporal, and born only to die; mere shadows of some unseen realities, from whom their laws and life are derived; while the eternal things which subsist without growth, decay, or change, the only real, only true existing things, in short, are certain things which are not seen; inappreciable by sense, or understanding, or imagination, perceived only by the conscience and the reason. And that, again, the problem of philosophy, the highest good for man, that for the sake of which death were a gain, without which life is worthless, a drudgery, a degradation, a failure, and a ruin, is to discover what those unseen eternal things are, to know them, possess them, be in harmony with them, and thereby alone to rise to any real and solid power, or safety, or nobleness. It is a strange dream. But you will see that it is one which does not bear much upon 'points of controversy,' any more than on 'Locke's philosophy:' nevertheless, when we find this same strange dream arising, apparently without intercommunion of thought, among the old Hindoos, among the Greeks, among the Jews; and lastly, when we see it springing again in the Middle Age, in the mind of the almost forgotten author of the '*Deutsche Theologie*,' and so becoming the parent, not merely of Luther's deepest belief, or of the German mystic schools of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but of the great German Philosophy itself as developed by Kant, and Fichte, and Schelling, and Hegel, we must at least confess it to be a popular delusion, if nothing better, vast enough and common enough to be worth a little patient investigation, wheresoever we may find it stirring the human mind.

"But I have hope, still, that I may find sympathy and comprehension among some, at least, of my audience, as I proceed to examine the ancient realist schools of Alexandria, on account of their knowledge of the modern realist schools of Germany. For I cannot but see, that a revulsion is taking place in the thoughts of our nation upon metaphysic subjects, and that Scotland, as usual, is taking the lead therein. That most illustrious Scotchman, Mr. Thomas Carlyle, first vindicated the great German Realists from the vulgar misconceptions about them which were so common at the beginning of this century, and brought the minds of studious men to a more just appreciation of the philosophic severity, the moral grandeur, of such thinkers as Emmanuel Kant, and Gottlieb Fichte. To another Scotch gentleman, who, I believe, has honoured me by his presence here to-night, we owe most valuable translations of some of Fichte's works; to be followed, I trust, by more. And though, as a humble disciple of Bacon, I cannot but think that the method both of Kant and Fichte possesses somewhat of the same inherent defect as the method of the Neo-Platonist school, yet I should be most unfair did I not express my deep obligations to them, and advise all those to study them carefully, who wish to gain a clear conception either of the old Alexandrian schools, or of those intellectual movements which are agitating the modern mind, and which will, I doubt not, issue in a clearer light, and in a nobler life, if not for us, yet still for our children's children for ever."—*Alexandria and her Schools*, pp. 81–85.

Here Mr. Kingsley details very distinctly what is the pedigree of his philosophy. Undoubtedly, for reasons we have before intimated, a pantheistic philosophy—often idealist as well—has prevailed wherever unaided heathenism has pushed its speculations far. This was to be expected; but no more proves this wide-spread dream to be truth, than the coincident moral abominations of heathenism in different lands are to be presumed, because of their recurrence and coincidence, to be the standard of morality and virtue. It will be observed that the very philosophies, ancient and modern, which Coleridge declared to be pantheistic,—which the ripe reflection and extended experience of his later years condemned as unsatisfactory and immoral,—are quoted by Mr. Kingsley with the highest respect, and without intimating more than a shade of disapproval here and there. He *chooses*, without exception or caveat, to fraternize with that "illustrious Scotchman, Mr. Carlyle," and with such thinkers as Fichte.*

Moreover, in the passage we have quoted, philosophy and religion are plainly identified, and the "unseen, eternal things" of which St. Paul speaks in 2 Cor. iv. 18, (for the allusion to this passage is too plain to be doubted,) the knowledge of which is "the highest good for man, for the sake of which death were a gain,"—the truths which sustained Paul under all his "affliction," and made him count it "light" in comparison of the "exceeding and eternal weight of glory" to which he looked forward,—these are the things which it "is the problem of philosophy to discover," and which "the German philosophy, as developed by Kant, and Fichte, and Schelling, and" (let there be no shrinking) "Hegel," has mainly contributed to define and certify! Verily, St. Paul is here placed in strange companionship! He, who taught that the "world by wisdom knew not God," who protested that he had no fellowship with the "wisdom of this world," which is "foolishness with God;" he, the great antagonist of "science, falsely so called," of "philosophy and vain deceit;"—made to be the patron of Brahminical theosophy, Persian Soofism, and Alexandrian subtlety: he,—a "practised Platonic dialectician!" he,—the father of German philosophy, the prototype and pioneer of "Kant, and Fichte, and Schelling, and Hegel!"—why not add at once, of Oken and Strauss? Carlyle is a follower, or at least a fellow-disciple, of Paul: why not, also, Emerson and Parker? It is in perfect consistency with such sentiments as these for Mr. Kingsley to say, of the "form of Christianity" which he approves, and which he attributes to that school of Christian Neo-Platonists with which he has identified his own views, that he may tell all he knows about it, "*almost without mentioning a single doctrine which now influences the Christian world.*" If this is true, it will be held by most persons to be a strong presumption, that "the form of Christianity" in question must be considered as more properly and essentially heathen than Christian,—the conclusion to which we have been reluctantly driven by all our other investigations.

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* Carlyle is *best known* by his "Memoirs of Sterling." No one can read that book and suppose him to be a Christian. But his Pantheism might be decidedly inferred from what is stated of the later opinions and career of Sterling by Julius Charles Hare in *his* Memoirs of that unhappy man. What Sterling became Carlyle is proud to teach us that he made him. And as to Fichte, what Kingsley says of him may with advantage be compared with the testimony of Coleridge, that his "theory degenerated into a crude *egoismus*, a boastful and hyperstoic hostility to Nature, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy; while his religion consisted in the assumption of a mere *ordo ordinans*, which we were permitted *exotericè* to call God," &c.—"*Biographia Literaria*," vol. i., pp. 159–161. See also MANSEL'S "Bampton Lectures," First Edition, p. 74.

What, in fact, according to Mr. Kingsley's own statement, is the sole essential distinction between the Christian and the heathen schools of Neo-Platonism? Merely this:—

> "Plotinus said, 'I am striving to bring the God which is in us, into harmony with the God which is in the universe.' Pantænus, Origen, Clement, and Augustine" [whose name is very unfairly brought into this connexion, as he was not of the Alexandrian school, but of a different country, age, genius, and sympathies] "would have answered, 'And we, on the other hand, assert that the God which is in the universe, is the same as the God which is in you, and is striving to bring you into harmony with Himself.' There is the *experimentum crucis*. There is the vast gulf between the Christian and the heathen schools, which when any man had overleaped, the whole problem of the universe was from that moment inverted."—*Alexandria, &c.*, p. 100.

So this is *all* the difference between Christianity and Neo-Platonism. A few pages farther on, however, Mr. Kingsley, who does not appear to have very completely premeditated the points, or very accurately laid out the plan, of these "Lectures," brings into view what seems to be presented as another point of difference, and yet may, perhaps, be intended to be regarded as subordinate to the former.

> "The Neo-Platonists said, that there is a Divine element in man. The Christian philosophers assented fervently, and raised the old disagreeable question, 'Is it in every man? In the publicans and harlots, as well as in the philosophers? We say that it is.' And there again the Neo-Platonist finds it over hard to assent......For the herd, Plotinus cannot say that there is anything Divine in them."—*Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

We have now laid before our readers the agreement and the difference between the "two schools" of Alexandria, according to Mr. Kingsley's presentation of the case. Let us, then, ask,—If the one of these is heathen, on what ground is the other to be called Christian? The heathen was a pantheistic philosophy, and *as such* taught that "God was in man." Where is the protest against this Pantheism on the part of the Christian school? For all that appears from Mr. Kingsley's exposition and criticism, the Christian and heathen ideas, as to the immanence of the Deity, agreed; the only question being as to the extent and impartiality of the

Divine influence. Where are the Christian doctrines of creation, of the separate personality and individual responsibility of man, of atonement and redemption, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in their mutual relations, and in their respective offices towards man? Mr. Kingsley, indeed, makes a forced and ineffectual attempt, at pages 107–8, to hang on the doctrine of the personality of the Logos to that of the universality of Divine influence. But this is plainly an afterthought, and no just inference from the distinctions he has so emphatically and so definitely stated.

It is proper to add, however, that Mr. Kingsley's distinctions are not just either to the heathen or to the Christian Neo-Platonists. He has not informed his readers of that which was an essential and universal principle of heathen Platonism, and particularly of Neo-Platonism,—the belief in the necessary defect and evil of matter. *This* was supposed to limit the power and benefit of the Divine life in all things, in the Kosmos, in animals, in man. The heathen Neo-Platonists believed as fully, as Mr. Kingsley says that their Christian rivals did, in the universal immanence and pervasiveness of the Divine (*τὸ ϑεῖον*) in man, and in the universe; but they believed that the defect and vice of matter limited its *prevalence*. Hence they came to the conclusion, that in many men it was altogether neutralised and submerged in the flesh; and that only the philosophers who, by temperance, study, and self-denying asceticism, sought to subdue the flesh, could become truly illuminated and Divine. Whereas Clement and Origen, while retaining many Platonic ideas about the essential evil of matter, as they also believed in its eternity, taught that by repentance and faith in Christ all men might become partakers of the Holy Ghost, and thus be, by grace, more and better than the Neo-Platonists could become by their philosophy. The strong tincture of Neo-Platonic views which they retained, in reference to matter and the flesh, and the virtue of asceticism, passed from them, with certain modifications, into the general faith and practice both of the Eastern and Western Churches, and contributed powerfully to form and fix the doctrines of monasticism and priestly celibacy. Now *here,* it is important to remark, is a point of contrast between those Alexandrian Neo-Platonists and their modern disciples. Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley do *not* believe in the independent existence of matter, or the *virus* of the flesh. They are spiritualists and transcendental idealists. With them ideas and archetypes are all, or the causes of all. The tough and stubborn material on which the spiritual energies of Neo-Platonism were supposed to work is taken out of the way, and the super-sensible and the spiritual have absolute lordship. There is only one source of opposition to the true and Divine, and that is self-will. Self is the only sphere out of which the Divine may be excluded; self-will the only ultimate and efficient antagonist to the universal Spirit. Self-will, in fact, with Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley, takes the place of the flesh and of matter in the system of their ancient prototypes.

Passing from negations and distinctions, we find that Mr. Kingsley thus defines positively the "Christian Neo-Platonist" principle, which he adopts as the philosophical basis of his theology :—

> "The Logos, the Divine Teacher in whom both Christians and heathens believed, was the very archetype of men, and He had proved that fact by being made flesh, and dwelling bodily among them, that they might behold His glory, full of grace and truth, and see that it was at once the perfection of man and the perfection of God; that that which was most Divine was most human, and that which was most human, most Divine. That was the outcome of *their* metaphysic, that they had found the Absolute One; because One existed in whom the apparent antagonism between that which is eternally, and that which becomes in time, between the ideal and the actual, between the spiritual and the material, in a word, between God and man, was explained and reconciled for ever."—*Alexandria and her Schools*, p. 123.

We need not say that we have here the "root-idea" of the Kingsley and Maurice theology. In our chapters on Mr. Maurice, we have shown how this idea unfolds, and how it affects his theology throughout. Let us now adduce the strongest confirmation of the truth of our former conclusions, and the most luminous illustration of the essential character of this theology, that we have met with. In reading Mr. Vaughan's "Hours with the Mystics," we came to a passage in which he describes one of the main principles of the theology of Ruysbroek, (A.D. 1350,) a German Mystic. This passage struck us as containing the very pith and quintessence of the Maurician gospel, and as such we transcribed it into our note-book. A few days after, taking up the September number of "Fraser's Magazine," we observed that it contained a review of Mr. Vaughan's work, which, as we expected, proved to be from the pen of Mr. Kingsley, there being not only the unmistakeable identity of his style, but also the signature of his initials; and in this article we had the satisfaction of finding that Mr. Kingsley appropriated the paragraph in question as embodying his own theology.

Mr. Vaughan supposes Ruysbroek to be explaining his theology to Tauler (who has been currently, but, it now seems, erroneously, supposed to be the author of the "*Deutsche Theologie,*" referred to in a previous extract from Mr. Kingsley); and he makes him thus express his fundamental belief as a Christian divine; the authorities for this representation being Engelhardt and Arnswaldt, whom Mr. Vaughan quotes in his Appendix.

> "I believe that the Son is the image of the Father, that in the Son have dwelt from all eternity, foreknown and contemplated by the Father, the prototypes of all mankind. We existed in the Son before we were born. He is the creative ground of all creatures,—the eternal cause and principle of their life. The highest essence of our being rests, therefore, in God,—exists in His image in the Son."—*Hours with the Mystics*, vol. i., p. 275.

Of this "utterance" Mr. Kingsley speaks as "containing the very key-note and central idea of mysticism;" he characterizes it as "essentially true," and "inexpressibly important," so "that twenty pages of comment upon it would not have been mis-devoted;" and complains that Mr. Vaughan "has passed it over without a word." If Mr. Vaughan, however, has not thought fit to comment on this "utterance," he has on another, which is precisely equivalent to it. He remarks, in reference to Angelus Silesius, a pantheistic monkish versifier of the seventeenth century, that—

> "He seems to believe that through Christ, in some way, every man is a Divine son of God, if he will only think so. All he has to do is to realise this sonship; then he becomes, *by grace*, all that the Son of God is by *nature*, The obvious result of this mysticism is to identify man with the Son."—*Hours with the Mystics*, p. 341.

So old is this Maurician heresy. Its roots derive from pantheistic heathen philosophy; its very form and flower flourished congenially in the Middle Ages; it re-appeared, with some modifications, in the dark and turbid systems of Behmen and Fox; it is now adopted and expounded by the *alumni* of Trinity College, Cambridge.* It is a regression to the darkness which revelation had dissipated, and is the result, at least in its present form, of self-centred and self-sufficient philosophizing on the part of those who refuse to accept the plain discoveries of creative power and redeeming holiness and love.

The last clause in our latest quotation illustrates the point which we have had in view throughout all our remarks on Mr. Kingsley's philosophy. The doctrine taught by himself and Mr. Maurice so far approximates to Pantheism as it tends to confound the human and the Divine personality. With pantheistic materialism Mr. Kingsley has no sympathy;

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* See p. 9. Mr. Kingsley himself, however, though a Cambridge man, was not educated at Trinity, but at Magdalen College. His introduction to Coleridgism, or at least his preparation to receive Coleridgean influences, dates from a period prior to his going to Cambridge. It appears that he had been privately educated under the care of the Rev. Derwent Coleridge, for whose benefit the philosopher, his father, had written many of his "Notes on English Divines," and to whom Mr. Maurice dedicated his "Kingdom of Christ."

he is thoroughly a spiritualist. He is in no danger of being led, by his philosophy, to merge God in an objective universe; but he sums up the universe in God. He is in danger of absorbing all proper human personality into the Divine. In this sense he misapplies the passage, "In Him we live and move and have our being," to suit his own philosophy, remarking, at the same time, that the text does not say that He is in all things. This distinction, however, is without a difference, on the Platonic theory of participation, fit root for the oriental schemes of emanation; and we fear that, logically, the distinction between Mr. Kingsley and a pantheist is not very great. The difference between his philosophy and confessed Pantheism is not so much "in its consequences," to adopt Coleridge's words, but mainly "as it may express the striving of the philosopher himself to hide these consequences from his own mind."

We do not, however, mean to charge Mr. Kingsley with being actually a pantheist. There is Pantheism in his premises and his principles, but he rejects Pantheism in his conclusions and in his practice; just as High-Church Evangelicals let in Popery with their pet pride of apostolical succession, but reject it in their doctrines of justification and sanctification. Clement and Origen held some principles which, logically followed out, implied Pantheism; nevertheless they worshipped a personal God and Father no less truly than they believed in a personal Christ. The writings of the pseudo-Dionysius are rankly pantheistic; yet, for many centuries, he passed with true saints of God, such, for instance, as Bernard of Clairvaux, for an all but inspired Christian teacher, and his high-sounding phrases were quoted by such saintly men with the highest reverence and in a truly pious sense. That mighty logician of the ninth century, John Scotus Erigena, was unquestionably a Neo-Platonizing pantheist in philosophy; yet a recent able critic says that "several of the pantheistic consequences logically derivable" (from his premises) "were so traversed by Christian principles and spiritual agencies, that Scotus never lost his faith entirely, either in the personality of God, or in the supernatural teaching of the Bible; the holy influences of childhood, the affectionate lessons of some gentle teacher, or the prayers, it may be, of an Irish Monica, had never been forgotten; they still guided, softened, and restrained him where he seems to totter on the brink of unbelief." Most of the leading Middle-Age mystics, influenced by such writers as the pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena, held pantheistic principles, and some, there is reason to believe, pushed these principles to their blasphemous and immoral consequences; but many of them, unaware of the real purport of the forms of speech which they admired, were undoubtedly men of spotless purity, and of Christian piety and faith. Coleridge, as we have seen, embraced and taught a philosophy which, by his own later testimony, was essentially pantheistic; yet that very record in which this is testified seems to warrant us in concluding that, at least in his middle and later life, he himself was not consciously a pantheist. And so, although the philosophy of Mr. Kingsley is, as Neo-Platonism always has been and must be, radically and essentially pantheistic, he himself is no pantheist. Indeed, he speaks very strongly against Pantheism, as if his approximation to it in many points made him the more sensitively afraid of being identified with it; and it is only just to him to say that there is, perhaps, no man living who so zealously, so frequently, and so eloquently insists upon the personality and present rule and providence of God, as the eternal and the living God, and as essentially *holy, just, and good.* This is a marked characteristic of most of his writings. We may here note that especially in "Alton Locke" and in "Phaethon" he exposes and opposes that form of Pantheism which would merge man, nature, and God in one vast ocean-like All, which possesses, indeed, unity, law, universal sympathies and harmonies, and a rule of progress and development, but includes no all-ruling, intelligent Personality. "Phaethon" is expressly anti-Emersonian and, in this sense, anti-pantheist.

Nevertheless, though Mr. Kingsley denounces the degraded Neo-Platonist Pantheism of Proclus and the latest Alexandrians, and the corresponding school, as he considers it, of American spiritualism, he cannot shake off his own quasi-Pantheism. This must, in part, explain his strong sympathetic admiration of Carlyle, which is so evident in his earlier writings, especially "Yeast" and "Alton Locke," and breaks out even in one of his later and simply didactic works, in the passage we have already quoted from "Alexandria and her Schools," wherein he speaks of Carlyle as "that most illustrious Scotchman," &c.; which has so manifestly tinctured his sentiments and infected his style; and which has even led him, in "Alton Locke," to repel, in Carlyle's behalf, the imputation of being an unbeliever.* We are happy, indeed, to know that in a private letter written with reference to our criticisms, Mr. Kingsley disclaims all sympathy with Carlyle's "theology, or quasi-theology," and says distinctly that "his 'eternities' and 'abysses' and such-like language are nothing to him but clouds and wind put in the place of a Personal God." We undoubtingly accept this disclaimer: but we must at the same time express our regret that Mr. Kingsley's earlier sentiments of a different stamp, and his later tribute of high admiration, remain *in print* without retraction or qualification.

Mr. Kingsley's own quasi-Pantheism must also be taken as the explanation of the fact, that he even ventures upon an attempt, in that article in "Fraser's Magazine" to which we have already referred, to vindicate the Hindoo Yogi's "pantheistic identification of subject and object, worshipper and worship," as bringing into view, as "the ideal goal of man," that which "we confess it to be in the Communion Service," where we say that "we dwell in Christ, and Christ in us; that we are one with Christ, and Christ with us!" With such a form of Pantheism as that described in the last paragraph, Mr. Kingsley has little sympathy; but it is no less really a form of Pantheism to lose man in God, than to merge God in the All: he is perpetually upon the verge of sinking the personality of individual man in the great all-entering, all-pervasive, all-controlling Personality of God; or, as it has been well said of Neo-Platonic mysticism, of "*transubstantiating* the whole universe into God." Enough has already been said to justify this observation, and its truth will appear yet more clearly, as we proceed to show how Mr. Kingsley's philosophy affects his manner of stating the doctrines of the Gospel.

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* See "Alton Locke," pp. 135, 230, 231. Mrs. Sara Coleridge, in her edition of her father's "*Biographia Literaria*," vindicates for Carlyle the character of a truly "religious" man. This reminds us of *Novalis*, who calls Spinoza a "God-intoxicated man." He who sneers at the doctrines of the Old Testament as "Hebrew old-clothes," is scarcely a religious man.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER XI.

On the Pantheism of Ancient Philosophy. See p. 247.

IN a lecture delivered by the author in Exeter Hall last January, he has thus more fully and distinctly expressed himself on some of the points referred to in the text.

"The endeavour of the philosophers, from first to last, was to imagine how the organized universe might be developed out of pre-existing rude and formless matter, by means of some inworking power and principle of movement and order which they chose, as I may say figuratively, to call God. This power and principle—this heartless and impersonal Divinity—they tried to imagine as somehow infused into the material universe, and as influencing and moulding it by a sort of universal, omnipotent, and omniscient instinct; by a sort of instinct, I say, not by conscious wisdom, voluntary power, or loving Providence. They had various theories—they gave their speculations different forms—but this was the common character of all the attempts by which they vainly essayed to bridge the gulf between the Eternal Self-existent, and this shadowy and changing world. Thus has human speculation on all these subjects, in seeking to wing its way from the earthly region of sense and matter of fact to the empyrean of ultimate truth and of original causes, ever fallen down ingloriously into the weltering chaos of Pantheism. A subtle and developed Pantheism is the substance of Brahminic Vedantism,—a grosser Pantheism was taught by Thales and the succeeding physical philosophers of the Ionian and early Grecian schools,—a sort of mathematical Pantheism was the doctrine of Pythagoras,—Pantheism is inwoven in the dreamy folds of Platonic idealism,—a pantheistic necessitarianism was the Stoic creed, and a pantheistic fate the Stoic god,—a most complex and logically reticulated Pantheism, in some respects nearly resembling that of the Brahminical philosophers, was taught by the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria. The only alternative left to philosophers, if they rejected Pantheism, was to accept

ancient philosophers generally
pantheists. A question as to Anaxagora

the atheistic materialism of Democritus and Epicurus. Unless, indeed, with wiser Socrates, they resolved to refrain from all speculation as to physical causes, and confined themselves to accepting and expounding the traditional faith in Providence and morals, in a personal God and a moral government."—*The Bible and Modern Progress*, pp. 23, 24.

A few remarks confirmatory and illustrative of these statements may, perhaps, be here introduced with advantage.

Professor W. Archer Butler denies that any philosopher before Anaxagoras, of whatever school, was a believer "in a God in any sense which a Christian reasoner would assign to that proposition." "One of the most difficult tasks," he says, "but one of the most necessary for the inquirer into the true spirit of a remote philosophy, is *a total abstraction of all local and modern ideas.*"......"We may think that, by a strong effort of imagination, we can adequately conceive this state of human reason in its first awful interview with nature; but we are still like those who, after looking at the Sun, pass suddenly into darkness: for a time there remains upon the eye the involuntary image of the brightness we have left. The conception of the free production of a universe by an Infinite Essence, altogether above and beyond it, is not elementary in human reason; it is not the step of the child, but the stride of the man."—*Lectures*, vol. i., pp. 291–4.

What he says of the Vedanta philosophy of Hindooism, applies very extensively to ancient philosophy. God was conceived of as "the Emanatory Cause—at once the efficient and the material cause—of the universe." And what follows is not less true of the Alexandrian than of the Indian Pantheism. "From God all proceeds—into Him all is to be ultimately resolved—as a spider extends and retracts its thread, or as a tortoise protrudes and then gathers back its lower limbs."—*Ibid.*, p. 260.

Yet, very justly does he say, at a later part of the same volume, "We are not to call these early labourers of reason 'Atheists;' for all, or almost all, admitted a governing principle in some sense. They were pantheists, in that higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associates the universe necessarily and irrevocably with its principle, yet does not wholly confound them, and even allows to the moving spirit [or principle] a certain superiority over the mass it pervades......Every investigation of the feeble and wavering theology of primitive times will deepen your reverence for that old and venerable record which, in the midst of so much uncertainty as even the wisest acknowledged, when they approached the relation of nature and its cause, calmly prefaced its story of the world with the declaration, without exception, reservation, or indecision, that 'in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.'"—*Ibid.*, pp. 295–6.

We have seen that Professor Butler allowed an exception in the case of Anaxagoras to this general statement as to the Pantheism of the ancient philosophers. The clearness, refinement, and elevation of the philosophical views of Anaxagoras are certainly wonderful; there can be no doubt that he was vastly in advance of his age, and worthy to command, as we know that he did command, the admiration of Socrates. Nevertheless, the writer must express his own belief that Mr. Lewes puts the case truly when he says, "The intelligence which Anaxagoras conceived was in no wise a moral intelligence; it was simply the *primum mobile*, the all-knowing and motive force by which the arrangement of the elements was effected."—LEWES's *Biog. Hist. Phil.*, p. 69. Still less probable, if we may venture to say so in opposition to so high an authority as Professor Butler's annotator, is the opinion maintained by Professor Thompson in a learned and able note, that Xenophanes was not a pantheist. The opposite opinion is held by M. Matter, ("History of the Alexandrian School," vol. iii., book vi., ch. xv.,) by Ritter, (vol. i., pp. 162, 430, 434–5,) by Butler, and by Lewes. The observations of the last-named are so pertinent and so well put, that we must quote from him again. "It is necessary to caution the reader against the supposition that by the One God Xenophanes meant a personal God, distinct from the universe......This point would never have been doubted, notwithstanding the ambiguity of language, if moderns had steadily kept before their minds the conceptions held by the Greeks of their gods, as personifications of the powers of nature. When Xenophanes argued against the polytheism of his contemporaries, he argued against their *personifying* as distinct deities the various aspects of The One. ......He was a monotheist therefore, but his monotheism was Pantheism; he could not separate God from the world, which was merely the manifestation of God; He could not conceive God as the One Existent, and admit the existence of a world *not* God. There could be but One Existence with many modes; that One was God."—*Biog. Hist. Phil.*, pp. 39, 40.

Professor Butler's exposition of Plato's philosophy as to "The Being" and "The Good" is one which, as his annotator, Professor Thompson, remarks, is inconsistent with the supposition of Plato's belief in "the personality of the Divine Essence, and with those passages in the *Timæus* and elsewhere, in which that personality seems to be clearly asserted." Yet Professor Thompson also states that, as thus expounded, Plato's "ancient interpreters" did "undoubtedly" all understand him, "Platonists and Neo-Platonists alike," and that such is "the view of most of his German expositors;" and ends by asking, "Are we to suppose that such passages [as seem to speak of the personality of the Divine Essence] are to be taken in an exclusively mythical or popular sense, and that we are to look to the *Republic* and *Philebus* as conveying Plato's interior meaning?"—BUTLER'S *Lectures*, vol. ii., pp. 61, 62.

In confirmation of the general view which has been supported in these remarks, reference may also be made to a very decided passage in Archbishop Whately's Annotations on Bacon's Essays, Third Edition, p. 145.

CHAPTER XII.

KINGSLEY'S THEOLOGY.

The central question in Christian theology is that which relates to the ground and nature of man's union with God in Christ. The solution of this question determines that of every other. Essential opposition here implies opposition throughout all the circumference of theology. Here, then, we find the root and centre of all the heresies of the Maurice-Kingsley School of baptized Platonic realism. Christian orthodoxy, notwithstanding all its minor varieties, has from the beginning held that Christianity is a remedial and restorative plan and work of grace,—an economy of Redemption. Mr. Kingsley holds, on the contrary, that the root from which Christianity is the legitimate and orderly development, "the bright, consummate flower," was planted before the Fall or the Creation, the apostasy of man being but a subordinate parenthesis in the history, progress, and destinies of the race. Thus Christianity is made to be, only in a subordinate and accommodated sense, a means and power of redemption. The reconciliation of *man* to God was never needed, seeing that the Eternal Word, ever and essentially one with the Father, has been from eternity and is essentially the Root and Archetype of humanity. As the Word or Son is by necessity of nature one with the Father, so, it is the doctrine of Mr. Kingsley, man is always one with the Son. What Christianity does is, by the manifestation of this truth in the person and mission of Jesus Christ, revealed as God in man and man in God, to make known to *men,* individually and distributively, their position and their privileges, and to exhibit before their eyes the actual life of their Divine-human Ideal and Exemplar, thus bringing into practical realisation and effect that union of God with men which has always virtually subsisted. Thus the at-one-ment, to use the word in the etymological sense which our modern philosophers affect, is not, according to their view, the union of estranged man to an offended but merciful God; it is simply the manifestation of a oneness, which never was, or could have been, violated. As surely as the seed, sown in fruitful soil and under a kindly sky, implies the fruit that is to be, or as the root involves the future flower, so surely did the necessary and constitutive relations of God and man imply, from eternity, the coming and incarnation of the God-man. From eternity, necessarily and naturally,—not in virtue of any decree or pre-arrangement of grace,—He has been and is the Mediator between God and man. Hence it follows, that all men are sons of God, not by grace or by adoption, but by nature,—*all* are sons of God *in Christ;* and Christian baptism becomes the sign of a fact existing prior to birth, existing from the beginning. All men, by constitution of nature, are "members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven." * Mr. Kingsley distinctly ridicules the idea that only "when we have been convinced of sin, and converted, and received the earnest of God's Spirit, by which we cry, Abba, Father, *then* we shall have a right to call ourselves God's children." † And, in perfect consistency, he claims for all men, as men, the position of being *risen with Christ.* (Col. iii. 1.) ‡ So he repeatedly indulges in such sarcasms as that in "Phaethon," (page 71,) where such a lady as he likes to call a "Low-Church saint" is represented as "making the children every week-day pray that they may become God's children, and then teaching them every Sunday evening the Catechism, which says that they are so already." And in another place he says, in language too explicit to allow of any doubt as to his meaning,—

> "You have a right to believe that, *as human beings*, you are dead with Christ to the old Adam, the old, sinful, brutal pattern

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* "Sermons on National Subjects," First Series, p. 14.

† "Sermons for the Times," p. 256.

‡ "Sermons on National Subjects," First Series, p. 86. In a just sense the orthodox Evangelical holds as strongly as Mr. Kingsley, that all men are the children of God, and not, as he says they hold, "the children of the devil." But not all men, only true believers, are "in Christ," and "children of God by faith in Jesus Christ."

of man. Baptism is the sign of it to you......And the Lord's Supper also is a sign to us that, *as human beings*, we are risen with Christ to a new life. A new life is our birthright. We have a right to live a new life. We have a duty to live a new life. We have a power, if we will, to live a new life; such a life as we never could live, if left to ourselves; a noble, holy, godly, manful, Christlike, Godlike life, bred and nourished in us by the Spirit of Christ.......The Lord's Supper is the pledge and token to us, that we all have a share in the likeness of Christ, the true pattern of man; and that if we come and claim our share, He will surely bestow it on us.......He who is the eternal life of men will nourish us, body, soul, and spirit, with that everlasting life of His, even as our bodies are nourished by that bread and wine."—*Sermons on National Subjects, Second Series*, pp. 136, 137, 139.

This is indeed the staple, substantial, and characteristic doctrine of Mr. Kingsley's Sermons, except his "Village Sermons," the earliest, most earnest and practical, and decidedly most beautiful and powerful of his volumes.* Here, as he wrote more exclusively for the poor and unlettered, his philosophy and his heresies come far less into view, and he might pass muster, if not very closely challenged and scrutinised, as an orthodox divine. But though the doctrine just stated is an obvious corollary from his philosophy, and a fundamental and pervasive principle of his theology, it would not be difficult to produce passages, from nearly all his theological writings, which might seem to contradict it. In one passage which we have noted, Mr. Kingsley so far imitates the disingenuousness of Mr. Maurice (with whom such language is not unusual) as to speak, in High-Church phrase, of the "Holy Spirit, by which you were regenerate in holy baptism." † We presume that this is intended to mean, "the Holy Spirit, by which, at the time of receiving the baptismal ordinance, which declares your participation of this Spirit, you were already regenerate." We need hardly explain that the doctrine of his school, explicitly put, is that all men have been from the beginning *created* in Christ, (though this is really a contradiction in terms,) and that when the Son of God, the Head of the race, came forth into the world, as the incarnate Word, then in Him, the Christ, all men were begotten and born again into the fuller participation of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ, and into the possession of a better hope. Thus humanity, which subsisted in the Son of God, the Word, was regenerated,—"born again," and "risen again,"—in the same Word, as the Son of Man.*

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* While this chapter is passing through the press, Mr. Kingsley's last volume of sermons has come into our hands. This is perhaps more beautiful than even the "Village Sermons." There is nothing in its doctrine, however, to call for special remark, or to modify the criticisms and judgment in the text. It contains much lovely writing, much true and wholesome teaching, as opposed both to antinomians and servile ceremonialists or Popish work-mongers, and a good deal of heretical Kingsleyism, less tinctured, however, than usual by anti-evangelical virulence. We wish, in this connexion, to say to Mr. Kingsley that, in substance, his doctrine of *True Repentance*, as stated in this volume, is likewise and fully ours.

† "National Sermons," Second Series, p. 186.

Elsewhere truth and practical earnestness for the good of his fellow-men seem to break down Mr. Kingsley's scheme and fence of philosophy, and to hurry him into evangelical language, precisely such language as that which he upbraids Calvinists and "Low-Church saints" for using. Thus he writes:—

> "God must pardon us before we can have mercy on ourselves; God must change us before we can come right; God must give us eternal life in our hearts, before we can feel and enjoy that new life in us."—*Sermons on National Subjects, First Series*, p. 94.

And again:—

> "There is but one hope for us all,......to cast ourselves utterly on His boundless love and mercy......And then, my friends, how or why we cannot understand; but it is God's own promise, who cannot lie, that he will really and actually forgive

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* Of the doctrine of vicarious atonement we have already spoken, in part, in our discussion of Maurice's views, and shall treat more fully in the last four chapters of this volume. Here we confine ourselves, as far as possible, to what is specially characteristic in Mr. Kingsley's writings, as compared with others of our modern philosophic theologians. The discussion, indeed, is one which Mr. Kingsley himself almost entirely ignores. He does not argue against the doctrine, but supplants and supersedes it by the views which we have exhibited in the text: indeed, in his "Village Sermons," and sometimes elsewhere, he so far adapts himself to popular notions and feelings, as to use language which, to all ordinary apprehension, would seem to teach the doctrine itself in its orthodox and evangelical sense. See "Village Sermons," pp. 158, 159.

these sins of ours, and blot them out as if we had never done them, and give us clean hearts and right spirits, to live new lives, right lives, lives like His own life; so that our past sinful lives shall be behind us like a dream," &c.

Who now would suppose that such a preacher as this is the same man who wrote the early chapters in "Alton Locke," or the extracts which were given before? It is, however, a significant fact that, in proportion to the simpleness and moral destitution of those whom he addresses, and to his own direct and earnest purpose to reform and elevate them, Mr. Kingsley, like most other heterodox teachers, approximates to orthodoxy and evangelical colouring in his sentiments and manner of address.*

Since, according to Mr. Kingsley, all men are one with the Son, and in Him are *always* children of the Father; since all men, as men, are "created and redeemed in Christ," and in Him are justified, adopted, and regenerate, though all do not know it, and even those who have learnt to recognise it, are far from acting always worthily of their position and privileges; it follows, as a necessary consequence, that there is no real or essential distinction between the church and the world. The church is the world viewed under a certain aspect. The world is called the church, when it recognises its relation to God in Christ, and acts accordingly. The church is the world lifting itself up into the sunshine; the world is the church falling into shadow and darkness. When and where the light and life that are in the world break out into bright, or noble, or holy word or deed, then and there the world shows that the nature and glory of the church live within it. Every man of the world is not only potentially, but virtually, a member of Christ's church, whatever may, for the present, be his character or seeming. Like the colours in shot silk, or on a dove's neck, the difference of hue and denomination depends merely upon the degree of light, and the angle of vision. In conformity with this principle, Mr. Kingsley's theology altogether secularizes "the kingdom of Christ." It is too plain for controversy that, in the New Testament, this kingdom is exclusively one of holy men and holy principles. Its members are such, and such only, as, in character, purpose, and influence, agree with the description given by our Lord, in the fifth chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel. Its powers and principles are "righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." (Rom. xiv. 17.) Genius, heroism, science, and art, *as such*, have no relation to this kingdom. Its triumphs are to be won by means of a Spirit, whose office it is, not to teach and inspire these things, but, distinctly and expressly, to "convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." (John xvi. 8.) His special office, as the Teacher of Truth, in this dispensation, is limited to one department,—He was to revive and illuminate the doctrine of Christ, and to lead into that truth which respects the glory of His person and work. In this sense was He to "guide into all truth." Such is the plain scriptural account of the "kingdom of Christ and of God," as it was to be established upon earth; and such has hitherto been the common faith of Christians. They have believed that this kingdom shall rule over all, and that principles of heavenly righteousness,—love to God and man,—shall be made to triumph over the principles of selfishness and sin, in every department of human influence and activity, in every relation of life. But they have not been accustomed to identify abstract or scientific truth with moral righteousness, heroism with holiness, (though holiness be the highest heroism,) genius with devotion, inductive philosophy with Divine revelation, or the beauties of art with "the beauty of holiness." A creed which does this, according to the common feeling of Christians hitherto, must, to this extent, be pantheistic rather than Christian. Here, notwithstanding all his struggles and reclamations, Mr. Kingsley does, in fact, attach himself to the same "Church" of "reformed Catholic Christians" as Emerson, or "Professor Windrush." But let us hear him for himself. The speaker, in the extracts which are to follow, is Eleanor, Lady Ellerton, the heroine of "Alton Locke," who was the means of converting the Chartist tailor-poet from infidelity (bred of Calvinism) to Christianity, and from enmity against society to universal love. She is one of the *illuminatæ* of the Maurice-Kingsley school.

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* With the passages quoted above may be connected one at p. 174 of the "Village Sermons," where he affirms that "baptism is nothing without holiness;" and another in the Second Series of "Sermons on National Subjects," at p. 247, where he says, that "if we fall from grace, we shall be lost, as if never baptized." Nevertheless, simple readers need to be warned that, as the former says no more than that baptism is but a sign, not a cause or means, so the latter does not really mean that any man, baptized or unbaptized, will be judicially rejected or finally lost.

"She paused.—'Go on, go on,' cried Crossthwaite and I in the same breath.

"'That state, that city, Jesus said, was come,—was now within us, had we eyes to see. And it is come. Call it the church, the Gospel, civilization, freedom, democracy, association, what you will,—I shall call it by the name by which my Master spoke of it,—the name which includes all these, and more than these,—the kingdom of God. "Without observation," as He promised, secretly, but mightily, it has been growing, spreading, since that first Whitsuntide; civilizing, humanizing, uniting this distracted earth. Men have fancied they found it in this system or in that, and in them only. They have cursed it in its own name, when they found it too wide for their own narrow notions. They have cried, "Lo here!" and "Lo there!" "To this communion!" or "To that set of opinions!" But it has gone its way,—the way of Him who made all things, and redeemed all things to Himself. In every age it has been a Gospel to the poor. In every age it has, sooner or later, claimed the steps of civilization, the discoveries of science, as God's inspirations, not man's inventions. In every age, it has taught men to do that by God which they had failed in doing without Him. It is now ready, if we may judge by the signs of the times, once again to penetrate, to convert, to re-organize the political and social life of England, perhaps of the world; to vindicate democracy as the will and gift of God. Take it for the ground of your rights. If, henceforth, you claim political enfranchisement, claim it not as mere men, who may be villains, savages, animals, slaves of their own prejudices and passions; but as members of Christ, children of God, inheritors of the kingdom of heaven, and therefore bound to realize it on earth. All other rights are mere mights,—mere selfish demands to become tyrants in your turn. If you wish to justify your Charter, do it on that ground. Claim your share in national life, only because the nation is a spiritual body, whose King is the Son of God; whose work, whose national character and powers, are allotted to it by the Spirit of Christ. Claim universal suffrage, only on the ground of the universal redemption of mankind,—the universal priesthood of Christians. That argument will conquer, when all have failed; for God will make it conquer......Learn a new lesson. Believe at last that you are in Christ, and become new creatures. With those miserable, awful farce-tragedies of April and June, let old things pass away, and all things become new. Believe that your kingdom is not of this world, but of One whose servants must not fight. He that believeth, as the Prophet says, will not make haste. Beloved suffering brothers!—are not your times in the hand of One who loved you to the death, who conquered, as you must do, not by wrath, but by martyrdom? Try no more to meet Mammon with his own weapons, but commit your cause to Him who judges righteously, who is even now coming out of His place to judge the earth, and to help the fatherless and poor unto their right, that the man of the world may be no more exalted against them,—the poor man of Nazareth, crucified for you!'

"She ceased, and there was silence for a few moments, as if angels were waiting, hushed, to carry our repentance to the throne of Him we had forgotten.

"Crossthwaite had kept his face fast buried in his hands; now he looked up with brimming eyes,—

"'I see it,—I see it all now. Oh, my God! my God! What infidels we have been!'"—*Alton Locke*, pp. 288, 289.

"An influence has been, unseen though not unfelt, at work for ages, converting, consecrating, organizing, every fresh invention of mankind, and which is now on the eve of Christianizing democracy, as it did Mediæval Feudalism, Tudor Nationalism, Whig Constitutionalism; and which will succeed in Christianizing it, and so alone making it rational, human, possible; because the priesthood alone, of all human institutions, testifies of Christ the King of men, the Lord of all things, the inspirer of all discoveries; who reigns, and will reign, till He has put all things under His feet, and the kingdoms of the world have become the kingdoms of God and of His Christ. Be sure, as it always has been, so will it be now. Without the priesthood there is no freedom for the people. Statesmen know it; and, therefore, those who would keep the people fettered, find it necessary to keep the priesthood fettered also. The people never can be themselves without co-operation with the priesthood; and the priesthood never can be themselves without co-operation with the people. They may help to make a sect-Church for the rich, as they have been doing, or a sect-Church for paupers, (which is also the most subtle form of a sect-Church for the rich,) as a party in England are now trying to do,—as I once gladly would have done myself: but if they would be truly priests of God, and the priests of the Universal Church, they must be priests of the people, priests of the masses, priests after the likeness of Him who died on the cross." *—*Alton Locke*, p. 301.

Since, according to Mr. Kingsley's philosophy, Christ, the Logos, the Word, is the ground of human consciousness, the archetypal exemplar, cause, and ever-living spring of our life, the "Inspirer of all discoveries," the Infinite Reason manifesting Himself in each and all of our souls, it is difficult to understand what place is left for the Holy Spirit in his theology. Nor is his common manner of speech such as to help us in our difficulties. It is evident that he feels his own confusion. His Sermon on "Books," for example, is full of it; and, in one sentence, it comes out rather remarkably, when he says of the Prophets, that "when the Spirit of God stirred them up, the Word of God gave them speech." The Word is necessarily conceived by all Neo-Platonic Realists as *in* us, not by the Spirit, but Himself; and we are ever in, of, and by Him. There is no room left for an intermediate power, for the Holy Spirit to be "sent into our hearts." The Spirit, rather than the Word, is represented by Mr. Kingsley as present in and with the inanimate and irrational creation: the Word, rather than the Spirit, as with and in man. But the whole tenor of the word of God prevents his adhering to this distinction. Scripture too plainly says, that the Spirit is now, in a pre-eminent and glorious sense, given to the world, that He dwells in and sanctifies the saints, that Christianity is the dispensation of the Spirit. It would relieve Mr. Kingsley's theology of incongruity and superfluity, if he could adopt the Unitarian tenet on this point. But he cannot do this. It is only justice to him to say, that in his Sermon on "The Work of God's Spirit" ("National Sermons," Second Series) he distinctly teaches the proper personality of the Holy Ghost. Leaving him, however, to deal with his own inconsistencies and perplexities, we have only here to remark, that his doctrine of the Spirit's influence, as already, indeed, intimated, accords with his views of the nature of Christ's kingdom. The special office of the Holy Ghost, under the Christian dispensation, is lost sight of. Things to which our Lord could have had no reference in His very specific promise of the gift of the Comforter, are placed within His sphere. He is represented as operating all things in nature, and inspiring and consummating all science, art, and holiness. He is made to be the inspirer of "every separate act of induction,"* in the discovery of truth; and the promise to the disciples that "mouth and wisdom" should be given to them, is interpreted to signify that true "poetry and philosophy" are the gift of the Word by the Spirit.† How different is such teaching as this from that of St. Paul,—that "practised Platonic dialectician," as Mr. Kingsley is pleased to style him! His dialect of Platonism differs considerably, at any rate, from that of Mr. Kingsley. The Apostle's words are, "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, fidelity, meekness, temperance." How much more nearly does the doctrine of our modern pseudo-Christian Neo-Platonists correspond with that of Hypatia, a heathen priestess of pantheistic Neo-Platonism, as it is represented by Mr. Kingsley himself, in the passages following, where she rhapsodizes on the subject of the "world-soul!"

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* Compare, also, "Yeast," p. 264.

"An energy, a soul, an idea, one and yet millionfold, rush-ing through all created things like the wind across a lyre, thrilling the strings into celestial harmony; one life-blood through the million veins of the universe, from one great unseen heart, beating for ever in the abysmal solitude, beyond the heavens and the galaxies, beyond the spaces and the times, themselves but veins and runnels from its all-teeming sea."—*Hypatia*, vol. i., p. 187.

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* "Sermons on National Subjects," First Series, p. 150; "Alexandria," &c., pp. 28, 29.

† "Village Sermons," pp. 233, 231.

"The universal soul thrills through the whole creation, doing the behests of that Reason" [Logos] "from which it overflowed;......warring with the brute forces of gross matter, crushing all which is foul and dissonant to itself, and clasping to its bosom the beautiful, and all wherein it discovers its own reflex; impressing on it its signature, re-producing from it its own likeness, whether star, or dæmon, or soul of the elect."—*Ibid.*, p. 186.

Such being his views, in general, as to the work and office of the Holy Spirit, it may easily be anticipated what is Mr. Kingsley's doctrine as to the work of man's sanctification. This cannot, on his theory, be conceived of as a special and supernatural work of the Holy Ghost within us; and cannot, therefore, be a matter of explicit and peculiar self-consciousness. Our Lord indeed says that "except a man be born again," and born of the Holy Ghost, "he cannot see the kingdom of God." He taught His disciples to "watch and pray, lest they should enter into temptation." The whole Scripture represents the life of the saint as a conscious and life-or-death struggle against "the world, the flesh, and the devil." "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh." Christians are enjoined to "examine" and to "prove their own selves, whether they be in the faith," to "lay aside every weight and the sin which doth so easily beset" them, to "crucify the old man," to "mortify the flesh with its affections and lusts." All such watching and praying, however, all self-examination, all thought of subduing the flesh, are, in "Westward Ho," represented as mere Jesuitism and Popish work-bondage; and the hero is brought before us expressly as an instance of unconscious godliness, native Christianity, practical piety separated altogether from "the religious sentiment," as Mr. Kingsley would sneeringly say.

> "I have tried to hint to you," he says, "two opposite sorts of men. The one" [the Jesuit] "trying to be good with all his might and main, according to certain approved methods and rules, which he has got by heart; and like a weak oarsman feeling and fingering his spiritual muscles all over all day, to see if they are growing. The other not even knowing" [the sense and logic of the paragraph require him to mean, not even *caring*] "whether he is good or not, but just doing the right thing without thinking about it, as simply as a little child, because the Spirit of God is with him."—*Westward Ho*, vol. i., p. 92.

Truth, however, dramatic truth and every-day experience, as well as the truth of the Scriptures, is too strong for Mr. Kingsley in this very novel, and practically breaks down his theory. Unconverted Amyas Leigh, great, good, and simple as he tries to paint him, proves but a sorry Christian. The "old Adam" works strong within him; fierce, implacable revenge takes terrible possession of him, and envenoms all the natural charities of his heart; nor can the novelist devise any newer or better method of mastering this Satanic passion, than by bringing, through blindness and the chastening stroke of God upon him, this model of an unconscious child of grace, at the very end of his active career, and at the end of the third volume of the novel, to true contrition and conversion. Instead of a demonstration of his own hypothesis, the novelist conducts us to a *reductio ad absurdum*. It is still more remarkable that the best and really the noblest character in this work, one admirably conceived and depicted *con amore*, is that of a Calvinist and Baptist, whose repentance, conversion, and faith are described most beautifully, and who is made to close his own account of his conversion in these sweetly evangelical words:—

> "Falling into very despair at the burden of my heinous sins, I knew no peace until I gained sweet assurance that my Lord had hanged my burden upon His cross, and washed my sinful

soul in His most sinless blood. Amen."—*Westward Ho,* vol. i., p. 262.

Such representations as this, with which may be compared the account of the conversion of Tregarva, the Wesleyan Cornishman, in "Yeast," we cannot but regard as involuntary tributes to evangelical truth, wrung from Mr. Kingsley by its Divine authority and power, in spite of his philosophy. We could point, also, to several passages in his "Sermons," in which he finds himself similarly constrained to speak of the special and sanctifying power of the Spirit, and even of the necessity of "conversion" and a new heart.

The same theory which degrades the sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit from its "sole pre-eminence" above all other powers and influences, by including within its direct and proper scope and sphere the dreams and fancies of poetry, the discoveries of science, the inventions of machinery and art;* and which, so far, approximates to Pantheism; further shows its kinship to the same kind of philosophy, by reducing the inspiration of the Hebrew Prophets to a level with that of heathen seers. Indeed, the same principle which leads to the one result must also, manifestly, require the other. On this point Messrs. Kingsley and Maurice are in perfect agreement with Mr. Jowett. Their differences are but circumstantial, their agreement is substantial. The Neo-Platonists have the higher positive reverence for the Prophets and Apostles of Scripture, and are disposed unduly to elevate the heathen philosophers that they may not greatly depress the Bible teachers. And in order that Paul, in particular, may not suffer by a comparison with the heathens whom they raise to the rank of prophets, he is represented as "knowing thoroughly the writings (*sic*) of

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* Mr. Kingsley tells us that the "spiritual" is "the moral," *not* "the intellectual," and again, that "to confuse the moral with the notional, and finally the notional with the material, is Pantheism."—*Alexandria,* &c., pp. 115, 95. It would be very instructive to the common crowd if our philosopher would try clearly to distinguish and exhibit the difference between Pantheism, thus defined, and his own philosophy as illustrated in the text. We claim a rule *nisi;* let him show cause.

Socrates (?) and Plato,"* and as being "a practised Platonic dialectician." Mr. Jowett, however, has no such delicacy of feeling as to the intellectual reputation of the sacred writers. He is, therefore, content to leave the heathens at their own level, does not scruple plainly to disparage the inspiration of the Hebrew Prophets, and seems to feel a peculiar gust in depicting Paul as an illiterate enthusiast. But all agree that there was nothing peculiar in the inspiration of the Bible Prophets, and that proper foresight was not within their gift. The following extracts present an epitome of that doctrine which is common to Messrs. Kingsley and Maurice, and which the latter teaches most expressly in the latter part of his "Prophets and Kings."

> "As I believe, one common Logos, Word, Reason, reveals and unveils the same eternal truth to all who seek and hunger for it. Therefore we can, as the Christian philosophers of Alexandria did, rejoice over every truth which their heathen adversaries beheld, and attribute them, as Clement does, to the highest source, to the inspiration of the one and universal Logos."—*Alexandria, &c.*, pp. 98, 99.

The following is given in "Yeast" as the teaching of that mythical personage, Barnakill, "the Prophet" of the grand new Catholic Church that is to be. "Claude Mellot," the artist, retails it to Lancelot Smith, at first as if it were his own, but confesses immediately after that he learnt it from "the prophet."

> "Prophetes means, not a foreteller, but an out-teller,......and he became a foreteller, among heathens, at least, *as I consider, among all peoples whatever*, because, knowing the real bearing of what had happened, and what was happening, he could discern the signs of the times, and so had what the world calls a shrewd guess—what I, like a pantheist, as I am denominated, should call a Divine and inspired foresight—of what was going to happen."—*Yeast*, p. 295.

It is well to have a plain-speaking colleague like Mr. Kingsley, to tell what a misty writer like Mr. Maurice does not choose clearly to speak out. The last quoted sentence throws light upon what comes next :—

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* "Sermons for the Times," p. 239.

> "There was an infinite difference between them" (the Rabbis) "and the old Hebrew writers. They had lost something which those old Prophets possessed. I invite you to ponder on the causes of this strange loss; bearing in mind that they lost their forefathers' heir-loom, exactly in proportion as they began to believe it to be their exclusive possession, and to deny other human beings any right to, or share in, it……It may have been that the light was there all around them still as bright as ever, but that they would not open their eyes and behold it; or rather could not open them, because selfishness and pride had sealed them. It may have been that inspiration was still very near *them* too, if their spirits had been willing to receive it. But of the fact of the change there was no doubt. For the old Hebrew seers were men dealing with the loftiest and deepest laws: the Rabbis were shallow pedants. The old Hebrew seers were righteous and virtuous men: the Rabbis became, in due time, some of the worst and wickedest men who ever trod this earth."—*Alexandria, &c.*, pp. 72, 73.
>
> "In such a state of mind it was impossible for them to look on their old Prophets as true seers, beholding and applying eternal moral laws, and, *therefore*, seeing the future in the present and the past."—*Ibid.*, p. 76.

This is the principle on which Mr. Kingsley expounds prophecy.* We need not say that it is nothing more or less than a part of pantheistic naturalism and rationalism. Push it to its conclusion, and our adorable Saviour's predictions must be similarly interpreted and explained away. Is Mr. Kingsley himself aware how far and how fast he is going?

The Neo-Platonist theosophy is founded on the principle that the Logos, in whom all things subsist, and the archetypal world of all things has ever subsisted, is Himself the original of all being and life, and that the living link which binds them to Him never can be severed. In particular, His personality is the "root and ground" of all personality, and all intelligence the actual effluence of His. It follows from this, that no beings can be wholly severed or absolutely and utterly estranged from Him. How this principle applies to the case of sinful men we know from Mr. Maurice's "Essays." But what is to be inferred in regard to the estate of "Satan and his angels?" The necessary conclusion must be that these also are not utterly lost or to be finally damned. We have already assigned our reasons for doubting whether Mr. Maurice believes in the existence and operation of evil spirits. We incline to think that self-will personified is his Satan, his spirit of evil, tempting all mankind. Mr. Carlyle can talk as easily and glibly as Mr. Maurice of "real devils," and of every man having a "world," a "flesh," and a "devil" to contend against. And what *he* means by this sort of phrase we pretty well understand. Nearly all who have been tinctured with Pantheism have denied the existence of the devil. Erigena and Coleridge are but instances of a general rule. So far as Mr. Kingsley is concerned, we have had our doubts, too, upon this point. But these have been almost removed, while reading some of his sermons. He repeatedly speaks as if he believed in a personal devil; and in the sermon "Hell on Earth," in particular, he speaks so plainly and so strongly, that all subterfuge or *double entendre* would seem to be out of the question. He declares distinctly that "evil spirits are persons," and that "vast numbers" of them are "continually tempting man." One thing, however, even here, somewhat staggers us. He seems to go too far to mean all he says in its obvious sense. He says that particular evil spirits tempt to each particular sin: one to worldliness, another to filthiness, others to falsehood, to pride, to covetousness, to cruelty, under the name of law, to idleness, to meanness and unfairness in trade and in controversy, and so on. Of *these* spirits he says, "These are the devils which haunt us Englishmen—sleek, prim, respectable fiends enough; and truly *their* name is Legion." We know not how to believe that Mr. Kingsley is serious and literal in such a statement as this. If he is, it reminds us of the climax of Alexandrian Neo-Platonism, which, in the hands of Proclus, while thoroughly pantheized, had yet come to have a boundless faith in spirits, and genii, and, so to speak, personal essences.

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* See also "National Sermons," Second Series, pp. 27, 28, 83.

We must be forgiven, indeed, if we have come to suspect that Mr. Kingsley himself knows something of that *disciplina arcani* of which, as subsisting among Alexandrian Christians, he speaks so indulgently. With every predisposition to think him as sincere in his speech as he is certainly both benevolent and earnest in spirit, we know not how to avoid the conclusion that even he has his exoteric and esoteric doctrine. It could hardly be believed that the same man wrote the "Village Sermons" and the novels, or even the "Lectures." He who is perpetually sneering, in "Yeast," "Alton Locke," and "Hypatia," at the evangelical doctrine of everlasting punishment, speaks in these "Sermons" of "the gate of everlasting death and misery," of "suffering God's will in eternal woe," of the "resurrection of damnation to burn as chaff in unquenchable fire." He says, in plainest words, that "as the tree falls, so it lies;" that "if a beast can be changed into a man, then death can change a sinner into a saint;" that "if under the present state of things we cannot be holy, we shall never be holy;" and that, "at the second coming of Christ, He shall appear to take vengeance on those who know not God, and destroy the wicked with the breath of His mouth;" adding a closing warning as the last sentence of the volume, that all should beware of the "wrath of the Lamb." * This is his ordinary style throughout this volume; and even in his other series of "Sermons," though by no means so plain or stirring as this, he can now and then express himself in language little less strong or clear. Yet this same man can close his preface to "Alexandria," &c., by warning his brother clergy against "instilling" into their "countrymen selfish and superstitious fears, and a theory which represents God, not as a Saviour, but as a tormentor;" and goes on to teach the boldest and most unqualified universalism: in particular, imitating in this respect those Romish monks who preached a holy crusade, he assures his readers that whoever, in the late conflict with Russia, "died like a man" in defence of the right, should be highly rewarded in the life to come.

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* "Village Sermons," pp. 31, 172, 206, 207, 212, 213, 244.

There is no reproach which Mr. Kingsley is more fond of casting against evangelical religion, than that it teaches men to value the Gospel "chiefly as affording them the means for obtaining pleasure and escaping pain after they die."* He would fain renew the old quibble of the mystics, and insist that God and virtue are to be loved merely for their own sake, and altogether independently of any hope of future reward. But, however we may logically distinguish, it is impossible to separate, in fact, the love of God and holy obedience to His law from the hope of future reward. It is no more possible that we should cherish a purely abstract love of God, than that a child should feel a purely abstract love for its father. As the hope of a smile is a part of the child's love, and his delight in his father necessarily implies a desire of his presence and favour, so is it with the Christian in his feeling towards God, and his unquenchable desire of one day beholding His glory, and being made partaker of the riches of His grace. Besides which, the idea of reward as connected with obedience is inseparable from the very conception of a Holy Creator and Governor as related to His intelligent and moral creatures, and will be seen necessarily to imply its converse, punishment, as connected with disobedience. These principles Mr. Kingsley himself cannot but recognise and respect, even while he is engaged in misrepresenting and condemning one mode of their expression. Indeed, there is no system either of theology or moral philosophy but is grounded upon them. Only utter scepticism and atheism (or Pantheism) can reject them. And therefore we look upon the mystic quibble on this point as equally unmeaning and unprofitable with that of those who have raised a question, whether God's omnipotence includes the power of performing contradictions. At the same time, there is no doubt that the truth on this point may be most perniciously perverted. As the doctrine of justification by faith may be taught in an antinomian sense, and that of the necessity of practical holiness in a Pharisaic sense, so, no doubt, the promise of "eternal life" to those "who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honour, and immortality," as well as the threatening of "indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish," against the "disobedient," though a part of the teaching of Christ and His Apostles, may nevertheless be perverted into selfish motives to servile externalism and task-work. But surely this is no necessary consequence of these doctrines rightly taught. Evangelical theologians know how to guard their teaching by distinctly and emphatically inculcating that such externalism and task-work form no part of that holiness which God will reward; and that a grateful love to that God who "first loved them" is the only source of acceptable obedience. We could cite passages from the most popular modern evangelical divines, in which Christians are as clearly and pointedly warned against supposing that true religion consists merely in aiming at the salvation of their own individual souls from hell, as even Mr. Kingsley himself could warn them. We repel, then, as utterly groundless and untenable, the imputation that "evangelical" Christians are the teachers of a selfish religion. And if "a tree is known by its fruits," we may surely point to the history of all noble and philanthropic enterprises in refutation of such a charge. The religion of the "Clapham sect" was not one of selfishness. The faith of Wesley and Whitefield, of Howard and Elizabeth Fry, of Wilberforce and Buxton, of Bickersteth and Noel, of Shaftesbury and Robert Grosvenor, is not grounded upon selfish principles.*

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* Preface to "National Sermons," Second Series.

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* In his new Preface to "Yeast," Mr. Kingsley cannot refrain from those bitter sneers at evangelical orthodoxy, which are symptomatic of his particular mania. He represents it as the easy, selfish religion of the smooth, cheating, supplanting Jacob, and as worse than useless to the bold, reckless, hairy Esaus of the navy, the army, the mine, and the rail. Yet of six living persons whom in this Preface he mentions with honour,—Lord Shaftesbury.

The annual meetings in this metropolis, which add a moral beauty and promise to the natural spring-time of the year, have all their root, not in selfishness, but in evangelical philanthropy. It is because of the religious motive and direction of this benevolence that the secular philanthropist has no sympathy with its spirit, and takes no share in its labours; and under the shelter of such authority it has come to pass that the small-wit and the worldling presume to sneer at "Exeter Hall;"—because forsooth the sublime charities of which it is an eminent centre and symbol, are not doled forth on mere poor-house principles, but flow over into all the world, and reach on beyond the limited necessities of time.

We do not disparage the benevolence of such generous and warm-hearted men as Maurice and Kingsley; but we confess that we do not attribute this in any degree to their peculiar philosophy. We do not look for a new Pentecost of zeal and brotherly love to come forth from the college cloisters where Neo-Platonism has found its modern home: a philosophy so near akin to that of him who wrote the "Latter-Day Pamphlets," and who has taught his admirers to sneer at Howard, is not likely to overflow with pity for man, or to lead the way in enterprises of charity.

Let us say, in conclusion, that we have no apprehension that the positive opinions of Mr. Kingsley's school will prevail to any considerable extent. His philosophy is too abstruse and complex, too inconceivable and unmanageable, to be accepted by English common-sense, even if it were not too heathenish to be accepted by English Christianity. And his theology cannot be understood till his philosophy has first been mastered. A few cultivated men may fancy that they believe this new-fangled amalgam; but what are plain, hard-working sinners to make of it? Mr. Kingsley's own words

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J. H. Newman, Hedley Vicars, Havelock, Florence Nightingale, and Catherine Marsh,—*four* belong to that hated class of Christians whom, if he could, he would "improve off the face of the earth." It is characteristic of the Cyclopean vision which he brings to bear on this subject, that he chooses to take Spurgeon as the type of the Evangelical preacher.

in reference to Emersonian Pantheism will apply well enough to *his* theology :—

> "If you had not been a cultivated man, Templeton, a man with few sorrows, and few trials, and few unsatisfied desires ; if you had been the village shop-keeper, with his bad debts, and his temptations to make those who can, pay for those who cannot ; if you had been one of your own labourers, environed with the struggle for daily bread, and the ale-house, and hungry children, and a sick wife, and a dull taste, and a duller head ; in short, if you had been a man such as nine out of ten are, what would his school have taught you then ? You want some truths which are common to men as men, which will help and teach them, let their temperament and circumstances be what they will, do you not ?"—*Phaethon*, p. 81.

But the negative and destructive tendencies of his writings—the writings of a man of so splendid a genius and so much heart—will, we fear, do extensive harm. Mr. Kingsley does not mean it so ; but his philosophy and philosophized theology sow the seeds of scepticism and pave the way to Pantheism. He is helping Carlyle "to set rolling a ball which may in the next half-century gather into an avalanche, perhaps utterly different in form, material, and direction from all which he expects." Our voice will have no power with him ; or, if it had, we would entreat him to consider, before his youth is past, what he is doing. All his works, noble though they be, are poisoned ; and this poison will, ere long, hasten their passage into oblivion. Meanwhile, let Christians not be afraid of such "vain wisdom and false philosophy." The effect will surely be, first to precipitate the dregs of error, and then to separate the pure wine of truth. We ourselves have *suffered* not a little in mind and heart while engaged in studying the writings of our Christian (?) Platonists and Pantheists ; but the end has been a more confirmed assurance of the truth and authority of the Scriptures, and of the essential correctness of that evangelical theology which is the common faith and hope of orthodox and spiritual Christians.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RELATIONS OF PROFESSOR JOWETT AS A THEOLOGIAN TO THE PROPER COLERIDGEAN SCHOOL.*

The greatest operations of nature, even when most complicated and obscured, may all be more or less nicely appreciated by human observation and science. Nor does the uniform silence and slowness of these operations altogether disguise either their method and law, or their vast sweep and power. Not only in the case of a widely extended earthquake, but of those gradual, though mighty, movements of the earth's crust, which are discovered to be simultaneously going forward, and, like an earthquake, to be originated from one centre of force, we estimate the depth of that centre below the surface, by the distance to which the movements diverge in opposite directions, and the extent of surface affected by them; and from the same criteria, taken in connexion with the rate of displacement,—whether this be more sudden or more gradual,—we gain an idea of the power with which the disturbing forces operate. A similar rule of inference may be applied, by analogy, to the moral and theological movements of the age; and, so applied, it will show us that forces of unprecedented power, and operating at a great depth below the surface, have, for years past, been at work upon the minds of the most earnest modern thinkers. From a common centre of force, how widely divergent, and how mighty, have been the disturbing influences in matters of religion! Of the leading spirits who were to be found forty years

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*1. *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans: with Critical Notes and Dissertations.* By Benjamin Jowett, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. In Two Vols. London: Murray. 1855.

2. *St. Paul and Modern Thought: Remarks on some of the Views advanced in Professor Jowett's Commentary on St. Paul.* By J. Llewellyn Davies, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Incumbent of St. Mark's, Whitechapel. Cambridge: Macmillans. 1856.

ago at our two great Universities, and most of whom were then linked to each other in friendship and intellectual fellowship, we find that on the one hand were ranged the Hares, Thirlwall, Arnold, Whately, and Hampden; and on the other Newman, Pusey, Manning, and the Wilberforces. Some dozen years later were to be found at Cambridge Maurice, Trench, and Sterling; the second of whom has happily long ago passed the point at which it might have been feared that he would be vanquished either by the Pantheism which ruined his unhappy friend Sterling, or the Neo-Platonism which has bewitched his friend and late colleague Maurice, and is now a teacher and defender of orthodox evangelism. In Oxford, a few years later still, —at the very time when that University was full of Tractarian influences,—when her most distinguished Professors were, with one or two exceptions, semi-Popish, and all her *alumni* were supposed to be training into Jesuit Priests,—when the "Tracts for the Times" were being published, and Mr. Ward was thinking out his "Ideal of a Christian Church,"—it now turns out that Germanized students of a very liberal school of "free criticism" were rising there, whose influence, within a few years past, is said to have transformed the seminary of Tractarianism into a school of Neology. And yet, if what the papers have announced be true in regard to several recent perversions, it would seem even that the turn of the tide has not sufficed to prevent a few who had been drifted Romewards from being stranded on that dangerous shore. Between Scylla and Charybdis, as it would appear, have the most earnest and thoughtful minds of the present day to steer their difficult and perilous course; and, alas! how many are there who have been either sucked into the vortex of transcendental infidelity, or driven on to the rock of Popish infallibility, there to cling with precarious and desperate hold, and ever in danger of being washed off into the raging tide! Julius Hare was, after a struggle, happily saved from what he calls the "fascination of Pantheism;" his friends

Manning and the two Wilberforces have gone to Rome. The elder Newman has fled for refuge from Rationalism to a monastery; his brother has become the leader of "rational spiritualists" in this country. Dr. Arnold was "a liberal" Protestant; his friend and correspondent, Sir J. T. Coleridge, has long been numbered among very high Churchmen; so also other members of the Coleridge family have diverged, some towards Rationalism, and some in the opposite direction. It was stated, some years ago, in the public prints, that the Rev. Dr. Temple, late Principal of Kneller Hall, had gone over to Popery. This report was, of course, incorrect; but still it is well known how very high are the church views of that accomplished Clergyman. On the other hand, Mr. Jowett, who inscribes his well known work to Dr. Temple, "in grateful acknowledgment of numberless thoughts and suggestions, and of the blessing of a long and never-failing friendship," is now declared as one of the leaders of that school of modern theological criticism which, abandoning the first sure principles of truth, will find no logical resting-place short of a blank and utter scepticism.

It is easy to say that this Rationalism is a reaction from Tractarianism. So, no doubt, it is in part. But this is not all the case. If it were, there would be no difficulty in accounting for the present state of things. There is nothing wonderful at any time in the appearance of something tantamount to "Puseyism" within the Church of England. It is always latent in the formularies and discipline of that Church, and its germs lie ready to be quickened into life in any season of new warmth and deepening earnestness: witness the age of Puritanism, in which Laudianism also sprang up, the form which the original Methodism took at Oxford, and the late Oxford developement. But, in fact, the roots of Rationalism were struck deep into the soil of both Universities long before the rise of Puseyism. Thirlwall was at Cambridge, and Hampden at Oxford, years before the issue of the "Tracts for the Times" commenced. It might even be argued, with more than plausibility, that Tractarianism has been itself, in part, a reaction from a rising Rationalism. There can be no doubt that a bold and growing Rationalism will ever tend ultimately to beget its opposite,—a slavish faith and bigoted superstition; nay, that those who are themselves Rationalists, so far as their intellectual character is concerned, and yet crave religious rest and faith, when they have undermined, by critical scepticism, the paramount authority of the word of God, as such, will fall back on tradition and church authority to sustain a faith which can no longer stand upon the sure foundation of Holy Writ. The whole question, therefore, as to the causes of the present state of things resolves itself into an inquiry respecting the origin of the modern Rationalism of the Church of England.

The general critical tendencies of the past and passing age have had much to do with this matter. The ancient history of the classical nations has been disenchanted of its legends. At one time it seemed likely that the very existence of such a poet as Homer would come to be finally exploded as a mere myth; his identity was boldly denied, and the critics were prepared to disintegrate and dislocate his great poem into a number of popular ballads. The spirit of criticism must be, to a great extent, sceptical; and the sceptical and critical appetite "grows by what it feeds on." In itself, too, this critical scepticism cannot but strongly tend to self-sufficiency; just in the same proportion, indeed, in which it indisposes to faith and reverence. Moreover, this tendency, in the present case, has been incalculably strengthened by the growth and prevalence of an arrogant *à priori* philosophy, which made man, each individual man, not only the "measure," but really the sum, "of all things." Even now, spite of the endeavours of Carlyle and Emerson, this egoistic and idealistic philosophy is utterly inconceivable to the general mind of practical Britain. Yet its evil effects may be traced in every department of life and morals, very far, indeed, beyond the sphere in which it is known or thought of;

and nowhere have these effects been more destructive than in matters of faith and religion. By attributing to reason in man the power of infallible intuition, by merging, if we must use such language, the "objective" in the "subjective," the universe in the "*ego*," or the universe and the *ego*—the out-seeming world and the conscious personal spirit—in what they call the "absolute," the philosophers of this school have, in effect, annihilated God, and set up each several man upon the Creator's throne.* Instead of a personal God, they have given us a mere personified Order of Nature,—an *Ordo Ordinans*,—which works blindly, yet infallibly; which "tends to personality," as they say,—that is, so operates that we might be ready to attribute to it design, intelligence, and moral qualities,—but nevertheless cannot be conceived of as a spirit or a person. Hence all Divine interpositions must, on this hypothesis, be done away. There can be no creation, no revelation, no miracle. In all departments there can but be gradual evolution and developement. What each event shall be, and what each man shall know or be, is determined absolutely by his or its position in the procession of the ages. No man can rise above the level of his age. The laws, degrees, and circumstances of progress in physics, in morals, in intelligence, in all science and all history, are absolutely fixed, and could not be other than they have been or shall be. Such a philosopher as Schelling or Hegel, seated on the throne of the intuitive Reason, can determine, *à priori*, what has been, what must have been, the course of past history, and can also predict the future. Nay, he can determine the law of evolution in the physical world, register, without research, the order and history of past discoveries, and forecast the future of science. Hence Schelling has taken upon himself to refute Newton's supposed discoveries, and to correct the physics of our day. Fallible induction must retire in the presence of infallible intuition.*

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* Fichte merged the universe in the *ego*: his was the subjective idealism. Schelling merged the universe and the *ego* in the Absolute; his was the objective idealism. Hegel, in the main, gives the logic of Schellingism, and developes the doctrine systematically. See KAHNIS'S "History of German Protestantism," book ii., chaps. i. and ii.; CHALYBAUS'S "Speculative Philosophy," Lectures vii. to xvii.; and MANSEL'S "Bampton Lectures," pp. 30, 31, 290–295.

How far such philosophy as this is susceptible of being mischievously modified and popularised for the million, may be judged from the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation." How far it has concurred with the general critical tendencies of modern times in diffusing the deadliest Rationalism throughout not only Germany, but, we must now add, America and Britain, may in part be understood by reference to the *à priori* ground of pantheistic Naturalism assumed by such writers as Strauss and Emerson. The same general tendencies appear strongly in the speculations of Theodore Parker; they underlie much of Francis Newman's writing; they are boldly adopted by Miss Martineau; they may be recognised as colouring the whole phraseology, and giving form to the philosophy, of modern "spiritualist" Unitarians; and now it cannot be denied that they form a far too appreciable element in the volumes of Mr. Jowett, whom yet we dare neither call a Pantheist, nor deny to be a believer in the mission of Christ.

Nevertheless, the proper English school of Idealism, though originally impregnated from Germany, and continually influenced from that country, has a character and a pedigree of its own. Of Coleridge's influence as the first teacher of the transcendental philosophy in this country, and of the character of the theology which he connected with his peculiar idealistic realism, we have already spoken at large in this volume. He first Neo-Platonized Schelling, and then applied the curious resulting amalgam to the interpretation of scriptural theology. Moses and Plato, Philo and St. John, Paul and Plotinus, and lastly Schelling, were all illuminati of his school, and were all recognised, with almost equal authority, as his teachers. The prophetic inspiration of Scripture, the ecstasy of Plotinus, the intellectual intuition of Schelling, were but different names for the same thing,—the light of the Logos in man. The Logos was also the Archetype of all things, in whom subsisted, as real entities, the primary and super-sensible ideas, of which all existent things are but shadowy copies or transitory gleams.

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* Compare MANSEL's "Lectures," p. 319.

This Coleridgism proper, as we have seen, has been faithfully and consistently carried out by Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley. The able and well-written pamphlet of the Rev. J. L. Davies, "St. Paul and Modern Thought,"—the full title of which is given in the note at the beginning of this chapter,—is one of the latest manifestoes we have seen on behalf of this school, and is specially to our present purpose, inasmuch as it exhibits the view taken of Mr. Jowett's pantheizing semi-Rationalism by an honest and earnest Neo-Platonist, of a reverent spirit, and helps us to understand the relations between Coleridgism proper and the later idealistic Rationalism of Professor Jowett. Altogether, it is the most perspicuous, devout, and intelligible publication, expressly in elucidation of the views of the proper Coleridgean party, which we have yet seen. The following brief extracts, in which the *italics* are our own, may serve to show how perfectly Mr. Davies's philosophy and theology agree with the views of Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley, as already explained in this volume :—

"The name of Jehovah, the *Absolute Being*, was revealed through Moses, as the *ground of law*."—Page 55.

"The *primordial creation of mankind in Christ* underlies and explains our redemption by Him."—Page 74.

"The earlier chapters" (of the Epistle to the Hebrews) "speak of Christ very much as Philo and the Alexandrian school in their best moments had spoken, as having been the King, and *Priest, and Pattern Man, before He was manifested in the flesh*."—Page 76.

"The loving Father of the spirits of men, *because they are, in a spiritual and ineffable manner*, His children, *created so* in the Eternal Son of His love," &c.—Page 56.

"To one who holds that all visible objects, all actions and events, are *in*separable from the unseen world, and are but the vestures through which spiritual realities manifest themselves, the phenomena which so confounded Mr. Jowett are quite consistent. And one might have hoped that a view in which Goethe coincides with St. Paul, and which to the ears of this generation is so earnestly preached by such thinkers as Maurice, Carlyle, and Ruskin, would not have been treated by Mr. Jowett as non-existent."—Page 22.

Mr. Jowett, it seems, is not prepared to view St. Paul as a realist, or—for our readers will already have learnt that the two expressions, apparently so contrary, have come to mean, in certain connexions, the same thing —as a transcendental idealist of the Alexandrian school. And Mr. Davies wonders at Mr. Jowett's want of insight not to have distinctly discerned what is to himself so apparent. It is evident that Mr. Davies would go the whole length of Kingsley, who speaks of Paul as "a practised Platonic dialectician." Indeed, he uses the words, "Pauline or Platonic idealist." (Page 13.) It is rather startling, however, to find the Pantheist Goethe and the great Apostle of the Gentiles thus classed together. It serves to show us how tolerant this baptized modern Neo-Platonism is of German Pantheism, and how kindly it remembers "the hole of the pit from which it was dug." So we have seen that Kingsley speaks of "that most illustrious Scotchman, Mr. Thomas Carlyle," * as having "vindicated from vulgar misconceptions the great German realists,—such thinkers as Emmanuel Kant and Gottlieb Fichte;" and tells us that the "strange dream" which lay at the bottom of the Alexandrian philosophy,—the Neo-Platonic Realism,—has "become the parent of the great Germanic philosophy itself, as developed by Kant, and Fichte, and Schelling, and Hegel." If this is indeed so, it will follow that while modern or revived Neo-Platonism is derived from German Pantheism,—which, however, its admirers would perhaps not allow to be called Pantheism,—the German philosophy itself is derived from the original Neo-Platonism. So close is the kinship between the two.

Mr. Davies is a positive and confident Neo-Platonic idealist, determined, after the manner of Maurice, to make the writings of St. Paul speak in his own dialect

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* "Alexandria," &c., p. 89, and also p. 85.

and teach his own philosophy: Mr. Jowett is, on the contrary, a sceptical, pantheizing idealist, quite incapable of supposing that St. Paul could so anticipate the present age, and rise so far above the level of his own, as to talk precisely like a modern disciple of Coleridge; neither will he allow him to have possessed enough even of Alexandrian lore to have enabled him to frame a new system of theosophy out of hints supplied by Philo. Hence he comes with no other bias to his work of interpretation, than that he is disposed to take the most superficially obvious—what he would call the "most natural"—meaning of the Apostle's words, and that he is disinclined to adopt the true evangelical sense. It is one of his greatest defects, that he is unwilling to go much below the surface in quest of the Apostle's meaning at any time; his philosophy leading him, in all cases, to expect to find St. Paul neither very profound in thought, nor very far-reaching in foresight. No wonder that two such authorities as these Clergymen continually differ in their interpretation. As might be expected, also, Mr. Jowett, though often defective, and sometimes very erroneous, as an interpreter, for the reasons just assigned, yet, from his high critical qualifications, as well as from his having no strong or positive bias, is much less frequently in positive error, than Mr. Maurice and his followers. Where the Apostle is really profound, Mr. Jowett is often superficial and defective, often incorrect; where he is expressly evangelical, Mr. Jowett becomes misty; but the Neo-Platonist, just in these cases, is almost always *profoundly wrong.* We must do Mr. Davies, however, the justice to say, that many of his criticisms upon Mr. Jowett's expositions and comments are very acute and able; sometimes, also, where his philosophy does not come in the way, they are altogether just. And his conception of the Apostle's character, as well as his reverence for the text of Scripture, is far higher and more Christian-like than Mr. Jowett's. He has drunk less directly and less deeply of the arrogant egoistic philosophy.

Mr. Jowett, as we have implied, does not belong to the pure and proper Coleridgean school of Anglican Neology. Coleridge led the way to the study of German philosophy; but all even of his own friends do not seem to have accepted his modification of it. Hare appears to have been more attracted towards Pantheism than Neo-Platonism, of which latter no traces are found in his writings. His works bear everywhere evidence of the diligence with which he had studied Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, his admiration for whom he does not disguise. Hence it is no wonder that in reading Jowett we are often reminded of Hare. This remark, however, applies only to the common ground of philosophy; not by any means to Hare's theology. Carlyle was mixed up with the school of Coleridge, and sometimes heard "the master." But he could not be brought to admire his amalgam, and became an independent expounder of Germanism, and a special admirer of Goethe's pantheistic philosophy. Sterling, Hare's friend, and at one time his Curate, was an idolizing hearer of Coleridge, and took notes of his wondrous talk; but Carlyle subjugated his understanding, and led him captive to Pantheism. Francis Newman has evidently been influenced both by Coleridge and by Carlyle. Whether he is to be considered a pantheist or not, we can hardly say; but at least his philosophy has very strong tendencies in that direction, and he is disposed to speak of the Deity rather as "Personality" than as a Person. Now, in naming Mr. Jowett along with these, we do not mean to class him with such confessed unbelievers as Carlyle and Newman: but we wish to show how far the pantheizing philosophy which enters into his theology, as well as the Neo-Platonic idealism of the Maurice school, probably owes its origin, directly or indirectly, to the influence of Coleridge, or, at the least, has been largely affected by that influence. Practically, Mr. Jowett's theology—apart from what may be called his theosophy—coincides very closely with Coleridge's; traces of Coleridge in maxim, phrase, and catchword, appear in every part of his volumes; and the dissertation on the Atonement is, through a great part of it, only a reminiscence of Coleridge's remarks on the same subject in his "Aids to Reflection."

We have been thus particular in tracing the origin and growth of the modern Anglican Neology, in its two varieties, because we are convinced that, in order to the fundamental and effectual refutation of any heresy, it is of the first importance to understand the root and central principle from which it derives its life and form; and because, moreover, we have observed that even well-informed journals have seemed to be totally in the dark both as to the common ground on which these two varieties of heresy rest, and as to the specific and characteristic differences which distinguish the one from the other. It will not do merely to meet the superficial aspects which these theories have in common with each other, and with elder Unitarianism, by arguments of the same precise fashion as those which were effectual to refute Unitarianism thirty years ago. The ground of philosophy being still untouched, and the wordy evasions and ambiguous subterfuges of the modern speculations not being analysed and disentangled, the opponents of our evangelism will still dogmatize *à priori*, still enchain their dupes, and still consider themselves to be not only unrefuted, but, in the depth of their philosophy, to be undisturbed and unapproached. Neither will it do to class together Messrs. Maurice and Jowett as adepts of the same philosophy, and upholders of the same theology. They know, and their respective followers know, that this is not the case. Already a controversy has commenced between the two schools. Mr. Jowett, it is evident enough from his very able dissertation on Paul and Philo, precisely understands the character, and knows how to touch the weak points, of the modern Neo-Platonism. Many of his remarks upon Philo's system of theology philosophized—or philosophy theologized—apply, and were plainly intended to apply, most pointedly, to Maurice's Coleridgism, which, indeed, in its spirit and main principles, is most curiously identical with the system of Philo. Put *Christianity* instead of *Judaism,* and the following sentences, which have, in part, been already quoted in one of our chapters on Kingsley, might have been written of the modern amalgam of Christianity and Alexandrian Neo-Platonism:—

> "The Jew and the Greek met together in Alexandria; and the strangest eclectic philosophy that the world has ever seen was the result of their union. It was Judaism and Platonism at once; the belief in a personal God assimilated to the doctrine of ideas.......Alexandrianism gave the form and thought; Judaism the life and power.......*Like modern theologians* who have fallen under the influence of systems of philosophy in the interpretation of Scripture, Philo applied the Neo-Platonism of his day to the interpretation of the Mosaic writings."*—*Jowett,* vol. i., pp. 367, 369.

Mr. Jowett is no believer in this philosophy. Yet we fear the philosophy he does believe in, if not so complexly absurd, is every way as pernicious. Nay, in so far as it is more directly and intensely German, and more strongly naturalistic, it is more unfriendly to the grand truth of a loving, personal God, and more promotive of an irreverent spirit.

The main points of agreement and difference between

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* In later pages, he gives from Philo interpretations of the creation as described in the first chapters of Genesis, of the creation of the ideal world, the ideal man, and then the individual man, exactly the same as those given by Maurice in his "Sermons on the Old Testament;" and, again, as Maurice makes, in his "Unity of the New Testament" and his "Essays," the "Lord from heaven," the "heavenly Man," and the "first Adam," to signify the Logos, conceived as the ideal or "archetypal man," so it may be seen from Mr. Jowett's Essay, that Philo had used very similar phraseology in the same sense. Here, too, we find the original of Mr. Maurice's strange explanation, in the "Unity of the New Testament," of the "angels"—that is, the archetypal ideas—of little children "always beholding the face of the Father in heaven." Philo's "powers" are but "a new name for the Platonic ideas." "They might be described in the language of the Old Testament as the angels of the Divine Presence. They abide in the Word." (Page 387.) The Word, or Logos, we need hardly say, holds the same place in Philo's system as in that of Coleridge and Maurice. The Logos is the "idea of ideas," the "archetype of archetypes," in whom subsists the supersensible world of *ideas*, which, in this system, are the only *realities.*

We sicken at these subtleties, and strange, uncouth inventions, which transform into unintelligible jargon the blessed Gospel of the grace of God, intended for the healing and comfort of sinful man.

Maurice's Neo-Platonized Christianity and Jowett's pantheizing Christianity may be summed up as follows. In regard to the most important practical points, as we have already stated, they work out the same results. Mr. Maurice says that the Logos,—the Word,—the Son of God, is ever present with every man, even with the most wicked of men, as his living Light and Righteousness; and thus, that all men *are* one with God in Christ, already righteous in Him, if they did but know, and would but believe it. Mr. Jowett teaches that in all the actions of men God is present, that good and evil are one in God, that "these pairs of opposites, God and man, mind and matter, soul and body, pass into one another, and are lost in the idea of a communion of the Creator with His creatures." * It needs better eyesight than ours to discern the practical difference between these two doctrines. Mr. Jowett does not allow that there is any essential distinction between natural and revealed religion, and so depresses Judaism, as to make it—adopting the words of Goethe—only "the first of the ethnic religions." Mr. Maurice comes practically to the same result by elevating Socrates and Plato—if not Mahomet also (see his "Religions of the World")—to the rank of Prophets,—teachers inspired as truly as Moses and Isaiah, though perhaps not so greatly and uniformly inspired. Mr. Maurice, no less than Mr. Jowett, does away with prediction, in any proper sense of the word; (see, in particular, the latter half of his "Prophets and Kings;") both claim, by the light of intuitive reason in man, or, in Mr. Jowett's words, of "modern criticism and morality," to sit in judgment on the teaching and morality of revelation; both explain away expiatory sacrifice and the grand doctrine of a vicarious atonement; and, though by different routes, yet both arrive at substantially the same conclusions as to the non-necessity of a conscious and personal justification or regeneration; both alike ignore the distinct office and personality of the Holy Ghost; both make the coming of the Lord and the day of judgment to be but figures of speech.

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* Vol. ii., pp. 504, 505.

Mr. Jowett makes Satan to be but a personification of moral evil. In this he agrees with Coleridge, and perhaps also, as we have seen, with Maurice.

So much as to the agreement of the Neo-Platonic and pantheizing leaders. There are, however, several strongly marked, though not practically very important, differences between them. Mr. Jowett, as we have seen, denies *in toto* the fundamental principle of Mr. Maurice's peculiar philosophy,—the aboriginal and natural relationship of all men to the Logos, as the Archetypal Man, *in* whom they all have always been, are, and ever shall be. He consequently disallows, also, Mr. Maurice's doctrine of the collective justification and regeneration of mankind in Christ. Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley believe that primeval man was created pure, and commenced his race as an enlightened worshipper of a personal and loving God and Father: Mr. Jowett's principles, on the contrary, lead directly and obviously to the conclusion, that man happed upon the earth, a tribe here and a tribe there,—how, we cannot guess,—without any knowledge whatever of his Creator, with only blind instincts feeling after worship. Mr. Maurice has a much higher positive estimate of the Mosaic law and the Old-Testament dispensation generally than Mr. Jowett; and believes, however inconsistently with his denial of vicarious atonement, the Jewish sacrifices to have been ordained of God, and typical of the sacrifice of Christ: this is denied by Mr. Jowett. The former has a higher estimate of Paul's philosophical knowledge and accuracy of expression; the latter, on the other hand, spite of his deadly philosophy, has a far truer understanding of what spiritual religion means. He conceives more justly and sympathetically the nature of conversion and the spiritual life; and though he thinks such things are now obsolete in cultivated England, and not agreeable to modern conditions of feeling and society, yet he does clearly believe that it might be even yet possible—or at least that it might have been until lately—to find upon earth such experiences as those of the primitive Christians. If this last sentence reads like satire, that is not our fault. It conveys just the impression Mr. Jowett's writing makes. We must add, that he often talks like one who has been trained in a truly earnest and spiritual school, and has himself "tasted and seen" the goodness of Christ's sanctifying grace and power; and that in this, as in several other respects, he strongly reminds us of the case of Francis Newman, with whose philosophy his own has close affinities.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROFESSOR JOWETT'S SEMI-PANTHEISM, AND ITS BEARING UPON HIS THEOLOGY.

It is now high time that we should concentrate our attention upon Mr. Jowett's remarkable work. Its nucleus consists of a critical commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans. Around this, however, are grouped a number of dissertations, some of them introductory to the interpretation of the Epistles, others suggested by their contents, and all intended either to throw light upon the Apostle's character and position, to explain his language and modes of thought, or to examine and illustrate the bearing of his views and doctrines upon modern conditions of life and society. These dissertations are disposed in the order most convenient for the purposes of the critical commentary, and for mutual illustration. Of the clear, calm, elegant, and scholarly style in which they are written, so different from the elaborate, pompous, and periodic style in which ostentatious half-scholars delight, there is no need for us to speak, any more than of the acute and subtle power of thought which may everywhere be recognised, and of the extensive and well-mastered learning which they do not display, but imply. Mr. Maurice, though he possesses undoubted genius and ability, is yet very much of a cloudy mystic, and (on the old principle, *Omne ignotum pro magnifico*) what he writes passes for much more than it is worth. But Mr. Jowett's volumes show a ripe and wide scholarship, and critical taste and acuteness, not unworthy of the reputation which he has long enjoyed as one of the ablest tutors at Oxford. Yet, as a Scripture critic, like nearly all the general scholars and critics of the English Universities with whom we have become acquainted, he is deficient in painstaking, in research, and in profundity. If our University men would take the trouble to become deeper theologians, they would be better biblical critics. If they would but believe in the harmony and unity of the evangelical doctrine, and think it worth their while to meditate upon the profounder meaning of the sacred text, that they may discover this harmony and unity, their exegesis would greatly gain in richness, depth, and truth. If some of St. Paul's critics would only bestow as much labour to discover his meaning, as they would in meditating upon some dark passage in Shakspeare; if they did but give to the inspired Apostle as much credit as to the intuitive poet, for having a true, deep, and beautiful sense in those passages which seem to be obscure and difficult; orthodoxy and evangelical truth would be largely benefited. And the true progress both of theology and of biblical criticism in Britain and in the world would be greatly promoted, if, besides studying the stores of German erudition and criticism, they would not neglect the treasures of theology and exegesis contained in many of the old writers of our own language. But it is an ill sign for any age when the letter of Shakspeare is more reverenced by professedly Christian scholars and critics than the text of Scripture, and his profound truth more believed in than the inspired authority of St. Paul.

We do not think that we can give a more correct general idea of the tendency of Mr. Jowett's volumes, than by saying, that he seems to have attempted, as far as is compatible with any sort of faith in a personal God and the Christian Revelation, to adapt the principles of the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," and to apply a theory analogous to the one contained in that work, to the course of man's progress as a moral and religious being. The author of the "Vestiges" endeavoured so to trace the continuity of developement in the physical and organic world, as to leave no place for creative epochs or acts. The whole course of nature was resolved into a law of progress and developement,—an order of nature,—gradually unfolding itself from grade to grade, from unorganized to organized matter, from plant to animal, from vegetable life and movement to instinct and volition, from these to reason, from monkey to man. So Mr. Jowett also would, as far as his faith in Christ will at all allow him, break down the limits which define the Divine dispensations to man. He would exhibit the natural continuity of moral and religious developement. Looking backward along the perspective which he gives of man's advancement, we see civilized humanity dwindling and degraded into a universal condition of dark and groping savageism,—how far removed from the instincts of the ape, it is not possible to say: looking forward into the future, we see the theology and morality of the New Testament left far behind. No primeval light shines upon the dark lair of incipient humanity; what is called "revealed religion" was, in its earlier stage, but a certain form of natural religion; the Jewish sacrifices were but blind heathenish rites; the principles of the Gospel gradually grew up as a sort of underwood beneath the shadow of Mosaic superstition; the Prophets did but dimly read the future by the light of the past and present; when Christ came, even He was limited and bound down in His prophecies and revelations by the circle of Jewish ideas of His age; St. Paul and the other Apostles were, of course, in like manner necessarily restricted and darkened in their views; modern Christians are much superior to the Apostles—if we must not add, to our Lord Himself—in illumination, even as to moral and religious subjects. These are, substantially, the views which Mr. Jowett gives of man's religious course and history.*

It is impossible not to recognise in all this a close approximation to the views of Theodore Parker and Francis Newman; and equally impossible not to perceive that nothing but a strong infusion of pantheizing philosophy can account for such views being put forth by one who professes to believe in Christianity, and who is a Clergyman of the Anglican Church. A few pages back we gave the pith of the last sentence in Mr. Jowett's final dissertation, on "Predestination and Free Will," in which he does away practically with all distinction between soul and body, mind and matter, God and man; with which passage the curious reader may compare the note on 1 Thess. i. 1,* in order to see how these views shape themselves in commenting upon the Apostle's words. Such language cannot but remind us of Schelling's identification of the subject and the object in the absolute, or Hegel's principle of the "identity of contraries."

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* Compare MANSEL'S "Lectures," pp. 420–422.

But Mr. Jowett's pantheizing does not rest here. It leads him, after the example of his German masters, to deny the argument from design and final causes in proof of the being of God. A mere order of nature,—a mere plastic pantheistic power,—however happily it may work, however its products may seem to imply intelligence, can, of course, be animated by no conscious purpose, can have in view no "final cause," cannot be conceived as working in conformity with any pattern or design. Hence Pantheists—whom, as regarded from the Christian point of view, we hardly know how to distinguish from Atheists—must deny the argument from design, which, as wrought out by such writers as Paley, not only has been, but, whatever Mr. Jowett may think, always will be, to mankind at large, as cogent and conclusive as our instinctive judgments can make it. But what are we to think of such passages as those which follow, in the writings of a Christian Minister of the Church of England as by law established? We quote from the Essay on "Natural Religion:"—

> "The arguments from first or final causes will not bear the tests of modern metaphysical inquirers. The most highly educated minds are above them, the uneducated cannot be made to comprehend them.......The highest mark, not of design, but of intelligence, we trace everywhere in the world.......We are all agreed that none but a Divine power framed the infinite contrivances of creation. We differ only as to whether that Divine power is to be regarded as the hand that fashioned, or the

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* Vol. i., p. 40.

intelligence that designed them, or an operation inconceivable to us which we dimly trace and feebly express in words."—*Jowett*, vol. ii., pp. 410, 411.

So, it seems, plain men cannot understand Paley, and Whewell and Sedgwick are *not* to be reckoned among the most highly educated minds of the day. We presume that they do not belong to the philosophical elect, who, as Schelling and Coleridge taught, are *born* intuitive and idealists, but rank with the *profanum vulgus* of born Aristotelians. If all minds must be consigned to the same category which are unable to draw the fine distinction between design and intelligence in conscious and voluntary operations, we fancy few indeed will be numbered among the higher class. If, on the other hand, Mr. Jowett means—as consistency would require—to follow Fichte, Schelling, Oken, Hegel, and the other "most highly educated minds" of these modern days, in denying a conscious and will-ing Deity, he should plainly and honestly say so. The last sentence we have quoted is certainly calculated to excite the most grave suspicions as to what is his real meaning. We suppose that all believers in creation regard the Divine act or operation as "inconceivable to us," and such as "we dimly trace and feebly express in words;" but if, in so speaking of it, Mr. Jowett intends to deny such a direct and conscious operation of Deity as is figuratively implied when we speak of "His hand fashioning" all things, or such a wise and intelligent purpose in creation as is implied when we speak of "His intelligence designing" them, we can only say, that we are unable to distinguish such a vague belief in "Divine power" from Pantheism.

But, in truth, Mr. Jowett finds it impossible to abide by his own distinction. He disallows "design" in creation, and yet he speaks of its "infinite contrivances." Nay, he tells us, within a few lines of his denial of "design," that "the absence of design, if we like so to term the phrase, is a part of the design. Even the less comely parts, like the plain spaces in a building, have elements of use and beauty." Of some very weak and, to borrow the word he is so fond of applying to St. Paul's ideas, very "wavering" sentences which follow, there is no need that we should take notice.

Transcendentalists may shout to us from their fog, if they please, and tell us that they are above our logic and common sense. But we have no intention, on that account, to allow them the least superiority over ourselves. We have thought over this question of design in creation again and again, and we have arrived at the firm conclusion,—whether by the steps of logic or the glance of intuition it matters not now to tell,—that they who speak of a law and order of nature, imply, by such expressions, that there is to be recognised in creation a grand unity in the midst of infinite complexity and variety,—a method, plan, and harmony in the great whole, which must, therefore, be traceable through all the parts; and that such a conception is self-contradictory and unmeaning, except upon the assumption of a conscious and intelligent Creator. But if this is so, the argument from design and final causes must stand.

He who teaches, as Mr. Jowett does in his last Essay, that the distinction between free will and necessity, and between man and God, is "lost in the idea of a communion of the Creator with His creatures," and that "these pairs of opposites" thus "pass into one another," does, in fact, strike at the rule of all moral distinctions. Every system of Fatalism does this in effect; but a pantheistic Fatalism more immediately and manifestly than any other, because it utterly blots out the conception of a Personal Source and Judge of Righteousness, of a "God who is Light, and in whom is no darkness at all," and, being such, whose "eyes behold and eyelids try the children of men." Hence we cannot be surprised to find, with so strong a bias as Mr. Jowett everywhere shows towards this fatal pantheistic philosophy, that he represents good and evil as inextricably combined, and does not even shrink from making God the author of evil. In several passages this is represented as the scriptural doctrine :—

> "According to the view of the Apostle, God not only, in our phraseology, permits sin, but even causes it as a punishment for previous sin."—Vol. i., p. 158.
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> "In modern times we say God is not the cause of evil: He only allows it; it is a part of His moral government, incidental to His general laws. Without considering the intimate union of good and evil in the heart of man, or the manner in which moral evil connects itself with physical, we seek only to remove it as far as possible, in our language and modes of conception, from the Author of good. The Gospel knows nothing of these modern philosophical distinctions, though revolting as impious from the notion that God can tempt man. The mode of thought of the Apostle is still the same as that implied in the aphorism: *Quem Deus vult perdere, priùs dementat.*"—Vol. ii., p. 58.

The second of these passages occurs in a comment on Rom. i. 24.

This, then, is the spirit of "the Gospel:" "Whom God would destroy, He first makes mad!"—We must, however, do Mr. Jowett the justice to say, that elsewhere he modifies this view, if he does not directly contradict it. He tells us, in a comment on chap. ix. 18 of the same Epistle, that "in the Old Testament God leaves or gives a man to evil who already works evil, while the prevailing tone of the New Testament is that evil, in all its stages, is the work of man himself." *

It is not our business to reconcile this last quotation with those which precede. The general tenor of both Mr. Jowett's philosophy and his morality agrees with those rather than with this. Thus, for instance, when —in language which perhaps applies more aptly to the Kingsley school of "Christian Socialists" than to any other class—he has been speaking of visionary moralists, as he considers them, who strive to regenerate society in conformity with their own abstract notions, he adds,—

> "They are kicking against the pricks; what they want is a society which has not the very elements of the social state; they feel the evil without comprehending the necessity of it;

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* Vol. ii., p. 250.

they do not recognise that the world is a mixed mass of good and evil,—evil held together by good, good inseparable from evil."—*Essay on the Law as the Strength of Sin*, vol. ii., p. 441.

So again :—

"If the rule is to be, not, 'My kingdom is not of this world,' but, 'We ought to obey God rather than man,' there is nothing left but to supersede civil society, and found a religious one in its stead."—*Ibid.*, p. 439.

These are not the principles on which heroes and reformers have acted. The saying of our Lord is by no means opposed to the noble maxim of His Apostles. "We ought to obey God rather than man," is a rule which is neither to be abrogated nor limited, though care must be taken to apply it aright. It was not by the adoption of such counsels as Mr. Jowett's that Christianity conquered the world at first. Our Lord did not act upon them; nor did Peter and John; nor Paul and Silas; nor the martyrs of the early Church; nor Luther, and Calvin, and Knox; nor Wesley and Whitefield.

In a similar strain we are told in the Essay on "Casuistry,"—

"So, again, in daily life cases often occur in which we must do as other men do, and act upon a general understanding, even though unable to reconcile a particular practice to the letter of truthfulness, or even to our individual conscience. It is hard in such cases to lay down a definite rule. But, in general, we should be suspicious of any conscientious scruples in which other good men do not share. We shall do right to make a large allowance for the perplexities and entanglements of human things; we shall observe that men of strong minds brush away our scruples; we shall consider that not he who has most, but he who has fewest, scruples, approaches most nearly the true Christian. For, as the Apostle says, 'Whatsoever is not of faith is sin;' and, 'Blessed is he who condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth.'"—*Essay on Casuistry*, vol. ii., p. 350.

What, now, are we to think of the "moral" of this passage, and what of the texts which are so curiously quoted to "point" it? It would seem as if Mr. Jowett were disposed to be facetious. We could imagine with what unction and satisfaction at his own wit a jolly freebooting Friar Tuck might have quoted these passages in Mr. Jowett's sense, by way of encouraging himself and his comrades in their free use of their victims' treasures and stores. But for a Christian Clergyman to deduce from the Apostle's words a maxim so destructive of all morality, and at the same time so glaringly contrary to their true sense, is what no one could have anticipated. Not even an Alexandrian Platonical Jew—not even Philo himself—could have more curiously and perversely misapplied a Scripture text than the Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford has done here. What the Apostle really teaches is, that he is the best Christian who never acts in any way about which he has a scruple. Whereas Mr. Jowett's doctrine, which he attributes to St. Paul, is that the most unscrupulous man is the best Christian. This surely is to reverse a picture, and then swear that the painter drew the likeness of one who walked upon his head.

Even if we take the gentler expression of the writer's meaning given in the first sentence of the paragraph, we can come to no other conclusion than that Mr. Jowett's standard of morality is very lax and time-serving. It *really seems* as if he recognised no essential distinction between good and evil, right and wrong. If all had acted upon similar maxims, the slave-trade would have still existed; bribery at elections would still be counted no harm or scandal; tricks and lies in trade might claim the tolerance, if not the sanction, of Christianity; adulteration of goods might be defended as no wrong; and "to do evil" would cease to be criminal, provided we took care to "follow a multitude." Shall we confess to a suspicion which clings to us, that the above paragraph was penned by Mr. Jowett with an uneasy consciousness that it would be difficult to reconcile his own position in the Church of England "with the letter of truthfulness, or even with his individual conscience?" The subject of the previous paragraph, which we have not space to quote, confirms this suspicion. Assuredly it is not to be wondered at, that a Clergyman in Mr. Jowett's position should be led to meditate upon the subject of "casuistry." The following sentences, from a former part of the same Essay, agree with what we have just hinted, and harmonize perfectly with the previous quotations:—

> "Numberless questions relating to the profession of an advocate, a soldier, or a Clergyman, have been pursued into endless consequences. In all these cases there is a point at which necessity comes in, and compels us to adopt the rule of the Apostle, which may be paraphrased, 'Do as other men do in a Christian country.'"—*Essay on Casuistry*, vol. ii., p. 342.

Such a paraphrase applied to the Apostle's counsel to the Corinthian Church (it is in reference to this that Mr. Jowett is writing) is manifestly absurd. The very question was, How were Christians to behave in a heathen community? and an obvious principle of morality underlies the Apostle's counsels. To give countenance to idolatry was wrong; to share in its spirit was wrong; merely material contact with it, involving neither of these things, was not wrong.

From such principles as Mr. Jowett has here laid down, nothing great or good can be expected. Under their influence, everything virtuous, noble, and truly great must wither and die. Mr. Llewellyn Davies not inaptly compares them to the philosophy of Mandeville, who taught that private vices were for the public good. Such assuredly was *not* the teaching of those Hebrew Prophets whose morality Mr. Jowett supposes himself to have so far outgrown. They knew nothing of an inglorious compromise with evil. Nor is such the spirit of Christianity. Self-denial is its demand. "Be not conformed to this world," is its motto: Righteousness is its law: Truth is its standard; and, therefore, Freedom and Love have been its fruits. Nay, such maxims as we have quoted fall far below the standard of the old Stoic morality. How would Seneca or Antoninus have frowned upon them! But they agree with the doctrines of Hobbes; they would have found favour with Hume. And they are truly representative of the spirit of a pantheistic philosophy which resolves all realities into shadowy abstractions, and which loses all distinctions of good and evil, God and man, in its impalpable and imponderable *TO ΠAN*.

Nevertheless, in this, as in most other cases, it is not difficult to make Mr. Jowett answer himself. Having, in the Essay from which we have last quoted, first given his own principles and counsels of casuistry, a few samples of which have been submitted to our readers, he next proceeds to furnish an estimate of the principles and method of the Jesuitical science of casuistry. Towards the close of this, he tells us that "those who act most truthfully, honestly, firmly, manfully, consistently, take least time to deliberate;" and that "such should be the attitude of our minds in all questions of right and wrong, truth and falsehood. We may not inquire, but act." (Page 356.) He afterwards closes the Essay with the following just and eloquent paragraph:—

> "To conclude, the errors and evils of casuistry may be summed up as follows: It makes that abstract which is concrete, scientific which is contingent, artificial which is natural, positive which is moral, theoretical which is intuitive and immediate. It puts the parts in the place of the whole, exceptions in the place of rules, system in the place of experience, dependence in the place of responsibility, reflection in the place of conscience. *It lowers the heavenly to the earthly, the principles of men to their practice, the tone of the preacher to the standard of ordinary life.* It sends us to another for that which can only be found in ourselves. It leaves the highway of public opinion to wander in the labyrinths of an imaginary science, the light of the world for the darkness of the closet. It is to human nature what anatomy is to our bodily frame; instead of a moral and spiritual being, preserving only 'a body of death.'"—*Essay on Casuistry*, vol. ii., p. 357.

Whatever may be thought of Mr. Jowett's views on the subject of moral distinctions, they are at least in perfect harmony with the theory which he holds in reference to man's history and course as a moral and religious being,—or, we should rather say, as a religious and moral being; for, according to his view, man had been a religious animal for long ages before he had any conception or sense of morality. The following passages will give a fair outline of his hypothesis, which, it will be seen, precisely harmonizes with the views of Messrs. Newman and Parker, *et hoc genus omne*. With the exception of the first short extract, which occurs in the Essay on the "Connexion of Immorality and Idolatry," they are all taken from the same dissertation on "Natural Religion," in which, as we have already seen, Mr. Jowett denies the evidence from design and final causes, in favour of the being of a God.

"The heathen religions sprang up in an age prior to morality. We see men in the dawn of the world's history, just raised above the worship of stocks and stones, *making themselves gods to go before them*."—Vol. ii., p. 64.

"There is a refreshment to the fancy in thinking of the morning of the world's day, when the sun arose pure and bright, ere the clouds of error darkened the earth.......We pierce through one layer of superstition to another, in the hope of catching the light beyond, like children digging to find the sun in the bosom of the earth."—*Ibid.*, p. 393.

"The theory of a primitive religion, common to all mankind, has only to be placed distinctly before the mind, to make us aware that it is 'the baseless fabric of a vision.'......The earliest history tells nothing of a general religion, but of particular beliefs about stocks and stones, about places and persons, about animal life, about the sun, moon, and stars, about the Divine Essence permeating the world, about gods in the likeness of men appearing in battles, and directing the cause of States, about the world below, about sacrifices, purifications, initiations, magic, mysteries. These were the true religions of nature, varying with different degrees of mental culture or civilization. The further we trace them back, by such indicatians as language or poetry supply, the more difficult do we find them to conceive. Human beings in that age seem to have had only a kind of limited reason; they were the slaves, as we should say, of mere associations. They were rooted in particular spots, or wandered up and down upon the earth, confusing themselves, and God, and nature, gazing timidly on the world around, starting at their own shadows, and seeing in all things a superhuman power at the mercy of which they were."—Vol. ii., p. 395.

"Religion, rather than reason, is the faculty of man in the earliest stage of his existence. Instincts of fear and love bind him to his God; he has the feeling of a slave towards his master, of a child towards its parents, of the lower animals towards himself."—Page 396.

"The religions of the world......are like so many steps in the education of mankind."—Page 386.

"The worship of nature in its many forms is now acknowledged to be deeply rooted in the age, country, people, which gave them birth."—Page 385.

The question which forces itself upon one in reading such passages as these is, *Was* man, then, created? If so, what occurred at that epoch? What instruction was afforded him, what provision was made for him, by his Creator? It is manifest, that the conclusion to which Mr. Jowett's representations point, is very near akin to that of Lord Monboddo, or of the "Vestiges." Mr. Jowett, to be consistent, must hold that man was *not* created, but developed; and that the transition stage through which he passed was that of some superior ape, whose instincts were illumined and elevated by the fitful gleams of a wavering and embryo reason.

In curious juxta-position with one of the extracts given above, Mr. Jowett tells us that "there is one stream of revelation only,—the Jewish." (Page 365.) But the same authority which guarantees what Mr. Jowett would call "the Jewish stream of revelation," —let him date the beginning of this from where he will,—tells also of an earlier and primitive revelation. How then are we to discriminate between the authority which belongs to the Jewish history, and that which must be conceded to the patriarchal; and who is to say, looking at the Book of Genesis, where the one begins and the other ends?

"The earliest history," Mr. Jowett informs us, "tells nothing of a general religion, but of particular beliefs," &c. But how early, let us ask, is this earliest history?

Does it mount as high as the time of Josiah? If not, then how are we to dispose of the testimony of that incomparably earlier history, the truth of which has received so many illustrations and endured so many tests, which tells us of a pure and primeval revelation made to the father of the human race, and to following patriarchs?

If, in speaking of "the earliest history," Mr. Jowett refers to the discoveries made by means of Egyptian hieroglyphics and Assyrian arrow-heads, it is obvious to reply that the fragmentary and superficial information furnished from these sources,—interesting and important as it undoubtedly is,—constitutes rather material for historical conjecture than anything to be properly called history; that its merely negative evidence is really of no weight as against the fact—as we assume it to be—of a primeval religion, until it is shown that the hieroglyphic and arrow-head inscriptions are of considerably higher antiquity than has hitherto been made very probable; and, finally, that the one thing which these venerable remains have undoubtedly established, so far as their evidence goes, is the truly historical character and perfect accuracy of that sacred record whose earliest portions Mr. Jowett would reject; those portions of it which have been directly illustrated and confirmed being of a far more ancient date than any other history, and having in former times been the subject of the same sort of scepticism which would now reject what it chooses of the Book of Genesis.*

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* In reference to this point, we cannot refrain from quoting the words of that most distinguished philologist and antiquarian, Sir Henry Rawlinson, the report of which has been published since the preceding paragraph was written, and which might have been prepared in order to illustrate and enforce the position we have taken. The occasion on which they were uttered, was a Meeting convened at Willis's Rooms, on Thursday, July 17th, 1856, for the purpose of promoting the establishment of a Scriptural Museum. We quote from an abstract of the proceedings:—

"Sir Henry Rawlinson then spoke. He had always looked on biblical illustration as the most important branch of his investigations,—as, in fact, the motive which had induced him to go on from stage to stage for many years. He had been enabled to trace oriental records, by means of the

The evidence of history, as such, except the Bible history, scarcely bears directly upon the question of a primitive revelation and primeval religion. But the evidence of *mythology* is in favour of the scriptural representations of man's earliest condition. The "particular beliefs," notwithstanding all their wide and wild diversity, show, when compared with each other, strong traces of a common substratum and original of religious truth. It suits Mr. Jowett's purpose to write as if all his positions were indubitable, as if no man of "modern" intelligence and "modes of thought" could be found to differ from him. But, though we should allow him to treat as unworthy of notice the vast learning and practised acuteness of the late G. S. Faber, surely Dr. Prichard's authority upon this point is worth something; and the recent ponderous work of De Rougemont may show how powerfully inductive evidence, gathered from every part of the world, and from every period of its history, confirms the scriptural view of this subject.* No doubt "indigenous" influences have had a great share in shaping and developing those superstitions which have grown out of or about primeval truth. This is understood by all intelligent inquirers. But, in affirming this, we do not admit that man's religious course began in Fetishism. We are not bound to construct any hypothesis upon this subject. But if we did construct one, it would be something after this sort. Sun-worship appears, and may naturally be supposed, to have been the earliest

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monumental inscriptions now in the British Museum, from the time of Abraham's departure from Ur of the Chaldees, down to that of Alexander the Great,—a period of two thousand years. Wherever the course of the history came into contact with that of the Jewish people, there was an absolute coincidence between these monumental records and the details of Scripture,—the same names, the same succession of Kings, and the same facts. He gave interesting proofs of this in relation to Chedorlaomer at the earliest period, and Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar at a later date. He felt that these discoveries were sufficient to meet the doubts thrown by some Continental—he was glad to say not English—students on the historical statements of Scripture."

* See the Article on De Rougemont's "Primitive People," in the "London Quarterly Review" for July, 1856.

idolatrous deflection from the worship of the Invisible Supreme. This being established, fire would soon be adored, as the emblem of the sun, and as participating in his nature. With sun and fire worship would easily be associated, among nomad tribes, who lived by pasture or the chase, and roamed the wide and level wilderness, the adoration of that starry host whose gentle beaming eyes seemed to watch them so ceaselessly in their nightly vigils and wanderings. This would especially be likely to take place in the brilliant intertropical latitudes, where night is so lovely, glorious, and welcome. In other regions, where Nature, lusty Queen, giant in strength and prodigal in fruitfulness, made earth grand with lofty mountain and rejoicing river, dark with forests, bright with verdure, full of voice and music with the rush or murmur of waters, the shout of the wild tempest, or the whispering of the wooing winds; where she assumed all moods and wantoned in the wildest forms, sleeping sweetly in the deep valley shade, lifting herself on high into the joy of sunshine, threading the maze of ever-winding streams, hiding in still sequestered spots of weird and dream-like beauty, known only to her dearest followers; in such regions, where heaven seemed no longer to be the starry and all-ruling mistress of the earth she spanned and rested on, but only the bright crown set upon Nature's head; it would be likely that the sun-worship would merge in nature and element worship, and this again pass into a more distinct and developed Pantheism. Fetishism we take to be a degraded nature-worship, appropriate to a degraded race. Hero-worship would come in, at a later stage, perverted traditionary truth concurring with Pantheism to prepare the way for it. Hero-worship grafted upon and combined with astral worship (or Sabaism) and Pantheism, would speedily develope into a manifold Polytheism. The religions of Chaldea and of Arabia,—of Medo-Persia in the earliest times, so far as we can trace it,—and of the Aryans at the time of the Vedas, of Africa and of Greece, would furnish illustration and confirmation of the view we have thus ventured to outline.

Mr. Jowett expects us to believe, on the strength of his quiet dogmatism, that there is no evidence afforded by scientific and archæological investigation in favour of the common origin of the human race. But, in fact, physiology and philology concur with mythology in sustaining the scriptural view. Is the Oxford Professor in such a position that he can presume to ignore the authority not only of that distinguished Englishman and devout Christian whom we have already named, Dr. Prichard, but of such men as the late Baron de Larrey, and as the author of "Kosmos?" And as to philology, in particular, we may say, that it seems to point to one of two conclusions,—either to different origins with a profoundly remote antiquity, or to some confusion of languages happening among the tribes of men when they were united in one community, but still leaving traces of that community, in a certain general agreement of lingual and grammatical principles. The latter is the scriptural solution of the case. By those who refuse to admit a miraculous character, as belonging to man's early stage of history, this solution will not be accepted. But those who believe in *creation,* and in the congeries of miracles which this implies, especially when the creation of *man* is contemplated;—those who recognise in the geological history of the past creative epochs;—those who hold that Sedgwick, Brewster, and Hugh Miller have utterly demolished the theory of the "Vestiges," &c.,—and that the last, in particular, has shown that degradation, instead of developement, has often been the law of the Divine plan, in regard to different species of both the animal and the vegetable kingdom;—these will not reject any account of the early ages of man, or of the commencement of any new dispensation, merely because it is miraculous.

It is necessary to ask, moreover, how it happens, if Mr. Jowett's representation of the early history of the race is the true one, that, at so remote a period of antiquity, when other nations were still, to adopt his phraseology, either sunk in Fetishism, and timid, cowering nature-worship, or, at best, only emerging into the older and more uncouth and monstrous forms of Polytheism, such a pure and lofty Monotheism and such sublimity of conception as we find in the former part of the Book of Genesis should have been possible? Mr. Jowett believes this to be merely a collection of myths; but whence *such* myths? Do they not, even on his own principles, seem to imply the previous continuity of a noble and worthy revelation?

If Mr. Jowett would deny the truth of the former part of the Book of Genesis, he must be prepared with some solution of the great difficulty which the existence of such a document opposes to his theory. Here is a history, or, if Mr. Jowett pleases, a collection of traditional stories, which must have been committed to writing in that "dawn of the world's history," when, we are told, "men were just raised above the worship of stocks and stones, *making themselves gods to go before them.*" Yet it furnishes its own explanation of the deepest imaginable questions,—questions connected with the being of man upon the earth, his relation to his Maker, the cause of the wickedness already so widespread among the nations, the origin and purpose of sacrifices, the division of time into weeks, and the confusion of tongues,—the very conception of which, for the first time, would seem to have been impossible except in an age of profound reflection, and utterly beyond the powers of a people so rude and so ill-circumstanced as the Israelites either before, or indeed for long after, the time of Moses. And yet, again, the myths which are intended to resolve these questions, *if myths they are,* must have been traditions of a time long anterior to that of Moses; for we cannot suppose that Mr. Jowett would attribute them to the invention of any one man, least of all of Moses. Add to these considerations, that the Book of Genesis affords a minutely circumstantial history of that Deluge of which the traditions of all races concur in speaking; and that it gives a table of the genealogy and migrations of the early tribes of men which bears every mark of authenticity, and which all the succeeding history both of the sacred volume and of other records, as well as the results of modern research, has strongly confirmed; and we have a problem to solve in the existence of such a book, on which we think every theory of developement must be broken to pieces.

Indeed, it will not be difficult in this as in other cases to refute Mr. Jowett from his own testimony. His theory obviously requires him to maintain—and he does maintain accordingly—that "instead of the earliest religions being the purest, the reverse is the fact;" that "the stream is the clearest, not at its source, but lower down." (Page 402.) Now, does Mr. Jowett really intend us to receive this as a universal, or even as a general, truth? Was the religion of Egypt in the days of the Ptolemies and of Vespasian, or even in the days of the middle and later Pharaohs, *purer* and more elevated than at the era of the building of the Pyramids? Is the Polytheism of India, such as it has grown up since the Christian era, "clearer and purer" than in the times of the sun and element worship which forms the substratum on which the *Veda* liturgies were founded? There has been developement, no doubt, in these idolatries; but it has been the developement of absurd and demoralizing invention. Or again, we may ask, if the religion of Greece in later days was really so much purer than that of the early ages, on traditions of which were grounded the plots and principles of the severe and moral tragic muse. As to Rome, we shall hear Mr. Jowett speak himself. Or has there indeed been advancement and purification in the Fetish-worship of Africa, or the abominations of Feejee?

But let Mr. Jowett answer himself. Having spoken of the general immorality of the heathen world, he proceeds as follows:—

> "The picture suggested by these features is not equally true of the heathen world in all ages, nor of Greece and the East, nor of Rome itself in the earlier years of the Republic and under the Emperors. It could hardly have been the mere fond recollection of the past that made the Roman tell of the Sabine morals of his ancestors, or of the lessons of truth and virtue to

be gathered from the examples of Consuls and Dictators. It is probable that Rome was long preserved from the impurities of Greece and the East; yet, as it seems, only reserved for a deeper contamination and pollution. To see the old world in its worst estate we turn to the age of the Satirists and of Tacitus, when all the different streams of evil coming from east, west, north, south, the vices of barbarism and the vices of civilization, remnants of ancient cults and the latest refinements of luxury and impurity, met and mingled on the banks of the Tiber."—Vol. ii., p. 69.

"Nor must the extreme confusion be overlooked which religion had introduced into the natural sense of mankind respecting them," (unnatural sins,) "consecrating them by the example of gods and heroes, and representing even the worst of them as religious mysteries. Least of all would the increase of refinement tend to their diminution. It was not to the elegant and luxurious Senator such abominations were peculiarly odious, but to the antique Roman, rude in speech and knowledge, hating the contamination of foreign manners, lingering in thought around the liberties of the Republic."—Vol. ii., p. 70.

So much for the assertion that the earliest religions are the most impure, and that the stream becomes clearer as it flows down. Mr. Jowett tells us, that only "with the help of such a parallel as childhood offers to the infancy of the world, shall we be willing to admit" his views "to the full extent." (Page 364.) But he might have remembered the simplicity and comparative innocence of childhood, as well as its ignorance and fears; he might have remembered, too, that even children can exercise a true and beautiful faith in their living God and Father.

"Heaven lies about us in our infancy,"

says the poet; and we believe this to have been true of the childhood of our race. The opposite opinion may agree better with the notion of a pantheistic God; but ours agrees better with the scriptural representation of our God as the "Father of the spirits of all flesh," as well as with the plain letter of the Divine word, and the uniform tradition of all races,—a tradition which, as Mr. Jowett states in the same sentence in which he speaks of it as an "error" and a "fallacy," "has exerted so great an influence on mankind, and reproduced itself in so many different forms among heathen as well as Christian writers." Nevertheless, we too are believers in progress and in developement, for good and for evil,—evil which shall be overruled for good. Though we should count it as little less than impious to speak of the abominations of Egypt, Hindostan, and Feejee, as "steps in the education of man," in which we may trace "a sort of order and design;" yet we too can say, with Tennyson,—

"For I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widen'd by the process of the suns."

Humanity has grown to man's estate; it has lost indeed the bloom and purity of its childhood, it has taken its way to wisdom through the knowledge both of good and evil; but even when descending deepest in sin and idolatry, ideas of truth and holiness have still been growing and ripening within it here and there; and, in the end, we trust that God's grace and goodness will completely master its evil, and Christ's Spirit take entire possession of its powers.*

If such are Mr. Jowett's views regarding "natural religion," or, as he calls it, "the plant in its uncultivated state," what is his belief in reference to revealed religion,—"the same plant when sown by the husbandman?"† It is difficult to answer this question. He admits, as we have seen, that "there is one stream of revelation only,—the Jewish;" he says, moreover, that "the interval which separates the morality of the Old Testament from the *Vedas* or the *Zendavesta,* or early Greek mythology, is wider than that which separates Socrates from the Gospel of Christ." (Page 385.) This is a striking and most important testimony; and such a statement seems to us logically to imply that God had given to Israel a direct and full supernatural revelation of moral and religious truth. But then, on the other hand, he does not allow that we can "draw the line sharply," or that there is any real and essential distinction between natural and revealed religion. (Pp. 391, 392.) He more than half adopts Goethe's saying, that the Jewish religion "is the first of the ethnic religions, but still ethnic." He denies the Divine institution of sacrifice; he will not even allow that the Jewish sacrifices received a particular Divine sanction, but interprets them by those of the Heathen; though he admits that by so doing he "seems to reduce the Jewish dispensation to the level of the Heathen." * Of course this involves the denial of all typical meaning to the Mosaic ceremonial,—a denial explicitly made in a note on Rom. xii. 1. In consistency with this, he shows a systematic purpose to disparage the law of Moses. He most unwarrantably represents the spirit of prophecy as from the first opposed to that of the law, as "another religion;" in which "the voice of God cried aloud against sacrifice and offering;" † as if Samuel and Isaiah were contrary to Moses, as if the Law and the Prophets might not always be harmonized in the spirit of the latter verses of the Fifty-first Psalm.

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* On the subject dealt with in the few preceding pages, the author has now (1859) great pleasure in being able to refer, in confirmation of the arguments which he has advanced, and the general view which he has taken, to the observations of Mr. Mansel in his Bampton Lectures for 1858, pp. 420–423. First Edition.

† Vol. ii., p. 387.

If Mr. Jowett's naturalistic tendencies lead him to disparage the Law, they equally involve the depression of Prophecy. According to his view, a Prophet is a compound of piety and enthusiasm. He is the subject of no supernatural illumination; he receives no direct revelation from God. He is inspired, no doubt, in a sense; mastered and carried away by his faith and piety. He bears "witness of the invisible God, and of the law of justice and mercy in the dealings of Providence." His predictions are but his own moral intuitions of what may be expected from the Providence of a just and merciful God; his pictures of the future only reflect the principles and reproduce the scenes which his

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* Vol. ii., p. 478.

† *Cf.* vol. ii., pp. 298, 436.

faith and piety have dwelt upon in the past. Proper foresight or foreknowledge he has not. Such is the rationalistic view of prophecy, borrowed from German sources, which Mr. Jowett holds in common with Mr. Maurice.* Such a theory as this utterly breaks down when it is tested. It makes the Prophets to have been not only their own dupes, but false witnesses to their God; it is plainly inconsistent with the language of Christ and His Apostles; it can never explain the minute fulfilment of the Messianic prophecies, and of many predictions of the fate of nations. If admitted, it involves a denial not only of the inspiration, but of the sober sense, if not, also, of the honesty, of the Apostles. Nay, to us it seems to make our Lord Himself to have been a deceiver, and to involve the denial of His prophetic power. We know no principle on which it can be admitted that our Lord's prophecies were real predictions, and yet the true prophetic inspiration of the Hebrew Seers be denied. In one word, this view involves the rejection of the truth and Divinity both of Christ and the Christian dispensation.

Such views as we have indicated are in strict harmony with the principle which Mr. Jowett has adopted from his German masters, that no man, however "inspired," can rise above "the natural modes of thought and association of his day." † He even ventures, in a most painful passage, too long to quote,‡ as full of "confusion of thought," as, according to him, the writings of St. Paul everywhere are,—and as irreverent as confused,—to more than intimate the same thing as to our Lord Himself. As to the Apostle, he tells us that, being brought up in an Alexandrianized and Rabbinical school, he was not aware of any "distinction between argument and illustration," and that such a distinction "could hardly have been made intelligible to him;" that he was "not capable of weighing evidence, or distinguishing between the working of the Spirit,"—whatever Mr. Jowett means by that,—"and of his own mind;" that "want of point," and the "unmeaning use of emphatic expressions," were characteristic of him; that he "often employs an antithesis of words where there is none of meaning;" that he is in the habit of "inverting the modes of thought," and putting cause for effect, and effect for cause; that he was "unconscious of logical consistency;" and could not even appreciate the distinction between the moral and ceremonial law; *i.e.*, between what he has himself distinguished as "the law of commandments contained in ordinances," and that law of which he has told us that the fulfilment is love.*

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* See the Essays on the "Character of St. Paul," vol. i., p. 295; the "Man of Sin;" and the "Contrasts of Prophecy."

† Vol. i., p. 285.

‡ Vol. i., pp. 97, 98.

In two of his dissertations, "On the Abstract Ideas of the New Testament," and "Of Modes of Time and Place in Scripture," Mr. Jowett expounds more fully the principles which have guided his conclusions on these points. But are we to believe that because the language of children has few abstract terms, and makes one word answer many senses, concrete, abstract, and derived, therefore no real distinctions subsist in their ideas? Which are we to believe? that language has been shaped and moulded by thought, or that thought has been, from the beginning, absolutely dependent for its shades and distinctions upon language? It would be necessary to maintain the latter alternative, with all the absurdities which it must imply, if we were to suppose, with Mr. Jowett, that the defects of the Alexandrian philosophical language made it impossible for St. Paul to understand distinctions which are implied in the nature of things and in the operations of the mind.† But the second of these Essays is yet more extravagant in what it asserts and implies than the former. It brings in what are called "mixed modes of time and place" as characteristic of the conceptions of the Apostle. It reduces him to infantile ideas of time and place; makes him lose and confound both past and future in the present, and allows him no larger or truer idea of the broad world than an ignorant Cockney child. Something like this might apply to the case of Bushman or Australian savage, but not to a noble spirit of that nation "whose were the fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came;" not to one who could count a long line of ancestry, and belonged to a people whose history gave the annals of a past, stretching backward through many generations of men, and actually numbered the ages, and whose traditions and prophecies looked forward to the end of the world and to the life to come; whose Psalmists had pointed the contrast between the time and flux of human affairs, and the eternity of that God, with whom "a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years;" not to one of that nation whose Prophets had shown themselves to possess as grand conceptions of the majesty of creation as of the sweep of the ages, had spoken of the earth below as answering in its vastness to the o'er-mantling heavens above, of their God as "weighing the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance, and taking up the isles as a very little thing," and beheld in the Spirit the "multitude of the nations gathered together to battle in the day of Jehovah's anger;" not to one of that race whose ancient oracle taught them that in their promised Seed "all nations of the earth were to be blessed," who had been conversant with the great empires of Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, and Persia, and the later civilization of Greece and Rome, who had long been sown far and wide among the nations of earth; least of all to that Saul of Tarsus, whose mind had been enlarged by

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* Jowett, vol. i., pp. 284, 285; vol. ii., p. 180; vol. i., pp. 300, 25, 238; vol. ii., pp. 138, 260, 40; vol. i., p. 160; vol. ii., p. 437.

† It will be remembered that Mr. Jowett represents St. Paul as so trammelled by the modes of thought and speech of his age, that he was unable to conceive the question as to God's causation or permission of evil. Yet, in his introductory remarks to the third chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, referring to the great questions of "the origin of evil, and the eternal decrees, and the everlasting penalty," as suggested by the train of thought in that chapter, he speaks of them as "questions which, in every age, from that of Job and Ecclesiastes, have been more or less clearly seen

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in various forms, Jewish as well as Christian, as problems of natural or of revealed religion, common alike to the Greeks and to ourselves, and which have revived again and again in the course of human thought." (Vol. ii., p. 107.) We need not point out how utterly this sentence contradicts very much of Mr. Jowett's writing.

foreign travel and intercourse, who was the "Apostle of the nations," who had himself preached the word from Jerusalem to Illyricum, and from Illyricum to Rome.

How weak and wilful is such a sentence as the following from the pen of Mr. Jowett! More foolish transcendentalism was surely never put forth by one of "the most highly educated minds" of the present philosophical age. He is speaking of the first believers.

> "So little did the idea of time enter into their conception of Christ's existence, that they could speak of Him as at once ordained 'to be the Son of God with power,' and also as the 'first-born of every creature'—as 'speaking by the Prophets,' and yet also as contrasted with them and following them. (Heb. i. 2.)"—Vol. ii., p. 103.

And yet we read, "Before Abraham was, I am," "He is before all things," "In the beginning was the Word," "I am the First and the Last." Nay, the very passage (Heb. i. 2) to which Mr. Jowett refers, shows that the sacred writers did not confound, but combined and harmonized, Christ's past and present, or rather His eternal and His human existence.

Yet Mr. Jowett cannot always be consistent with himself as to these points. Truth ever and anon breaks down his theory. However incoherently and reluctantly he may do it, he is compelled to concede that the Great Teacher and St. Paul *were* far in advance of their age. Speaking of the quotations from the Old Testament in the New, he says, "Such tesselated work was after the manner of the age...... There are few, if any, traces of it in the discourses of our Lord Himself, though it frequently recurs in the comments of the Evangelists."* This latter fact he offers in proof that such Scripture quotations "belong to the externals rather than to the true life of the New Testament." To us it is rather an evidence that our Lord spoke of Himself, out of His own treasure and fulness. But, at any rate, it is a fact inconsistent with his theory, that not only the Apostles, but even our

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* Vol. i., p. 354.

Lord, were limited and conditioned by the modes of thought of their age; or, as he puts it in the very next page, that they necessarily "adopt the modes of thought and citation of their age."

But his self-contradiction in the case of St. Paul is very worthy to be noted. He is speaking of Christian writers from the latter half of the second century, as having lost the spirit of St. Paul, and says,—

> "His influence for a season seems to vanish from the world. ......An echo of a part of his teaching is heard in Augustine; with this exception, the voice of him who withstood Peter to the face at Antioch, was silent in the Church until the Reformation."—*On St. Paul and the Twelve*, vol. i., pp. 346, 347.

It appears, then, that St. Paul was fifteen hundred years before his age. The age spoke in his opponents; the Holy Ghost—who is of eternity—spoke in him.

Again, in the following passage our author still more directly stultifies himself, and prostrates his own favourite theory:—

> "'It is one God who shall justify.' (Rom. iii. 30.) Let us turn aside for a moment to consider how great this thought was in that age and country,—a thought which the wisest of men had never before uttered, which even at the present hour we imperfectly realize.......Even to us it is hard to imagine that the islander of the South Seas, the Pariah of India, the African in his worst estate, is equally with ourselves God's creature." [*This* bathos is not the Apostle's, but Mr. Jowett's.] "But in the age of St. Paul, how great must have been the difficulty of conceiving Barbarian and Scythian, bond and free, all colours, forms, races, and languages, alike and equal in the presence of God who made them!"—Vol. ii., p. 126.

And yet, in spite of this amazing superiority, St. Paul was bound down by the modes of thought of his age!

That the Prophets of old, that our Lord and His Apostles, adapted their modes of speech to the capacities and modes of conception of those whom they addressed,—just as we now do for our children,—is, of course, undeniable. But that it follows from thence that their modes of speech answered to, and truthfully reflected, however dimly in some cases, no realities well understood by themselves,—that they directly adopted and endorsed prejudice and error,—that their prophecies were not proper predictions,—that the day of judgment which, Mr. Jowett admits, both our Lord and St. Paul seemed to believe in, was the mere projection on to the canvas of prophecy of an idea or principle rooted in the human conscience, but will have no distinct or proper fulfilment,—that in the Apostle's case this was the vision of an enthusiast who was "out of harmony with nature" and the world,—that his prediction as to the future of Israel is a demonstrated mistake, and never *can* be fulfilled: these are views which no one will admit who believes in the power and truth of the God of the Bible.

After what we have already seen, none can be surprised that Mr. Jowett's developement-theory leads him to maintain that St. Paul's views of Christian doctrine not only expanded, but became essentially modified, as his years and labours increased. He had once "preached circumcision,"—had once "known Christ after the flesh,"—at the outset of his Christian course, —"in the beginning of the Gospel,"—according to the unique interpretation which Mr. Jowett puts upon this phrase. All his new exegeses, in connexion with this subject, are singularly weak and unfortunate. He will have it, contrary to overpowering evidence, as we think, not merely that St. Paul was ignorant of the precise era of the coming of Christ,—whether it might be in an early age, or after many ages,—but that he confidently expected it in his own life-time. From the fact, which we admit, and he exaggerates, that the Apostle put forth certain aspects of the Gospel more or less prominently at different times, he infers, not that this variation corresponded to the varying circumstances of those to whom St. Paul wrote, and to the different relations in which he stood to them, but that he taught at different times opposite doctrines,—although what, on Mr. Jowett's interpretation and theory, is to be considered his earlier doctrine, is distinctly implied in his later Epistles, and *vice versâ*. He tells us that "a future life, as distinct from this, was *not* made a part of the first preaching of the Gospel."* He opposes, moreover, the doctrine of the other Apostles, as to certain points, to that of St. Paul.† In all this he closely follows his German leaders.

There are many fine and true things in Mr. Jowett's Dissertations on the "Conversion of St. Paul" and the "Character of St. Paul." But there is also much exaggeration and distortion; and the noble, loving, catholic, human Apostle—who had, no doubt, an eye for the "things which are seen," and which declare the "eternal power and Godhead" of their Maker—is pictured sadly too like a Middle-Age fanatical saint; as a trembling, palsied, and utterly illiterate enthusiast, with a strange wild light in his eye, who *never* knew whether he "was in the body or out of it;" who led an ecstatic, half-lost sort of life,—though marvellous sagacity mingled with and regulated all his enthusiasm,—and who, under an overpowering impression of things eternal and invisible, and under the excitement of the continual expectation of the coming of the Lord, was insensible to all distinctions of time and to all feeling of earth's realities.

Mr. Jowett's views on the subject of "miracles" are not distinctly brought out. Only, after the example of Coleridge and the Germans, he depreciates their value as furnishing evidence of the Divine mission of Christ and the Apostles. He throws doubt upon the reality of the appearance of our Lord to Saul, and says that it matters not whether it was a vision or only a subjective impression. He casts in, also, a significant slur upon the testimony by which miracles generally may be supported.‡

If we pass over these important matters slightly, it is because they have been well and fully handled by several contemporary journals, and because we wish to reserve space for the vindication of the cardinal doctrine of the Gospel against the attacks and misrepresentations not only of Professor Jowett, but of Messrs. Maurice, Kingsley, and the whole school of Anglican Neology.

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* Vol. i., p. 99.

† See the Essay on "St. Paul and the Twelve."

‡ See vol. i., pp. 231, 232, 292.

CHAPTER XV.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT—THE ABYSS OF SCEPTICISM.

"The offence of the Cross" has not yet ceased. The "natural man" still contends against the doctrine of "justification through faith in Christ's blood." The heart and conscience, indeed, respond to this doctrine with a welcome such as Despair, from the depth of his dungeon, might wake up to give to a sudden and sure vision of Hope. But the pride of intellect rebels against it. To the believing "barbarian" or "Scythian," "Christ crucified" is "the power of God, and the wisdom of God;" but still, as in the Apostle's days, to the self-righteous "Jew" this Gospel is a "stumbling-block," and to the cultured "Greek" "foolishness." The doctrine of the Incarnation may be accepted: it exalts humanity. The doctrine of the Trinity, even, may not repel: it is a mere mystery, requiring man, indeed, to confess his ignorance of the mode of the Divine Existence, but not, of itself, humbling to the moral pride of the individual man; or its peculiarly mysterious character may be in a great measure removed, by explaining and refining it away into a virtual Sabellianism, disguised under the forms of the Neo-Platonic Divine triad. But the doctrine of a vicarious and expiatory atonement involves such views of man's personal guilt and spiritual helplessness, and such an estimate of the inviolable majesty of the Holy Law of God, as cannot but be revolting to the pride of human sinners, the guilty subjects of that law. Hence, there is carried on, from age to age, a continuous struggle, even among those who bear the Christian name, and some who profess to be orthodox believers, against this doctrine. At present, we lament to say, the number of able and accomplished men, among Trinitarians, who have espoused what we consider the anti-evangelical side in this controversy, is proportionately greater than at any former period. Among these are to be found in Germany some distinguished semi-evangelical divines of the better class of the admirers of Schleiermacher; while in England all are to be reckoned on this side who would acknowledge, as their masters in philosophic and theological thinking, such men as Coleridge, Arnold, and Hare. Nor is it only within the pale of Anglican Episcopacy, that the anti-evangelical tendency is found to be making way. There is too much reason to fear that its current has visited Nonconformist colleges, if not also Scotch universities.

Up to the period of the publication of Mr. Jowett's theological speculations, however, the adherents of orthodoxy within the Episcopal Church seemed for the most part indisposed to take up arms in its defence. Mr. Thomson (Bampton Lecturer for 1853) stood almost alone, as a learned and able opponent of Mr. Maurice's views. For the most part the enemies of the faith encountered little or no resistance; nor was Mr. Thomson's volume, notwithstanding its high merits, either complete as an argument or very decided in its evangelical tone.

Mr. Jowett's book, however, has at length waked up the Anglican divines. We presume it is because of Mr. Jowett's reputation as a student and a critic, and of the position which he occupies at Oxford as Professor and Tutor, that his attack upon the orthodox doctrine of Atonement, though comparatively incidental, and occupying so little space among the various and profound discussions contained in his volumes, has excited so much attention, and been met by an array of replies which the reiterated misrepresentation and invective of other eminent Clergymen, though persevered in for a series of years, had not called forth.*

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* "Christian Faith and the Atonement: Sermons preached before the University of Oxford, in reference to the Views published by Mr. Jowett and others. By E. B. PUSEY, D.D., REV. T. D. BERNARD, M.A., &c. With a

The part of Mr. Jowett's volumes which directly relates to this grand article of faith is, indeed, exceedingly small. The Dissertation occupies no more than fourteen pages, out of more than nine hundred in the two volumes. Of course, however, there are a number of indirect or incidental references to the subject in the commentary, as well as several in some of the other dissertations. Yet, on the whole, it is not so much as an attack upon the doctrine of the Atonement that Mr. Jowett's work should be regarded, but rather as a systematic attempt to undermine the foundations of the Christian faith both in God and in the word of God. Without presuming to impute motives, without attempting to speculate upon the pleas which the author might use in self-justification, or the disguise under which his work may appear to his own eyes, we have a right to affirm, upon the evidence adduced, that this is the real character of these volumes. The radical tendency is altogether sceptical: the writer believes in an historical Christ, and in an historical Christianity; he recognises the good faith and general historical accuracy of the books of the New Testament; but he no more believes in doctrinal Christianity than in Judaism. To a certain extent,—to a large extent, no doubt,—he accepts the history of the Old Testament; but he rejects what his critical faculty disapproves, and disallows the supernatural character of the dispensation, whether in law or prophecy. Such being the case, our controversy with Mr. Jowett is far broader, as well as more fundamental, than if his views merely affected the evangelical doctrine of a vicarious atonement for the sins of men, vital as this doctrine is.

We feel bound, moreover, to say that, as an opponent of the doctrine of the Atonement, Mr. Jowett is by no means so virulent or unfair as many of the writers with whom he may be classed. After becoming familiar with the violent caricature and invective of Maurice, who, on this subject, can scarcely be exceeded by Theodore Parker himself, Mr. Jowett's

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Preface by the Rev. the Vice-Chancellor, and an Appendix of Authorities. 8vo. Oxford and London: Parkers. 1856."

remarks seem almost mild and candid. At the same time, however, he shows a more complete disregard for the authority of Scripture upon this subject, whether of the Old or New Testament, than any of the Neo-Platonist school. The truth is, he is too able an interpreter of the letter of the New Testament not to see that this is in favour of the evangelical sense, and too far gone a rationalist to be much affected by his knowledge of this fact. He therefore admits the plain meaning of the scriptural testimony, and, at the same time, explains away its authority. In this respect he is only an instance of what will be found commonly true,—that rationalistic interpreters of Scripture, such as Gesenius and Winer, are far more to be trusted as merely exegetical critics than those whose philosophy refuses to accept Christian doctrines, and yet whose respect for the authority of Scripture, or whose position as Christian teachers, constrains them to force Scripture into conformity with their philosophy. Mr. Jowett has far more absolutely than Mr. Kingsley, or his critic Mr. Davies, cast off the authority of Scripture; but he is often far more correct, and far nearer the evangelical sense, in his interpretation of Scripture.

Mr. Jowett's objections against the orthodox doctrine of the Atonement are substantially the same as those urged by Coleridge, Maurice, and the whole semi-Socinian school. They are, in fact, the old Socinian objections; and, briefly put, are to the effect, that this doctrine "interposes a painful fiction between God and man," and that it is opposed to the "moral sense" of mankind. The doctrine is "painful," as implying God's inability to pardon without atonement; and in this it is opposed to our "moral sense." It is a "fiction," as "involving a moral illusion;" and in this respect, also, it is opposed to the "moral sense."

Mr. Jowett objects to the doctrine, because it assumes that God cannot, merely on condition of repentance, forgive all sin and every sinner; because it implies that justice has its demands, no less than mercy,—that breach of law requires to be marked by

Divine displeasure, and that mere penitence is no atonement. All which Mr. Jowett supposes to be contrary to our moral "sense." But, if by "moral sense" he means *conscience*, we cannot take his word for this. We know not what the cultured "moral sense" of semi-pantheist philosophers may teach them; but we know what our own conscience, and what the conscience of mankind at large, teaches, and always has taught. Conscience, by its sting and its foreboding, teaches us that sin deserves punishment, and that our Maker and Ruler is a Judge, who will call us to account for our transgressions. Our instant indignation when we hear of wrong and outrage, and the universal sentiment which rises up within us, that such wrong and outrage call for condign punishment, that violated law and righteousness require to be vindicated, impress the same lesson. Do we not all feel that there are sins committed against society for which no repentance can atone, but which must be visited by severe and signal punishment? Witness the comments of almost the entire press of this country, on occasion of the frauds and forgeries of the late eminent city bankers, and of the Rugeley murders.

No; the principle which makes atonement necessary is *not* opposed to the conscience and the moral sense. These have ever been in its favour, as the language of mankind, the laws of all nations, and the rites of sacrifice testify. But it is opposed to a certain philosophical theory. It is not the instinctive judgment of the heart, but the inferences of a speculative reason, which oppose the principle of punishment for sin. We are told that men can freely pardon, and why not God? that mercy in men is counted more blessed, the more freely and largely it forgives, and that God must be more merciful than man; that "God is the Father of the spirits of all flesh," and must be infinitely willing to forgive every penitent sinner, without any other atonement than his repentance. But is not God a Ruler, as well as a Father? the Ruler not only of earth, but of heaven,—not only of this world, but of other worlds? We are often told, by our transcendental illuminati, that we argue from shallow earthly analogies to incommensurable spiritual realities; that from mere "conceptions" of the practical and logical "understanding," we draw unwarranted conclusions in regard to "ideas" which lie within the province of the intuitive reason. Our reply is, that if we are compelled to argue, we can only argue thus. If we try to conceive Divine things, it must be by the help of earthly analogies. They are to be blamed for this, who themselves deny the truths of what they call "the higher reason," *i. e.*, of man's conscience and universal instincts, and perplex the present question with cavils of the understanding; who reject the distinct testimony of God's word, and lose themselves in the mazes of their own philosophy. But, besides this, we return them the objection with interest. We confess that all earthly analogies applied to Divine things must be superficial and defective, and must be used cautiously and subordinately, to illustrate rather than to demonstrate, or by way of defence against objections rather than to establish positive principles. But the analogies on which the opponents of the evangelical doctrine depend are not merely superficial; they most manifestly fail, in reference to the very point they are alleged to prove. They fail, just where they ought to be exact, and so they become positively false. It is so in the present instance. We are told that God is a Father. This is not denied by us; but we ask, Is He not also, and perhaps even more characteristically, a Moral Governor,—the Moral Governor of all creatures, and all worlds? As such, is it not necessary that He should uphold and enforce law? The question is not whether He could "freely forgive a debt" owing merely to Himself. It is strange that transcendentalist philosophers should urge appeals to analogy which imply so low and contracted a conception of the Divine Governor. Our God has to rule for the interests of all His creatures; the object of His government must be to enforce righteousness upon all His creatures in their dealings with each other. It is necessary in order to this, as well as right in itself, that His law should be implicitly obeyed.*

Nor is it true that, in all cases, a man may freely forgive a debt owing to himself. Public interests may demand that the offender be punished. It is not even true that a father can always freely forgive a penitent child. Penitence comes easily and far too often to some children. Repeated or glaring offences may require that a father, even though fully convinced of the sincere repentance of his child, and yearning strongly in heart towards him, yet, for the sake of example and warning to others, should mark the offence by some decisive token of his displeasure.

Men, so far as experience in this world teaches, are only to be governed on the large scale by means of rewards and punishments. These may take different forms, may be administered wisely or foolishly, may tend to engender a slavish spirit, or a spirit of free and cordial obedience, to beget selfishness, or to promote generosity and enlargement of spirit. But let them be disguised ever so subtly, or let them be employed ever so wisely, it will be found that the motives of reward and punishment have to be employed, cannot but be employed, in influencing and training human beings from the cradle to the grave. The very men who declaim so strongly and so continually against the selfishness of such motives when applied to religious concerns, find themselves constrained to use them in training their own children. Nay, they admit the principle when they proclaim that virtue is its own reward, and vice its own punishment. They honour the principle when they declare that God is the Author and Vindicator of law, and will not suffer His own ordinances to be violated without entailing upon such violation its appropriate punishment. In society, in civil and political life, the same motives, though seldom distinctly recognised, are always operating; and without them all things would either languish and stagnate into a dreary immobility and death, or reel and fall asunder into a universal chaos. And in the governments of this world, we need not say, rewards and punishments are the avowed and only weights and impulses brought to bear upon the community.

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* Let us illustrate and supplement the remarks in the text by the following extract from Mr. Mansel's Lectures.

"It is obvious, indeed, on a moment's reflection, that the duty of a man to forgive the trespasses of his neighbour rests precisely upon those features of human nature which cannot by any analogy be regarded as representing an image of God. Man is not the author of the moral law; he is not, as man, the moral governor of his fellows; he has no authority, merely as man, to punish moral transgressors as such. It is not as sin, but as injury, that vice is a transgression against man; it is not that his holiness is outraged, but that his rights or his interests are impaired. The duty of forgiveness is imposed as a check, not upon the justice, but upon the selfishness of man; it is not designed to extinguish his indignation against vice, but to restrain his tendency to exaggerate his own personal injuries. The reasoner who maintains, 'It is a duty in man to forgive sins, therefore it must be morally fitting for God to forgive them also,' overlooks the fact, that this duty is binding upon man on account of the weakness, and ignorance, and sinfulness of his nature; that he is bound to forgive, as one who himself needs forgiveness; as one whose weakness renders him liable to suffering; as one whose self-love is ever ready to arouse his passions and pervert his judgment." —*Mansel's Lectures*, pp. 214, 215.

What then? Has our Divine Ruler nothing to do with us, nothing to make of us? Has He no ends to be accomplished beyond those of time and this world? Is there no future in which we are to be nearer Him, and for which He would train us here? Does He, our Creator, He, the Eternal Father, waive all claims upon our immortality? Will He never enter into relations with us, His children, closer and more personal than connect us with Him here? Has He abdicated to the governments of earth, and the influences of time, all authority and power over us? And, as to the future,—that which passes beyond the horizon of our present sphere,—is it to be as it may chance? is it a matter of so little concern to us, and so utterly beneath His care, that He will utter no law looking forward to it, make known no sanctions, bring to bear upon us no influences specifically related to it, arrange no system of motives and inducements adapted to prepare and train for it?

But, if God is indeed to influence and govern us for Himself and for the future,—if He does not merely leave time and this world to mould and rule us as they may,—it is manifest that He can only deal with us as we are. It matters not whether the future for which we are to act and live lie in this world or another, we are still the same. The mere mention of the unseen developes no new faculties which make us independent of ordinary motives, and cause us to act rightly from pure love and right principle. No: rewards and punishments must be used by the Divine Father, no less than by earthly parents, if it is His purpose, as we believe it to be, to train us for Himself and for the eternal future from our very infancy; they must be used by the Divine Governor, no less than by earthly governments, if He would have His law to be consciously obeyed, and His will to be done, "on earth as it is in heaven." Children have to be taught and trained to obey and hope in God above; careless men have to be raised from their carelessness, and brought to feel their relationship to Him and to eternity; bad men have to be deterred from perseverance in evil, and to be "awakened" to their need of repentance and a changed heart; good men have to be cheered in trouble and suffering, and to be sustained and inspired in the hour of peril or persecution:—and how can all this be accomplished except by means of rewards and punishments determinable by spiritual acts and conditions?

Let the principles implied by the objections of such writers as Jowett, Maurice, and Kingsley, be pushed to their conclusions, and what will be the result? Let all men be told, in Mr. Jowett's words, that "God cannot be angry with any," and that whatever may have been a man's sins, if he will but repent, there is no hindrance to God's freely forgiving him all, without the infliction of any punishment whatever, and without the need of any atonement or intercession. What would be the effect of such a proclamation? Would it make sin appear "exceeding sinful?" Would it enhance our idea of the holiness of God? Would it not make sin appear a light and trivial thing, tolerated too easily by a "good-natured" God, to be held as of much account by man? Well may Mr. Arthur say, "Right in our governments is the imperfect reflection of a perfect right. Had the favour of the Almighty crossed the line which divides innocence from guilt, and smiled upon the latter, that smile would have been a scathing flash wherein all morals would have blackened." *

The theology which now objects to evangelical orthodoxy points to the conclusion that sin is to be marked with no brand,—that there is to be nothing to show its curse and evil. We may, indeed, be referred to the punishment of a man's own conscience. But, on this theory, the testimony of conscience in its remorse and foreboding is false, and has no reality in God or the future answering to it. We may be told that sin does, in fact, bring its penal consequences after it. But to say this is to give up the principle of our opponents, and to concede that for which we contend. Moreover, what *is* the punishment which, in this world, follows sin, and who are they that suffer it? "The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children." *We* believe in this, and believe this to be a part of the punishment of sin. But it will not do for our opponents to adduce it. This is the very principle which Mr. Jowett dares to say was disowned by the later Prophets of the Jewish people, which he evidently supposes to have been a part of the heathenish immorality of the Mosaic law. If this principle is admitted, the doctrine of imputation, of mediatorial curse and blessing, is, in fact, allowed, and the way is made ready for believing both man's fall in Adam and his atonement by Christ. There is nothing which Messrs. Maurice and Kingsley are more eloquent in asserting than that the sins of a nation are visited upon it, that it has a national responsibility, and will have a national reward or punishment. This is, no doubt, true. But, as we have just implied, it concedes too much for our opponents; and yet it falls far short of what the case requires. It concedes too much, for it admits that sin deserves the mark and brand of punishment, which a tardy repentance may not be able to avert; it moreover concedes the principle of imputed guilt. But it falls far short of the requirements of the case. The evil-doers are not so often the sufferers in these cases as those who come after them. They who personally suffer are not those who were personally guilty; and for this great and glaring inequality no compensation is provided in a life to come.*

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* "The Tongue of Fire," p. 18.

From such considerations as have now been adduced, we conclude that the principles of government in general, and in particular that the purposes of the Divine government of mankind, as responsible and immortal spirits, make it necessary that punishment should be annexed to sin, that such punishment should have respect to "the life to come" as well as to that "which now is," and that mere repentance should not be considered as an atonement for guilt, or the sufficient condition of pardon.

We have hitherto argued upon the implication, that all which the opponents of the Scripture doctrine of guilt and punishment contend for is that the *penitent* sinner must be forgiven. But, in fact, they must be prepared to press their point farther than this. They assume, in all their reasonings, that the only end of punishment is reformation. The mere vindication of the law of holiness they will not allow to be a proper end of punishment, but revile it as "revenge." What, then, we ask, is to be done with the finally impenitent sinner? That such there may be, who will be so hardy as to deny? Who that knows the human heart, that has observed how some men ever turn grace into wantonness,—who that has meditated upon what is implied in the mysterious feeling (or "idea") of personality and responsibility,—will deny that men may be, and probably will be,—on whatever theory of probation, after whatever length of trial,—still wilful, rebellious, impenitent? The common judgment of mankind affirms that this may and will be so. What, then, is to be done, we ask again, with the finally impenitent? On the assumption that the object of punishment is only the amendment of the offender, it must follow that those who are past amendment are also past punishment. This is the logical result of the view we oppose; it is also its obvious result. It is a result which all will at once perceive and understand. And what must be the effect of such a view upon the hardened sinner? Must it not embolden him in his iniquity, and stimulate him to more daring impiety? It amounts to this, that a sinner perfectly hardened and impenetrable, whose will is lifted up against the all-holy Governor in invincible defiance, has, in fact, purchased his impunity by his impiety, and may roam freely all realms of the universe, "a gentleman at large," enfranchised from law, from fear, and from obedience to God. Such is, in effect, the new moral law which is set up by such writers as Messrs. Jowett and Maurice.

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* "Conceive—what may really take place—the opulent proprietor of the slave-ship enjoying, in some delicious clime, all the luxuries which the world can afford. These luxuries are purchased by the cruellest agonies, bodily and mental, of thousands of his fellow-creatures, and the utmost moral debasement of the agents whom he must needs employ in the perpetration of this foul villany. Where is the punishment, in this world, of such atrocity? The reproaches of his conscience? His conscience indeed! Such are the reproaches of the epicure's conscience for the lamb on which he has dined......But, then, there is the hatred of his fellow-men. Whose hatred? that of the persons around him? He is courted, applauded, perhaps sincerely loved by them. If a man behaves well to his *class*, he may, for them, behave as he pleases to others. Whose hatred then? An assemblage of philanthropists at Exeter Hall, for whom he cares nothing, of whom, perhaps, he never heard. Yet this man, by observing the physical and organic laws, may preserve himself in ease, and health, and comfort: by the exercise of a judicious personal moderation, he may extract the last sip of enjoyment from every source which the world can supply."—*Edinburgh Review, January,* 1842. Art. *Phrenological Ethics.*

But the object of threatened punishment is not merely, or even in the first place, to amend. It is rather to deter. He who makes a law, and enforces it by the sanction of a threatened punishment, does this with the purpose that the fear of punishment may prevent the transgression of law. Is it not so in a family, in a school, and in the commonwealth? We cannot, therefore, but assume that it is so in the case of the Divine law. How utterly the code of law, which would be sanctioned by our modern anti-evangelical philosophers, would fail in *deterring* men from evil, the remarks made above will show. We now add, that the view of Divine law and punishment which they teach is equally ill adapted to bring about the *reformation* of any offender. *Both* these ends of punishment must fail, on their scheme.*

He can know but little of human nature who supposes that a hardened offender is likely to be brought to consideration and repentance by being told that God will only punish in order to amend, and that, as soon as ever he repents, he may be sure of being received into the Divine favour. The feeling of the rebellious heart, on hearing such an announcement, will be likely to be, "If God is so easy about my rebellion, why should I be much concerned? If at any stage of the affair He is ready to forgive, what matters it how late I postpone my repentance?" A person already penitent might be deeply melted by the consideration of God's wonderful long-suffering and readiness to forgive; but moral considerations of this kind are likely to be ineffectual upon the hardened sinner just in proportion to his hardness, and therefore in proportion to his need of repentance. The truth is, that only the doctrine which is fitted to *deter*, is likely to *reform*. The *first* step towards a hardened sinner's reformation must be to "awaken" him to a sense of the guilt, by showing him the danger of his state. The measure of God's anger will be to him also the measure of his sin's demerit; the degree of his own threatened punishment and present peril will be the measure of them both. A sinner and rebel must not be appealed to, in the first instance, by considerations of righteousness and gratitude, but by selfish considerations of personal advantage or risk. The same kind of motives must operate upon such a man in reference to spiritual as in reference to worldly things. And this must be the case precisely in proportion to his need of reformation and repentance.

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* Of the object of punishment, viewed as, in the first instance, an index of God's holy indignation against sin, and as intended to vindicate the majesty of violated law and righteousness, we have already spoken (p. 337). Here we are dealing merely with another and narrower aspect of the case, as respects the effect of punishment on those who have sinned or are tempted to sin. On this whole subject there is much valuable thought in A. Barnes's Essay on "The Atonement, in its Relations to Law and Moral Government." Philadelphia. 1859.

So much for "the law" of our modern Rationalists; the case is not improved if we look at their "gospel." All, yes, literally all, that Mr. Jowett's gospel has to tell the sinner is, "that Christ performed the greatest moral act that was ever done in this world." * But *what* is this to tell the sinner? Will it convince him of his sin, and bring him to repentance, and assure him of God's favour? Will not his reply to any such announcement be, "But what is this to me? What has that act to do with my case? How does it make me worse or better? There have been many great acts performed,—if not so great as this,—but what has this any more than those to do with me? How is it to make me fear or hope? Why should I repent? How am I to be changed and made holy, by being told of this?"

To all these questions Mr. Jowett's gospel is dumb. Christ's death and life, according to him, are but the example and reflection of God's love to man. They have no force to change man's position towards God, or to awaken man's sense of guilt and transgression.

But what Mr. Jowett's gospel has no voice to utter, the old-fashioned Evangel speaks; what his doctrine has no power to accomplish, that the doctrine of a vicarious atonement for sin can effect. This doctrine is founded upon the principle that sin, as such, deserves the brand and punishment of God. At the same time, however, it provides that the timely penitent shall not be ultimately punished. But it does this without abrogating or obscuring the great principle before stated. It provides an adequate atonement in Christ. The law is no less "magnified and made honourable" by this atonement, than if it had been vindicated by the marked and public punishment of the sinner. Nay, the law is more signally and impressively honoured by the Atonement. This doctrine, full of mercy as it is, deprives the law of no part of its power to deter and to awaken. Against the finally impenitent the terrors of the law are aggravated. The very doctrine of Christ's atonement tends to enhance those terrors. If we read, "It pleased the Lord to bruise Him; He hath put Him to grief," how immediate and how awful is the inference! "He that spared not His own Son, how shall He spare the finally impenitent? If His anger against sin were so real and earnest, that He did not withhold His hand from bruising Him, how will His just indignation bruise me!" These are the terrors of the Gospel. And this power of the Gospel to deter is the measure of its power to awaken and to bring sinners to take the first step to repentance. "Knowing the terrors of the Lord," says the Apostle, "we persuade men." "The Law," in this sense,—the Law living and magnified in the Gospel,—is still "the schoolmaster to bring men to Christ."

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* Vol. ii., pp. 475, 481.

If the Gospel doctrine is thus fitted to deter and to awaken, need we add that it is indeed most eminently fitted to subdue and to melt into genuine repentance? How does *our* view enhance the love of the Father in sending His Son, and that of the Son in coming to redeem us! What an infinite emphasis of meaning does the evangelical doctrine put into the fifty-first chapter of Isaiah, which Mr. Jowett's interpretation would make to be mere inflated and delusive rhetoric! And what tenderness into such expressions as, "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened until it be accomplished,"—"The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for many!" How much fuller and more impressive a text, according to our doctrine, than according to Mr. Jowett's, is that of St. Paul! "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them."

But, Mr. Jowett tells us, this doctrine involves a "fiction," "a moral illusion." Let us inquire what this means. Where is the "fiction" in the case? where the "illusion?" We take up and echo Mr.

Jowett's own question, "Was the spectacle real which was presented before God and the angels on Mount Calvary?" We answer, *Yes;* every article in *our* doctrine of atonement cries aloud, *Yes.* It is such a doctrine as Mr. Jowett's which says, No; which gives the lie to the utterances of Psalmists and Prophets, to the plain statements of our Lord Himself in reference to His death; which deprives the "greatest act that was ever done in this world" of all its emphasis, and makes it to be no longer an act, but a mere sufferance; which empties the dying words of our Lord of their meaning, and denies the virtue of the sacrificial blood. We maintain that the act was real, and that its efficacy is real. Where, then, is the "illusion"—"physical" or "moral"—in this case?

Mr. Jowett probably means to say that the doctrine represents God as acting upon a legal fiction. But our reply to this is, that the principle on which we represent—on which the scriptural doctrine of Atonement represents—God as acting in this great cause, is one which runs through every department of His providential government. It is no fiction that God acts upon the principle of mediatorial blessing and curse. It is not for us to question this principle of the Divine procedure, not for us to cavil at it and call it by an evil name, but to accept it and to act upon it. All creatures are to each other mutually sources of good or of evil. We are blessed in and for one, and cursed in and for another; and yet the personal responsibility of each remains, and strict justice is rendered to all. "The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children;" and yet, God's "ways are equal;" the son does not perish "for the iniquity of his father," but if "he does that which is lawful and right, and keeps God's statutes, he shall surely live."

To deny this principle of mediation is to abate man's responsibility to a mere thing of nought, to cut off every man from his fellows, and, by extinguishing nearly every motive to prayer, to cut him off also from his God. It is upon this principle we ourselves act in all our dealings; and mediation and intercession are facts and realities of our every-day life in our families. They are the warp to the web of life. How can we wonder, then, if God, our Great Father, acts upon them? if Christ, our Elder Brother, should appear as Intercessor on behalf of the family?

As to this principle of mediation,—the very principle on which the doctrine of Christ's vicarious atonement rests,—the arguments of Butler are, in our judgment, unanswerable.* The late Dr. Harris not only proved himself to be a worthy disciple of Butler, but to be entitled to speak, on his own account, as a philosopher of well-won authority, and with powers both of synthetic and analytic reasoning equal to his gift of eloquence. We are happy to illustrate our present position by the following quotation from his latest work.

> "By a single act of transgression the child may incur the forfeiture of the parental roof, and entail worse than disgrace on those who descend from him. The poverty of the prodigal is the poverty of his children. The intemperate and licentious, sometimes by a single act, entails disease on his offspring, and renders his descendants loathsome for some generations to come. An evil once incurred, on travel its effects in unbroken series to a distant futurity. The family constitution is so compacted, and society so organized, that actions never terminate in themselves, and their influence propagates itself for evil or for good for ever. That the influence and effects of the good should be thus perpetuated, is seldom, perhaps never, objected to; and yet, as it takes place in virtue of the same general laws which account for the similar diffusion of evil, the one cannot be consistently objected to, without objecting to the other also.
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> "And this brings us to another most important point of analogy between one of the aspects of the moral government of God in its opening stage, and the family government,—we refer to the principle of mediation. In the first promise, and in the institution of sacrifice, the Divine Being was saying, in effect, that the consequences of man's transgression should, in some way, be remedied by means of the conflict and sufferings of another. Now all pre-existing nature was already in analogy with such an arrangement. All its processes and operations in

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* See the "Analogy," part ii., chap. 6.

the family, as far as they came under man's observation, were to be conducted by *means*. The child comes to the enjoyment of life through the pain and travail of another. From early perils and death he is saved by the self-sacrificing watchfulness of the mother. The patient toil of the father is the price paid to save him from ignorance and want. But the evil from which man was to be saved was the consequence of transgression. From similar evil the child is saved in the family, *by means of others*. He may, indeed, do much himself towards remedying certain kinds of evil. But the evil may be of a nature to incapacitate him from helping himself; and to be parallel with the evil in question, it is of such an evil only that we are supposed to speak. Now the occurrence of such an event brings to light an antecedent remedial provision. The tears of the mother, or the efforts of the father, save him from the effects of his voluntary misconduct. Or, it may be that the tender and earnest intercessions of the mother save him from the just infliction of the paternal displeasure; and, still further, it may be that the maternal intercession is both the means of bringing the son to repentance, and is the ground on which the father sees reason to extend that forgiveness which he would not otherwise have conceded even to that repentance itself. Be that as it may, the child is pardoned and improved, and that by means of the self-denial and suffering of others; for even the compassion which prompted the remedial effort includes in itself an element of suffering. We do not say that this is all that mediation includes."—*Patriarchy*, pp. 409–411.

To complain, therefore, of the evangelical doctrine as implying a "fiction," a "moral illusion," is altogether unwarranted. Such an objection is aimed not so properly against this doctrine of Christ crucified, as against the principles of the Divine Government; and as aimed against these, it recoils upon him who hurls it. There is no contending against facts. Curious quibbles as to principles and methods of government will not meet the case of him who asks, "What must I do to be saved?" The question is, What does the Most High require? It is not, How should He act according to our philosophy? but, How *does* He act? The answer is, He acts on the principle of mediation, whether men like it or not; and in most precise agreement with this principle, as the grandest exemplification of it, He saves sinners by the sacrificial death of Christ.

Nor is it in the least degree true that the "moral sense" of men revolts against this procedure. On the contrary, as we have seen, men continually act upon the same principle in their families. And classic story tells us of one most remarkable instance in which precisely the same principle was acted upon by an earthly King of the highest and purest equity in the case of his own son's transgression. When Mr. Jowett, in the days of his youth, first read the affecting story of Zaleucus, the King of the Locrians, and his son, we venture to affirm, that his then unsophisticated "moral sense" found no "fiction" or "moral illusion" in it, —that, instead of revolting, it admired. The ends of justice in that case were accomplished, and yet the offender spared; but how? By the mediatorial suffering of the righteous King for the offending son. And all who beheld admired and approved the deed of atoning love.*

Indeed, no assertion can well be more at variance with fact, than to say that our moral sense revolts against the doctrine of Christ's vicarious atonement. The sacrifices of all nations—the principles implied in the universal institute of sacrifice—are trumpet-tongued to proclaim the contrary. Mr. Jowett says that these "are the dim, vague, rude, almost barbarous expression of that want in human nature, which has received satisfaction in Him only."* That want was atonement,—reconciliation to God. The symbolical language in which it was uttered, expressed the sense of man's own guilt and liability to punishment; it expressed also his dim apprehension that deliverance from his guilt was to be obtained through the offering of a substituted victim. "Nothing," says Madame de Staël, "can obliterate from the soul the idea, that there is a mysterious efficacy in the blood of the innocent, and that heaven and earth are moved by it. There are some primitive ideas which re-appear, with more or less disfigurement, in all times and among all nations. These are the ideas upon which we cannot grow weary of reflecting; for they assuredly preserve some traces of the lost dignities of our nature."

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* Other analogies to the principle of vicarious mediation are given in systematic treatises on the Atonement. We may here again refer to A. Barnes's Essay, also to Dean Trench's Sermon on the Atonement (in the *Five Sermons* preached at Cambridge). Mr. Barnes's definition of Atonement is "something substituted in the place of the penalty of the law, which will answer the same ends as the punishment of the offender himself would." (Essay, p. 244.) Mr. Macdonnell, whose acute and cautious distinctions and reasonings are very valuable,—though, as we think, his conclusions might safely, on some points, especially as to the relations of the Atonement to Divine Law, be firmer and more explicit than they are,—adopts Dr. Wardlaw's definition of vicarious sufferings, as "sufferings endured on the part of one by whom they were not deserved, on behalf, and so as to effect the deliverance, of those by whom they were deserved."—*Donnellan Lectures*, p. 165.

It appears, then, that it is not "*our* moral sense," the moral sense of mankind in general, but *their* "moral sense,"—that of a few philosophical illuminati,—which revolts against the doctrine of a vicarious atonement. It is not even the "moral sense" of the cultivated classes which here decides against the instincts of the uneducated multitude. For it cannot be denied that most of the noblest and the profoundest minds of every age,—such as Howe and Milton, Barrow and Taylor, Newton and Pascal, Berkeley and Butler, Robert Hall and Thomas Chalmers, Isaac Taylor and Henry Rogers,—have received, in lowliness of spirit, this humbling and awful, but hopeful and glorious, doctrine. Far less is it the "moral sense" of the "excellent of the earth," which here rejects the bias and prejudice of an all but universal selfishness of spirit. The good and pious, the great benefactors of the race, the originators and sustainers of all benevolent enterprise and activity, have, almost to a man, been devout and grateful believers in that doctrine of "Christ crucified," which has ever been "to the Jew a stumbling-block, and to the Greek foolishness; but to them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God."

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* Vol. ii., p. 479.

If the "moral sense" of nearly all men is to be considered a decisive authority in reference to the doctrines of Scripture, then is the doctrine of vicarious atonement established by this authority. If not, (as we rather hold,) then whither must we go for instruction but to the word of God? "Moral sense," on this point, is either against our philosophers, or, at best, its testimony is uncertain and contradictory. We must be content, therefore, either to submit our doubts and differences to the arbitration of Scripture, or to remain without light or hope on this most important of questions. For our own part, we have made up our minds to follow Scripture guidance wherever we can distinctly trace it, assured that this must be our only pilotage across the dark waters of human perplexity. And there is a wisdom, a depth, a piercing power, a humble, yet unfaltering, firmness and assurance, a profound, though inartificial and (in a sense) unconscious, harmony, about the Scripture revelations as to sin and guilt, pardon and holiness, heaven and hell;—so wonderful, when we consider what manner of men, in outward seeming and circumstances, the writers were;—so strangely contrasting with the utterances of all besides themselves who lived when they did; and, we may add, contrasting not less remarkably with the wavering and inconsistency of their modern Spiritualist and semi-Pantheist critics;—that we cannot doubt whether God spake in and by them, giving them clear, profound, far-reaching revelations of "hidden wisdom," opening for them illumined clefts into the gulfs of the unseen and the eternal, and thus lifting the spirit far above the level of ordinary and uninspired humanity.

We need not to argue the point with Mr. Jowett as to whether Scripture teaches the doctrine which he denies. He says very frankly and explicitly, in reference to the Old-Testament teaching,—

"To state this view of the doctrine at length, is but to translate the New Testament into the language of the Old."—Page 470.

Our readers are of course aware, that with him the Old Testament is no authority upon this point. But we trust it is with them. Not less distinctly does he imply that the language of the New Testament strictly interpreted teaches the same doctrine as the Old.

"Ideas must be given through something; those of a new religion ever clothe themselves in the old.......All history combines to strengthen the illusion; the institution of sacrifice is regarded as a part of a Divine design in the education of the world."—Page 475.

"The Apostles were Jews;......they could not lay aside their first nature, or divest themselves at once of Jewish modes of expression. Sacrifice and atonement were leading ideas of the Jewish dispensation; without shedding of blood there was no remission.......It was natural for them to think of Christ as a 'sacrifice' and 'atonement' for sin," &c.—*Ibid.*

In short, it was a mere affair of the association of ideas. The Apostles hung the new to the old; there was more than they could understand in either; "and they interpreted the one by the other." (Page 476.) Such is Mr. Jowett's explanation of the case; and this grossly naturalistic and very irreverent explanation may throw light upon his views of apostolic inspiration. St. Paul had really no doctrine upon the subject, no principles, no clear ideas. He turned his experience into rhetoric, and our evangelical theology is just this "rhetoric turned logic." His experience, however, *was* real; and this experience being associated with faith and love toward Jesus, he somehow came to regard Christ as his Sacrifice, and himself as identified with Jesus Christ.*

But it is just at these last stages that this naturalistic explanation most glaringly breaks down. *How* came St. Paul to consider himself and every "Christian as one with Christ, living with Him, suffering with Him, dying with Him, crucified with Him, buried with Him, rising again with Him, renewed in His image, glorified together with Him?" (Page 480.) Mere association of ideas is utterly inadequate to account for such an association and identification of persons as this.

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* For an acute and searching exposure of Mr. Jowett's fallacies on this point, we may refer to Mr. Macdonnell's "Donnellan Lectures," pp. 76–86.

There is one of the sacred Epistles which deals expressly and at large with this point, and explains too formally and distinctly to leave much room for cavil on what principle the Christian comes to be identified with Christ: we refer to the Epistle to the Hebrews. But Mr. Jowett will not allow this Epistle to be St. Paul's, and repeatedly throws out slurs upon its character and authority. He evidently regards it as a piece of Alexandrian speculative philosophy, resulting out of a determination to reconcile Christianity with Judaism. He cannot consistently admit its truth or authority, because it proceeds upon the assumption, which his principles negative, that the Jewish sacrifices were ordained of God. And he tells us that "from this source, and not from the Epistles of St. Paul, the language" of evangelical theology "has passed into the theology of modern times." (Page 476.)

We need not vindicate against a writer of Mr. Jowett's principles the canonical authority of the beautiful Epistle to the Hebrews. But we should be willing, for the sake of argument, to confine ourselves to what Mr. Jowett acknowledges as St. Paul's own Epistles, and we would undertake easily to show that the language of these Epistles is as full and express upon this point as that of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in perfect harmony with the language of that Epistle.* The doctrine which lies at the foundation of all St. Paul's theology, and is implied in every phrase, is that sinners are reconciled unto God in the person, and through the life and death, of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as their Mediator, Sacrifice, and Substitute. Let this be recognised, and all becomes clear and consistent. Let it be denied, and the Apostle's writings must be full of "confusions." This doctrine is taught in plain and express terms, it is implied in continual turns and allusions, it is made the motive of every duty, it is represented as the door opening into every privilege. It is not the garnish of high-flown rhetoric, but the principle which gives impulse to every act and form to every thought. It is St. Paul who says, "God hath made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God through Him;" (2 Cor. v. 21;) "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us;" (Gal. iii. 13;) "Christ, our Passover, is sacrificed for us;" (1 Cor. v. 7;) "As many as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into" [a participation of] "His death...... Now he that has died, has been justified from his sin. If then we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Him," &c.; (Rom. vi. 1, 7, 8;) "If one died for all, then" (*ἄρα,* in effect) "did all (*lit.*, the all) die," (2 Cor. v. 14,) "that is," as Dr. Pye Smith well says, "upon the constitution of mediatorial grace, and relatively to the great ends of law." It is just in the same strain that St. Peter says, in his First Epistle, "Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God."

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* Since the first edition of this work was published, this has been ably performed by Mr. Macdonnell in his "Donnellan Lectures."

In his note upon Rom. iv. 25, Mr. Jowett tells us that we might transpose the Apostle's words, and say that our Lord was delivered for our justification and raised again for our offences, without any injury to his sense. Similar remarks he would apply to Rom. v. 10, 11, and other such passages. In regard to all such he is pleased to inform us that "there is an antithesis of words, where there is no antithesis of meaning." If, however, he would but give the Apostle credit for knowing his own meaning,—if he would be less confident of his own intuition, and more reverent in the presence of the inspired Apostle,—he would not utter such rash and presumptuous sentences. In all the cases to which he refers, the order of the Apostle's words indicates his meaning, and strictly agrees with the principles which we have stated. The death of Christ *was* for our sins, in a peculiar sense, as His resurrection was not; and the resurrection of Christ for our justification, in a peculiar sense, as His death was not. So, again, we were, in a special and pre-eminent sense, "reconciled to God by the death of His Son;" and now, being thus reconciled, we look for blessing and salvation "through His life;" (Rom. v. 10, 11;) for "He ever liveth to make intercession for us."*

But here we must stop, though many points yet press upon us for observation. We cannot examine Mr. Jowett's views as to conversion, justification, and regeneration, which, notwithstanding the freshness and spiritual savour of many passages, his theory seems to make merely natural and, to a great extent, illusive phenomena, though, at the same time, peculiar and delightful. We cannot investigate his views in their relation to the question of "inspiration," on which he directly says not one word. Our readers may, however, form their own judgment from what they have already learned. Perhaps a hint of his opinions on this subject may be gathered from his description of "revelation," which he compares, as a spiritual state, to the abnormal condition of the body in "catalepsy." Here the cloven foot of Naturalism comes out again. We suppose we are doing no injustice to him in believing that his views upon this point very nearly coincide with those of the "Rev. John Macnaught, Incumbent of St. Chrysostom's Church, Everton, Liverpool," who seems (pp. 2, 8) to be a disciple of the Maurice school; and who certainly is, in that case, the most arrogant, irreverent, and advanced disciple of the school whom it has been our fortune to encounter. He tells us plainly, "Milton, and Shakspeare, and Bacon, and Canticles, and the Apocalypse, and the Sermon on the Mount, and the eighth chapter to the Romans, are, in our estimation, all inspired." (Page 192.) And again, that "inspiration signifies that action of the Divine Spirit by which, apart from any idea of infallibility, all that is good in man, beast, or matter is originated and sustained." (Page 196.)

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* See the "Donnellan Lectures," pp. 109, 110. We have not thought it necessary to refer to Mr. J. M. Campbell's work on Atonement, in connexion with the discussion in the text. He is not to be classed with Mr. Jowett or Mr. Maurice. He by no means denies the vicarious character of Christ, as Mediator between God and man. On the contrary, he teaches that Jesus Christ, as the second Head and Representative of the human family, so took upon Himself the burden of our sins, as to confess them, on behalf of the race, to His Father with sorrow and agony of spirit,—such sorrow and agony as only the God-man, who could see the true evil, extent, and reach of the world's sin, was capable of feeling,—such sorrow and agony as wrung the bloody sweat from Him in Gethsemane, and broke His heart on Calvary. But he denies the *penal* character of these sufferings. Many good and true things are said in his book; some truths are insisted upon which have been generally overlooked. But his explanation fails to satisfy the force of our Lord's words in anticipation of and during His sufferings, or of many strong and striking passages in the Epistles. Moreover, by making the great High Priest's intercessory feelings and confession to be His sacrifice, he, in effect, leaves Him without an offering to present.

A shallow piece of irreverent smartness like Mr. Macnaught's book excites only indignation tempered by deep scorn. In reading Mr. Jowett we tremble to see of how fine and powerful a spirit the dark, unhappy demon of pantheistic scepticism has taken possession. We tremble, and we pray that we and all we love may be kept from that bottomless pit of unrest into which he has fallen. We are moved more by pity than by indignation, fearful and impious as is the meaning of much which he writes. He regards Christianity as a force which has spent itself; he pictures its better life, and its ancient power, with much eloquence and beauty, though his picture is often one-sided and exaggerated; and then, with a "melancholy undertone," as Mr. Davies says, "of conscious despondency," which makes itself felt beneath all "the strange calmness of the book," he describes the contrast presented to all this in modern Christian society, (so called,) in the Christianized world of modern England, and seems to think that the primitive and apostolic power and spirit are "clean gone for evermore." But surely the days of Wesley and Whitefield are not so far gone by. The conquests of the Gospel among heathen tribes still attest that its power is *not* spent. The late wonderful revival in America has come in season to rebuke this Oxford scepticism, and to startle and confound worldlings and unbelievers. Nay, so long as such men as the late Hedley

Vicars are to be found in Britain, and such books as the "Tongue of Fire" are written, we cannot accept Mr. Jowett's picture as just, far less consent to the inglorious compromise which he suggests. We may add, too, here, that the case of Hedley Vicars shows how false is the representation which Mr. Jowett often gives of a fervent Christianity as necessarily unfitting for the duties and ties of every-day life. Surely he ought to know that the reverse is the fact.

Does any one heedlessly congratulate himself that his lot has fallen on the days of "liberal inquiry," and point with special gratitude to works like this of Mr. Jowett's? Let him read the following passages; he cannot do so without some emotion of another kind. The picture is that of a mind diseased by scepticism. The very exaggeration shows under what influences they were written. Verily the heart of the recluse sceptic, only living to doubt and criticize, preys upon itself.

"Inquiry is not an easy task; hard to all, impossible to most; seeming in its very nature to have no resting-place until all is disclosed. Behind every reason another reason seems to be concealed; each cause points to a further cause; the solution of every difficulty brings into view new difficulties yet unsolved. ......As we pursue the never-ending track of investigation, our days are told. Life has passed away ere we have learned how to live. We hang between the opposing tendencies of reason and faith, our theory at variance with our practice, the head contradicting the heart. And then if, pursuing our doubts, we wage war with established opinions, we ourselves become isolated, and deny our social nature.......Alone we move in a world of shadows; there arises in us a feeling of suspicion respecting the human faculties themselves; a vain consciousness of superiority, though it be in knowing that we know nothing; an utter apathy about all aims of human good, or schemes of earthly ambition. Our sense of differences of opinion will probably lead to an habitual concealment of opinion. To that class of men who are the most devoted to the good of their fellows we shall become peculiarly the objects of enmity and aversion. Better not to have been than to live in doubt and alienation from mankind.......Such are a few of the trials which meet us in the course of our pilgrimage. We must overcome them, not by earthly warfare nor by human wisdom, but by humility, by patience, by resignation to the will of God, by taking up the cross and following Christ. There is a circle within which we can still live; a spirit of truth, which in the deepest night and lowest abyss of scepticism may yet save us, *so as by fire.*"—Vol. ii., pp. 443–445.

We forbear comment on these sad passages, though it is obvious that the progress of the humble, healthy, loving mind of the thinker, who prays and works as well as thinks, is not so truly from doubt to doubt, as from truth to truth, from faith to faith, from victory to victory. We cannot but hope that even from the abyss of pantheistic scepticism this gifted and interesting writer will indeed be saved, though we feel assured that it must now be *so as by fire,* and that he will bear the scars of his fiery sufferings through life. But is it not strange that, as intimated very plainly in the context of the passages we have quoted, Mr. Jowett should despair that revelation will ever be reconciled to science or reason to faith, when—not to refer to such a remarkable case as that of Ampère in France—it is so well known that not a few of the most illustrious names in British science, philological, physical, and metaphysical, are those of devout believers in the sacred book? Surely when Whewell and Sedgwick, Brewster and Miller, the late Professor Archer Butler, and the present Professor Ferrier, have devoutly maintained their faith in the Bible, the present age need not despair of Christianity.

If, indeed, such a work as Mr. Jowett's had remained unanswered by writers of his own ecclesiastical community,—if the ancient and illustrious Church of England could show no champions "valiant for the truth," who can meet and match this able man,—if no successors were at this day to be found worthy to follow in the line of the Berkeleys, Butlers, Horsleys of former days; then, indeed, one might almost begin to tremble for the prospects of English Christianity: though, even in a case so sad, we could never yield to despair, while Nonconformity can produce apologists so accomplished and masterly as the author of "The Eclipse of Faith." But the Church of England has, since the first edition of this volume was published, shown that she is not unequal to the demands of the present crisis. At that time we had to lament that no adequate reply to Mr. Jowett, or even to Mr. Maurice, had as yet appeared. The great and vital doctrines of Christianity, nay, the very master-truths of Revelation, remained almost without defence. The Oxford volume of sermons contains some good arguments in reference to one or two points of vital importance, but is, of course, fragmentary and unsystematic; it is also very partial in its views, and everyway insufficient. Mr. Cowie's book, though acute and able, is cumbrous and unpopular in style and method, and treats exclusively of the doctrine of Atonement.* Mr. Litton's more recent and very able volume (the Bampton Lecture for 1856) only regards a small portion of the case,—"the Mosaic Dispensation considered as introductory to Christianity." Mr. Thomson's Bampton Lectures, indeed, published six years ago, had covered a considerable portion of the space occupied by the controversy; but though of great value, and evidently the production of an elegant, acute, and accomplished mind, there was, as we have already intimated, a lack of thoroughness in treatment, and there was a vagueness in some of the views presented and conclusions indicated, which prevented that work from being generally received as decisive or satisfactory. We had reason to say, two years ago, that we looked for profounder, more comprehensive, and more masterly works on the great principles involved in the argument, than any we had seen or heard of. It is gratifying to know that at least one such work, going to the root of all the questions involved in the controversy, has since then been published. We refer, of course, to Mr. Mansel's "Bampton Lectures," on "The Limits of Religious Thought." We are not, indeed, prepared to adopt, without close question, all the arguments of this very remarkable volume; yet we cannot but hail it with deepest gratitude, as the most profound, learned, and thorough reply to the principles of Rationalism which has yet appeared. Dublin, too, has done her part in the present crisis, by the "Donnellan Lectures" of Mr. Macdonnell. Cambridge, however, still "makes no sign;" for the five sermons of Dr. Trench can hardly be counted a University manifesto. Her sons led the way in the Neo-Platonizing Rationalism: can her Colleges furnish no champion of evangelical orthodoxy?

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* "On Sacrifice: the Atonement, Vicarious Oblation, and Example of Christ; and the Punishment of Sin. Five Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge, March, 1856. By B. MORGAN COWIE, B.D., late Hulsean Lecturer, and late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. 8vo. Cambridge: Deightons. 1856."

CHAPTER XVI.

THE DIVINE ORIGIN AND VICARIOUS IMPORT OF PRIMITIVE AND PATRIARCHAL SACRIFICE.*

The doctrine of vicarious atonement is one which involves the whole question of sacrifices. Its principle is,—suffering instead of suffering, death for death, deliverance won for "the many" by the "obedience unto death" of "the One," even of the Man Christ Jesus, who "gave His life a ransom for many." Beyond all question, and by the admission of all parties, this same principle precisely is involved in the Gentile idea of propitiatory sacrifice, as embodied in the rites and worship, whether called religious or superstitious, of all nations and tribes. It would be inconceivable, then, that the principle embodied in Gentile sacrifices, and sanctioned and realised in the stupendous self-sacrifice of the Divine Mediator, should be expressly excluded from the sacrificial rites of the Jewish nation, whose very life was the Hope of that coming Mediator, and all whose religious ceremonies and worship were directly ordained by Divine authority, and were intended to serve as emblems and shadows of Divine realities. If the doctrine of a Divine Suffering Substitute and Saviour is indeed, as evangelical teachers hold, life from the dead to a sinful world, it must assuredly have found some expression, adapted to call forth and meet at least an incipient faith, in the Divine revelations and the Divinely ordered religious economy of that people, whose were "the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of the temple, and the promises, whose fathers were the Patriarchs, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever." * And where could such an expression be found, if not in the appointed sacrifices?

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* 1. *De Sacrificiis Libri Duo; Quorum Altero explicantur Omnia Judæorum, Nonnulla Gentium Profanarum Sacrificia: Altero Sacrificium Christi: Utroque Ecclesiæ Catholicæ his de Rebus Sententia contra Faustum Socinum, ejusque Sectatores defenditur.* Autore Gulielmo Outramo, S.T.P., Ecclesiæ S. Petri apud Westmonasterienses Canonico. Londini. MDCLXXVII.

2. *Two Dissertations on Sacrifices, &c.* By William Outram, D.D. Translated, with Notes, by John Allen. London. 1817.

3. *Discourses and Dissertations on the Scriptural Doctrines of Atonement and Sacrifice.* By William Magee, D.D., F.R.S., M.R.I.A., Archbishop of Dublin. Two Vols. 8vo. London.

4. *Remains and Occasional Publications of the late* Rev. John Davison, B.D., formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, Author of "Discourses on Prophecy." Oxford. 1840.†

5. *Four Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ.* By John Pye Smith, D.D., F.R.S. Third Edition. 1847.

6. *The Typology of Scripture.* By Patrick Fairbairn, Professor of Divinity, Free Church College, Aberdeen. Second Edition. Enlarged and Improved. Two Vols. 8vo. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1854.

7. *The Atoning Work of Christ, in Eight Sermons. The Bampton Lecture for* 1853. By William Thomson, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Queen's College, Oxford. 1853.

8. *The Doctrine of Sacrifice.* By F. D. Maurice, M.A. Cambridge. 1854.

9. *Patriarchy; or, The Family: its Constitution and Probation.* By John Harris, D.D., Author of "The Pre-Adamite Earth," "Man Primeval," &c. London. 1855.

10. *The Mosaic Dispensation considered as introductory to Christianity. The Bampton Lecture for* 1856. By the Rev. Edward A. Litton, M.A., late Fellow of Oriel College. London: Hatchards. 1856.

11. *The Donnellan Lectures on the Atonement.* By J. C. Macdonnell, B.D. London: Rivingtons. 1858.

† The work of Mr Davison's from which we shall have to quote is incorporated in this volume. It was originally published in 1825, with the title, "Inquiry into the Origin and Intent of Primitive Sacrifice, and the Scripture Evidence respecting it."

It follows that those who deny the vicarious and expiatory character of Christ's atonement, must needs also deny either that the sacrifices of the Jewish law were Divinely appointed, or that they were vicarious and piacular. This consequence is so obvious and immediate as to be necessary and universal. Not only Crellius and the Socinians, not only Priestley and modern Unitarians, but all believers in the Divine authority of the Bible, Trinitarians not less than Arians, who, like Dr. Taylor of Norwich, or Henry Taylor, the author of "Ben Mordecai," or Schleiermacher's followers on the Conti-

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* Rom. ix. 4, 5, partly according to Conybeare's rendering.

nent, or Coleridge's school in Great Britain, have begun by refusing to receive what is considered the "evangelical" doctrine of atonement, (by which, be it observed, we do *not* understand the peculiar tenets of rigid and consistent Calvinists,) have found themselves compelled to proceed to the denial of the vicarious and piacular character of the Mosaic sacrifices. Equally obvious is it, that if the Mosaic sacrifices are admitted to have been vicarious and piacular, it will follow that the great Christian Sacrifice, at once the archetype, in a just sense, and the antitype of all the sacrificial types under the law, must have been offered as a vicarious satisfaction for the sins of men. The only escape from these consequences is to deny the Divine origin and authority of the Jewish ritual, as Spencer has all but done, and as Jowett does in effect. But this must ever lead to the denial, in any peculiar or pre-eminent sense, of the divinity of the New Testament itself.

Nor is it possible to limit this question to the points already referred to. If all the dispensations of truth are connected; if together they are but the gradual unfolding of one system of truth and doctrine of holiness; and if the climax of this gradual revelation of the Divine will and glory is to be found, as evangelical orthodoxy teaches, in Christ's sacrifice of Himself, to which the legal sacrifices pointed, and which they foreshadowed; it is at least a natural presumption that, under the primitive or patriarchal dispensation, God would not, as to this grand and climacteric truth, have left Himself without witness, and that Sacrifice under this dispensation was appointed to teach, to witness, and to prophesy, in the same sense and with the same ultimate reference as under the Mosaic law. This conclusion seems to agree with the harmony of the Divine arrangements, and the unity of the Divine counsels. But it implies for Sacrifice, as existing from the beginning, a Divine origin and authority. On the other hand, if a merely human origin and invention should be attributed to Sacrifice, it would seem, as we think, improbable that God should so sanction and glorify a system of bold will-worship, as subsequently to adopt it Himself, as the most prominent part of that religious and typical system which He gave to His chosen people, and by which He prepared the way for the coming and the work of His Son.

Accordingly, as the connexion of all the points in this argument has come to be more clearly seen and more definitely fixed, the question of the Divine or human origin of sacrifice has been found to be directly involved in it; and around this point has been waged a controversy nearly as obstinate and general as respecting the piacular character of the legal sacrifices. It is true, indeed, that the learned, able, and orthodox Outram, the father of modern theological research on this subject, overawed, as it would seem, by an authority which, in his days, weighed much more than, in relation to such subjects, it does in the present day,—that of the majority of the primitive fathers,—has written dubiously on this point. But with this exception, and *perhaps* that of Davison, who wrote with great ability against the Divine origin of sacrifice, some thirty years ago, we hardly know where to find a writer who, while sound in his theology on the subject of the atonement, and maintaining the expiatory character of the legal sacrifices, has not at the same time maintained the Divine origin of sacrifice.

What we cannot but regard as the orthodox view on this most important subject has, during the last half century, been most learnedly and ably sustained. We need but mention the names of Archbishop Magee and Dr. Pye Smith. The work of the former, unsystematic and fragmentary as it is, is an invaluable treasure and repertory of learning and argument on this subject. The volume of the latter on the "Sacrifice and Priesthood of Jesus Christ" does not deal very largely with the mere question of sacrifice; but yet, what is there is a precious *multum in parvo*. We can scarcely imagine a more complete reply than is afforded by these standards to the theories of Spencer, Warburton, Sykes, and, by anticipation, of Davison,—and to the sophistications of

Dr. John Taylor, and of H. Taylor, author of "Ben Mordecai,"—on the subject of sacrifice and atonement. Nor can we much wonder at the bitterness with which such heresiarchs as Maurice, or men so heterodox as the late John Sterling, have spoken of Magee, when we consider how completely he has pre-occupied nearly every position, and forestalled nearly every argument, by which they have sought to fortify their cause. Davison's Sermons on Sacrifice called forth a very masterly work in reply, from the late truly pious, and very acute and learned, George Stanley Faber, on the "Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice," which he dedicated, most appropriately, to Archbishop Magee. After this, the question seemed to be set at rest for some years. But within the last ten years, the subtle, but powerful, influence of the writings of the Taylors, and of the Neo-Platonized theological teachings of Coleridge, together with the rapid influx of German Rationalism and anti-supernaturalism, has produced that change in the character of the rising theology of the Anglican Church which has been described in former chapters. Tractarianism is waning, that Rationalism may wax. The evangelical doctrine of sacrifice has been very prominently assailed. Even some who, in other respects, seemed to be opposed to transcendental Rationalism, have yet yielded upon this. Herein the learned and eloquent historians of St. Paul's course would seem but too much inclined to adopt the Coleridgean theology.

Mr. Thomson's "Bampton Lectures" on this subject, to which we have already more than once referred, must be taken as an orthodox protest against this neological tendency. They are beautifully written and well planned and argued. Their eloquence is of the rich, modest, purely English school; their spirit of candour and of piety is very charming; and we need hardly say that they show a competent acquaintance with the learning proper to this subject, whether patristic or modern, continental or English. They are, also, no less acute than candid, and are amply and easily sufficient to rebut the Rationalist. But yet they lack

—we are obliged again to say—distinctness of view, and close decisiveness of argument. Sometimes they do but hint and outline, where, as we think, they might safely and well have done much more. The writer is, evidently, himself somewhat of a Coleridgean, or at least of a transcendentalist, in philosophy; and appears to have too haunting a distrust of logic. Moreover he seems to have written and spoken with the continual consciousness that learned and acute opponents were listening, ready to submit every assertion and conclusion of his to a very sceptical and critical scrutiny. Notwithstanding, he has done great and good service to the cause of evangelical orthodoxy, which we value the more as coming from Oxford. Mr. Litton's able work, also from Oxford, on the "Mosaic Dispensation considered as introductory to Christianity," occupies, only in part, common ground with Mr. Thomson. In some directions he goes beyond his field; in others covers only a portion of it. He supplies, however, some defects in the volume of his predecessor in the lectureship; his doctrine is more distinct, and his tone more decided. Altogether his is a very excellent volume, and we hail its appearance as a very hopeful sign. Mr. Macdonnell's work embraces not only the moral argument as to atonement, but the Bible criticism of the subject, both as regards the Mosaic Institute, and the textual exposition of the New Testament; and it furnishes, on these points, an excellent reply both to Jowett, as we noted in the last chapter, and to Maurice. With some minor exceptions, we hail this volume as a most valuable contribution to sound criticism and theology, and one highly creditable to the University and Church of which the writer is an ornament. Its greatest defect is that it does not fully meet and refute the plausible theory of Bähr. The work of Maurice is, of course, on the other side, and may, we presume, be taken to represent substantially the views of "Broad-Church" heterodoxy on "Sacrifice," making abatement for those roundly developed Coleridgean and Neo-Platonic ideas on the subject of man's relation to the Godhead, and of the Trinity in Unity, which tinge his views upon every question, and which may not perhaps be shared to their full extent by all the adherents even of the Coleridgean school. Although, in reference to the origin of sacrifice, this volume presents nothing new; and although the sophistications of the plain letter of Scripture are substantially the same as those of Crellius and the Socinians, as they were so well described by Outram, nearly two centuries ago, in the preface to his work on Sacrifice, or as those of Dr. John Taylor and Henry Taylor, which were exposed and refuted by Magee; yet, as it presents the most distinguished recent attempt to explain away the Scripture doctrine of salvation, as the name of Maurice will give it some vogue, and especially as it adopts and embodies, in reference to the spiritual significance and purpose of the *Jewish* sacrifices, the novel and ingenious hypothesis of Bähr,—a most subtle and plausible heresy, —we shall proceed to give a slight analysis of this work, and make this our introduction to such an outline argument in support of the orthodox doctrine on Sacrifice, including a refutation of Bähr's peculiar views, as our limits may permit us to give.

Our analysis of Mr. Maurice's work must begin not with the beginning, but with the end. His doctrine on sacrifice depends upon, and is moulded to, his doctrine of atonement. And as what we are about to advance is not in any degree disputable; as we shall but epitomize views which it is notorious that Mr. Maurice holds, and which he does not now attempt to conceal; we shall consider ourselves to be absolved from any necessity of giving extracts illustrative and confirmatory of the slight sketch of his main course of thought, which we are about to furnish.

Maurice's fundamental principle as to the theology of sacrifice is, that Christ's life and death were the Divine Sacrifice, by means of which God declared His own relation, as a loving, reconciled Father, to universal mankind. As the God-man, according to this view, Christ embodied and exhibited self-sacrificing love to man and God; thus at the same time representing God to man, and also, as the archetypal Man, attracting men to imitate God, as seen and known in His own humanity, and glorifying the principle of self-sacrifice, as due from man to God and man. The sacrifices ordained by God under the law did not, like the heathen sacrifices, (with which in this respect, as Mr. Maurice teaches, they were directly and strongly contrasted,) embody the principle of piacular atonement, in order to obtain the favour of God; but taught and exhibited, as their essential purpose, the principle and duty of self-sacrifice. At the same time, as on the part of man the recognition of this duty is connected with a consciousness of failure, of selfishness or sin, which makes confession natural and befitting; and with a consciousness of the need of Divine help to deliver from this sinful selfishness, which makes prayer natural and befitting; Mr. Maurice's theory accordingly connects with sacrifice confession and prayer to God. It follows from this view that the ancient Jewish sacrifices were not directly or properly typical of Christ, and that, in relation to Him and His sacrifice, there was no special point of analogy between the death of the animal victim and His precious death. The Jewish rites taught the general lesson of sacrifice, of which the crowning sanction and instance was afforded by Christ's sacrifice of Himself and God's sacrifice of His Son; the lesson of Christ's whole life being brought to a climax in His death, which thus becomes the grand symbol of Christian principle and of the Christian faith.

As for the Sacrifice of the Passover, Mr. Maurice would have us to understand that this was but the symbol of national consecration and unity, and the memorial of national deliverance. He denies to it altogether, either as at first instituted or as afterwards commemorated yearly, a propitiatory or expiatory character. He does not, however, in the least argue this point, but simply ignores all the evidence bearing upon it, with the exception of the four verses in Exodus xiii. 14–17, on which he would seem to ground his own one-sided views.

Such being Mr. Maurice's opinions on these points, we need scarcely add that he denies the Divine origin of animal sacrifices. If these were divinely instituted, it must have been before the date of Abel's sacrifice, and, therefore, soon after the Fall. But a mere symbol of self-sacrifice, without any provision for expiation and propitiation, seems scarcely so adapted to the needs of a fallen and guilty creature, as that God should have directly instituted this. Or, if we reject or explain away the doctrines of man's fall and guilt, as Mr. Maurice seems to do, then there is no need for any specific or extraordinary Divine interposition to teach men worship and duty.

In this outline of Mr. Maurice's views we have omitted many subsidiary topics, as, for instance, that of Christ's priesthood and intercession; but have faithfully exhibited his main scope. It will be seen, as we have already remarked, that what is novel must be limited to those ideas as to the spirit and purpose of the Jewish sacrifices, which he has borrowed from the able and well-known Bähr. Our own argument will reverse the order of the foregoing analysis, thus falling into the line of historical developement, and coinciding with the actual arrangement of Mr. Maurice, whose work, like all he writes, is not logical or analytic, but didactic and expository.

We have said that Mr. Maurice denies the Divine origin of sacrifice. Those, however, who read his first sermon in this volume, on "Cain and Abel," if they are not very careful readers, or are unacquainted with the peculiarities of this writer, may perhaps think that herein we do him injustice, since he speaks of the sacrifices of Cain and Abel having been preceded by a "revelation of God," and of such a revelation as "a much more deep and awful kind of communication," than a direct and outward statute or decree. But if they will observe that this Divine revelation is supposed (p. 8) to have enlightened and prompted Cain in his sacrifice as well as Abel, and particularly when they read (p. 33) that "that revelation was not an exceptional or anomalous accident," but that "it was just as much presumed *in the ordinary tillage of the ground as in the most awful worship,*" they will understand how to estimate the force and import of his language, in reference to such "a much more deep and awful kind of communication." This is no other than his doctrine of the universal inspiration of humanity, his Coleridgean Neo-Platonist doctrine of the Logos in man,—"that man would not be a thinking, reasonable, moral being, if there were not an intercourse between him and his Creator,—if God were not awakening him continually to a sense of that which he has to do, and of the principles upon which he is to do it." (*Ibid.*)

The following, in fact, is the account which Mr. Maurice gives of the origin of sacrifice:—

> "Do not, I beseech you, try to realise this conviction by imagining these two men to be different from others of their kind. Conceive of them just as the Scripture represents them, —one as a tiller of the ground, the other as a keeper of sheep. They are working just as men have worked in all countries and in all generations since. They look now and then to the sky over their heads; generally they are busy with the stubborn earth, which they are weeding of its thorns and thistles, or with the animals they are watching and folding, and following when they wander. To such men there come thoughts of One who is ruling them as they rule the sheep, who in some strange way makes the seeds grow which they put in the ground. These thoughts are altogether wonderful; they cannot weigh them nor measure them; at times they are crushed by them; at times they are lifted up by them. No doubt their parents have told them that they have a Lord, and that He sees them, and that He is ordering their ways. Surely it is He who is making them feel His presence, urging them to confess Him. How shall they confess Him? What is the simplest of all possible methods in which they can manifest their subjection? Ask yourselves: Is it speech? Is it some vehement phrase of thanksgiving, some passionate petition? These may come in time, but they cannot come first; they are not the most childlike way of testifying homage, not the one which ordinary human experience would lead us to look for, when One has

revealed Himself to us whom we perceive but dimly, yet with whom we have to do. Acts go before words. The shepherd takes the sheep; he desires to present it to this Ruler, who must be near him, whom he must find some way of acknowledging. The tiller of the ground takes the fruits of the earth; he would present these. You ask why one mode of presenting them occurs to him rather than another? I cannot tell, any more than I can tell you why one mode of tillage, or one mode of folding the sheep, occurs to him rather than another; it may be shown him in due time, if he has not found it. Whatever he discovers on that subject or any other, he receives. It is wisdom which is imparted to him, light which comes to him from the Source of light."—*Maurice*, pp. 5–7.

Our readers will not fail to remark how forlorn and untutored is the condition in which, according to this picture, the children of our first parents found themselves. From those parents Cain and Abel had received no religious knowledge, except that there was a God and Lord, and that His Providence watched over them. As to their moral and spiritual character and responsibilities in reference to Him, and the manner in which they were to approach Him in worship, Adam, it seems, had told them nothing, from which it may fairly be inferred that he had nothing to tell them. *They* were left to invent, or, if Mr. Maurice prefers the word, to "discover," even the very simplest method of drawing nigh to that Divine Father in whose image their unillumined father had been created. But it is more to our immediate purpose to observe that the account which is given in the above extract of the mode of the invention of sacrifice is of perfectly general application, and leaves it to be inferred that both eucharistic offerings of the fruits of the earth and animal sacrifices would be the spontaneous, and the most simple, expression, among all tribes of men, of the elementary feelings of devotion towards God; and that such symbolical worship would naturally precede oral prayer and praise. On what grounds Mr. Maurice would affirm that such offerings are "the most childlike way of testifying homage," more so than simple utterances from the heart; or what he means by appealing to "ordinary human experience" in reference to such a case as this; we confess ourselves unable to conceive. His glib wordiness often outruns his thoughts, and we think it must have done so in the present instance. But, in fact, the view which he has given is no other than that of Warburton, which has so often been weighed in the balances and found wanting. The brief reply of Magee to the theory of Warburton applies as strictly and forcibly to the view which has just been exhibited. "The language which Scripture expressly states to have been derived to our first parents from Divine instruction cannot have been so defective, in those terms that related to the worship of God, as to have rendered it necessary for Abel to call in the aid of actions, to express the sentiment of gratitude or sorrow; and still less likely is it, that he would have resorted to that *species* of action, which, in the eye of reason, must have appeared displeasing to God,—the slaughter of an unoffending animal." *

Indeed, on Mr. Maurice's theory, that primitive sacrifices, as taught by the inward revelation, were not propitiatory or piacular, but only intended to express dependence and obligation, we should not only deny the spontaneous origin of animal sacrifice to be natural or probable, but the symbolical significance of the rite to be appropriately expressive. In what way could the slaughter and burning of an animal victim convey, on the part of Abel, an expression of his dependence on God, or of his obligation to Him as his Benefactor? Spencer, it is well known, explained all sacrifices to be gifts offered to a Superior Power, in order to purchase favour, and as expressive of duty and submission. But this unworthy and degrading idea now finds no favourers. It is inconsistent with the revelations of Scripture regarding the religious condition and feelings of Adam, Abel, Noah, and Job, all but the first of whom are recorded to have used sacrifice; and it supposes a state of society with established maxims and habits, such as could not have existed in the days of Abel.

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* MAGEE. Discourse ii.

Sykes, by a not less conspicuous proleptic anachronism, explained animal sacrifices to be federal rites, or feasts of friendship and covenant, as between man and God. The facts that, until long after the Flood, we have no notice of any sacrificial feasts, but that the primitive sacrifices seem to have all been holocausts, or whole burnt-offerings; and moreover that the practice of covenant-feasts as federal rites among men, from which he supposes the sacred rite to have been derived, must have been long posterior to the time of Abel; at once dissipate this idea. Only on the supposition that man is a fallen and guilty creature, and that the slaughter of the animal victim is symbolic of his guilt and his desert of punishment, can we discover any appropriateness in animal sacrifice to the condition and feelings of primeval man. And even in this case, we hold that the idea of adopting and consecrating such a symbol would never have been likely to enter into the mind of man spontaneously. Apart from the ordaining authority of God, and the hope of propitiation and mercy as warranted in connexion with such a symbol, we cannot but feel that the first slaughter of a victim for sacrifice would have been not an acceptable rite, but a revolting act of will-worship, such as neither Adam nor his sons could be supposed to have devised. On this point the language of Davison, though an upholder of the human origin of sacrifice, is very strong.

> "Instead of attempting," he says, "to deduce the doctrine of *expiation and atonement by animal sacrifice* from the light of nature or the principles of reason, I confess myself unable to comprehend, with the most ignorant, how it can ever be grounded on any such principles, or justified by them. There exists no discernible connection between the one and the other. On the contrary, nature has nothing to say for such an expiatory power; and reason everything to say against it. For, that the life of a brute creature should ransom the life of a man; that its blood should have any virtue to wash away his sin, or purify his conscience, or redeem his penalty; or that the involuntary sufferings of a being, itself unconscious and irrational, should have a moral efficacy to his benefit or pardon, or be able to restore

him with God: these are things repugnant to the sense of reason, incapable of being brought into the scale of the first ideas of nature, and contradictory to all genuine religion, natural and revealed.......Reason teaches repentance, as a preliminary condition to the hope of pardon; but reason can do no more. External rites merely human.......may speak *the suppliant suing for pardon;* they can never speak *the suppliant absolved*.......If, therefore, the primitive age had its expiatory sacrifices, sacrifices framed according to this standard, it would be difficult to account for them as rational rites; still more difficult to think that, under the palpable incapacity of their human origin, they could have been accepted by God. No: expiatory sacrifice must have been of God's own appointment, to reconcile it either to God, or to man himself, till he was fallen under a deplorable superstition."—*Davison's Remains*, pp. 24, 25.*

That Mr. Davison, whose undertaking was, to prove the human *origin* of *all* sacrifice, and the merely human *authority* of *all anterior to the Mosaic law*, would, if it had seemed to him at all conceivable, have argued for the human origin of expiatory sacrifice, *on the principles of reason and natural religion*, there can be no doubt. He goes as far as he can in this direction, contending for *such* an origin of eucharistic, penitential, and even *deprecatory* sacrifice, and assigning to this latter class the sacrifices of Abel, Noah, and Job. But he felt that he could not account on *such* principles for the practice of piacular sacrifice. Nevertheless, he cannot but admit that such a practice prevailed in the world, anterior to the giving of the law. Hence he has no alternative, but to maintain that that peculiar species of sacrifice which God, under the law, solemnly appointed as most sacred, and as directly typical of the great Sacrifice of Christ, "sprang up," to use Faber's apt and just words, "accidentally and unauthoritatively, in the fertile soil of a guessing superstition." Without adverting, at present, to the case of Abel's sacrifice, it would be easy to show, as Faber has done very ably, that the language of the Divine record is such as to admit no doubt that the sacrifices offered by Job and Noah were as distinctly expiatory as they were deprecatory.* But, at this point of our argument, we rather wish to direct attention to the significant and important fact, that precisely that kind of sacrifice which, as Davison has so strongly and convincingly put the case, is equally abhorrent to the reason of man and to the dictates of natural religion, has been found, beyond all others, to have prevailed from the earliest period and to the widest extent among men,—in fact, to have been in use always and everywhere,—to have been practised *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus.* On this point the candid and competent inquirer cannot doubt. The collections of Grotius, and Magee, and the more recent and still more extensive researches of Ernest Von Lasaulx, have abundantly settled this question; and the inquiries of modern Missionaries and ethnologists add every day to the vast body of evidence. It is not now a thing to be denied by any, who would escape the charge of gross ignorance, that the principle of vicarious atonement, as embodied in the sacrifice of animal and even human victims, has been co-extensive with the race. Well worthy of quotation are some of Mr. Thomson's remarks upon this point:—

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* It will be observed that we have abridged this remarkable passage here and there.

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* Here we have the misfortune altogether to differ from Mr. Macdonnell, who thinks Mr. Davison's argument against the propitiatory nature of sacrifice before the law as conclusive as we think it inconclusive, and Faber's triumphant. But, in fact, there is one serious ground-error, as we take it, which affects an important part of Mr. Macdonnell's able volume. He has thought it necessary, while maintaining the expiatory virtue of the legal sacrifices, so far as regarded the Mosaic law, to deny that they possessed any value beyond this to the immediate worshippers. He "restricts their effects to an external cleansing;" and will not allow them to have been, in any spiritual sense, "means of grace," or that they could under any circumstances be "genuine and sincere acts of worship and penitence," which might "operate to procure spiritual remission and acceptance." (Pp. 16–19.) And yet, with entire, though unconscious, inconsistency, he admits the spiritually symbolical character of these same sacrifices; as if they could be spiritually symbolical, and at the same time, to a devout worshipper, spiritually inefficacious. Because the Apostle denies to these sacrifices any necessary, proper, and independent spiritual efficacy, he infers that they could possess no conditional or derived efficacy as means of spiritual approach to God. In such views Mr. Macdonnell stands all but alone, not only among evangelically orthodox divines, but among those in general who recognise any spiritually symbolical character in the rites of the ancient worship. Such a view would be too low for Bähr. An immediate consequence from this error is that Mr. Macdonnell finds himself compelled to deny all spiritual and truly propitiatory character to primitive and patriarchal sacrifices, since he could not concede more to them than to those of the Mosaic Institute. Hence, again, he is tempted to question the Divine origin of primitive sacrifice, although, on the whole, he yields to the force of the arguments in its favour.

> "The use of sacrifices must be accepted as a fact; and it proves at least this much, that men believed they could find help from external means in drawing closer their relation to the Divine Power. And the ethical objection so often urged against this truth,—that one's own sins are not transferable either in their guilt or their punishment,……is so obvious, that we must believe it was known to the Greek or Roman who brought his costly victim to Zeus or Diana, as clearly as to the philosopher of modern days. The fact that, in the face of that natural law,—'The soul that sinneth *it* shall die,'—every nation visited death upon sinless victims, in order to expiate its own transgressions, will be taken by any candid person as a sign that the principle of sacrifice has a stronger hold on the human mind than that of simple retribution."……
>
> "Call them, if you will, barbarous superstitions, for indeed the oracles were false, and the piacular blood was poured out in vain; but do not mock at the notion of a substitutive suffering, nor propose to carry the crude principles of human justice into the Divine economy……; for the stammering lips of the human race in its childhood will rebuke you."……
>
> "Let these facts, out of many, suffice for the present. And let us only ask ourselves what deep-seated yearning of the mind these horrible rites," [*human* sacrifices,] "so widely practised, so repugnant to that natural pity which can never be extinguished in the mind of any father, brother, or son, were meant to satisfy."—*Bampton Lectures*, (1853,) pp. 31-40.

The philosophic mind of Madame de Staël had been profoundly impressed with these facts. Hence she says, in her work on Germany,—

> "I consider sacrifices as the basis of all religion, and the death [*sic*] of Abel as the first type of that sacrifice which forms the groundwork of Christianity. In whatever way we decide upon this opinion, it affords much room for thought. The greater part of ancient religions instituted human sacrifice; but

in this barbarity there was something remarkable, viz., the necessity of a solemn expiation. Nothing, in effect, can obliterate from the soul the idea, that there is a mysterious efficacy in the blood of the innocent, and that heaven and earth are moved by it. Men have always believed that the just could obtain, in this life or the other, the pardon of the guilty. There are some primitive ideas in the human species, which re-appear, with more or less disfigurement, in all times and among all nations. These are the ideas, upon which we cannot grow weary of reflecting; for they assuredly preserve some traces of the lost dignities of our nature."

Now to represent such a universal, incradicable, and yet unaccountable idea, as this of vicarious attonement by sacrifice, as being the accidental, unreasonable, and monstrous growth of a wild and debased superstition, as Mr. Davison has done, seems to us an hypothesis so violent and improbable as to seal the condemnation of the theory which leads to such a conclusion. The practice has not been accidental or partial, but universal; and under all conceivable varieties of ritual and offering the same principle everywhere and always re-appears, the same unreasonable and unnatural principle, if judged apart from God's revelation and authority, of vicarious sacrificial atonement. We think, with Faber,* that the only possible method of accounting for these facts, is to admit that the practice of piacular sacrifice came into the postdiluvian world with Noah, the second head of the human race. To attribute it to what Michaëlis (as cited by Pye Smith) calls a *sensus communis*, or (which is the same thing) to make it, as it would seem that Mr. Thomson is disposed to do, a primitive and necessary idea, proper to humanity, is, in truth, to derive its origin and authority direct from God, only not by outward revelation, but by inward and intuitive teaching. But whilst *this* hypothesis has its peculiar difficulties, it seems to us to possess no advantage over that which we have indicated, but to be less simple and less probable.

We hold, then, that there are few inferences in historical inquiries where any obscurity whatever prevails, more probable or reliable than this, that piacular sacrifice was a part of that primeval religion which Noah brought over with him from the world beyond the Flood. We have not space to show how precisely the Scripture narrative, in reference to the sacrifices both of Noah and of Job, coincides with this inference. It is an easy step from the foregoing argument to conclude that this religious rite was, in the antediluvian world, of Divine origin and authority. If reason could not have devised it, so neither can we suppose a base superstition to have invented that which Noah, "the preacher of righteousness," taught, and which God so graciously accepted at his hands; as afterwards he not only accepted, but required it, at the hands of Job. Indeed, what scriptural believer can doubt that the faith of Noah had descended to him pure through hands so few and so holy,—the hands of Adam, Seth, and Enoch?

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* "Expiatory Sacrifice," section ii., chapters 1 and 2.

With this conclusion how perfectly do the scriptural accounts of the sacrifice of Abel agree! Those who hold the human origin, and deny the piacular character, of primitive animal sacrifices, will ever find an insuperable difficulty in harmonizing their views with the history of Abel's sacrifice, and with the Apostle's commentary on this history in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. We cannot conceive that the unbidden and unauthorized sacrifice to God, for the first time, by a violent death, of an innocent animal, laid bleeding and palpitating on His altar to be consumed by fire, could have been an acceptable offering and service; or that, in such a case, He would have "smelled a sweet savour." To us, therefore, such a sacrifice offered by the pious son of Adam seems necessarily to imply parental approval and Divine authority. This conclusion is, in our judgment, established by the inspired comment of the Apostle, who informs us not only that Abel's was a "better sacrifice" than Cain's, but that it was offered "in faith," which must imply, that the offerer was assured that he was acting in conformity with the Divine will, and also that he so acted in expectation of the

Divine blessing. Mr. Maurice, indeed, does not scruple to say that the ground of Abel's offering being accepted rather than Cain's, was not anything in the offering itself, or connected with it, but merely the fact of his prior and personal righteousness. But in so saying he only acts in the spirit of his creed, which makes all men to be under the teaching of an inspiration the same in kind with that which influenced the Apostles, and entitles himself, or any other person who believes in his own qualifications for so doing, to revise and to set aside the assertions and decisions even of Scripture itself. We must still continue to attach immeasurably more weight to the plain statement of the inspired writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, than to any *dictum* of Mr. Maurice's.

Without, therefore, entering into any discussion of that difficult and disputable verse, (Gen. iv. 7,) on which so much stress has been laid in this controversy by Magee, Faber, and others, who would render "sin" *sin-offering*, but in reference to which the orthodox and learned Fairbairn strongly maintains a different view,—we think that on plain, prominent, and unassailable grounds, we are entitled to conclude that Abel's sacrifice was offered in conformity with the revealed will of God. It was God's ordinance that animal victims should be slain and offered in sacrifice to Him. A strange and even a revolting ordinance this might seem, at first sight. If, indeed, it is denied that man is a fallen and guilty creature, and that the appointed animal sacrifice bore any reference to his guilt and desert of punishment, or possessed any vicarious import, as typically related to the great coming Sacrifice for the sins of the world, we can see no way in which such an ordinance can be reconciled with the Divine character. But let these things be admitted, and the ordinance becomes full of worthy meaning, as symbolical of human guilt, and of the Divine Holiness and Mercy, and all that might have seemed incongruous is harmonized. Then we perceive clearly the nature of Cain's infidelity and sin, and of Abel's obedience and faith, and we understand wherein consisted the excellence of Abel's "better sacrifice."

Thus does the language of Scripture in regard to Abel's sacrifice afford independent confirmation of the conclusion which, on other grounds, we have shown to be so probable, not to say certain, that the primitive animal sacrifices were piacular in their nature and of Divine origin and authority. How and when the ordinance originated is a further question, not perhaps of very great importance. Few, we apprehend, who have accompanied us thus far in our argument can hesitate to go a step farther, and conclude that God Himself directly taught our first parents the way of approaching Him by sacrifice. Mr. Thomson, indeed, contents himself with rebutting the arguments and pretensions of those who maintain, and try to account for, the *human* origin of sacrifice; but will not commit himself to the maintenance of the contrary view. He says that we must accept sacrifice as a fact, without attempting to account for it, holding in this particular very much the position of Outram. Only he intimates that this universal fact, if not to be accounted for as originating in the direct and external authority of God, must be held to imply a Divinely implanted idea or principle in the human soul, suggesting and sanctioning the doctrine of vicarious atonement. Why we cannot be content to accept this position, we have already shown. Fairbairn, on the other hand, in an able summary, advances as far as we have already come; but having come thus far, he strangely halts, and refuses to admit that God directly and externally taught our first parents to worship by sacrifice. He prefers what we cannot but regard as a forced and unnatural hypothesis, that God, by slaughtering animals, for the first time, not for the purpose of feeding man, but of clothing him, and by making the skins of the slain animals the covering of his shame and nakedness, taught him *symbolically* the doctrine of atonement (*covering,* in Hebrew) by sacrifice, and that this symbolical lesson, together with the inward illumination of His Spirit shining thereupon, will account well and worthily for the commencement of the practice of animal sacrifice. This, he maintains, was in all probability the Divine method of teaching. He holds, of course, that sacrifice thus taught possessed a proper Divine authority. We do not think it necessary to argue against this singular view; but prefer to support our own conclusions by a quotation from the late Dr. Harris's admirable volume on "Patriarchy."

"That sacrifices were not of human invention, but of Divine institution, appears morally certain, we think, from such considerations as these :—That it is not antecedently probable that God would leave man in ignorance of the manner in which he should acceptably worship Him ; and yet the first act of acceptable worship which we find men performing is that of animal sacrifice. That this improbability is greatly increased by the fact that God had not only inspired man with hope by the language of promise, but had even condescended to instruct him to clothe his body with a skin-vesture; and surely He who thus condescended to meet man's bodily wants, would not abandon him to his own inventions respecting the cravings of his higher nature. That the *universality* of expiatory offerings proves man's deep consciousness of such a want; and yet, if they were not divinely appointed, no provision was made to meet the exigence. That if God had left man uninstructed, it is not likely that man would have *so early* devised *any* settled method of his own for approaching God; yet here we find the first members of the first family coming before the Lord with offerings as their *familiar*, *established*, and *only* mode of worship. That of all methods of worship, that of shedding blood, —of *sacrificing* an *animal*,—is one of the least likely to have originated in the human mind; and yet here we find a member of the first family,—one who had probably never slaughtered an animal for himself,*—rejecting the more simple and natural oblation of fruits and flowers, and confidently calculating on pleasing God by putting an animal to death. That the *Divine acceptance* of the first sacrifice on record confirms the conviction that the rite was instituted by God......And that the acceptance of Abel's offering, and the rejection of Cain's, was not owing merely to a difference in the worshippers, but also to *a difference in their offerings;* for not only is the Divine approbation of Noah's offering attributed to its sacrificial nature, (Gen. viii. 20, 21,) but as the faith which the Apostle celebrates, when speaking of Abel, was a faith which led the patriarchs to acts of obedience, who can doubt that the faith of Abel consisted also in obedience to a Divine appointment? On these grounds we conclude that the institution of sacrifice was of Divine origin." —*Patriarchy*, pp. 71–73.

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* In a note here, which we do not insert, Dr. Harris supports the opinion of those who believe that at this early period animal food was not yet in use, remarking that "it is unknown in many parts of Asia to this day;" and also suggests that the chief reason why Abel was a "keeper of sheep," must have been to provide them for sacrifice.

After some remarks on the "*significance* or *symbolical nature* of sacrifice," Dr. Harris thus proceeds:—

"Now, that the patriarchal and primitive sacrifices were regarded as *piacular* is established by all the evidence of which the case admits. Thus, of Job it is recorded that 'he offered burnt-offerings' for his sons; for he said, 'It may be that my sons have sinned.' (Job i. 5; see also xlii. 7, 8.) When 'Noah builded an altar unto the Lord, and offered burnt-offerings upon the altar, the Lord smelled *a savour of rest* [or *propitiation*]; and the Lord said, 'I will not again curse the ground any more.' (Gen. viii. 21; comp. Lev. xxvi. 31.) He was appeased. So also, of the first recorded offerings it is said, that Cain brought of his *fruits* and Abel of his *flock;* 'and the Lord had respect unto Abel and his offering, but unto Cain and his offering He had not respect.' (Gen. iv. 4, 5, 6, 7.) But why this distinction? Considered merely as eucharistic offerings, Cain's fruits, the products of his own tillage, were not less appropriate than the firstlings of Abel's flock. Regarded in the light of covenant-pledges,—of which a portion was eaten by the offerer,—the oblation of Cain was even preferable to that of Abel; for animal food was yet unknown. The only inference is, that the reason of the Divine preference of Abel's sacrifice lay in its piacular nature; but that Cain, though sinful like his brother, and needing forgiveness, ignored the awful fact of his guilt, and thus converted his confessed homage into an act of impenitence and insult.......

"What then were the sentiments which sacrifices were calculated to develope in the mind of primeval man? Let the thrilling scene of the first sacrifice be imagined. Let the offerer be pictured, recent from his guilty fall, and with the last accents of his Maker still sounding in his ear. Let him be seen inflicting on the selected victim the fatal stroke,—now, first, looking on death by violence,—death inflicted by his own hand. Let him be traced through all the stages of the service,—till the last palpitation of the animal has ceased,—the life-blood has poured its last drop,—the consuming flame has burnt out,—and nothing but the ashes of the animal remain. How eminently was the impressive rite calculated to awaken sentiments such as these!—'No more can I come before God in the simple glow of gratitude and the confidence of innocence; I have sinned, I have sinned; the purpose for which life was bestowed on me I have frustrated; the only condition on which I could hope to retain it, I have violated; I have brought my will into collision with the Supreme will; my offence is heinous, death its only proper punishment; I am unable, by anything I can do, to merit exemption from the penalty; and, like this sacrifice, I deserve to die. But, in the appointment of this awful rite, God has shown Himself to be full of mercy; the way of forgiveness may be through the substitution of an expiatory victim; but, whatever that way may be, I desire cordially to acquiesce in it; and therefore, in faith and obedience, I present this sacrifice; offering myself as I offer this blood; surrendering my forfeited life that I may receive it back again as the free gift of God.' How many of these reflections were present to the mind of Adam or of Abel we know not. It is not to be supposed that every offerer could give to himself so distinct an account of what he was doing. But the fact that Abel sacrificed 'by faith' determines that his *state of feeling* was in harmony with this Divine strain, and gave to the act this significance."—*Patriarchy*, pp. 75–78.

It was with peculiar satisfaction that we found the author of these extracts supporting with such distinctness and ability what we deem the orthodox and evangelical view on this cardinal subject. No one could accuse him of blind bigotry, or straitlaced rigidness, or ignorance of modern illumination and argument on moral and theological subjects. His candour, liberality, and caution, indeed, in the very work from which we have quoted, have exposed him—unjustly, in our opinion—to the suspicion of doctrinal laxity, if not heterodoxy. His reputation, moreover, as a philosopher and logician had of late years grown so high as fairly to overtop that which his previous works had acquired for him as an essayist of unrivalled powers in respect of lucid statement, luminous and harmonious arrangement, eloquent diction, and felicitous illustration. The well-earned authority of his name may, therefore, be fairly taken as much more than a counterbalance to any weight which the questionable reputation of Mr. Maurice might be supposed to have thrown into the other scale; while, as to argument, Mr. Maurice never attempts to reason the case at all, but Dr. Harris, in a few pages, comprises the substance of a most consecutive and convincing chain of reasoning.

Of the obvious relation of the institute of sacrifice, typical as this was of a vicarious Redeemer for fallen and guilty man, to the promise made to our guilty first parents of a Kinsman-Redeemer, who should be born of the woman's seed, we have not space to speak. Who can doubt that when the conscience-stricken pair were condemned as guilty, and at the same time were comforted with the promise of mercy, they were also taught to approach their offended but merciful Father by that way of sacrificial worship, which symbolized at once their guilt and the mercy promised? Nothing to our mind seems more probable, or more beautiful in its harmony, than such a connexion between the promise and the symbol, the PROTEVANGELIUM given to our fallen parents and the Institute which prefigured so speakingly the Gospel-message of these later days.

We have endeavoured in this chapter to exhibit in outline what we are convinced is an irrefragable argument in proof of the Divine origin and authority, and the piacular character, of primitive and patriarchal sacrifice. We have shown how several independent lines of induction and argument, derived not only from the Scriptures both of the Old and the New Testament, but from the universal history and tradition of the race, converge to one and the same conclusion. Against this our opponents have nothing to urge but, first, an *argumentum e silentio,* which, in such a case, can surely have no weight, considering what is the character of the book of Genesis, and how many, and, to a superficial view, how remarkable, are its omissions; and, secondly, an argument from moral philosophy, which we have already examined at length in our last chapter, and which the universal instinct of mankind, or, as Mr. Thomson says, "the stammering lips of the human race in its childhood," may suffice to confute.

The position which we have thus gained places us on high vantage-ground for prosecuting, in the following chapter, our argument in reference to the nature and purpose of the Jewish sacrifices, and the bearing of the sacrificial institute from first to last upon the evangelical doctrine of propitiation by the offering once for all of the body and blood of Christ on behalf of a world of sinners.

CHAPTER XVII.

VICARIOUS EXPIATION THE DOCTRINE OF THE MOSAIC INSTITUTE—THE THEORY OF BAHR AND MAURICE EXAMINED.

Mr. Maurice professes to believe,—herein, we presume, differing from Professor Jowett,—that the Mosaic institutes were a truly Divine revelation. But, at the same time, we can scarcely doubt, that he would deny the outward and objective character of that revelation. The Mosaic theology he would probably admit to have more of Divine truth and sublimity, and less of human error and weakness, than any other which has been taught to men, Christianity excepted. But we do not think he would allow that there was an essential generic distinction between this theology in its nature, evidence, and authority, and that of the Persian Zerdusht, or of Socrates and Plato. Yet, by a glaring though perhaps unconscious inconsistency, he would take out of the Mosaic theology an idea which is found in all Gentile theologies, (if we must so name them, rather than mythologies,) and which we have seen to be, notwithstanding its repugnance to the principles of mere human reason, so ineradicable and universal throughout the race, as to acquire from this very fact a stamp and signature of primitive authority and Divine truth. If pagan religions are, indeed, in any sense or degree the effect of Divine teaching and revelation, surely that idea of atonement by vicarious suffering in which they all wonderfully accord, among otherwise all but universal discord, and in the midst of the strangest diversities and contrasts, must be taken to be a part of the common substratum of truth, on which, according to this hypothesis, all alike were grounded. More especially should we be disposed to insist upon this point from the consideration that this same idea has been welcomed with a ready faith by the great majority of Christians; that it *seems*, to say the least, to form one of the central and prominent principles of Christianity itself; and that by the Jews all but universally, whether learned or unlearned, and by the immense majority of Bible readers of every grade and condition, it has ever been supposed to be, in a most emphatic and impressive manner, embodied in the Jewish ritual of sacrifice. Nevertheless, Mr. Maurice's Christianity, or rather his Neo-Platonic philosophy, compels him to deny that this idea is taught in the law of Moses. He must either do this, if he is to maintain his philosophy, or deny the Divine truth and authority of the teaching of Moses; for which, to do him justice, he is not yet prepared.

We trust that in the last chapter we succeeded in proving the Divine origin and truly piacular character of primitive and patriarchal sacrifice. He, who convicted our first parents of their guilt, and at the same time showed them mercy; who pronounced their sentence, and at the same time gave them the gracious promise of a Redeemer; did not fail to show them how to come to Him as guilty creatures needing mercy. He who cared for their bodies, and clothed their nakedness with skins, did not forget the need of their naked, trembling, self-condemned souls, but surely taught them how to approach Him, with faith and hope, in the way of worship;—how, in a befitting manner, to draw near to Him for "prayer and supplication with thanksgiving." They were to come in the way of sacrifice. Atonement for conscious guilt by the blood of an animal victim, whose death represented the demerit and legal doom of the offerer, was the distinctive purpose of Abel's offering, and constituted its superior fitness and excellence as contrasted with Cain's tribute and thank-offering of fruits. Hence what Abel sought for, he obtained,—the witness "of his justification or righteousness,"—"God testifying upon his gifts." (Heb. xi.) Noah, coming forth from the ark into a world whose guilt and pollution had needed to be washed away by the Flood, offered burnt-offerings on behalf of the race now beginning its probation afresh, a sacrifice both of humble and solemn thanksgiving for the deliverance of himself and his family, and of suppliant and trembling intercession on behalf of mankind in the future. God was propitiated; He smelled a "savour of rest;" He entered into a gracious covenant, of which He gave a bright, and beautiful, and most appropriate token, and He promised that He would no more destroy the earth by a flood. So also Job offered holocausts continually for his sons, lest they should have sinned, and, at the direct bidding of God, whose "wrath was kindled against" his friends, he did the like for them; praying also for them that they might be forgiven. And the principle of vicarious atonement, as symbolized by the sacrifice of animal victims, having thus entered into the post-diluvian world with Noah, passed into the religious faith and practice of all nations. The farther we trace back the religious traditions and rites of the great primitive races of men, the more distinctly and solemnly do we find this principle expressed and embodied in their mythology and worship. That fearful perversion of the sacrificial institute—the offering of human victims—proves how deeply this principle was imprinted on the human heart, and that its hold was stronger than the force of the tenderest opposing affections. It is remarkable that human sacrifices were not a late invention of men, or a remote corruption—after a course of growing perversion—of the traditional principles of worship. On the contrary, they were frequent in the early ages of idolatry, and became rare in the later. It is obvious, that, though a horrible, they were not a distant or difficult deduction from the principle of vicarious atonement by sacrifice; especially if that were associated with any idea, however dim, of future deliverance to be won for man through the sufferings and death of a human Redeemer. Though long ages have passed away; though some races have mouldered down, and been disintegrated and degraded into savage tribes, whilst others have grown and consolidated into civilized or semi-civilized communities, some of them of vast extent and most artificial in their maxims, habits, and usages; we yet find that the same principle, though, as could not but be expected, sometimes comparatively faint and obscure, and often overlaid by other and later ideas, is (except in Buddhism, which is rather a pantheistic philosophy than any system of religious faith and worship) nowhere extinct; so that the Missionaries who preach, as Missionaries always do preach, if they preach to any good purpose, the doctrine of Atonement through the blood of Christ's Sacrifice, find a ready response to their doctrine in the consciences and hearts of their hearers.

Those who admit the truth of the foregoing statement, will not be disposed to deny the vicarious character of the legal sacrifices. The God of the patriarchal dispensation was also the God of Israel; and the truths taught to primitive and antediluvian man must have formed the substratum on which the further revelations of the Mosaic dispensation were grounded. The unity of the Divine counsels, and the harmony of the Divine procedures, demand that we maintain this. It is not, indeed, antecedently either impossible or improbable that the same institute of sacrifice might be made the medium by which to convey new and further discoveries of truth. It is easily conceivable that other lessons might be annexed to the first. This might be in accordance with the progressive character of the Divine revelations, and might illustrate the complex harmony and "manifold wisdom" of the Divine plans. But it is *not* conceivable that God should cancel that fundamental idea which He had originally ordained to be shown forth by the rite of Sacrifice, and which, through so many ages, He had continued to teach by the same means. It is *not* conceivable that, as at a second Babel, He should so "confound the" symbolic "speech," which He himself had taught to mankind,—and which, however in other respects it had changed, among different nations, into wide and wild dialectic varieties, had, at least in relation to this cardinal idea, remained unchanged,—as to reverse the meaning which He Himself had attached to the rite of Sacrifice.

We have no wish, however, to determine the question of the significance of the Jewish sacrificial institute merely by inference from another and a prior argument. The question may well be discussed upon its own merits; and if, so discussed, it should be decided in favour of the vicarious character of the legal sacrifices, we shall thus obtain another and an independent argument, of cumulative force, on behalf of the orthodox and evangelical doctrine of atonement through the vicarious sufferings and death of our Lord Jesus Christ; and shall also be strongly confirmed in our previous conclusion in reference to the Divine origin of vicarious sacrifice.*

Socinus, Crellius, and their followers, including modern Unitarians,—and in general all those, whether professedly Unitarians or Trinitarians, who have refused to admit the doctrine of vicarious atonement for sin,—have been accustomed to try to evade the argument in favour of this doctrine, deduced from the sacrificial institute of the Jews, by representing the propitiatory sacrifices either as mere ceremonial purifications, or as mulcts or fines for legal offences, having no moral reference, and implying no spiritual service. This shift, however, seems now to be abandoned. It so completely degrades the character of the Mosaic dispensation, taking out of it, in fact, all spiritual significance, and reducing it altogether below the moral level of the patriarchal dispensation, much more of that Decalogue which forms its own grand moral basis; it so ill accords with the provision of the daily burnt-offerings; (Lev. i. 4;) it so directly contradicts the express letter of the law itself, which, in some remarkable cases of trespass against neighbours, both prescribes a mulct for the offence to be paid to the party injured, and also ordains a trespass-offering "to be brought unto the Lord, that the Priest may make atonement for him before the Lord, and his trespass *be forgiven him;*" (Lev. vi. 2–7; xix. 20, 22;) and which requires sacrifices to be offered in order to make atonement for "sins committed ignorantly [that is, through haste, frailty, or inconsideration] against *any* of the commandments of the Lord;" (Lev. v.;*) it is so utterly opposed to the whole spirit and purport of the sacrificial solemnities connected with the great day of atonement; and is so plainly irreconcilable with the facts of Israelitish history, for example, with the sacrifice offered by David on behalf of himself and his people on account of their sin in the matter of numbering the people; that it seems to be on all hands now agreed that this hypothesis is altogether untenable. With a slight dialectic variation in the phraseology of the first and last sentences, so as to conform them to the peculiar teaching of their school, and to take out of them all implication of mortal doom, because of the Divine displeasure impending over the unforgiven sinner, we suppose that such writers as Bähr and Maurice would find little or no difficulty in giving a general adhesion to the following statement of Mr. Thomson as to this point:—

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* "It is," says Mr. Macdonnell, "a very dangerous mode of seeking for truth, to begin by forming fixed opinions on so obscure a subject as that of primitive sacrifice, and then to allow these opinions to govern our interpretation of the clearer language of the Mosaic code, and the New Testament." To *govern*,—yes. But, otherwise, there may be a peculiar advantage in following the track of Divine revelation, reading ever the present by the light of the past, and arriving at last before the page of the New Testament with all the knowledge and impressions needful to realise its true and full meaning. The reverse plan to this does not seem to us to be "surely the more philosophic method of proceeding." More especially, when the opponents of Gospel truth endeavour to mystify the statements of the New Testament by pretending to illustrate them through the Old Testament, laying the eggs of their New Testament sophisms in the obscure coverts of the Mosaic Institute, does it become necessary first to find our way through these last. We cannot, therefore, wonder that, as he tells us, (p. 216,) Mr. Macdonnell "found that it was almost impossible to get any one to discuss the efficacy of sacrifice under the law, apart from their opinions as to sacrifice antecedent to the law."

> "The ritual system of the Mosaic law is intended to represent in visible acts and things man's entire dependence upon God, and God's hatred of sin. This is effected by punishments and sacrifices; an offence wittingly committed is punished by death or by cutting off from the congregation; when the same offence is committed through ignorance, a sacrifice is accepted instead. The principle of the law was, that no sin was passed over, and

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* See Magee's very able note on these points, "Mosaic Atonements applicable to Cases of Moral Transgression," No. xxxvii.

even outward personal defilements were to be purged away by rites and offerings; in order that this people, lifting up its head from slavery, and going forth with Jehovah leading it into lands where strange idolatry, and horrible sins, and loathsome diseases prevailed, might be hedged in and kept unspotted, if that were possible, until the day of better things. Now every Jewish sacrifice had a real effect, and also a symbolical meaning. It restored the worshipper to his position as a member of the Divine polity, and so far was effectual; and it set forth the universal truth that God must be reconciled to the sinner who has offended Him, if he would save his soul alive; but as it was impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins, and as no sacrifice was prescribed or allowed for heinous, wilful transgressions, this part of the sacrifice was symbolical only."—*Bampton Lectures*, (1853,) pp. 64, 65.

That is to say, the sacrifices had a direct and necessary legal and ceremonial efficacy; and also were adapted symbolically to teach moral and spiritual lessons, and to become means of spiritual intercourse between the offerers and God.* This important position is one which those who maintain the evangelical doctrine of atonement, and the typical character of the Jewish sacrifices, do not now need to defend. The question between ourselves and our opponents is happily narrowed to this, What is the symbolical sense and teaching of the Jewish sacrifices?

We need hardly say that our present inquiry as to this point does not include any reference to the meat and drink offerings of the law. These were not animal sacrifices, nor do they seem ever to have been offered independently. They were eucharistic offerings to the Giver of all good, and appear to have been merely supplementary to the burnt and peace-offerings. (Num. xv.) The offerings with which we are at present concerned are the sin and trespass-offerings, the burnt-offering or holocaust, and the peace-offering. These were all animal sacrifices, and they include all the regular sacrificial services of the law. To the sacrifice of the Passover,—which was a special commemorative ordinance,—we shall advert separately.

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* We have already noted the unhappy singularity, as we deem it, of Mr. Macdonnell's views in relation to the moral efficacy of the Mosaic sacrifices, and in particular his striking inconsistency in admitting the evangelical symbolism of the sacrifices, and yet denying that they were means of spiritual intercourse between the offerers and God.

The sin and trespass-offerings were sacrifices ordained exclusively to make atonement for sins on account of which the offerers felt themselves to be in danger of condemnation. The burnt-offerings were intended to make a general atonement for the sin of the offerers, whether these had any distinct consciousness of their transgressions or not, but included also within their import the idea of self-surrender and self-sacrifice on the part of the offerer, as symbolized by the consumption of the whole sacrifice upon the altar, and were hence appropriately accompanied by a meat and drink-offering. The distinction between the sin and trespass-offerings and the burnt-offerings is well brought out by Fairbairn, who says that the former "had for their object the restoring of the offerer to a state of peace and fellowship with God, which had been interrupted by the commission of iniquity," while the latter "were for those who were already standing within the bonds of the covenant, and without any such sense of guilt upon their conscience as exposed them to excision from the covenant."* Nevertheless, as Fairbairn goes on to remark, there was undoubtedly implied, in this sacrifice, a general consciousness of sin on the part of the offerer, since it is expressly said "to be accepted for him, to make atonement for him." (Lev. i. 4.) The burnt-offering, in fact, symbolically represented that complex state of feeling which must always attend the sincere worship of an earnest believer who desires to consecrate himself to the Lord in a spirit of humble gratitude, but is at the same time painfully conscious of his own sinful short-comings in love and duty. It was at once sin-offering, thank-offering, and covenant-sacrifice. "It embodied the general idea of sacrifice, and in a sense represented the whole sacrificial institute." Hence it was "the daily and nightly, the constant and perpetual sacrifice,—the symbolical expression of what Israel needed to be ever receiving from Jehovah, as the God of the covenant, and yielding to Him again as His covenant people. Holding such a position in the sacrificial institute, we can easily understand why the altar of sacrifice should have received its usual designation from this, and was called 'the altar of burnt-offerings.'"* Peace-offerings seem to have been free-will votive sacrifices, offered either with prayer for blessings desired, or with thanksgiving because of blessings received. It is not to be assumed, however, that because this was the main and characteristic idea connected with these sacrifices, they implied no idea of sin and guilt as attaching to the offerer. Confession of sin naturally introduces either a prayer for favour, or a grateful acknowledgment of mercies received. Of the truth of this many affecting instances will be found in Bible history and in the Psalms. Reconciliation must precede friendly intercourse between parties who have been estranged from each other. Atonement is the basis of gratitude and the warrant of prayer. Hence the peace-offerings may well have been, in a sense, sin-offerings.

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* FAIRBAIRN, vol. ii., p. 352. On the difficult question as to the distinction between sin and trespass-offerings, and indeed on the whole sacrificial institute, Fairbairn well deserves to be attentively read. See also WINER'S valuable account of Sacrifices, as given in the Appendix to DR. PYE SMITH'S "Four Discourses," &c.

Now there are certain features which all these sacrifices of the law possessed in common, and which, in combination, may therefore be taken as the general definition of a Jewish sacrifice. The victims were all slain in the court of the sanctuary; the offerer, turning his face toward the sanctuary, laid his hand on the head of the victim before it was slain; the priest, while the victim was being slain, received the blood in brasen bowls, and this blood he sprinkled "before the Lord," ordinarily "upon the altar round about," on some special occasions on the brasen altar of incense, or upon and before the mercy-seat. The question between us and the modern deniers of the doctrine of vicarious expiation for sin, relates to the interpretation to be put on these symbolic actions. Formerly it was, so far as we know, universally admitted by those who believed the Jewish sacrifices to possess any spiritual significance whatever, that the offerer presented the victim as his own representative; that, by laying his hands on the head of the sacrifice, he symbolically transferred to it his own guilt; that in its death he exhibited the punishment due to his own sins; and that in the pouring or sprinkling of the blood before the Lord, was concentrated the very point and meaning of the whole service, since the blood represented the life which had been forfeited, and which was thus symbolically rendered to the Lord. It is now, however, maintained by such writers as Bähr in Germany, and Maurice in England, that this is not the spiritual import and significance of the legal sacrifices. These, they say, did not represent the guilt and demerit of the offerer, nor in any respect image the death which was justly his due; but, on the contrary, they symbolized that surrender and sacrifice of self, and that devotion of life to the service of God, which the offerer, by the act of sacrifice, acknowledged to be his duty, and declared to be his desire. Of course they believe that such an acknowledgment and such a desire may be associated with grief and confession on account of particular past sins; the sacrifice then becomes a sin or trespass-offering. Or it may, with peculiar appropriateness, on this hypothesis, be associated with a special acknowledgment of past mercies, and with special engagements of duty and devotion for the future. In this case, the sacrifice becomes a thank-offering or a votive peace-offering. But in no case, not even in the case of the sin-offering, does it imply guilt as distinguished from sin; liability to punishment because of a broken law.

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* FAIRBAIRN, vol. ii., p. 353.

The peculiarity of this view is that the death of the victim is made to symbolize, directly and properly, not punishment, but privilege and duty,—the highest privilege and the noblest duty, that of self-consecration to the service of God. Now it is of the essence of a symbol that it be adapted to strike the common mind at once, and to speak out its meaning to the sense and understanding of all who are concerned to know it. A symbol must have a plain, and not a subtle or abstruse, interpretation. Symbols may become obscure by lapse of time, or loss of the history connected with them; but it is inconceivable that their original significance should have been dark or subtle in respect to those for whom they were appointed. The wider and more promiscuous the circle, too, in the midst of which the symbol was set up, the greater the need of its being plain and obvious in its purport. A national symbol must either refer to some event of the national history known by all, or to some common idea or feeling of the race. But, most of all, must a religious symbol, intended not only to represent the faith of one nation, but of all mankind, be adapted to convey its meaning plainly and unmistakeably to all men. Nothing could be more surprising than that such a symbol should be intended to be interpreted in a sense opposed to that which the feelings of mankind would naturally put upon it, and which, in fact, had been universally put upon it, until the modern philosophic sense was invented by certain subtle thinkers in Germany.

Yet, such would really be the state of the case, if that interpretation were put upon the rite of sacrifice, for which the new quasi-spiritual school of anti-evangelical interpreters contend. That event which, in the ideas and feelings of all men, is associated with evil and with fear, is made to be the symbol of the best and holiest of duties, with which are ever connected the purest and most exalted satisfaction to the spirit, the highest privileges, and the most blessed hopes. That rite which the whole world in all its races has held to be symbolic of guilt and punishment, is made to yield a subtle and sublimated sense, which transforms death inflicted and blood poured out into life consecrated, transfigured, and ennobled with a pure and spiritual glory. That the sense of all times and nations is against Mr. Maurice he indirectly admits; but dexterously covers the admission by denouncing that sense as heathenish, and those

Christians who adhere to it as inheriting the spirit and superstition of the worshippers of Moloch or Baal. But he must remember that the question is not, in the first place, as to the source of a dogma, but as to the sense of a symbol, intended for the world, and used throughout the world. Heathenism may be a bad source of theological doctrine; though we do not see how Mr. Maurice is to maintain this, in consistency with his own philosophy. But Heathens may, notwithstanding, be competent judges as to the import of a symbol. The consentaneous voice of the nations, as to the meaning of sacrifice, is what no one who professes to be a philosopher can despise; least of all, one who believes in the universal inspiration of mankind, and the relative truth of all theologies.

Nor will the view which Maurice has adopted from Bähr better endure the scrutiny of philosophic analysis than the test of popular intelligibility. "The blood," say Bähr and Maurice, "is the life;" hence the pouring out of the blood before the altar, "before the Lord," symbolizes the dedication of the life of the offerer to God's service. But, let us ask, is it life, or is it death, that appears in the rite of sacrifice? On this hypothesis, death should really have no place here. What has a violent death to do with that which is only intended to express the "sense of thankfulness, of obligation, of dependence?" * It may well be the shadow of sin, the image of punishment, the consequence of guilt; but it is not fitted to express the filial devotion with which a child of God consecrates his spirit and life to his Heavenly Father. But yet it is death, and death in a most repulsive form, violently inflicted upon an innocent victim, that appears in this rite of sacrifice. Strange masque it would be, which should habit filial devotion in garments of terror, which should make dire, bleeding death to image and express the union of the grateful soul to God in obedient life and service. According to the ordinary view, the offering to God of the blood, the vehicle of life, does but express the completion, and point out the object, of the

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* MAURICE, p. 72.

sacrificial death which has been inflicted. This is natural and easy to be understood. But, according to the new view, the death of the victim would seem to be but subordinately and, so to speak, accidentally necessary, in order to afford the opportunity of procuring and offering before God that blood which is the emblem of life, and the offering of which symbolizes the consecration of a spiritual life in continued and active service. But the death, so solemnly inflicted by the hand of Jehovah's representative, refuses to retire into the background in this impressive solemnity. It is the central and most solemn, the essential fact of the whole service.

Nor is the offering of the blood fitted in itself to convey the idea of a consecrated life-service. It is true that the "life is in the blood," that the blood was supposed to be the vehicle of life; but that was whilst the blood still coursed in the veins, whilst the animal yet lived. After the animal has been slain, the blood is but the representative of a life that was, but has been forfeited and sacrificed. The blood is poured out, is spilt upon the ground. What can this betoken but that the death is complete, the life extinct and at an end? But the sense which our modern philosophers would put upon the symbol is precisely the opposite of this. They would make it to signify, not a life forfeited in death, but a life consecrated in spiritual service. But death cannot thus image life, nor that which is poured out and spilt upon the ground symbolize an active spiritual service to be continued without end. To convey this idea under the metaphorical designation of sacrifice, St. Paul found it necessary to use so paradoxical an expression as that of "living sacrifice." But, according to Bähr and Maurice, such a "living sacrifice" was directly and properly symbolized by every dead victim whose blood was poured out before the Lord. St. Paul's is evidently a strong figure, a most expressive paradox, derived not from the idea of sacrifice, conceived as culminating in an act of death, and declared by the offering of the blood, but rather from the conception of the holocaust, the sacrifice wholly consumed by fire in the service of God, and giving forth a sweet savour, "holy, acceptable unto God." The idea of death, indeed, is expressly excluded from the Apostle's conception by the very phrase he employs,—a "living sacrifice." But it cannot be excluded from our conception of the legal sacrifices, as they actually took place. A derived metaphor may banish it, in order that attention may be exclusively concentrated upon another circumstance in a special kind of sacrifice, that of the burnt-offering. But in the rite itself, death appeared in the very centre of the foreground, and other ideas were subordinated to this. This was ever pre-supposed as the condition and foundation of all else that might be connected with it. In some of the sacrifices, the sin-offerings, for example, this idea of death was, indeed, not only chief, but sole; expiation and reconciliation by death and blood is their only lesson. In the burnt-offering we have already explained that the idea of self-consecration comes in, as grounded upon that of a previous expiation through the death of the sacrifice. This is an important part of the meaning of the burnt-offering; and it is upon this secondary idea that the Apostle, in the phrase we have referred to, concentrates his attention. But the question on which we are at issue with the school of Bähr and Maurice has nothing to do with any of the secondary ideas connected with the specific varieties of sacrifice. Our present concern is merely with the signification of those common characteristics which are found in all the varieties of sacrifice, but appear most prominently, and with scarcely any special adjunct, in the sin-offering, and of which the slaying of the victim is the chief and central.

Such are some of the difficulties that attach to the view we combat. They arise out of the incongruous predominance of death and its tokens in a ritual which, according to this view, should only savour and speak of the service and devotion of a sanctified life. An attempt, however, is made to cover them, by representing the death of the victim as the symbol of the death of self, of the extinction of the selfish, carnal life, in order that the spiritual life may thenceforth take its place. But this turn will not serve. In the first place, the life of the animal affords no analogy whatever to the selfish, carnal life of the sinner. The term *selfish* has no applicability to a creature that acts instinctively according to the proper laws of its being. The carnal or natural life of the animal is an innocent life, in conformity with the purposes of its Maker; whereas the carnal life of the sinner means a selfish, sinful life. Here, instead of analogy, we have a contrast, only veiled by the ambiguity which served as covert for the fallacy we are exposing. But, further, it will be seen that the plausible and convenient phraseology we are examining implies a contradiction to the fundamental idea of those who employ it. The animal victim has but one life to forfeit. We have seen that, according to that fundamental idea, this life, as represented by the blood, is so offered to God as to symbolize the consecration of the spiritual life of the offerer. It cannot, then, serve at the very same time to symbolize the selfish, sinful life which the offerer gives up, in order that he may live to God. The self-same symbol would thus be called on to pay an impossible "double debt;" in one sense, it would mean to bring to an end a sinful life; in the other, to consecrate a spiritual life in holiness. These two things may practically coalesce in most instances; though, on the views of Maurice, we do not see why the consecration of the spirit's life need imply a coincident death of the sinful nature, since this would also imply, in all cases, the previous existence, in force and predominance, of such a sinful, selfish nature; it would imply that, in all cases, sin and selfishness had been, in the first instance, the ruling law and power of life. But though the things may practically coalesce, it is impossible that the two ideas should be set forth by the same symbol. To forfeit and to consecrate cannot be each directly signified by the same action; nor can the same life be made the image, at the same time, of selfish carnality and of active obedience. The one representation makes the act of sacrifice to be an image of pain and punishment, the other of privilege and devotion.*

There is an attendant and significant circumstance, moreover, connected in all cases with the rite of sacrifice, which cannot easily, as we think, be reconciled with the modern quasi-spiritual view, but which perfectly harmonizes with the ideas of evangelical orthodoxy. We allude to the imposition of hands upon the head of the sacrifice. The custom of the imposition of hands, it is justly said by Professor Fairbairn, "viewed generally, appears as a symbolical action, bespeaking the communication of something in the person who imposes his hands to the person or being on whom they are imposed. Hence it was used on such occasions as the bestowal of blessing, and the communication of the Holy Spirit, whether to heal bodily disease, or to endow with supernatural gifts, or to designate or qualify for a sacred office. The circumstance of the hearers of blasphemy being appointed to lay their hands on the head of the blasphemer before he was stoned, is no contradiction" to this, "but rather a confirmation; for, till the guilt was punished, it was looked upon as belonging to the congregation at large; (comp. Joshua vii.; 2 Sam. xxi.;) and by this rite it was devolved entirely upon the blasphemer himself, that he might bear his punishment." † What, then, in the case of the animal sacrifices, did the offerer convey to the victim? If we seek our answer from the one plain statement of Scripture upon this subject, the reply must be, Guilt. In the account which is given of the solemnities of the great day of annual expiation, it is said, "Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, PUTTING THEM UPON THE HEAD OF THE GOAT: and the goat shall BEAR

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* Bähr's views on the points we have argued, with Kurtz's reply, are given by FAIRBAIRN in an appendix, vol. ii., p. 476, *et seq.*

† FAIRBAIRN, vol. ii., pp. 292, 295, *note.*

UPON HIM ALL THEIR INIQUITIES." (Lev. xvi. 21, 22.) In perfect consistency with this, it appears from Outram, that it was a maxim with the Jewish doctors, "Where there is no confession of sins, there is no imposition of hands." And the form prescribed for a person presenting his own sin-offering is said to have been, "O God, I have sinned, I have done perversely, I have trespassed before Thee, and have done so and so. Lo! now I repent, and am truly sorry for my misdeeds. Let then this victim be my expiation." *

Mr. Maurice finds it convenient to avoid all investigation into this subject. He does not even expound, —that is, he does not expound Scripture. He takes a text; and then states his own views, twice or thrice alighting on his text for a moment when it may be used in any way for the purpose of illustration. Points which seem directly antagonist to himself in the text, context, or general subject, he tries hard to double, with a faculty of circuitous evasion which must commend itself to the admiration of the special pleaders of Lincoln's Inn, whom he serves as Chaplain. But he never condescends to argue. We had felt curious to see how he would deal with that most significant and most solemn of legal services, the day of atonement, with its great sin-offering, the sacrifice of the scapegoat. But, strange to say, he passes over this service in one brief paragraph, and sums up its meaning in these three short closing sentences. "The bullock that was slain, the scape-goat that disappeared, suggested to the Israelite these two thoughts. God can entirely take away the evil of a people and of a man. If He takes it away, the Mediator, the sin-bearer, must in some unspeakable manner unite death and life." † Our space forbids us to enter upon the subject of that atonement here. But the lesson it teaches is so plainly that of a vicarious atonement,—it is so evident, and is indeed so distinctly stated, that the sins of Israel were laid upon the substituted sacrifice, and that the twin

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* See OUTRAM *De Sacrificiis*, lib. i., cap. xv., sect. 8, 10, 11.

† MAURICE, p. 85.

victims both bore and bore away symbolically those sins,—that any comment is really superfluous.* The minuter details of criticism connected with this subject, and with that of sacrifice in general,—as, for instance, the signification of עֲזָאזֵל and the effect, in certain cases, of the sacrificial blood on the persons or things with which it was brought into contact,—though both difficult and interesting, are not, in themselves, of essential importance, and lie beyond the limits of the present argument. On these points Fairbairn will be consulted with advantage. It will be seen from his pages that, while the orthodox view fully satisfies, and alone satisfies, the most important conditions of this whole question, there are no minor difficulties brought to light by minuter criticism which peculiarly affect it.

Scarcely less surprising than Mr. Maurice's evasion on the subject of the day of annual expiation, is the glaring one-sidedness of his statements concerning the Passover. According to him, the offering of the Passover was merely "the dedication and consecration of the whole Jewish nation." (Page 56.) Elsewhere he adds that the Passover was "to remind them from generation to generation that they were one people, one with their forefathers, one with their descendants, one because the Lord had redeemed them out of the house of bondage, one because He was their King for ever and ever." (Page 67.) In the course of several pages of rambling talk, (pp. 53–56,) in which he dilutes these ideas, and meanders round his direct line of thought, he distinctly dismisses from acceptance that which is, in truth, the revealed fact, that the Passover was appointed as a means of warding off death, as a sort of substitutionary sacrifice for the first-born of Israel, at the time when the destroyer slew all the first-born of Egypt. As such, it was a confession that in themselves the Israelites were as truly guilty in the sight of God as the Egyptians were, and liable justly to punishment on account of their sins. The guilt of Egypt, not in its precise form, but in its essence, clave to them. They had been ungrateful, disobedient, rebellious, spite of their special privileges. They had become scarcely less carnal, selfish, and grovelling than the Egyptians. They had become deeply imbued with the Egyptian temper, and had been immersed in Egyptian sin. And when the destroyer was abroad in the thick darkness, throughout the land, their consciences might well have foreboded judgment for themselves; nor could they, assuredly, on any ground of merit and obedience before God, have claimed exemption. It was of His mercy that *they* were not consumed. It was fitting that this mercy should be understood; that their escape from death should be felt to be due to God's free favour, and should be imaged forth as a result of mediatorial provision. Hence the first-born substitute was prescribed by God, and sacrificed by the people. The innocent was slain instead of the guilty; and the slaughter of the innocent substitute was the sustenance of those who themselves might otherwise have been slain. Surely here is sacrifice, substitutive expiation. Here, indeed, was a lively image of Christ's sacrifice. Hence, says St. Paul, "Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us." (1 Cor. v. 7.) No doubt this was also a covenant-sacrifice, and herein the fitter and fuller type of Christ. No doubt it implied the duty of consecration to God on the part of those whom God's mercy had redeemed from death. It was also appointed to be a commemorative ordinance, in celebration of the birth, so to speak, of Israel as a nation. It was the national sacrament, which bound the people to each other and to God their Redeemer. But, besides all this, and in it all, it was a typical sacrifice, shadowing forth the redemption of all mankind from death through the death of the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world."

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* See Lev. xvi.

The one principle which pervades all these sacrifices is that of vicarious atonement, that an innocent victim is slain instead of the guilty, the sins and guilt of the offerer being laid upon the head of the sacrifice, and that this symbolic transaction is made to be the vehicle of prayer and faith, and the condition of mercy. This principle is implied in the thank-offerings, expressed in the burnt-offerings, is the one lesson of the sin-offerings, is taught in the most pointed and impressive manner possible in those most solemn of sin-offerings which were prescribed in connexion with the day of annual expiation, and lies at the basis of all the ideas associated with the sacrifice of the Passover. It would not be difficult to trace it farther. In the rites connected with the ratification of the covenant, to which St. Paul alludes in Heb. ix. 18–22, it appears very prominently; in the purgation from an uncertain murder, (Deut. xxi. 1–9,) it cannot fail to be recognised; in the legal ordeals and purifications it is possible, we think, to perceive its supremacy, notwithstanding much that is obscure connected with these. Whether, however, it could be traced in these miscellaneous rites or not, many of which are not properly sacrifices, the arguments which we have advanced respecting the major and ordinary sacrifices of the law would not be invalidated. There will always, probably, be some points of obscurity connected with these antique rites of a nation whose peculiar ritual has so long passed away, referring, as they did, to circumstances the date of which is so extremely remote. No hypothesis has been able to free itself from such obscurities. They attach no less, but, as we think, more, to the modern philosophic theories, than to the orthodox doctrine. Our object has been to examine the main principle of a subtle and plausible modern heresy, and to test it by a fair application to the facts involved. The new key offered to us has been tried; but has been found not to fit in any respect. Whether orthodoxy be right or wrong, it is at least more consistent, natural, and probable, than this hypothesis which comes to take its place. Nothing, in fact, can be found to displace the old view. How many theories have been tried in succession, and found wanting! The new spiritualists themselves have lent a hand to sweep away the last remnants of the cold and superficial interpretation which the opponents of orthodoxy formerly inculcated. And now they in turn must give way. Only the old-fashioned Gospel doctrine can hold its ground.

The truth is, that in this last turn of the controversy between evangelical orthodoxy and those who deny the doctrine of vicarious expiation for sin, an attempt has been made to substitute for the primary signification and purpose of sacrifice, that which is either a secondary and inferential idea derived from it, or a figurative application of it. The life which is confessed to be justly forfeit to God because of guilt, if spared by redeeming Mercy, should assuredly be considered as belonging to Him who spared it, and should be accordingly consecrated to His service. He, therefore, who confesses his desert of death, and pours out before God in symbolical action his life as forfeit to His justice, by that act most strongly and impressively implies that the spared life, rendered back to him in mercy, in consequence of his humble and believing act of sacrifice, should be wholly devoted to the service of the God who restores it. This secondary idea was probably symbolized directly by the consumption of the body of the whole burnt-offering as a sweet savour unto God. The same idea may, moreover, be metaphorically conveyed by the term "sacrifice;" because in the consecration of the life to God, as in the case of the slaughter and sacrifice of an animal victim, there is an absolute and unconditional surrender of the whole to the Supreme Lord. But to deny the plain and obvious symbolic sense of sacrifice, as all mankind have ever understood it, is, in fact, to cut away the basis on which the secondary and inferential idea rests; and to do away with that true, direct, and natural meaning on which the metaphorical sense must be grounded. We have seen how vain is the attempt to make the secondary or metaphorical sense to be the primary and original import of the symbolic institution. To do this, is to try to make a speaking symbol dumb, or to seek to pervert its plain speech into subtle and incoherent philosophizing. It is to bid one turn away from the bright face of the symbol we wish to interpret, and to seek its meaning by inspecting the dark reverse of its medal. It requires us to reconcile subtlety with popular intelligibility, and to attribute philosophic refinement and abstruseness to that which must, from its nature, be direct and plain. It requires us to contradict the sense which poetry could not choose but put upon a universal symbol, which history teaches, and which revelation sanctions, in order to accept that which a modern philosophy has devised.

In reference to "the sentiments which sacrifices were calculated to develope," there is a fine paragraph in a passage which we have already quoted (pp. 384–5) from Dr. Harris's "Patriarchy." It is one to the truth of which the dramatic faculty of Poetry, the testimony of History and Revelation, and the piercing wisdom of true Philosophy, unite to give their sanction. We think that it concedes to Bähr and Maurice *all* that can possibly be conceded; and that this all, so far as the essential purpose of their doctrine is concerned, amounts to nothing. Nor is it the less relevant to our present purpose, that its direct reference is to the first institution of sacrifice.

Such sentiments as are so strikingly described in that paragraph were certainly those which the institute of sacrifice was naturally adapted to awaken and develope even from the beginning. And, as time advanced, as the prophetic promises became clearer and fuller, as the dispensations unfolded, and the illumination and education of the chosen people grew more complete, it is no violent supposition that the lessons and language of the sacrificial institute became fuller and more impressive. Indeed, it is evident that in the Mosaic dispensation the ritual of sacrifice became not only more complex, but more expressive, and more adapted to the various wants and feelings of sinful and guilty man, as well as more distinctly and largely typical of God's provision of mercy for men through the sacrifice of Christ.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOME REMARKS RESPECTING THE TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ON SACRIFICE AND ATONEMENT—CONCLUSION.

It has been the uniform practice, from the first, of those who, professing to be believers in Revelation, have yet rejected the doctrine of vicarious and piacular atonement, to retreat from the direct discussion of New Testament texts into the obscurer thickets and coverts of the Mosaic ceremonial. And hence it is necessary, in order to approach the New-Testament argument with advantage, to dislodge our opponents from these tangled paths and holds of criticism. Many of those texts of the New Testament which set forth the vicarious character of the death of Jesus Christ, are manifest allusions to Mosaic sacrificial rites. And attempts have been made to explain away other pre-eminently evangelical texts, however plain and strong their language, and though to ordinary well-informed readers they seem to be entirely free from all Jewish allusion or colouring, as nothing more than such allusions, passing into a new form or vehicle of thought. Indeed, if the language of the legal ceremonial does not express the doctrine of vicarious expiation, it is difficult to understand what language could be devised which might incontrovertibly express it. So that to exhaust the language of the Mosaic ritual of all vicarious and truly expiatory import, might well be supposed to be substantially equivalent to silencing those who would defend the orthodox doctrine from either Testament.*

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* Some admirable remarks upon this subject may be found in the Preface to Outram's work on Sacrifice, a few sentences from which we here subjoin:—" Ita scilicet Socini discipuli, quoties urgentur sacris literis, vel ad verborum ambiguitatem, vel ad sensus quosdam tralatitios, tanquam in castra, se recipiunt. Quas etsi latebras, his de rebus dum cogitarem, ipsâ locorum ratione, quibus de Sacrificio Christi agitur, iis occlusas nonnunquam vidi, tamen dispiciendum existimavi, an ex naturâ ipsarum rerum, nempe

If such writers as those to whom we have referred were professed Rationalists, if they did not consider themselves bound to keep some terms with the Scriptures, and even to seem to draw their teaching from them, it is possible that while retaining their philosophy, they might at the same time do more justice to the meaning of the sacred text. Such German critics as Gesenius, De Wette, and Winer,—out and out Rationalists as they are,—agree with the multitude of the orthodox, whether learned or simple, in their views of the question of sacrifice. It is not their business to justify Scripture; they do not profess to believe in its peculiar doctrines any farther than their reason warrants them; they concede no Divine authority to the Divine Word: but they are learned and capable critics; they understand Hebrew and Greek profoundly; they know what is to be known of the history of the world before Christ; and they cannot hesitate as to what the teaching of Scripture is on the point we have been considering, whether that teaching be received by them or not. So that, with few exceptions, all those who profess to seek, from a profound study of Scripture itself, to ascertain its meaning, whether they are believers or infidels, agree as to the cardinal doctrine of sacrifice. Those, for the most part, dissent from this view, who are bound, from their position, to reconcile Scripture with the foregone conclusions of their philosophy.

In conformity with this principle we find that Professor Jowett—being at the same time a much more competent interpreter and critic, so far as regards the letter of the Scripture text, and much less scrupulous and more advanced in his Rationalism, than Mr. Maurice—feels himself obliged, while equally with Mr. Maurice rejecting for himself the doctrine of

mortis et sacrificii Christi, paulo certior elici constituique posset sensus earum omnium locutionum, quibus rerum earum vis ac ratio in sacris literis enunciatur: fore ratus, id si fieri posset, ut majorem passim res ipsæ verbis, quam verba rebus lucem afferrent:......Quæ cum sententia mihi penitus in animo insedisset, aggrediendum existimavi ad Sacrificia Judæorum, et diligenter enucleandum, quæ propria sit Sacrificii ratio, quænam essent Sacrificiorum genera," &c.

vicarious expiation, frankly and fully to admit that this was the doctrine of the Mosaic ritual, and that, so far as mere language is concerned, it is the doctrine also of the New Testament. We need not again state particularly his special theory on these points. We are only concerned with him at present as a *witness* to the facts of Old Testament history and to the plain teaching of the language of the New Testament. He boldly denies the Divine institution of sacrifice, and of course he disallows the idea that it formed any "part of the Divine design in the education of the world." He classes Jewish with heathen sacrifices, as "the dim, vague, rude, almost barbarous expression of a want in human nature." But he admits that "to state this" —the evangelical—"view of the doctrine" of atonement "at length, is but to translate the New Testament into the language of the Old." He apologizes for the language of the Apostles,—which he admits to be fully in favour of the evangelical doctrine,—on the ground that "ideas must be given through something," and that "those of a new religion ever clothe themselves in the old;" that "the Apostles were Jews, and could not lay aside their first nature, or divest themselves at once of Jewish modes of expression." While himself almost contemptuously rejecting the idea that the Levitical sacrifices were typical of the Christian Sacrifice, he yet admits that "all history combines to strengthen the illusion" that "the institution of sacrifice was a part of the Divine education of the race." * If he could have eliminated from the Scriptures, which we cannot doubt that he is anxious, as far as he sees it possible, to honour and reverence, the doctrine of vicarious expiation, from which he revolts so strongly, it is certain that he would gladly have done so. His testimony, therefore, as that of a witness predisposed to take an opposite view, is of very high value as to the points in question. Herein the weight of his authority is on our side, in opposition to Mr. Maurice.

We have now, as we cannot but hope, attained such a position in this argument, as gives us a full right to bring the accumulated authority of the patriarchal and the Mosaic dispensations, the testimony of all preceding ages of advancing illumination, as presumptive evidence in favour of that doctrine of vicarious atonement which we have been defending. The evangelical language of Isaiah and of other Prophets acquires its full force. The allusions to the law in the New Testament, especially those in the Epistle to the Hebrews, form now a master argument in our favour. And the many other passages accordant with these, and some of them of singular precision and fulness, must be held to augment the force of this cumulative argument.

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* "Dissertation on Atonement," *passim*, (vol. ii., pp. 469–479.)

In this chapter we can but attempt to give a slight outline of the general argument, the character of which has now been indicated. The Prophet (Isaiah liii.) speaks of Him who was led "as a lamb to the slaughter," and upon Whom "the Lord has laid the iniquity of us all." Here we behold the great Sin Offering of our Race, bearing on His head our guilt, that we might be forgiven, dying that we might be saved from death; "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," (John i. 29,) Who "was wounded for our transgressions," and "bruised for our iniquities," and upon Whom was laid "the chastisement of our peace," that "with His stripes we might be healed." (Isa. liii. 5.) In order to complete His sacrifice, and to mark it out as a Sin-Offering, it was needful that He should finally "pour out His soul *unto death;*" (verse 12;) nevertheless it is in the foregoing "travail of His soul" (verse 11) that we recognise the chief and most precious part of *His* offering, Who bore in His person a far richer freight of life to present unto God than that mere animal life (*nephesh*) of which "the blood of bulls and goats" was the vehicle and representative,—Who, "through the Eternal Spirit, offered Himself without spot to God;" (Heb. ix. 14;) Whose whole Mediatorial life and service upon earth was of the nature of a true and meritorious sacrifice; Whom, a conscious but unresisting victim, His enemies may be said to have been binding, securing, and leading to the slaughter for long months before His crucifixion; and Who finally "gave up the ghost," not so much because of the pangs and exhaustion of His suffering body, as through the mortal and heart-breaking agony of His spirit. The Gospel which Isaiah preached so plainly, ages before the coming of the Lord, and which the words of the Baptist, when pointing to the Saviour Himself, come in the flesh, echoed so distinctly, is the uniform doctrine of the New Testament, from Matthew to Revelation. Not only in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the language of which throughout is sacrificial, but in our Lord's own sayings,—brief but pregnant, as awaiting the illustration which was to be afforded them by His death, and the illumination of understanding which His disciples were, through the gift of the Spirit, to receive after His resurrection,—and throughout the apostolic writings, whether of Paul, or Peter, or John, the same doctrine is distinctly and consistently taught.

There is one saying of our Lord's so clear and so significant that it demands special notice. We refer to the passage in Matthew xxvi. 28, at the institution of the Holy Supper,—"This is My blood of the New Testament,"—let us with Mr. Macdonnell render, as surely it should be rendered, *New Covenant,*—"which is shed for many for the remission of sins." It was the paschal supper. The lamb had been slain,—his blood had been shed and sprinkled,—the story of that memorable night had been rehearsed when the blood on the lintel and door-posts had availed to exempt Israel from the common death and judgment which passed through the land, though they too had been rebellious and sinners before the Lord, hardly less guilty than the Egyptians. All the circumstances of the original Passover were fresh before the minds of our Lord and His disciples. And now, rising after supper, (1 Cor. xi. 25,) He takes the cup and says, "This is *My* blood in the New Covenant, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." As if He had said, "Lo! from henceforth behold in *Me* your Paschal Lamb. See in *My* blood that which has secured for you safety and deliverance. Date from this hour a new and greater Passover. This is to you the beginning of a *new* and more blessed *Covenant*. Up to this time the yearly Passover has been to you a *national* sacrament, which has bound you and your fellow-Israelites to each other and to God who redeemed them from the house of bondage. This feast, as on My body and blood, which I now institute, shall be your *Christian* sacrament, which binds you to each other and to Me your Master and Redeemer. Your ancient Passover was to your people, as Jews, a commemorative ordinance, in celebration of the birth, so to speak, of Israel as a nation. This shall henceforth, to you and those who unite with you as brethren in My Name, be *your* commemorative ordinance, in celebration of this beginning of My spiritual family, the true congregation of Israel. Herein you are made 'to be a people, who were not a people.' And that which seals and ratifies the whole, which assures to you and all My people that 'remission of sins,' with which you are to commence your life as My covenant-servants, is 'My blood,' which I am now about to 'shed' for My Redeemed. This is My New Covenant, and thus do I fulfil the word of My servant Jeremiah." (Jer. xxxi. 31.)

What a flood of light does this passage and the history with which it is connected throw upon St. Paul's words, "Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us!" (1 Cor. v. 7.) And how fully and precisely is it in accordance with the reasonings and illustrations of the Apostle in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and with the allusion in Heb. xii. 24!* How perfect a fundamental harmony is thus evinced between parts of the New Testament the most unlike in method and in superficial aspects!

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* Especially, let us say, if in the latter chapter the plain requirements of the argument, and the consistency of the translation, are respected by giving to διαθήκη that sense of covenant, which is given to it in the eighth chapter, the tenth chapter, and everywhere else throughout this Epistle, which the passage in Exodus xxi. 8, quoted in v. 20, and referred to in v. 18, absolutely demands, and which is the almost universal rendering of the word elsewhere throughout both the Septuagint and the New Testament, and might with advantage be the sense everywhere. On this point let us refer to a note of Mr. Macdonnell's, "Lectures," pp. 226–228.

Further, how utterly impossible is it, by any ingenuity, to discover any intelligible interpretation of our Lord's words, either on the supposition that the ancient Passover was not a sin-offering, an offering "for the remission of sins," so far at least as regarded their temporal consequences, or that our Lord's death had no proper piacular merit and efficacy, "that it was nothing but an illustrious martyrdom described in sacrificial language, such as was familiar to a Jew!" Well may Mr. Macdonnell ask, in reference especially to this latter point, "Can we find any meaning in a feast on bread and wine, as commemorating heroic sufferings and a violent death, which were meant to induce us to forsake sin solely through the influence such an example might exercise upon our minds, but were destitute of any more direct power for its removal? Surely the partaking of that bread and wine which are the nourishment of our vital powers, and the emblems of social joy, is a strange way of commemorating a violent death: unless that death could minister to the support of a higher vitality; unless it were something more than a mere splendid spectacle of heroic endurance. Indeed, on the supposition of Christ's death not being a real atoning sacrifice, but a martyrdom described in sacrificial language, it is hard to give any plausible account of the significance of the Lord's Supper, even as a mere commemoration. Whereas, as a commemoration of, and a feast upon, a sacrifice, it naturally enough took the place of the ordinary paschal supper; and filled a similar, though more important, place in the new dispensation. The bread, not only broken, but eaten, and the wine, not only poured out, but partaken of by all present, lose all purpose and significancy unless they are believed to have been 'ordained for the continual remembrance,' not only of the death and martyrdom, but '*of the sacrifice* of the death of Christ, *and the benefits* we receive thereby.'" *

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* MACDONNELL'S "Lectures," pp. 73, 74.

But the passage on which we are commenting is only one of a class of passages which refer to "the blood" of Christ as the procuring cause of forgiveness to men; and which, interpreted as sacrificial allusions on the principles vindicated in the last chapter, furnish a powerful argument on behalf of the proper sacrificial character and expiatory virtue of the death of our Redeemer.

How strongly sacrificial is the language of St. John! "The *blood* of Jesus Christ His Son *cleanseth* us from all sin;" (1 John i. 7;) of St. Paul, "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation (or more exactly *expiation*) through faith *in His blood*,"—"Being justified *by His blood*,"—"In whom we have redemption *through His blood*, the *forgiveness of sins*,"—"Ye are made nigh *by the blood* of Christ,"—"Having made *peace through the blood* of His Cross;" (Rom. iii. 25; v. 9; Eph. i. 7; and Col. i. 14, 20;) of St. Peter, "Ye were redeemed by *the precious blood* of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot;" (1 Peter i. 19;) and again, of St. John, in the Apocalypse, "These have washed their robes in the *blood of the Lamb*." (Rev. vii. 14.) Besides these, the allusions in the Epistle to the Hebrews are, we need not say, numerous and emphatic, to "the blood of the covenant,"—of the "new covenant,"—"the blood of sprinkling," the "blood" in the "Holiest of All" sprinkled before the Mercy-Seat. The Priest there ever appears with "His own blood" as the great Victim. Now why this reiterated allusion to Christ's *blood?* why does everything combine to impress upon us so emphatically the fact that Jesus "*died* for our sins?" Surely there is but one answer. In His death His sacrifice was completed, declared, and presented. When His blood had been shed, an atonement had thereby been made for sin and sinners; the expiation was "finished;" the way was open for "the remission of sins." The reference is to the blood; because, under the law, the blood made expiation. "The life (or soul) is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh atonement for (or rather through) the soul (or *life, nephesh,* rendered *life* at the beginning of the verse.)" *

It is very hard for those who deny the peculiar efficacy of Christ's *death* for sin to deal with such passages as these, in which the shedding of His blood is brought into such emphatic prominence. If, as we have seen, they have striven in vain so to transmute the obvious meaning of the like symbol under the law, as to make the blood poured forth and sprinkled signify, not a life forfeited in death, but a life consecrated in spiritual service,—to force upon death the significance of life, and to make that which is spilt upon the ground symbolize an active service continued without end; they have found it still more difficult to efface the distinction which runs through all the New Testament between our being "reconciled to God by the death of His Son" and our being "saved by His life." (Rom. v. 10.) They have not been able as yet to make it appear a slightly plausible theory that death can be used as a synecdoche for life, that for Christ to "give His life a ransom" (Matt. xx. 28) was equivalent to leaving it as an example, that for "His blood" to "cleanse from sin" means no more than that the attraction and impressive example of His life and death win men from unrighteousness. Mr. Maurice, however, will seldom fail for want of courage as an interpreter; and he has a most extraordinary device for disarming all such texts as we have been considering of their opposition to his theory, and emptying them of their ordinary and obvious meaning.

His explanation of "The blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin," is as follows: "There is a new life-blood put into this nature of ours. God Himself has infused it. The Son of God has taken our flesh and blood." † Thus, in one of his most recent works, he explains Christ's Gospel to plain working men! "Blood" means "incarnation," or perhaps he would say that it means "kinship" or "relationship." But how will this sense, absurdly forced anywhere, fit with such a passage as that which teaches that Christ "made peace through the blood of His cross?" Of a piece with this specimen of exegesis are the interpretations which follow. "When He sacrificed Himself, He offered up the race as a living sacrifice acceptable to God."* "The Son of God has come into the world, stooped to our weaknesses, *died our death.* Abide in Him, Who has united you to Himself, *Who has died your death,* that you might share His life."† This is Mr. Maurice's summing up of the deep mystery of Christ's unshared agony and death!

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* *Maketh atonement through or in virtue of the life,* is now the generally accepted sense.

† "Epistles of St. John," p. 50.

Of the passages which we have quoted from St. Paul there is one in which the blood of Christ is distinctly and precisely connected with expiation. "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation" (literally an *expiation*) "through faith in His blood." The word here rendered *propitiation* (ἱλαστήριον) is one which, being thus applied to the death of Christ, being thus coupled with His blood, should of itself be decisive of the controversy. It is a word, as Mr. Macdonnell says, as all ordinarily informed scholars and clergymen know, "appropriated peculiarly to the effect of a piacular sacrifice," as when the high-priest is said, in Heb. ii. 17, to "make reconciliation" (literally, *expiation*) "for the sins of the people." This word, and others derived from the same root, ἱλάσκομαι, are employed in the Septuagint as renderings of the derivatives from the verb כִּפֵּר, "to atone." And, in classical Greek, they all have the undeniable sense of atonement by sacrificial expiation. The same words occur in the New Testament, besides the passage already cited, in 1 John ii. 2, and iv. 10; and, in all these passages, the ordinary and obvious interpretation understands them to refer to our Lord's sacrificial expiation through His death. Now Mr. Maurice is obliged to entertain the question, in what sense the Apostle used these words.

Is Mr. Maurice prepared to deny to these words their proper and invariable meaning? The Apostle wrote for Gentiles, at any rate, when he addressed the Romans: did he, without explanation or warning, use for their instruction a familiar word, possessing a definite meaning, in a foreign and unexampled sense? If not, it must be admitted that he taught the doctrine of expiation by blood. What, then, says Mr. Maurice to this? The following passage is eminently worthy of quotation:—

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* "Epistles of St. John," p. 111.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 154, 158.

> "Hebrew was no longer the tongue in which the mystery of a living and righteous God was to enshrine itself. In the language of heathen civilization, in the beautiful forms which generations of polytheists had consecrated to the service of demigods, of beings like themselves, was the Eternal Son, the brightness of the Father's glory, to utter His voice, and claim the homage of those whom He had not been ashamed to call His brethren. What business had those, to whom this new and mighty instrument had been intrusted, to cast away any one of the modes of thought and speech that had received an idolatrous taint and impregnation? Why was the Spirit given them, but that men might hear, in their own tongue, purged and regenerated, as the lips that spoke it were, by His living presence and power, the wonderful works of God?
>
> "Far, then, from pleading that the words *ἵλασμος* and *ἱλαστήριον* had not the sense which we should gather from all the history of the heathen world that they must have had, or that this sense was not one which would naturally suggest itself to the readers of the Epistle, baptized men though they were, I would earnestly press the reflection on you, that any other view of the case is incredible; and then I would ask you to observe with what a Divine art and wisdom the Apostle vindicates the word to a Christian use, showing that for that use its heathen signification must be—not modified—but inverted."—*Maurice*, pp. 153, 154.

The confusion of thought apparent in this latter paragraph is lamentable. The logical faculty which could permit the conclusion arrived at in the last few lines to be connected, not merely with the sentiments expressed in the foregoing paragraph, but with the former half of the same sentence, is really something prodigious. This philosophical critic does not plead, he tells us, that the words in question have not the ordinary sense which they had obtained in connexion with heathen rites of atonement, the sense, that is, of vicarious expiation; on the contrary, he maintains and "urges" that such a view would be incredible. Yet he explains that this sense is to "be—not modified, but—*inverted;*" and proceeds to do his best to invert the sense accordingly. In his futile effort to accomplish this, however, he takes care to evade all notice of one most essential point; viz., that, in perfect accordance with that sense of the word of which he is determined to get rid, though he is compelled to admit that it must be adhered to, propitiation, or, to give the word its just sense, expiation, is by the Apostle, as we have just shown, distinctly connected with the "blood" of Christ,—"whom God hath set forth to be an expiation through faith in His blood."

We shall not attempt to go through the New Testament evidence on the question we have been arguing; much less shall we think it needful to criticize in detail the perversions and sophistications of so unsystematic and ambiguous a writer as Mr. Maurice. Indeed, the task would be endless, not only because of the fallacies and ambiguities in which his writings all abound, but because it is his invariable practice to assume whatever he ought to prove, both in reference to his own views and the views of those whom he opposes. If our foregoing argument is good, it has, in effect, settled the whole question; since all admit that the current phraseology of the New Testament as to sacrifice and atonement is, to a large extent, adopted or adapted from the Old. It is, however, proper to repeat more emphatically what has been already stated, that the evangelical doctrine is by no means absolutely dependent, for its establishment and support, on phrases borrowed or coloured from the Old Testament. There are many independent, or but slightly and superficially allusive, passages, in which the New Testament teaches this doctrine in distinct, emphatic, unborrowed, language. That decisive paragraph (Rom. iii. 20–27) cannot justly be said to be peculiarly Jewish, or more Jewish than Gentile, in its sacrificial colouring; and, taken altogether, must be admitted, especially as addressed to the Romans, to be an independent testimony on this point. Let us refer, in addition, to Rom. v. 6–11; vi. 1–10; 1 Cor. vi. 20; 2 Cor. v. 14–21; Gal. iii. 13; Acts xx. 28; Matt. xx. 28; Eph. i. 7; 1 Peter iii. 18.*

The present is not a systematic treatise on theology. The object of these chapters has been simply to clear away sophistries which had grown up around the great doctrine of sacrifice and atonement, and to restore the historical argument in relation to it. The exposition and application of this doctrine, in its theological and practical aspects, must be left for others to furnish. Our lower, but often not less needful, task has been to remove the rubbish from the foundations of the temple of truth, so as to reveal its solid yet graceful symmetry, and to show the immovable rock upon which it rests. The voice of general history, the concordant traditions and sacred rituals of the nations, the conscience and religious instincts of universal man, the inspired records of primitive and patriarchal worship, the whole spirit and purpose of the Mosaic institute, the explicit statements and pervading tone and allusions of the New Testament, all combine to form a grand argument, the several parts of which rest, for the most part, on independent bases, and are mutually corroborative, and the whole of which is of cumulative and overwhelming force, in favour of that principle of interpreting the Scripture passages relating to atonement, which has hitherto been adopted by evangelical Christians. The moral and internal grounds of argument on which the evangelical doctrine rests had been so far examined in former chapters as might suffice for the refutation of the *à priori* objections which have recently been urged against it.

The object of the present volume is now accomplished. The character of our Anglican Neology has been explained, and its main arguments against evangelical orthodoxy have been submitted to examination. The individual and characteristic purpose of our undertaking is, therefore, satisfied. We have endeavoured, in the performance of our task, equally to "extenuate nothing" which we deemed essentially erroneous and evil, and to "set down nought in malice." It is vain to ring the alarm-bell in reference to such writers as we have passed in review, if nothing more is to be done. They must be met in argument; they must be candidly, but boldly, replied to. We do not wonder that the public mind of British Christianity has been greatly alarmed by the discovery of this "Neology in the cloister." Tractarianism was dangerous and alarming; but its poison was less obviously virulent and deadly, and less immediately potent, (though perhaps more surely fatal,) than that of this Rationalism. The approaches of the former, too, were scarcely more insidious, or its professions more plausible, or its disguises more subtle. The non-natural sense, in the one case as in the other, is the covert under which the deniers and opponents of the essential doctrines of the Anglican Church shelter themselves. Professor Jowett has found no difficulty in re-attesting his adhesion to the articles and canons of his Church. Indeed, more plausible excuses, however really flimsy, may be found for Dr. Pusey and his fellows in remaining Ministers of the Episcopal Church of England, whose Protestantism is *not* thoroughly consistent and universal, than for Messrs. Jowett, Maurice, and Kingsley, in retaining, rationalists and merely *Christiano-plated* philosophers as they are, their connexion with the same Church, whose orthodoxy on the subjects of depravity and atonement is liable to no doubts or limitations. The peculiar power for evil of the Anglican Neology arises from the fact, that it is in strong accordance with leading secular tendencies of the age. It is not, like Tractarianism, a mere revival of Popish priestism, which, although it may, under a new and modern disguise, gain a certain amount of public favour and influence, is yet in Anglo-Saxon countries really obsolete, and can by no means accommodate itself to the free spirit that is abroad, or to the prevalent ideas of modern civilization. On the contrary, this Rationalism is itself a product of modern thought, a corollary from modern philosophy, and is surcharged with all the principles and ideas of a critical, speculative, self-confident, cosmopolitan age. As we have already intimated, however, we do not apprehend that the philosophy of these writers in itself, and in its abstract meaning, will be an element of permanence for their theology. Neither Neo-Platonist Realism, nor transcendental pantheizing Idealism, is likely to commend itself to the popular mind of this or any age. Nevertheless a certain vogue these philosophies have; and moreover they have been made to furnish the form and vehicle for the combination and conveyance of certain principles and ideas, —not a few of them true and highly valuable, however questionable others may be,—which have found great acceptance with the present age. Here, then, is both their strength and their weakness; their strength, in their accordance with the sympathies and tendencies of modern progress and the present fashion of modern innovating philosophy; their weakness, in the unsubstantial, unattested, and mystical character of the philosophies on which, in great part, they are moulded, and with the inevitable decadence and disgrace of which their fate must, therefore, to a great extent, be involved. So far, moreover, as the mere theology of these neological writers is concerned, it is some comfort to reflect, that nearly all their objections and arguments are old, and have long ago been ably refuted; while Christians at least cannot doubt that true and genuine Christian doctrine, rightly expounded, must ever be found to be profoundly and perfectly in unison, as no erroneous system can be, with all true philosophy and with all that belongs to the real progress of the race.

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* See Litton's "Bampton Lecture," pp. 127–130, who, however, is not sufficiently discriminating in his statements.

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